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Entangling Molecules: an ethnography of a carbon offset 
project in Madagascar’s eastern rainforest 
 
 
Sara Peña Valderrama 
 
In this dissertation I explore the multiple social lives of ‘carbon’ as key 
object of contemporary forms of global environmental governance.  Through 
an ethnography of a forest carbon project, I detail the many forms that 
‘carbon’ takes as it is deployed in a small locality in the forests of 
Madagascar.   
TAMS was a forest carbon project that ran for two decades in eastern 
Madagascar. Its aim was to reforest degraded fallows from slash-and-burn 
agriculture, or tavy, and to provide farmers with alternative livelihoods 
through the benefits obtained from the sale of carbon credits. Carried out by 
major conservation organisations, international institutions and the 
Malagasy government, TAMS was once hailed as a pilot carbon project for 
the whole of Africa.  Six years after reforestation began, however, it came to 
a halt due to a series of complications and it was abandoned.  
My ethnography focuses on a series of glimpses into ‘carbon’ in its 
many guises as part of TAMS. This leads me to an analysis of the ways in 
which carbon credits are produced by, and at the same time re-articulate, 
ideas of value and waste in relation to forests and tavy; the peculiar 
materiality of ‘carbon’ as natural resource and form of labour; the 
experiences of ‘carbon’ as an instance of state oppression for farmers; and 
the complexity that arises from project actors’ efforts to turn grounded trees 
into mobile carbon credits. All along, we see how, far from the bounded CO2 
molecule, the ‘carbon’ of forest carbon projects is not a fixed or stable object, 
but rather appears and disappears in multiple ways through diverse 
material and discursive practices. My aim is to show how specific forms of 
‘carbon’—in their articulation of people’s relationships to each other and to 
their environments—open or foreclose particular socio-natural futures.  
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
Introduction 
Then, directly in front of him, he saw an animal that looked 
at first like a small deer. The animal came to his 
outstretched hand, and he saw that it had no horns. Its 
snout was long, and he glimpsed sharp teeth shaped like 
little scimitars. The long thin legs ended in cablelike fingers. 
The ears were large, flaring forward, the eyes limpid amber, 
in which the pupil floated like a glittering jewel, changing 
color with shifts of the light: obsidian, emerald, ruby, opal, 
amethyst, diamond. Slowly the animal raised one paw and 
touched his face, stirring memories of the ancient betrayal. 
Tears streaming down his face, he stroked the animal’s 
head. He knew he must get back to the settlement before 
dark. There is always something a man must do in time. For 
the deer ghost there was no time.  
William S. Burroughs, Ghost of Chance, (1995:5) 
 
In his novel Burroughs tells the story of Captain Mission, the founder of 
‘the free pirate settlement Libertatia on the west coast of Madagascar’ 
(1995:20), where he struggles to protect lemurs (known as ghosts in the 
native language) and ‘to demonstrate for all to see that three hundred souls 
can coexist in relative harmony with each other, with their neighbors, and 
with the ecosphere of flora and fauna’ (1995:8). In a stone temple he 
discovers deep in the forest—the entrance to the biological Garden of Lost 
Chances—lives Mission’s lemur friend Ghost, along with various other 
bizarre creatures. But when Martin, an emissary of the Board, blows up the 
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structure to sabotage Mission’s project, catastrophe ensues. Ghost dies in 
Mission’s arms, taking with it ‘a chance that occurs only once in a hundred 
and sixty million years’ (Burroughs 1995:21) and the place turns into the 
Museum of Lost Species, releasing, through Mission’s curse, extinct and 
strange diseases that wreak havoc worldwide. At the end of the story 
Burroughs leaps out of the narrative and asks readers to support the Duke 
University Primate Centre in order to save Madagascar’s lemurs, 
endangered, he argues, by hunting, population growth and deforestation and 
slash-and-burn cultivation. 
Around the same time as Ghost of Chance was published, in the early 
1990s, Louise Holloway, a British environmental researcher, travelled to 
Madagascar. The Andasibe Mantadia National Park (AMNP from now on) in 
the eastern Malagasy forests had recently opened, a sign of the times in the 
island, which had seen an escalation of conservation activity since the early 
1980s as the country had opened up to Western powers after a decade of 
isolationist policies under a socialist, post-colonial government. Similarly 
concerned for the lemurs of the area of Andasibe, whose future seemed 
endangered by slash-and-burn agriculture, or tavy, Holloway began to 
formulate an idea for a project that would enable both lemurs and tavy 
farmers to thrive in the rainforest. For both Holloway and Burroughs, then, 
lemurs indexed future possibilities of social and ecological harmony. Thus 
began TAMS, Tetik’asa mampody savoka, or ‘the project to restore the 
fallows’. By 2008, TAMS would have transformed into one of Africa’s first 
pilot forest carbon projects, a reforestation initiative aimed at generating 
carbon credits to mitigate climate change and providing sustainable 
development to tavy farmers.  By 2013 it had also become entangled with a 
series of complications that involved, among others, partly incommensurate 
agendas, a complex organisational structure or difficulties in establishing 
whom ‘carbon’ belonged to. About twenty years after it began, TAMS was 
abandoned. It could be said that TAMS today lies somewhere close to Ghost, 
buried in the rubble of the Museum of Lost Species (and Projects).   
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In this dissertation I bring TAMS back to life one last time, as I explore 
the multiple social lives of carbon as key object in contemporary forms of 
global environmental governance. Through an ethnography of TAMS as a 
forest carbon project, I detail how different practices and social imaginaries 
give rise to varied forms and understandings of ‘carbon’. My aim, like 
Mission’s settlement of Libertatia, is to explore the ways in which different 
articulations of people’s relationships to each other and their environments 
open or foreclose particular present and future possibilities. Carbon, from 
this perspective, appears as an object of contestation through which diverse 
socio-natural futures are imagined and play out.  
* 
 
The first disease in Burroughs’ story—the ‘Christ sickness’—unfolds 
on a clear day in Madagascar, where a group of herdsmen burn the forest to 
feed their cattle. Although there are no cattle in Mahatsara, a little village in 
the eastern Malagasy rainforest situated right by the AMNP, people there too 
practise tavy to cultivate rice. Their agricultural practice is in fact part and 
parcel of what distinguishes them as Betsimisaraka, one of the eighteen 
ethnic groups who inhabit the island1. Towards the end of September, men 
venture out to the fields and burn the vegetation that has rebelliously taken 
over last year’s agricultural efforts. Fires can be constantly spotted from 
Mahatsara’s highest points, becoming the centre of conversation, since, were 
they to reach the hilltops, they would draw the unwelcome presence of the 
authorities, with feared consequences. The smoke will travel unbound 
across the region and might make it to the capital, Antananarivo, where, 
confounded with heavy pollution, it will also enter urbanites’ conversations: 
‘they are doing tavy in the East, that’s why it’s so hot and the air so polluted’; 
‘they are doing tavy and destroying the nation’s most precious resource: our 
                                                        
1 Tavy is the official designation of slash-and-burn or shifting agriculture in the 
island, although it has many regional variants (i.e. hatsake or jinja). I use the term tavy 
because it is the one employed in Mahatsara.  
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forests’. In different forms, the smoke will also travel to foreign locations, 
such as offices in the World Bank or the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), where global warming is ‘scientifically assessed’ (Calel 
2011:15) and debated in yearly meetings. Since this scientific body claimed 
in 2007 that about 20% of global anthropogenic CO2 emissions came from 
deforestation and forest degradation (Van der Werf et al. 2009)2, in fact, the 
smoke released from the fields in Mahatsara has become a ‘critical object of 
intervention’ (Lansing 2011:739) in the management of climate change.  
Emanating from a world biodiversity ‘hotspot’, in turn, this smoke has also 
entered debates over environmental conservation and sustainable 
development, and since around the year 2000, it became the central yet 
elusive object of the ambitious forest carbon project TAMS. Through this 
initiative, 3000 hectares of degraded fallows from tavy were to be reforested 
in order to create a ‘carbon sink’.  
When the fires die down, and with the land still warm, women (and 
some men) in Mahatsara make it to the newly cleared fields early in the 
morning, cooking utensils and rice skilfully balanced on their heads, babies 
tightly wrapped around their backs. Their feet are dexterous at holding 
them in the steep, charred fields, and their hands rhythmically move as they 
pierce the ground with a dibber, or fitomboka, and throw a couple of grains 
of rice or corn in each hole they make. If all goes well, and with a constant, 
careful lookout for greedy little birds over the coming months, these seeds 
will turn into the year’s (meagre) harvest. Since families in Mahatsara are 
not allowed to expand into new land, however, the fertility of their fields is 
progressively diminishing, with harvests in a constant decline due to over-
intensive farming.  From 2009, in turn, many of these fields further shrank, 
some even by half, in order to make space for TAMS’ promising tree 
seedlings: instead of rice, the fields and its owners would now produce 
                                                        
2 This number was later reviewed and brought down to about 12% (Van der Werf et 
al. 2009:737) 
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‘carbon’—an ambiguous and often undefined object through which people 
expected to obtain work and revenue. 
As the above account exemplifies, the smoke released from tavy fields 
is an unbound and elusive object that travels across different spaces, times 
and imaginations, in both material and abstract forms. As the multiple object 
of forest carbon projects, in turn, it brings many of these together in novel 
forms of global governance that articulate conservation and development 
initiatives with emergent economic objects and practices. Far from the 
contained molecule of carbon dioxide, then, the ‘carbon’ of forest carbon 
projects such as TAMS is a dispersed and multiple object: it is both an 
ecological and economic object, rooted to particular socio-material 
landscapes as part of trees and at the same time circulating in transnational 
emissions markets as information; it is an element that promises to mitigate 
climate change while generating capitalist value by itself; as an ‘offset’, it is a 
peculiar form of equivalence between different actions, times and places —
the outcome of a calculation between what will be and would have been; it is 
a new financing mechanism for transnational conservation initiatives, a 
source of national revenue for post-colonial states and the promise of a new 
form of ‘development’ for marginalised, forest communities. Like the pupil of 
the mythical animal described by Burroughs in the opening quotation—a 
‘glittering jewel’ that changes colour with ‘shifts of the light’— so does 
‘carbon’ appear through multiple refractions as it is deployed in forest 
carbon projects such as TAMS. It is some of these refractions that I explore 
in this dissertation as I focus on the multiple social lives of carbon in a 
specific forest carbon project. Taken together, they provide important and 
unexplored insights into the kinds of things that ‘carbon’ is and the kinds of 
things that ‘it’ does, as key object in contemporary forms of global 
environmental governance.  
   6 
In an effort to bring carbon3 to the foreground I follow the different 
shapes it takes as it is deployed in the eastern Malagasy rainforest. My aim, 
however, is not to simply offer an account of the different meanings and 
experiences ascribed to carbon by different actors, but, rather, to query and 
explore carbon itself as the result of different practices and experiences that 
bring it into being—or don’t—in different forms (see Mol 2002a; Lien and 
Law 2011).  
In the following sections, I provide an introductory overview to this 
dissertation and the research context. I begin by exploring contemporary 
carbon imaginaries, and its emergence as key socio-technical artifact that 
merges the objectives of mitigating climate change, providing ‘sustainable 
development’ and creating capitalist value. I then move to its arrival in 
Madagascar, as I focus on the particularity of the island in global 
environmental imaginaries and the way carbon has rearticulated the 
relationship between forest conservation and tavy. We see here the 
intersection between carbon as an abstract object and the space/time where 
it is made concrete, which also leads me to a brief introduction of TAMS, as 
the key site where the abstract and the concrete meet. From here, I move on 
to situate carbon theoretically—through a brief review of the literature on 
the commodification of nature—and detail the specific issues that arise as a 
result and the ways in which I propose to approach them. I then provide a 
summary of the chapters and the themes that run throughout them. The rest 
of the chapter is dedicated to presenting how and where I conducted 
fieldwork, as I introduce the village of Mahatsara and highlight those 
elements that are relevant in understanding the methodological and 
knowledge practices this dissertation is based on.  
Carbon imaginaries today 
                                                        
3 From now on I refer to carbon, instead of 'carbon', bearing in mind that it is a 
multiple object that takes different shapes.   
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The Spirit of the Forest 
In consequence of burning coal ‘spiritus sylvestris’ comes 
into being. This spiritus, which was formerly unknown and 
cannot be kept in vessels, and cannot be converted into a 
visible form, I call by the new name of ‘gas’. 
Jan Baptist van Helmont, Ortus med. 1656, (Almqvist 
2003:93) 
 
Spiritus sylvestris, ‘wild’ or ‘forest’ spirit, was the first name given to 
carbon dioxide by chemist Jan Baptist Helmont, as he concluded that the 
mass lost by charcoal as it turned to ash upon burning must have 
transformed into an invisible substance. This ‘gas’, as Helmont called it, 
would later become known as ‘fixed air’, a name given to it by Scottish 
physicist Joseph Black in 1757 in reference to its ‘bound’ or ‘fixed form in 
carbonates and weak alkalis’ (Almqvist 2003:93). A few years later Lavoisier 
would describe ‘fixed air’ as a combination of carbon and oxygen, calling it 
carbonic acid gas.  Although we now know that carbon dioxide is anything 
but ‘fixed’—circulating between land, atmosphere and oceans and making 
life on earth possible (and, since the industrial revolution, endangered)—it 
may well be argued that its ‘forest spirit’ has made a comeback in the last 
two decades, giving the molecule hitherto unknown forms and capacities.  
Although the role of carbon dioxide in regulating the earth’s climate 
had been known for over a century, it was in 1997, through the adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol (which came into force in 2005) that the molecule was 
brought into being as a socio-technical artifact with multiple properties. 
Through the establishment of binding emission reductions among (most) 
industrialized countries, CO2 was made both institutionally visible at a 
global level as a biological object and, more fundamentally, made a scarce 
resource. At the same time, the creation of the so-called ‘flexibility 
mechanisms’—International Emissions Trading (IET), the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI)—gave this 
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biological object an economic life, as they now allowed for it also to be 
traded as a commodity in international emissions markets.  Although this 
was not a completely novel approach to the issue of environmental 
degradation, it did mark a sea change for two reasons: first, it created the 
possibility of organising a global trade in carbon permits, thus linking 
disparate times and places globally through a new market; second, and more 
fundamentally, it created a whole new sphere of intervention through the 
object called the ‘carbon offset’: under the CDM, projects that reduced CO2 
emissions in developing countries could now generate carbon ‘credits’ for 
polluters to use in industrialized ones. In exchange, some form of 
‘sustainable development’, along with the revenue from the sale of credits 
had to flow in the opposite direction. CO2 was no longer just a (scarce) 
biochemical object of climate change science and governance and a 
commodity, it was now also a form of ‘sustainable development’ and a 
source of monetary value for many states in developing countries (see also 
Leach and Scoones 2015:3). In various forms, the carbon molecule emerged 
as a new organising principle of global topographies (and as I will argue in 
the conclusion, chronographies). With the inclusion of forests in these 
mechanisms as key sites where emissions reductions could be generated 
(first through reforestation as part of the CDM, and later through 
conservation in REDD, Reduced Emissions From Deforestation and 
Degradation), in turn, the CO2 molecule became imbricated with 
conservation practice and the landscapes and peoples targeted by it. As 
carbon was abstracted, the political nature of people’s relationship to nature 
qua trees shifted, and its potentiality as a form of value opened up further 
spaces of governance and appropriation. The social, political and economic 
lives of carbon thus multiplied through the ‘reorganisation of social, natural, 
and technical processes’ (Mitchell 2011:239). 
We can begin to see how today, the idea of carbon as ‘spirit of the 
forest’ has been revitalised. But where Helmont’s spirit referred to 
something invisible, uncontainable and undomesticated—that is, ‘wild’—the 
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forest spirit of carbon dioxide is today seen as exactly the opposite: visible, 
calculable and containable in ‘carbon sinks’; or, in other words, ‘tamed’ 
(Leach and Scoones 2015:4).  In turn, it is a particularly ‘capitalist’ spirit 
(Weber 1958) in that, as an element integrated into a market, it also holds 
the potential to acquire monetary value. From this perspective, carbon may 
be seen today as an element productive of what Waldby has called 
‘biovalue’: ‘a yield of vitality produced by the biotechnical reformulation of 
living processes’ (2002:310). Although Waldby is here referring to stem cell 
technologies and the way they can be engineered in the lab to ‘increase or 
change their productivity along specified lines’ (2002:310), the carbon 
molecule can be seen to acquire this vitality as it is ‘put to work’ in forest 
carbon projects: it can mitigate climate change, protect biodiversity, provide 
sustainable development, and become an economic object with exchange 
value of its own. Like bioprospecting agreements explored by Hayden, the 
carbon of forest carbon projects such as TAMS, seems to ‘promise the world’ 
(2003:3).  
In the next section I explore the arrival of carbon to Malagasy 
landscapes and its entanglement with forest conservation practice and tavy. 
I complement this with a brief description of TAMS, its main aims and 
history.  
Forest Spirits 
Madagascar’s forests today are not just renowned for harbouring the 
spirit of the forest in ‘carbon sinks’, but also for forest spirits. The word 
lemur—the island’s most iconic animal—comes form the Latin lemures, 
which in Roman mythology refers to ghostly or ancestral spirits, a name 
Linnaeus gave the primates due to their nocturnal habits (Anderson 
2009:176). The fact that both Holloway and Captain Mission arrived in 
Madagascar in the early 1990s with a mission to save lemurs is not a 
completely chance occurrence. Situated in the Indian Ocean, this large island 
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has attracted naturalists and scientists since the eighteenth century, who 
were drawn to it by its peculiar flora and fauna (Anderson 2009).  
 
Figure 1. Map of Madagascar. Source: Nations Online Project 
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It was towards the end of the twentieth century, however, that 
Madagascar acquired a central position in global environmental imaginaries. 
This popularity derives from the island’s particular biological and 
geographical features which have imbued it with quasi-mythical properties 
as a biodiversity ‘hotspot’, a status it acquired in 1988 (I explore this further 
in chapter four). As Burroughs himself portrayed it in Ghost of Chance, 
Madagascar is imagined to be a place that ‘has lain moored in enchanted 
calm’ (1995:16) for tens of millions of years, having followed a unique 
biological path due to its early geological brake from the mainland. It is 
through this anachronic anomaly—Madagascar as ‘biogeographical 
anachronism’, as Sodikoff calls it (2013:140)—that the island’s unusually 
high levels of species endemism (around 80%) tend to be explained. The 
recent arrival of humans, said to have began around 2000 years ago4 with 
Indonesian, and later African, populations, reinforces the view of a perceived 
accelerated rate of degradation and extinction (Sodikoff 2013). Being an 
island ‘out of time’, has therefore squarely situated Madagascar within the 
environmental imaginaries of ‘our (Western) times’. 
Madagascar became a world referent for conservation-based aid in the 
early 1980s, as the country began to open up to Western institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after a decade of 
socialist/isolationist policies enacted by the post-colonial state. As I detail in 
the next chapter, this was also the time when discourses of environmental 
crisis were becoming institutionalised as part of global forms of governance 
through organisms such as the IPCC or the turn to ‘green development’ by 
the World Bank (see, for example, Goldman 2001). Thus, at the turn of the 
century, Madagascar’s uncommonly high levels of species endemism 
translated into an unusually high presence, activity and power of 
transnational environmental NGOs and donors in the country. The coupling 
of imaginaries of Madagascar as global environmental hotspot with the 
                                                        
4 Although new archaeological data suggest occupations as early as 2000 AC (R 
Dewar et al. 2013:1) 
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ascent of carbon (along with other ‘ecosystem services’) in the last decade 
has re-invigorated the role of the island’s forests as crucial sites of 
international concern and action. In this environment, as both Burroughs’ 
and Holloway’s stories exemplify, a very particular element stands out: tavy.  
Tavy, also known as slash-and-burn or shifting agriculture, is a 
rotational farming technique that involves the clearing of fields through 
cutting and burning for (mainly) rice cultivation in hilly landscapes. The key 
lies in long fallow periods (ideally from ten to thirty years) which allow for 
soil fertility recovery before the field is returned to cultivation. Thus, tavy 
also involves an important component of expansion as farmers change fields 
(and therefore often homes) after only a few years. It has been argued that 
this type of agriculture is characteristic of those places with abundant land 
and scarce labour (Bloch 1975; Scott 2009:192), as it is less labour 
demanding than other techniques, such as irrigated rice farming. While often 
vilified, shifting agriculture has been shown to be an efficient and 
sustainable farming technique with low population numbers (Kull 
2004:153–154). 
In Madagascar, this type of itinerant, subsistence agriculture has been 
in the spotlight of the various ruling elites since pre-colonial times and 
subject to different degrees of regulation. Today, while illegal, total 
enforcement is not usually practised; in the area of Andasibe where TAMS 
took place, farmers risk fines or imprisonment if caught expanding into the 
forest, but they are tacitly allowed to practice tavy in secondary vegetation 
and in confined spaces. This, however, means shorter fallow periods that do 
not allow the soil to regain its fertility and, therefore, a constant decrease in 
the amount of rice harvested, and consequent poverty. Although various 
efforts have been made to turn people to practise irrigated agriculture in 
this area, these have been largely unsuccessful, in part because of 
‘topographic and climatic constraints’ (Brimont et al. 2015:761). 
Coupled with a discourse on population growth and consequent land 
encroachment, the view of Madagascar’s unique biodiversity endangered by 
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tavy has led to what Keller has recently called a ‘canonical narrative’ (Keller 
2015:2) around the island. Evolving from an already dispelled—yet still 
powerful—myth of a once fully forested island, this narrative portrays tavy 
as the main cause of deforestation and as an impending threat to the 
remaining primary forest, and, therefore calls for urgent, conservationist 
action. It could be argued that this narrative has gained an even greater 
force since its forests became potential ‘carbon sinks’ because they now 
appear as doubly threatened, as both biodiversity and ‘carbon’ value are 
seen to be at risk from tavy. TAMS emerged in this context as a forest carbon 
project that would save both the ‘spirit of the forest’ and ‘forest spirits’.  
TAMS 
TAMS—Tetik’asa mampody savoka—has often been translated as the 
‘project to bring back the forest’, although a more accurate translation may 
be ‘the project to restore the fallows’. Developed, as we have seen, by Louise 
Holloway, it ran for about 20 years in the municipality of Andasibe5, in the 
eastern Malagasy rainforest. Famous for the babakoto, or Indri lemur, and 
easy access from the capital city of Antananarivo, Andasibe is considered a 
‘hotspot’ within a ‘hotspot’, and has been the object of great conservationist 
efforts since the late 1980s, when the Andasibe-Mantadia National Park was 
created.  
                                                        
5 And to a lesser extent in Ambatovola. I concentrate on Andasibe, since TAMS 
activities in Ambatovola were minimal.  
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Figure 2. Map of TAMS reforestation parcels in Andasibe and Ambatovola. 
Source: Conservation International 
 
TAMS expanded over the years in scope and number of actors, 
transforming from a locally-based reforestation and development project 
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into what was hailed as a pilot CDM project for Africa under the auspices of 
the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund (BioCF) 6 . It brought together 
Conservation International (CI), the Government of Madagascar, (GoM), the 
‘National Associations for Environmental Actions’, (ANAE, Association 
Nationale d’Actions Environnementales), seven organizations that operated 
in the area and which were conceptualized as Facilitating Agents (FAs) and 
local communities. TAMS’ main objectives were to reforest 3000 hectares of 
degraded fallows (reconnecting forest fragments) and to provide people 
with alternatives to tavy, both through improved agricultural techniques and 
through the (undefined) benefits obtained from the sale of carbon credits.  
By the time I arrived in Andasibe in 2011, and six years into this 30-
year long project, everything seemed to be at a halt. While some central 
actors claimed this was a temporary obstacle due to the World Bank’s (WB) 
withdrawal of all but humanitarian aid after the 2009 coup in Madagascar 
(see chapter 2), FA workers in Andasibe insisted the project was over and 
would not resume. They were right. In 2012 the BioCF cancelled the 
‘Emissions Reductions Purchasing Agreement’ (ERPA) they had signed with 
the government, and although CI envisaged using the trees for offset projects 
in the voluntary market,7 this never happened.  
Over the last two sections I have provided an introductory account of 
carbon as key object of global environmental governance, and of its arrival 
in Madagascar through forest carbon projects, and, specifically, through 
TAMS. All of these three histories—the development of carbon markets, 
Madagascar’s environmental governance, and the history of TAMS—will be 
further explored in the next chapter. I now turn to different carbon 
imaginaries, through a brief account of the main ways in which carbon has 
                                                        
6 The BioCF was created in 2004 as part of the World Bank’s Carbon Finance Unit 
and uses private-public funding to carry out demonstration activities of forest and agro-
ecosystem carbon projects. 
7 The Voluntary Market operates outside Kyoto regulation and is available to any 
initiating actor such as a private company or NGO. Projects can adhere to particular carbon 
standards for regulation and verification, and the process is generally known to be much 
easier than that in compliance markets, especially because it does not necessarily involve 
government participation.  
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been explored in the literature and which inform the analytical approach I 
have taken to its ethnographic study as part of forest carbon projects, as I 
detail below.  
Carbon imaginaries in the literature 
Leach and Scoones have recently qualified forest carbon projects as 
‘part of a more general move to address environmental problems through 
attaching market values to nature and ecosystems’ (2015:i). This ‘general 
move’ refers to what in the literature usually goes by the name of the 
‘commodification of nature’ (see, for example, Castree 2003), as a particular 
trait of what has been variously termed neoliberalism (McCarthy and 
Prudham 2004), post-neoliberalism (McAfee 1999) or neo-modernity 
(Knox-Hayes 2010). This approach has been particularly productive in the 
discipline of critical geography, where it has been applied to the study of 
processes through which previously uncommodified ‘natural’ elements—
water (Bakker 2003), carbon (Lansing 2011) or genes (Prudham 2007), to 
name a few—have been incorporated into some form of market exchange.  
An important precursor to this theoretical approach was an eco-
Marxist critique of capitalism which postulated that environmental 
degradation was the inescapable result of capitalist growth and would act as 
the basis for its demise. Alongside capital and labour, O’Connor (1998) 
introduced nature as a fundamental category, and theorized about 
capitalism’s ‘second contradiction’: the fact that capitalism undermined 
itself by destroying its own conditions of production through the 
degradation of its environment—both natural and social. Thus, it has been 
argued that, during the 1970s, capitalism began to incorporate nature into 
its own project by turning it into an accumulation strategy ‘in its own right’ 
(Katz 1998) in order to overcome its limits.  From this perspective the 
commodification of nature is often considered a strategy for the expansion 
of the ‘scale and scope of capital accumulation’ (Prudham 2007:407).  
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This strategy has generally been portrayed as following the 
neoclassical environmental economics assumption that the ecological crisis 
is simply an accounting mistake, the result of the failure to bring the earth 
‘within the balance sheet’ (Foster 2002:27). An example of this assumption 
is Sir Nicholas Stern’s famous assertion during the Royal Economic Society 
public lecture in Manchester in 2007 that ‘Climate Change is a result of the 
greatest market failure the world has ever seen’ (Benjamin 2007). Thus, by 
rendering nature visible and accountable—that is, by internalizing it—and 
assigning market values to its different elements, it is expected that the 
market will allocate natural resources in the most efficient manner (see 
Alexander 2005 for an ethnogrpahy of environmental accounting and 
valuation methods).  
Although there are no single approaches to the study of this type of 
phenomena—just as there is no single agreement as to what exactly 
neoliberalism is (Ferguson 2010)—a common denominator of this literature 
has usually been a focus on the production of exchangeable ‘bits of nature’ to 
deal with environmental degradation. A running and defining theme is 
therefore the fragmentation of ‘natural’ wholes into individuated elements 
and their abstraction from their spatial and temporal contexts8 (Prudham 
2007; Castree 2003).  
This idea of abstraction remains a very powerful element in analyses of 
the ‘commodification of nature’ where concomitant notions of fungibility, 
exchangeability, commensuration and fragmentation continuously crop up. 
In their exploration of the emergence of biochar as a (potential) ‘green 
commodity’ in African soils, Leach et al. detail how ‘soil carbon is ‘chopped 
out’ (2012:295) of its ecosystem and social contexts and revalued as a bit of 
nature that can be ‘exchanged with seemingly equivalent bits of carbon 
elsewhere’ (2012:302). This idea of ‘chopping out’ is not far from the 
                                                        
8 As Robertson (2000:466) argues, this idea of abstraction is of course a continuation 
of Marxist theory on the ways money and commodification turn the concrete into an 
abstraction (labourer and thing into labour-value and exchange-value respectively). 
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expression of ‘hemming in’ used by Bumpus to qualify the processes of 
‘individuation and functional abstraction’ that bring about carbon offsets as 
‘units of nature that are deemed socially useful’ (2011:619). Such 
‘displacement of nature, and its severance from sites of production and 
specificity’, Bumpus argues, is a ‘tenet of commodification’ (2011:622). Yet 
these are not processes exclusive to the production of carbon credits. In 
their ‘Synthesized Critique of Neoliberal Biodiversity Conservation’ (2012), 
Büscher et al. bring together a wide array of practices (protected areas, 
education programmes, ecotourism, and more) as part of a general trend in 
what they term ‘neoliberal conservation’, and argue that 
‘capitalism’s drive to turn everything into exchange value 
(commodities that can be traded) cuts up [these] 
connections and relationships in order to produce, sell 
and consume their [ecosystem’s] constituent 
elements…To further bring conservation into capitalism 
is to lay bare the various ecosystemic threads and 
linkages so that they can be further subjected to 
separation, marketization and alienation’ (Büscher et al. 
2012:5) 
A recent development in this literature has also been the turn to the 
study of processes of ‘financialisation’ as a specific and distinct phase in the 
commodification of nature (Knox-Hayes 2013; Sullivan 2013). In the context 
of environmental conservation, Sullivan has argued that this process takes 
two related forms: ‘the turning of banks and financiers to environmental 
conservation parameters as a new frontier for investment’ and ‘the 
rewriting of conservation practice and understandings of nonhuman natures 
in terms of banking and financial categories’ (2013:199–200). Carbon 
credits, biodiversity banks or derivative natures provide some of the most 
straightforward examples where processes of  ‘abstraction of nature into 
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categories amenable to derivative financialised products’ can be observed 
(Sullivan 2013:205).  
It is important to point out that the creation of ‘bits of nature’ and their 
incorporation into circuits of exchange does not just attend to 
environmental governance, but hinges on a more fundamental (neoliberal) 
turn to locate a productive potentiality in life itself (Haraway’s “enterprising 
up of life” 1997; see also Reno 2011). As we will see through this 
dissertation, carbon credits in fact share important similarities with certain 
biotechnical objects like DNA or stem cells, where similar processes of 
fragmentation and abstraction take place. In the case of biotechnology and 
life patents, for example, Prudham has argued that ‘the messy materiality of 
life’ is rendered ‘legible as discrete entities, individuated and abstracted 
from the social and ecological integuments ’ (Prudham 2007:414). It could 
tentatively be argued that a key, defining trait of neo-liberalism is precisely 
this proclivity to re-constitute life into (supposedly) autonomous fragments 
as new sources of value. If the post-Fordist economy’s main aim is that of 
turning ‘life’ into ‘surplus’, as Cooper (2008) has argued, the only way this 
can be achieved is through processes of fragmentation and abstraction: that 
is, by bringing ‘life’ into calculative spaces that render it legible and 
separable (Mitchell 2002; Callon 1998a). The ‘newness’ (Newell, Boykoff, 
and Boyd 2012) of carbon credits and other fragments of commodified 
nature may partly lie in the way these objects claim to transcend nature’s 
‘fictitious character’ as commodity, as elements that can actually ‘be 
detached from the rest of life, be stored and mobilized’ (Polanyi 1957:72).  
Of course, as Lohmann has argued, all ‘commodities-in-the-making are 
different’ (2014:158), and respond to multiple and varied processes that aim 
to bring them about.  In his thorough analysis of this vast literature Castree 
(2003), for example, distinguishes between four different types of 
commodified nature(s) (external, internal, the human body and 
information) and six different processes or qualities of commodification 
(privatization, alienability, individuation, abstraction, valuation and 
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displacement). Similarly, Robertson (2000), in his exploration of wetland 
mitigation programmes in the US, reminds us that the specificities and 
materialities of different commodified natures matter greatly. Wetlands, he 
argues, as ‘embedded features in the landscape’ appear as a ‘qualitatively 
different element of nature for capitalization than, say, grain or genes’, and 
their ‘place-specificity’ creates a ‘signature tension for the process of 
commodity abstraction’ (Robertson 2000:466).   
My analytic approach to the ethnographic study of ‘carbon’ as key 
object of contemporary forms of global environmental governance follows 
Robertson (2000) in paying special attention to the specificities of the 
element to be commodified, or made into tradable bits, and its 
consequences. The ‘signature tension’ of forest carbon projects, I argue, is in 
fact a very particular one: in order for ‘carbon’ to emerge as abstract and 
fungible bits of nature, a great amount of grounded and unique nature also 
has to be put in place. This is not just a matter of the messy practicalities of 
bringing ‘carbon’ as commodity into being—its ‘uncooperativeness’ (Bakker 
2003), as it may be called—but is a much more fundamental aspect of the 
‘tradable bits’ that forest carbon projects are supposed to create: the 
Certified Emission Reduction (CER) or carbon credits.  
Grounding and abstracting nature 
It is essential to bear in mind that, while often referred to as ‘carbon 
sinks’, what forest carbon projects aim to produce is not CO2 per se, but 
rather its ‘reduction’ or ‘offset’ expressed as a tCO2e (a tonne of CO2 
equivalent). Although I follow in detail the specifics of this element and its 
‘making’ in chapters 3, 4 and 7, I here want to draw attention to its basic 
characteristics, in order to show the type of grounded nature that projects 
such as TAMS need to produce for credits to emerge.  
A ‘carbon offset’ project operates under the fundamental assumption 
that emissions in one place and time are compensated by reductions in 
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another. For emissions reductions to occur 9  the project needs to 
demonstrate that it is ‘additional’—that is, that emissions reductions would 
have not happened without the project’s activities, or, what is the same, that 
emissions would have been released in the absence of carbon finance to 
carry out the project (Bumpus and Liverman 2008).  In addition, the number 
of offsets obtained (measured in tons of CO2 stored in trees), must be 
calculated against a ‘baseline’, a mean projection of the past 15 years or so of 
deforestation trends into the future10. Forest carbon projects are therefore 
premised on what Lohmann terms a ‘counterfactual scenario’: a ‘single, 
counterfactual storyline’ (Lohmann 2014:171) from which expert 
calculations—and therefore carbon credits— can follow. But this 
counterfactual scenario is not the only requisite that forest carbon projects 
such as TAMS need to meet. As part of the CDM, projects also need to 
provide some form of ‘sustainable development’. In TAMS, this meant 
conserving biodiversity and providing alternative livelihoods to tavy 
farmers for a period of thirty years11. While carbon credits may be abstract 
and decontextualized fungible elements, they can only come about through 
alternative forms of carbon that have a past, a present and a future and 
exceed their monetary value in markets.  
This is not just a discursive move, for it materializes through the 
fundamental act of rooting trees to specific landscapes, where carbon 
becomes unavoidably entangled with their socio-material and historical 
relations (Leach and Scoones 2015:2). This, as we will see through the 
dissertation, has fundamental consequences for the different ways in which 
carbon is produced, experienced and understood. The ‘signature tension’ of 
forest carbon projects is therefore that in order to produce tradable bits of 
                                                        
9 I am here referring to CDM projects. Voluntary market projects follow diverse 
guideline although they do operate on the same offset or reduction basis.  
10 As Lohmann succinctly puts it: ‘The credits generated by a greenhouse gas-saving 
project built as a result of carbon finance are calculated by subtracting the emissions of a 
universe with the project from the emissions of a hypothetical ‘baseline’ or business-as-
usual universe’ (2009:509). 
11 The specifics of forest carbon projects, as we will see, also bring very particular 
and tricky temporalities into play. 
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abstract nature, that is, in order to fragment or deracinate, one first has to 
root: the carbon credit cannot exist without it being something else entirely 
(and permanently) different. Carbon needs to be multiple.  
In a sense, this multiplicity could be seen as a case of ‘proliferation’ in 
Hayden’s terms, as she demonstrates how, in apparently reductionist 
projects such as pharmaceutical generic substitution, the making of 
‘sameness’—an assumed archetype of scientific, and, as she argues, capitalist 
reductionism—‘generates, and proliferates difference’ (2012:275). 
‘Pharmaceutical sameness’, Hayden argues, ‘can explode into multiplicity’ 
(2012:280). 
Carbon’s multiple social lives 
In The Social Life of Things Appadurai (1986) offered a new 
perspective on the long-standing gift/commodity dichotomy by arguing for 
an analysis of the processual flow of objects in and out of commodity status. 
The ‘commodity phase’ therefore appeared as one moment in a thing’s 
‘social life’, a trajectory that could be ‘slow or fast, reversible or terminal, 
normative or deviant’ (Appadurai 1986:13). A focus on the cultural 
biography of things thus revealed that ‘the same thing may be treated at one 
time as a commodity and not another’ or ‘treated as a commodity by some 
persons, and not others’ (Kopytoff 1986:64). The key was to follow and 
explore things ‘in motion’ (Appadurai 1986:16). 
While insightful, this approach is complicated when applied to the 
carbon of forest carbon projects.  As we have seen above, carbon’s trajectory 
is not a processual one in which at one stage it is a tree, and at another a 
credit. Rather, carbon’s commodity status as credit can only come about 
when it is also something else entirely (i.e. a tree, a form of development). 
Similarly, talking about different perspectives on the same thing only gets us 
so far because, as we will see throughout the dissertation, locating this thing 
often becomes problematic: carbon in TAMS was often experienced as an 
elusive object hard to locate, with a tendency to ‘disappear’ from view (see 
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chapter 6). Rather than taking carbon for granted as a pre-existing coherent 
and single whole, then, I partly draw on a recent approach to things and 
objects that treats them as multiple and enacted in practices (see, for 
example, Mol 2002a; Law 2002; Lien and Law 2011). I thus follow Mol’s call 
to ‘refrain from understanding objects as the central points of focus of 
different people’s perspectives’ (2002a:4) and to rather focus on how 
‘objects come into being—and disappear—with the practices in which they 
are manipulated’ (2002a:5). In its foregrounding of objects and the socio-
material practices through which they come about, this approach reveals 
their multiplicity: the many and simultaneous ways in which things are 
being ‘done’ and ‘known’. It is thus that I talk about the ‘multiple social lives 
of carbon’, as a way of dispelling the ‘feigned immobility’ (Harvey 2013:3) of 
carbon as single and coherent whole.  
While this approach allows Mol to explore ways in which multiple 
enactments of atherosclerosis are often made to ‘hang together’ (2002a:5) 
through practices of coordination—as well as ways in which incoherences 
are sometimes ‘lived with’ (2002a:87)—I think it also offers an interesting 
way of exploring those cases where things do not stabilize. As we will see, it 
could be argued that part of TAMS’ failure lay in the impossibility to make 
carbon ‘coalesce’ into an object ‘with clear borders and a solid core ‘ 
(Knudsen 2014:64), resulting in experiences of elusiveness and complexity 
(chapter 6 and 7). But I also extend Mol’s (2012) approach in arguing that 
not only is the carbon of forest carbon projects a multiple object enacted in 
different ways simultaneously—a natural resource, a commodity, a form of 
development, etc—but, rather, that it often has to be multiple in order to 
produce the kind of value it proposes: its abstract form as carbon credits can 
only come about through a very specific set of grounded practices that bring 
together people and things in forest landscapes. Some of the multiple social 
lives of carbon are therefore deeply intertwined and related (see Knudsen 
2014 for a similar approach), although these social lives are not, of course, 
the only ones (as we will see in chapter 5).  
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So what kind of nature emerges from this perspective? We have known 
since the 1980s that the concept of nature is not one that travels well 
(Strathern 1980). The idea of an external ‘natural’ world separate from 
humans loses plausibility in places like Mahatsara (see Descola and Pálsson 
1996:7–9), where the concept of the ‘environment’, tontolo iainana, for 
example, is one only understood in the context of conservation, but not as 
part of daily life (Sodikoff 2012a:87). But we have also seen how the concept 
of nature as a fixed realm distinct from humans does not even work in the 
West, as it can no longer be taken as a biological given or ‘fact’ (Strathern 
1992; Franklin 2003). The ‘nature’ that emerges from ‘carbon’s multiple 
lives should rather be seen as an object in motion, coming into being 
through simultaneous material and discursive practices: ‘it shifts its shape 
and form from practice to practice. It is done multiply’ (Lien and Law 
2011:83). Instead of assuming a fixed point from which different meanings 
or representations of carbon (and hence nature) are derived, it is more 
fruitful to explore how things are made to appear as a series of fixed 
points—and with what effects. If particular framings of ‘nature’ and ‘carbon’ 
are based on very specific ways of articulating people’s relationships to each 
other and their environments, then the question remains of which other 
possible worlds, and futures, are being negated. This is the question I will 
explore in the conclusion (chapter 8), as I bring together the temporal 
implications of carbon in forest landscapes that appear throughout the 
dissertation.  
In this section I have presented a rationale for the study of the multiple 
social lives of carbon in forest carbon projects. Through her often-cited 
phrase of ‘selling nature to save it’, McAfee has illustrated the 
transformation of nature into ‘world currency’ as ‘natural capital’ 
(1999:133) and its integration into various types of markets as a way of 
dealing with environmental degradation. The type of nature that emerges, in 
her view, is ‘of a very particular type: an abstract, ‘globalized’ resource torn 
out of its spatial and social historical contexts’ (1999:137). While this is 
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certainly a key consequence of such processes, it is not the only one. As I 
have argued, along with processes of fragmentation and abstraction 
inherent to the commodification of nature, forest carbon projects also 
involve the production of very specific and grounded forms of nature that 
become entangled with socio-material contexts. As we will see in this 
dissertation, in the process of ‘saving’ forests through an abstract and 
mobile form of carbon—the carbon credit—other forms, with firm 
attachments to local contexts, emerge.  
Summary of chapters: 
I have divided the ethnographic section of this dissertation into three 
parts, according to the specific forms, or social lives, of carbon that are 
explored in the chapters that compose them. Part I (chapters three and four) 
explores the social life of carbon in its credit form. Part II (chapters five and 
six) focuses on the specific experiences of people in Mahatsara that come 
about through carbon in two different guises. Part III (chapter seven) moves 
on to explore carbon in its (unfinished) commodity form. Since I provide an 
introductory account of the chapters at the beginning of each section, I here 
present them very briefly. 
The rest of this chapter provides an account of my methodological 
approach to the study of the multiple social lives of carbon as part of TAMS.  
I then present, in chapter two, ‘three histories’ that help us understand 
the emergence of TAMS as forest carbon project in Andasibe and that attend 
to its multiplicity. I therefore explore the historical development of carbon 
markets, the specific forms of forest management in Madagascar from pre-
colonial times to the present, and the history of TAMS, as told by its main 
designer, Louise Holloway.  
In chapters three and four I approach the social life of carbon through 
its credit form, in its interplay with questions of value and waste in relation 
to forests and tavy. Chapter three traces the transformations that TAMS 
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underwent through its engagement with carbon markets, and explores the 
effects of carbon credits’ logic of value in the project’s understandings, and 
treatments of, value and waste. Chapter four presents a historical overview 
of Andasibe’s forests in relation to past political and economic projects, and 
the role that tavy has played in each era. We will see that, while often 
portrayed as a completely new form of value production, carbon credits as 
part of TAMS established very specific historical continuities in these 
landscapes.  
Chapters five and six explore the social life of carbon as an unstable 
and sometimes hard to discern object as experienced by villagers in 
Mahatsara. In chapter five, carbon appears as an implicit element in 
experiences of what I term the ‘environmental state’: a form of spatial and 
temporal oppression that results from conservation practice and its 
curtailment of movement and agricultural expansion. Chapter six, on the 
other hand, explores carbon’s (im)materiality as natural resource at the 
point of ‘extraction’. A focus on carbon labour among men in Mahatsara—
and its contrast to past work experiences in graphite mining—reveals issues 
of temporariness, volatility and dislocation from the local that coalesce into 
an experience of carbon and TAMS as a ‘scam’.  
Chapter seven moves on to TAMS’ key actors’ experiences of 
complexity as they try to separate or disentangle carbon from the relations 
in which it is rooted in order to bring it into being as a bounded and mobile 
commodity. Through the case of carbon ownership we will see how this 
abstracting process is constantly complicated by carbon’s multiple—and 
necessary—socio-material entanglements. 
A running theme throughout many of the chapters, as we will see, is 
that of time. Chapters three and four, for example, expose the various pasts, 
presents and futures that make up, and, at the same time, are made through, 
carbon credits in Andasibe. Chapter five, on the other hand, dispels the 
conservation/development myth that Betsimisaraka farmers lack a future 
orientation by presenting the ways in which people think about, and act on, 
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their own socio-natural futures. I will show how the curtailment of spatial 
and temporal expansion through a ban on tavy is therefore experienced as a 
powerful form of oppression. To a lesser extent, the theme of time is also 
present in chapters six (through feelings of temporariness in carbon labour) 
and seven (through past and future entanglements that complicate the 
becoming of carbon as commodity). In chapter eight, and by way of 
conclusion, I bring together, and further explore, the mutual and productive 
connections between carbon and time at a more abstract level. I will argue 
that, as key object in contemporary forms of environmental governance, 
carbon attends to, and at the same time aims to re-work and overcome, 
temporal limits to capitalist growth. Its effects, I suggest, are those of 
foreclosing the future for some, while opening it up for others.  
I have also included three appendixes to aid reading. Appendix I 
presents TAMS’ main actors and their roles in the project. Appendix II 
details the key elements and concepts that make up a CDM project, and 
which are explored in the dissertation. Appendix III provides a brief timeline 
of Madagascar’s political history from pre-colonial times to the present. 
After that there is a small glossary of the most recurrent or relevant 
Malagasy terms that appear throughout the dissertation. 
Fieldwork:  
In this section I present the different research methods that I employed 
to study carbon in a specific locale. I begin by setting out the main rationale 
for my methodological approach. I then give a general background of 
Mahatsara, the village where I conducted fieldwork, and explore the kinds of 
‘situated knowledges’ (Haraway 1988) that my research practices allowed, 
including practical and ethical problems encountered. Finally, I note other 
sites and sources I drew on.  
The ethnography presented in this dissertation is the result of an 18-
month stay in Madagascar, divided into an initial period of 12 months in 
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2011, and another 6 in 2013. Additionally, I carried out three weeks of 
archival research at the National Archives of Overseas Territories, AOM 
(Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer), in Aix-en-Provence, France during 2014. 
This was complemented by online research and other archival and project-
based documents collected in Madagascar12.  
The methodological approach I have taken to the study of ‘carbon’ as key 
object in global forms of environmental governance follows Tsing’s call to 
study global phenomena or connections ‘in the sticky materiality of practical 
encounters’ (2005:1). Although this could of course have been done from 
many different sites, my interest in the intersection between carbon and 
tavy led me to a small location called Mahatsara, 14 kilometres north of the 
town of Andasibe, where farmers had both taken part in, and given fallow 
land to TAMS. I arrived in the village after six months of language learning 
and preliminary research in the capital city of Antananarivo, and stayed for 
an initial period of six months, between June 2011 and January 2012. During 
this time, my assistant Mahefa (whom I introduce below) and I would spend 
most of the week in the village, travelling every four or five days to Andasibe 
for a night or two. During the second stage, between February and June 
2013, I visited Mahatsara daily, spending nights in Andasibe as I was then 
travelling with my one year-old son. This time division allowed me to 
experience the agricultural cycle in Mahatsara almost in its entirety13, and to 
study TAMS at two different stages: during a perceived ‘halt’ in 2011, and as 
the project had (more or less officially) come to an end.  
Andasibe, on the other hand, was not simply a place to rest, but a 
productive location to approach TAMS through the rumours and news that 
circulated in town—mostly among TAMS workers but also with villagers in 
general. In addition, I attended key events in town where multiple actors 
came together, such as the National Environmental Day 2011 or ANAE’s 20th 
                                                        
12 My knowledge of French was helpful in navigating the archives in France, but less 
so in Madagascar, where I learned Malagasy to conversational standard and was greatly 
helped by my assistant Mahefa. 
13 Burning and sowing stages during 2011, and the harvesting season in 2013 
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anniversary, which provided important insights into the project that were 
not available in Mahatsara.  
I also carried out fourteen semi-structured, taped interviews among 
TAMS organizational actors, as well as more informal, un-taped 
conversations with local TAMS workers in and around Andasibe. 
Interviewed actors ranged from local, regional and national administrative 
staff to representatives of every organisation involved in TAMS at a national 
and international level14.   
Borrowing Hayden’s sentence, it could be argued that I followed the 
‘multi-sitedness built into’ (2003:9) TAMS as a project that cut across 
different places and scales—but I do not consider my research as an 
instance of multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995) in the strict sense of the 
word. Rather, my approach was to remain grounded in a single location and 
follow the ramifications of TAMS from this specific locale. This revealed not 
just connections to other spaces and scales, but also a great amount of 
disconnections, gaps and absences, which I have included as part of my 
analysis. The field site, from this perspective, involved Mahatsara as ‘carbon’ 
location, but exceeded the spatial boundedness of the village as ‘locality’ 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1997) through dis/connections.   
It is also somewhat ironic that I never actually got to see ‘carbon in-the-
making’. By the time I arrived in Mahatsara, TAMS was no longer operative 
and never resumed. Far from a hindrance, however, this turned out to be a 
very productive way of approaching the social lives of carbon, for various 
reasons. On the one hand, as we will see, the end of TAMS made much more 
evident the absence of a coherent and stable object called ‘carbon’. On the 
other, the fact that the project was no longer running granted some actors, 
                                                        
14 Taped interviews included the following: The Mayor of Andasibe; staff at 
Association Mitsinjo (Andasibe); staff at the Regional Forestry Service CIREF; staff at SAF-
FJKM Moramanga; the director of the National Land Reform (PNF); staff at the General 
Office of the Environment (DGE); staff at the General Office of Forests (DGF); staff at 
Conservation International CI; staff at ANAE; staff at the World Bank and the BioCF; Louise 
Holloway. Notable absences are Mr. B. Rajaonson, from the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund 
office in Madagascar, whom I could not locate and Mr. J MacKinnon (CI) and staff at 
Madagascar National Parks (MNP) in Antananarivo, who did not agree to see me. 
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especially those involved in TAMS organisational structure, a kind of 
detachment and heightened reflexivity on the project and its many 
‘complexities’15. The absence of TAMS and carbon, then, allowed very 
important presences, as fieldwork became a sort of cartographic exercise 
into the traces and memories, confusion and absences that the project had 
left in its wake.  
In order to understand my methodological approach (mainly based on 
participant observation, as I detail below) to the study of TAMS in Mahatsara 
and my positionality as researcher, I now introduce the village and those 
specific characteristics that are relevant to methodological issues.  
Mahatsara 
Mahatsara is situated 14 kilometres north of the town of Andasibe, and 
opposite the AMNP16.  
                                                        
15 This was especially true towards the end of my research period, and evident in the 
last round of interviews I carried out among TAMS actors, who appeared much more open 
than in previous encounters. 
16 Although I considered other locations as potential field-sites, Mahatsara’s 
particular characteristics as home to re-settled families seemed to open up avenues of 
research in case I was confronted with a total absence of TAMS.  
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Figure 3. Mahatsara seen from its highest point. Photograph taken by author in 
September, 2011. 
 
It was formed in 2001, when Madagascar National Parks (MNP, 
previously known as ANGAP) resettled about 50 households (made up of 
about five groups of extended families) comprising 480 inhabitants, who 
were at that time living within the confines of the newly established 
protected area. As I explain in chapter six, Mahatsara was initially hailed as a 
pilot village that would demonstrate the mutual benefits of development 
and conservation, although promises of development infrastructures and 
benefits soon dissipated. Households were allocated a proportional number 
of hectares for agricultural purposes. As is generally the case in rural 
Madagascar, status in the village is importantly related to land access. Thus, 
while a small number of families17 were able to obtain the best fields on the 
village’s eastern perimeter, which, being by the river makes them ideal for 
                                                        
17 These were most likely those with close ties to the Tangalamena, or village chief, 
or with higher status before they were relocated.  
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irrigated rice agriculture, tanimbary, most people were allocated fields 
inland, to the west of Mahatsara. Although a dam was supposed to carry 
water to these areas, villagers claim that it broke soon after it was built and 
water does not reach their fields. In any case, these fields are mostly 
dedicated to dry hill agriculture, or tavy, used to cultivate rice and, to a 
lesser extent, corn. Some families also have home gardens, or tanimboly, 
where they plant alternative (sometimes cash) crops, such as beans or 
cassava. Those who arrived later on had to buy or rent pieces of land, and 
make up the poorest strata of the village, although, as Graeber (2007) has 
noted for the small village of Betafo in the central highlands, the difference 
between rich and poor families is very nuanced. In any case, as we will see in 
chapter six, Mahatsara’s inhabitants, while often portrayed as subsistence 
farmers, have a long tradition of wage work for the now extinct graphite 
mining industry.  
The majority of Mahatsara’s inhabitants are Betsimisaraka but there is 
also a small proportion of Bezanozano, the area being a geographic border 
between these two ethnic groups, who are mainly differentiated by the type 
of agriculture they practice (tavy for the former, and irrigated rice 
agriculture for the latter, a result of the changing landscape from the 
western plateau to eastern mountains; see Astuti 1995; Bloch 1995). Ethnic 
divisions in this area, however, are not exclusionary and marriage between 
both groups is common. Most villagers still identify as practising fomban-
drazana or ancestor worship, although there seems to be a growing 
tendency to join the emerging ‘evangelical’ movements18, especially among 
younger generations. 
Around 2007, the village was included as part of TAMS, and was to be 
managed by the organisation SAF-FJKM, (Sampan’Asa momban’ny 
                                                        
18 Pentecostalism or Seventh-Day Adventism are growing in size in Andasibe, which 
also houses a Catholic and Protestant Church, and a Mosque.  
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Fampandrosoana FJKM19) as Facilitating Agent. Sixty-three men took part in 
reforestation work in and outside the National Park, and around twenty of 
them gave fallow land to TAMS. They signed a contract with ANAE and the 
regional forestry service, CIREF (Circonscription de l'Environnement et 
Forêts), in which they agreed to leave the land intact for the 30-year 
duration of the project. In exchange, they claim, they were promised work 
and the money from ‘carbon credits’, which would start to flow within five 
years of reforestation. This, however, never happened.  
An important reason for the selection of Mahatsara to take part in TAMS 
was its status as pilot village and the active role of the Tangalamena, the 
village’s spiritual leader and chief vis-à-vis the state20. The Tangalamena’s 
involvement with conservation and development initiatives has a long 
history, and goes from outright opposition to resettlement in the early days 
of the National Park, to a strategic yet complicated acceptance of 
conservation goals and initiatives. His current relationship to the state and 
conservation is in fact a peculiar and interesting one, revealing important 
intricacies of power dynamics in the village, as I detail below. As the head of 
the family into which I entered as researcher, in turn, his role in the village is 
fundamental to understanding my own positionality in Mahatsara.  
                                                        
19 SAF-FJKM is the development division of the Madagascar Church of Jesus Christ 
(Protestant). 
20 A CI technical worker once described to me the Tangalamena’s family as a ‘pilot 
family’, due to their interest and participation in conservation. 
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The Tangalamena, key mediator of power in the village 
 
Figure 4. Mahatsara's Tangalamena (in red, holding a baton), conducting a 
sacrifice ritual. Photograph taken by author in July 2011. 
 
For Betsimisaraka, the Tangalamena is one of the elder (usually male) 
members of an extended family who share a tomb. He is traditionally in 
charge of the spiritual connections with ancestors, settling disputes within 
the family and was once responsible for dividing and blessing the land to be 
worked. His power, which derives from his ability to act as mediator 
between the living and the dead, tends to be contrasted with the power of 
the state, as two distinct and contradictory spheres: if the Tangalamena 
embodies a legitimate form of authority based on ancestral custom, this is 
usually contrasted to the power of the state, largely considered illegitimate 
(a common feature of rural life in Madagascar, see Graeber 2007). 
Mahatsara’s peculiarity as both ‘manufactured’ village and home to separate 
groups of extended families has led to a peculiar situation in which each 
extended family may have their own Tangalamena (although not all of them 
do), but there is one who is recognized as leader vis-à-vis the state. The term 
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Tangalamena, in his case, has acquired a new and ambiguous meaning, being 
both a figure of authority for ancestral matters, and for administrative 
ones21, even when these two forms of authority are seen as antagonistic by 
villagers. This peculiar situation gained a further twist as he was elected in 
2013 Falierana’s Chef de Fokontany, the head of the smallest administrative 
unit to which Mahatsara belongs. Although there is no overt conflict in the 
village in this regard, there are many tacit forms in which the Tangalamena’s 
authority is contested, a result of his awkward engagement with 
administrative power.  
Two key elements must therefore be highlighted in order to understand 
the spaces that opened up or closed down for me as researcher. The first is 
the villagers’ essential distrust of external authority which is mainly 
experienced through regulations over tavy and a history of displacement 
and failed promises 22 . The other is the awkward position of the 
Tangalamena, and the consequent tension in power relations in the village, 
and with which I became entangled as I arrived in Mahatsara.  
Positionality and participant observation in Mahatsara  
One of my key aims when I arrived in Mahatsara was to distance myself 
as much as possible from TAMS and conservation practice in general in 
order to gain some kind of legitimacy and access to critical views of the 
project. Instead of arriving through TAMS—in one of ANAE’s visit to the 
village, for example—I chose to take the administrative route, as I asked for 
permission from the Vice-Mayor of Andasibe and later the Chef de 
Fokontany of Falierana, who sent me to the village with a red-stamped letter 
to hand to the Tangalamena.  
With hindsight, I realise that both the conservationist and administrative 
routes to Mahatsara were thoroughly intertwined, and choosing one or the 
                                                        
21 Such as getting permits to visit tombs in the Park.  
22 In chapter five I describe this amalgam of external actors as ‘the environmental 
state’ and present their oppressive force as is experienced in Mahatsara 
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other did not make much of a difference. Whichever way I arrived in 
Mahatsara, I arrived as a vazaha, or white foreigner. I did it, in turn, in the 
company of a male assistant, Mahefa, who was of Merina origin (the ethnic 
group from the highlands who also form the main elite in the island), an 
ethnicity inextricably associated to the external exercise of power23. 
Whether I liked it or not, then, we were squarely situated within both 
administrative and conservation imaginaries. These were only (partly) 
dispelled with time and, I believe, with participant observation’s most 
powerful tool: the cultivation of social relations through everyday practice. 
It was only as friendships were forged through everyday involvement in 
mundane tasks that some form of trust emerged and opened up spaces that 
had been previously off bounds.   
But even as we were able to dissociate ourselves from conservation 
practice to a large extent, did this not mean we were free from other forms 
of associations to authority and power. As we were lodged in the house of 
the Tangalamena’s youngest daughter, right below the Tangalamena’s home, 
also known as trano lapa or ‘palace’, we also became very specifically 
positioned in Mahatsara’s internal political landscape, and inherently linked 
to the Tangalamena’s family during our whole stay in Mahatsara. Although 
this was to be expected, and I could not have entered the field otherwise, it is 
important to note that my relationship with the Tangalamena and his family 
did foreclose other relationships, or at least information, in the village. Thus, 
I am firmly convinced that the reason why I never heard any explicit 
complaint about the Tangalamena was because I was considered his close 
ally. This, however, does not mean that I was not able to see conflict in the 
village, for it arose in other forms24.  
Mahatsara’s particularity as manufactured village, and people’s 
resentment towards the state and other forms of external authority, meant 
                                                        
23 As is general in Madagascar, Merina workers held all of TAMS’ national or regional 
level positions.   
24 Many of these, however, I cannot share here for privacy reasons. 
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that certain forms of research were simply out of the question. As Graeber 
explained in relation to his own research in the rural location of Betafo, 
‘techniques of knowledge were very closely identified with techniques of 
rule’ and ‘certain sorts of inquiry’ (2007:15) made people feel much more 
confortable than others. In my case, this meant avoiding any kind of 
cadastral inquiry, ‘door to door’ statistical collection (something also 
mentioned by Graeber) or participatory research techniques such as focus 
groups—a strategy often used by conservation/development actors, and 
hence symbolically charged. We carried out taped, semi-structured 
interviews among fifteen different households although some of the most 
interesting comments always seemed to spring up at unexpected moments, 
often in conversation between people. The fact that these were held in my 
presence, however, already points to a relative success in establishing trust 
and openness, I think. When a spontaneous conversation turned into an 
unexpected informal interview, I avoided taking out my recorder in order 
not to change the tone or direction of the conversation, and just jotted down 
the most relevant points and wrote them up later25.  
In any case, as a result of everyday practice, I spent most of my time with 
women—working the fields, attending to children (especially during my 
second stage, as I was then with my own child), fishing or simply hanging 
out—which takes me to the question of gender. With hindsight, it looks like 
a tremendously good choice to have been accompanied by a male assistant, 
as it opened up a whole side of research that might have been relatively off 
bounds. Although gender roles and relationships are not too strict in 
Madagascar, there were certain areas that I might not have been able to 
enter without the company of a man. On the other hand, my gendered 
position turned out to be a very positive element because women’s role in 
TAMS was non-existent, at least in Mahatsara. Participant observation 
among them, then, gave me a much more balanced perspective. When 
                                                        
25 Every quote that appears in this dissertation and goes beyond a sentence or two 
comes from recorded material.   
   38 
outside organisations visited the village to give talks or presentations, for 
example, I became aware of how gender structured access to conservation 
work and practice in the most basic ways: as I joined women in the back 
rows during talks, I realised that most of the time, one could hardly listen to 
what was being said due to both distance and the racket of babies26.  
Apart from participant observation in everyday situations, including 
agriculture, we also attended five ritual events in Mahatsara. The first one, 
dika ra, or ‘the crossing of the blood’, took place during my first week in the 
village and involved cattle sacrifice in order to bless the family of a man who 
had married a woman far away from the village. We then attended two 
funerary rites performed at Fête des Morts, around November 1st, by two 
different families with their respective Tangalamenas. The last two rituals, 
on the other hand, involved one specific family and Mahatsara’s 
Tangalamena as conductor: a spirit possession session, or tromba, at a 
sacred waterfall inside the Park, and the vonivao or ‘new seed ritual’, 
explored in detail in chapter five.  
Other sources of data: 
Apart from fieldwork and interviews in Mahatsara and beyond, I have 
also drawn on other materials to complement the data gathered. Grey 
documents played a key role in TAMS and I refer to them in various 
chapters. The most important ones were the Project Design Document, 
(PDD) which is still available at the UNFCCC website (CDM, UNFCCC n.d.), 
the contracts between farmers and the project that I was able to access in 
Antananarivo, and the ‘carbon property’ document ‘Note on the legal nature 
of carbon property rights and on carbon credits. Proposal to draft a Protocole 
                                                        
26 Bearing in mind that these were not fixed, clear-cut divisions, I have aimed to 
represent both male and female experiences of TAMS and ‘carbon’ in this dissertation. Thus, 
chapter 5 gives a bit more weight to key commentaries made by women, as I approach 
‘carbon’ through the lens of tavy and social reproduction, whereas chapter 6 focuses on 
male experiences of carbon labour, even if women’s perspectives on the project as scam are 
also present.  
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d’Accord (Implementation Agreement)’: a very hard to get document that I 
have been able to obtain thanks to the on-line Madagascar Environmental 
Justice Network, MEJN.  
In Antananarivo I visited the National Archives, (Foiben’ny Arisivam-
pirenena Malagasy) and the National library (Tranom-bokim-pirenena) for 
historical records of the area of Andasibe, although without too much 
success. For TAMS or carbon/conservation-related historical and 
contemporary information I visited the library of the National Office for the 
Environment (ONE, Office National pour l’Environnement), the library at the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MEF) in Nanisana, the library at the 
World Bank offices in Antananarivo and the library at ESSA-Forêt, the Water 
and Forest Department at the Agronomy School at the University of 
Antananarivo. For historical pictures and maps I visited Madagascar’s 
Geographic Institute, FTM (Foiben-Taosarintanin’ i Madagasikara).  
In October 2014, I carried out three weeks of archival research at the 
National Archives of Overseas Territories, AOM (Archives Nationales d’Outre 
Mer), in Aix-en-Provence, France.  My interest here was in finding 
information on Andasibe’s very early origins and its relationship to the 
colony. The information collected here is presented in chapter four.  
Ethical considerations 
Due to the nature of this research, and to both TAMS and Mahatsara’s 
specific characteristics, I have not been able to provide pseudonyms for 
either the project, the organisations involved nor Mahatsara. I have 
nonetheless changed the names of every actor in the village in order to 
protect their identity, or downplayed or slightly modified their features so 
that they may not be recognized. Taped interviews among organisational 
actors involved informed consent forms, with the possibility of providing 
information anonymously. In such cases, I have omitted their names and job 
positions. Informed consent in Mahatsara, on the other hand, was 
approached as a processual negotiation, and I have therefore excluded any 
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type of information or comment that I have deemed inappropriate to be 
made public. An essential person whose name I have not been able to modify 
is the Tangalamena, for obvious reasons. I have aimed to make very explicit, 
however, the fact that villagers’ views on TAMS were not necessarily shared 
by him. In an effort to avoid any future conflict, the Tangalamena appears in 
this dissertation mainly as an authoritative figure on ancestral matters. I 
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Chapter Two: Three Histories  
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I provide a historical account of carbon as part of TAMS 
in Andasibe/Mahatsara that attends to its multiplicity, by focusing on three 
different, yet intertwined, trajectories. My aim is to grasp carbon as multiple 
object, by tracing its emergence in global forms of environmental 
governance, while at the same time grounding it historically within the 
development of conservation practice in Madagascar, and, more specifically, 
as the main object of the specific and contingent ‘assemblage’ (see Li 2005; 
Marcus and Saka 2006; discussed below) that was TAMS.  
As we will see in this and the next chapter, TAMS did not emerge fully 
formed as a forest carbon project, but rather transformed into one over 
almost two decades, from the early 1990s to the late 2000s. In order to 
appreciate this transformation, and to grasp the role of carbon in TAMS 
more fully, we need to look beyond Madagascar, and back to debates over 
the management of waste and pollution that took place during the mid-20th 
century. Similarly, as we will see, TAMS as forest carbon project cannot be 
solely apprehended as the result of ‘global’ forces encroaching on the ‘local’ 
in a coherent and organised way, or as the effect of its designers’ 
commitment to carbon markets. The story of TAMS, and carbon within it, is 
much more messy and contingent. In the following sections, then, I follow 
the ‘makeshift links across distance and difference’ (Tsing 2005:2) that 
made carbon the protagonist of Andasibe’s entry into the 21st century.  
I begin with the emergence of the carbon dioxide molecule in scientific 
circles, and trace its transformation into a key socio-technical and economic 
object for climate change mitigation that responds to debates over the most 
appropriate forms of managing waste and pollution. I then move on to a 
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historical account of environmental management in Madagascar, from pre-
colonial forestry legislation to the country’s current engagement with 
carbon markets for conservation. We will see how post-colonial Madagascar 
is a very particular place, not only in terms of its endemic flora and fauna, 
but also in number and diversity of actors and the specific clusters of power 
that have formed around the country’s environmental governance structure.  
I finally present the history of TAMS, mainly through the lens of its designer, 
Louise Holloway, and introduce the main characteristics of both the project 
and the area of Andasibe (the history of Andasibe is presented in detail in 
chapter four). I finish with some concluding remarks on the ways we may 
think about TAMS as forest carbon project, as I elaborate on the concept of 
‘assemblage’.  
From molecule to credit 
Awareness of the role of CO2 on the earth’s changing temperature 
dates back to 1896, when the Swiss electrochemist Svante Arrhenius argued 
that fluctuations in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
were connected to changes in terrestrial temperatures. Twenty years later 
he predicted, following his colleague Elkholm, that CO2 levels in the 
atmosphere ‘might noticeably increase’ within a few centuries as a result of 
the exponential rise in industrial carbon emissions that had begun with the 
take-off of the oil industry in the mid-nineteenth century (Calel 2011:5). But 
Arrhenius’ theories were discarded during the following decades, until 
Callendar, a British engineer who had spent over a decade collecting data, 
successfully revived his postulates in the 1940s. Military funds for climate 
science significantly increased at this point, particularly in the US, where a 
new generation of climate scientists began to develop sophisticated data, 
models and technologies for the study of carbon dioxide’s impact on the 
earth’s climate (Calel 2011:6). At that point, however, it was still unclear 
whether greenhouse gas emissions would cause a cooling or warming of the 
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climate (Lohmann 2006:35). Concern over the effects of anthropogenic 
disturbance of the earth’s climate grew over the 1970s. A turning point was 
the ‘first major international conference on the greenhouse effect’ held in 
Vienna in 1985, where ‘climatologists warned of a rise of global mean 
temperature’ in the first half of the 21st century and ‘up to a one-metre rise 
in sea levels’ (Lohmann 2006:35). The alarm, Lohmann argues, did not just 
ring among climatologists, but also among the US Government, who began to 
steer climate research from independent researchers toward ‘technical 
bureaucracies’ (2006:35) with closer links to governments. Thus, in 1988 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was founded under 
the auspices of the UN, with the aim of developing ‘a comprehensive 
scientific assessment of the causes and consequences of global warming’ 
(Calel 2011:15).  
The origins of carbon trading as a mechanism to deal with climate 
change are not located, however, in the field of climate science, but in that of 
economics. More specifically, carbon trading is the result of a debate over 
the most appropriate ways of dealing with pollution and the role of the state 
in its management. This conversation is usually traced back to Cambridge-
based economist Arthur C. Pigou, who, in the 1920s, argued for a tax per unit 
to be imposed on private entities with negative social outcomes, as part of 
his ‘welfare economics’. Pigou, in fact, employed the example of smoke 
emitted by a factory that harmed consumers to describe negative social 
costs (or externalities), which, he argued, should be corrected by taxing 
policies (Sandmo 2015:20).  
This approach transformed during the 1950s as a result of the 
rejection of Keynesian state-interventionist methods by the Chicago School 
of Economics. The idea of emissions trading was in fact grandfathered by 
one of its most prominent members, Ronald Coase, in his essay ‘The Problem 
of Social Cost’ (1960), which would help him obtain the Nobel Prize in 
Economics in 1991. Instead of a tax exercised by government, Coase 
proposed the introduction of property rights as a way of dealing with 
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negative externalities, in the conviction that market transactions would lead 
to the most ‘optimum level of pollution’27. Coase’s seminal idea was taken on 
by various subsequent economists who moved away from the notion of 
‘optimal levels of pollution’ to call for government regulation in the 
establishment of pollution limits within which trade in permits could take 
place (Calel 2011:11).  
The idea that environmental degradation could be countered with the 
introduction of property rights had also gained force after Hardin’s 
renowned thesis on ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ in 1968. Arguing that 
common property in a ‘finite world’ led to resource depletion (and 
confounding the concepts of common property and open access), Hardin 
postulated that the ‘tragedy’ of degradation could ‘be averted by private 
property, or something formally like it’ (Hardin 1968:1245). Interestingly, 
however, he noted that the problem of pollution posed slightly different 
challenges, since ‘the air and waters surrounding us cannot readily be 
fenced’, advocating in turn for ‘coercive laws or taxing devices that make it 
cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than to discharge them 
untreated’ (Hardin 1968:1245). 
Ideas on the establishment of property rights and pollution permits to 
deal with degradation found their way into policy through the 1977 Clean 
Air Act in the US, following the establishment of the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) under Nixon’s mandate in 1970. An offset 
programme was brought into being which allowed firms to expand and build 
new producing plants in areas not subject to emissions regulations through 
trade in emission quotas. Over the coming decade, further mechanisms 
arose, allowing polluters to achieve compliance on emission levels through 
                                                        
27 Coase reframed the debate on the most appropriate ways of dealing with 
externalities by suggesting that social costs such as pollution were not unidirectional 
problems where A harmed B, but were rather reciprocal, since the regulations established 
to compensate B had also the potential to harm A. 
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similar offsetting practices (Solomon and Gorman 2002)28. Emissions 
trading began to be posed as the most cost-effective strategy to spur 
technology innovation for pollution control (Calel 2011) and gained 
momentum with the advent of Reagan’s neoliberal policies, which advocated 
for flexibility in environmental regulation. In 1990 the Clean Air Acts 
Amendments were introduced by George H. W Bush, effectively establishing 
a national sulphur dioxide emissions market to deal with the environmental 
problem of acid rain (Solomon and Gorman 2002). Along with the already 
operative Wetland Mitigation Banking system (see Robertson 2000), these 
two early approaches lay the groundwork for the rise of a market in other 
environmental services, such as CO2. It was this last one that acquired an 
unprecedented global reach, as the key mechanism to deal with the biggest 
environmental problem the world had ever faced: climate change.  
The Kyoto Protocol and the ‘flexibility mechanisms’ 
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit, marks the moment 
when the question of climate change became institutionalised at a global 
level.  The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was adopted at the conference with the stated aim of stabilising 
‘greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ 
(UNFCCC 1992:4). Under this framework, emissions by the year 2000 should 
not exceed those of 1990, although these were not binding objectives.  
Around the same time, various proposals were being put forward in 
favour of a global emissions trading system. In 1995, an IPCC report stated 
that ‘for a global treaty, a tradable quota system is the only potentially cost-
effective arrangement where an agreed level of emissions is attained with 
                                                        
28 ‘Netting’, for example, allowed firms to forego the modification of equipment 
needed to meet newly set standards if they reduced emissions elsewhere at the same 
location, whereas ‘banking’ allowed polluters to retain ‘offsets’ or ‘bubbles’ for future use 
(Solomon and Gorman 2002). 
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certainty’ (in Calel 2011:16). A greenhouse emissions trading system 
became a decisive leverage item in the run up negotiations to the adoption 
of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 because the US, along with various other 
countries, refused to accept binding commitments to emission reductions 
unless such a mechanism was included. Although the European Union 
suggested in 1998 that no more than half of the emission targets be offset by 
carbon trading, by the time the Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005 (and 
without the US commitment to any binding emission reductions), a 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) was in place, as well as 
three ‘flexibility mechanisms’ as part of the Protocol: International 
Emissions Trading (IET), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
Joint Implementation (JI). Under these mechanisms, Annex I parties 
(industrialised countries and ‘economies in transition’)29 could meet their 
reductions commitments through some form of carbon trading. Whereas the 
IET established the cap-and-trade system, where a cap on emissions is set 
and allowances are sold or given out to polluters who can then trade among 
them, the CDM and JI brought into being a new element: the project-based 
emissions reduction or ‘offset’. In this case, industrialized countries could 
now meet their reductions commitments by carrying out projects that 
reduced emissions in either ‘economies in transition’ (as part of JI)30 or in 
developing countries (as part of the CDM). Since the CDM spurred initial 
opposition among developing countries—seen as an easy way of reducing 
mitigation costs by industrialised countries—the idea that projects should 
include some form of ‘sustainable development’ was incorporated (Lecocq 
and Ambrosi 2007). The political economic relationships between 
                                                        
29 Annex I Parties are: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. 
30 Economies in Transition are: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.  
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industrialised and developing countries thus acquired a new vitality, and 
carbon dioxide took hold of the imagination of major ‘development’ actors.   
In 1999, for example, the World Bank launched the Prototype Carbon 
Fund (PCF), bringing together 6 governments and 17 private companies in 
an $180million fund with the stated aim of  ‘pioneering the market for 
project-based greenhouse gas emission reductions while promoting 
sustainable development and offering a learning-by-doing opportunity to its 
stakeholders’ (UNFCCC-CDM n.d.). The World Bank thus became the first 
investor in the CDM (Lecocq and Ambrosi 2007), and remains, to this day, a 
key player and advocate of the mechanism. By 2004, a year before the Kyoto 
Protocol came into force, the World Bank’s carbon finance activities had 
expanded to various other funds, including the BioCarbon Fund, explicitly 
set up to deal with land-use and carbon sequestration projects. Among them 
would eventually be TAMS, one of its ‘pilot projects’ in Africa. It is also 
important to point out here the role that big environmental NGOs played in 
lobbying for the adoption of carbon trading in the Kyoto Protocol. Lohmann 
argues, for example, that the WWF ‘joined the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists (UNCIE) and the US think-tank inspired Centre for European 
Policy studies in support of the EU Emission Trading Scheme’ (2006:58). 
Around the same time, Conservation International (CI) launched its Center 
for Environmental leadership in Business (CELB) division in its stated effort 
to ‘work with companies to minimise environmental impacts and to harness 
private sector ingenuity on behalf of healthy ecosystems and human well-
being’ (Conservation International n.d.).  
The inclusion of forests in the mechanism was always a controversial 
issue, both due to carbon measurement uncertainties and because it opened 
the door to large-scale commercial plantations, a point some environmental 
NGOs denounced. It was therefore resolved that as part of Land Use, Land-
Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) projects only afforestation and 
reforestation activities would be included, with their total numbers capped 
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and with a restriction in place that did not allow importation of credits into 
the EU-ETS (Lecocq and Ambrosi 2007).  
Although conservation projects were left out of the mechanism, they 
quickly began to thrive in the voluntary market 31  through Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, or REDD32. The 13th session 
of the Conference of the Parties (COP) at Bali in 2007 was a turning point for 
this mechanism, where a roadmap was drawn up for its inclusion as part of 
the CDM (Bidaud 2012:138). With the view set on post-Kyoto agreement, 
the World Bank established the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in 
2007, bringing together governments, businesses, NGOs, and, in theory, 
Indigenous Peoples to deal specifically with this programme (The Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility n.d.). Among the countries involved was 
Madagascar.  
In September 2012, three days after the UNFCCC celebrated the 
issuance of the 1 billionth Certified Emission Reduction, a report by the High 
Level Panel for the CDM Policy Dialogue issued a call to action to reverse the 
‘collapse’ of the CDM market (High Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue 
2012). An over-allocation of permits in the EU-ETS market and the global 
economic crisis that began in 2009 had resulted in a surplus of allowances, 
bringing down the price of a tonne of carbon from $20 in 2008 to $0.51 in 
2013. In addition, 2013 saw an 88% decline in the numbers of projects 
submitted for validation compared to the previous year (World Bank 
2014:39). Although various proposals have been made to revitalise the 
market, such as the inclusion of REDD or ‘voluntary cancellation’ where 
                                                        
31 The voluntary market is a non-compliance market where companies, individuals 
or other actors can ‘offset’ their emissions. It is regulated by different standards and 
regulations generally considered more flexible than those of the CDM.  
32 REDD was initially known as RED, and emerged from lobbying activities by 
Brazilian NGOs in 2002 to bring attention to the problem of deforestation in the Amazon. 
The second D was added in 2007 to acknowledge the degradation problems faced by 
countries in the Congo basin, as different to deforestation in Latin America (Bidaud 
2012:138). The initiative later became REDD+, and along with deforestation and forest 
degradation, today includes the conservation of forest carbon stocks, sustainable 
management of forest and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. 
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anyone could purchase CERs to offset their emissions (Michael n.d.),  the 
future of the mechanism hangs in the air, and all eyes are on the next COP 
that will be held in December 2015 in Paris.  
I have here presented a brief history of the development of carbon as 
part of carbon markets with a focus on the CDM. In the next section I turn to 
Madagascar, where I situate environmental management efforts within the 
country’s political-economic history. As we will see, Madagascar today is not 
only a particular place due to its high levels of endemic flora and fauna, but 
also due to the environmental governance structure that is in place in the 
country and its weight in national politics. This is fundamental to 
understanding the country’s involvement with carbon markets and the kind 
of project that TAMS was.  
A History of Environmental Management in Madagascar 
From pre-colonial to colonial times 
Madagascar is the world’s fourth largest island, located in the Indian 
Ocean and about 1000 km off the coast of Mozambique. It is usually 
portrayed as the result of a prehistoric split from the Indian peninsula, an 
argument also employed to explain the island’s high levels of species 
endemism (over 80%). Human habitation has always been considered a bit 
of a mystery, although it is generally accepted that the first humans arrived 
from what is today Indonesia around 500AD, later followed by East African 
populations (recent archeological research by R Dewar et al. 2013, however, 
suggests evidence of occupational sites dating earlier than 2000BC). The 
island today is home to over 20 million people, who speak dialects of a 
common language, Malagasy, of Malayo-Polynesian origin. There are 
eighteen recognised ethnic groups in Madagascar, where the Merina—the 
group that inhabits the central plateau in and around the capital city of 
Antananarivo—make up most of the national elite, predominantly present in 
the administration and higher-level jobs.  
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Figure 5. Map of ethnic groups in Madagascar. Source: Allen and Covell, 2005: 
xxvi 
 
Conservation efforts in Madagascar date back to the days of King 
Andrianampoinimerina in the late 18th century. Although various kingdoms 
had flourished in Madagascar during the 16th and 17th centuries, it was with 
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the Merina Kingdom that an island-wide unification took place for the first 
time (Allen and Covell 2005). The first bans on cutting firewood and burning 
the forest were established as a means to protect irrigated rice fields, as 
silting tended to happen on deforested hills due to torrential rains (Hufty 
and Muttenzer 2002). This effort was followed by successive legislation on 
the burning of forests through the 1881 Code of 305 Articles established by 
Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony, under the dictates of Queen Ranavalona II, 
Andrianampoinimerina’s fifth successor (Kull 2004:207).  
With the French annexation of the island under General Gallieni’s rule 
in 1896, conservation efforts progressively intensified. Most of these were 
geared towards stopping slash-and-burn agriculture, although there was 
also a strong scientific concern over the colonial government’s impact on the 
island’s environment. Hufty and Muttenzer, citing Boitau, declare that ‘on 12 
million hectares of exploitable forests at the time of the conquest, a third 
was destroyed in the space of 50 years’ (2002:4). This was mostly the result 
of infrastructural works—notably the railroad (as we will see in chapter 
four)—and agricultural expansion and intensification of cash crops (Jarosz 
1996). As a counter-measure, reforestation with exotic species was 
introduced in the central plateau and eastern escarpment and the first 
network of protected areas was established in 1927, which was made up of 
ten integral natural reserves and two national parks for public access (Hufty 
and Muttenzer 2002; Kull 2004; Raik 2007). In any case, most of the colonial 
efforts in terms of conservation were directed at eradicating slash-and-burn 
agriculture, or tavy, in the expectation that local populations would be 
drawn into wage-labour (Jarosz 1996; Sodikoff 2004)—one of Madagascar’s 
most coveted and scarce resources at the time (Feeley-Harnik 1991). In 
chapter four I further explore colonial conservation and economic policies 
for the area of Andasibe.  
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Post-colonial Madagascar 
The end of the colonial era in 1960 was followed by a decade of close 
ties and alliances between the island and the métropole under President 
Tsiranana’s rule during the First Republic (1960-72). Five other categories 
of conservation areas were introduced (national parks, special reserves, 
classified forests, deforestation zones and non-hunting reserves) along with 
a ‘complete set of environmental legislation’ (Kull 1996:54). Tsiranana’s 
regime was also the host to the 1970 International Conference on the 
Conservation of Natural Resources, organised though the International 
Union on the Conservation of Nature, IUCN—a Swiss based organisation 
which had begun operating in the country in 1963 along with the World 
Wildlife Foundation, WWF. Kull (1996) describes the conference as a 
milestone in the island’s environmental policy history, as it helped to bring 
conservation into the national centre-stage, establishing several 
conservation schemes and attracting important sources of funding.  
As I will show in chapter four, the Second Republic, established in 1975 
and preceded by the May Revolution of 1972, was a contradictory regime of 
strict environmental legislation in national centres and its inefficient 
implementation in the rural periphery. Various laws were passed 
aggravating the punishments for forest burning, but the general experience 
in rural Madagascar was that of a ‘gradual withdrawal of the state’ (Graeber 
2007:22), seen as either unable or unwilling to carry out any type of 
enforcement due to the economic collapse of the island. In his vision of a 
self-sufficient, socialist country, President Didier Ratsiraka had broken away 
from French and Western ties and aligned with the Soviet Bloc. His series of 
mega-development projects based on foreign loan investment, however, 
rapidly sent the country into a spiral of debt (Gow 1997) sinking both the 
state’s capacity to act beyond urban areas and the population’s living 
standards. In 1980, Ratsiraka opened up the country to Western powers 
once again, making of Madagascar the first African socialist country to enter 
into a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF). This moment is also generally considered to mark the 
beginning of the country’s current environmental governance structure, as it 
was then that Madagascar resumed its environmental policies within the 
new framework established by international institutions. It is no coincidence 
that the same year that Ratsiraka accepted the SAP, the WWF established its 
first offices in Antananarivo (Kull 1996). With images of degradation 
circulating in global media as Western researchers were readmitted into the 
country (and with deforestation peaking as a result of the decline in the 
country’s economic conditions (Pollini 2007:58)) Madagascar emerged 
towards the end of the twentieth century as an island in need of urgent 
environmental intervention.  
In order to understand the kind of place that Madagascar became at 
the turn of the century, and the clusters of power and governance that 
formed around its prestigious and endangered landscapes, we need to turn 
to wider events, and, specifically, to US politics.  
Over the previous decade, the environmental movement that had 
sprung up among civil society in the US during the 1960s had been 
institutionalised into US policy and global organisations. In 1972, the Club of 
Rome published the study ‘Limits to Growth’, in which they projected an 
unsustainable future for life on earth if current trends of resource use and 
population growth continued. Similarly, toward the end of the 1970s a group 
of environmental NGOs pushed the US Congress to authorise the United 
States Agency for International Development, USAID, to carry out 
environmental protection programmes as part of foreign aid (Corson 2010). 
With the perceived failure of state-centric development, and a call to direct 
funding through the private sector from the Reagan administration, NGOs 
rose to prominence in the implementation of USAID’s environmental 
programmes. This was also enhanced by a definition of biodiversity 
conservation as exclusively a ‘foreign concern’ (Corson 2010:594) and 
which helped appease civil society’s calls for environmental action while 
avoiding clashes with domestic political and economic debates. Thus, a 
   54 
particular group of NGOs began to be entwined with USAID’s biodiversity 
funding, an alliance that would only grow stronger in the coming decades 
(and which has now also been joined by corporations)33. The convergence 
between USAID and environmental NGOs in the US is of particular 
importance here because, as we will see, along with the World Bank, they 
have formed key alliances in the environmental governance of Madagascar, 
including TAMS.  
In this global arena, and with the institutionalisation of sustainable 
development in 1987 through the Brundlant Report (entitled Our Common 
Future), Madagascar became an object of prestige for environmental NGOS 
and donors—a status it still retains (Duffy 2006). In 1984, the Malagasy 
Government adopted the ‘National Strategy for Conservation and 
Development’, precipitating various conservation programmes funded by 
the World Bank, bilateral donors (the US and Switzerland), the WWF, and 
UNESCO and geared towards ‘soil conservation, forest management and 
biodiversity conservation’ (Pollini 2007:59). These efforts culminated with 
the drafting of the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) in 1988 with 
financial and technical support from ‘the World Bank, USAID, the Swiss aid, 
UNDP, UNESCO and WWF’ (Pollini 2007:60). This was also the year when 
Meyers included Madagascar in the list of the ten ‘hotspots’ in the world, 
described as conservation priorities due to exceptionally high levels of 
endemism and unusually rapid rates of deforestation (Myers 1988).  
The National Environmental Plans (I to III) 
The NEAP had two primary goals: a significant increase in the number 
of protected areas and the inclusion of populations in conservation 
programmes as part of ‘sustainable development’. The programme was 
                                                        
33  This Washington-established relationship has led to what Corson terms 
‘conservation enterprises’ where capital moves between ‘public, private and non-profit 
entities in the name of conservation, without ever being used ‘on-the-ground’’ (2010:580). 
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divided into three phases, and was expected to last from 15 to 20 years with 
a total funding of $300 to $400 million (Bidaud 2012:68).  
The programme’s first phase (EP1 1991-1995) was dedicated to 
building the institutional framework that would make it operational. From 
the $187 million it received (5 to 10% of the country’s annual budget) 60% 
went into biodiversity or forestry programmes. We can see here the 
influence of USAID’s biodiversity conservation programme presented above, 
which, as the major donor to the NEAP, justified its expenditure before the 
US Congress on the basis that ‘Madagascar is Africa’s most important 
biodiversity priority, and among the world’s top five for species diversity 
and uniqueness’ (Hufty and Muttenzer 2002:5). Under the Directorate of the 
Ministry of the Environment, three new offices were set up: the ‘Office 
National de l’Environnement’ (ONE) as coordinating entity, the ‘Association 
Nationale d’Actions Environnementales’, ANAE, in charge of conservation and 
development programmes, and, the ‘Association Nationale pour la Gestion 
des Aires Protégées’, (ANGAP now Madagascar National Parks, MNP) a 
public-private conglomerate that runs the country’s protected area network. 
It is worth detailing how ANGAP and ANAE are run, since both organisations 
took part in TAMS (ANAE was appointed TAMS project manager in 2008) 
and both are exemplary of the particularities of Madagascar’s environmental 
governance structure.  
As a ‘private organisation that runs a public utility’, ANGAP (or MNP) 
has among its members the three biggest environmental NGOs that operate 
in the country—WWF, WCS, CI—acting as both financial and technical 
partners. USAID and the WB provide funding, along with the German 
Development Agency (GTZ), the German Development Bank KFW and the 
EU. ANAE, on the other hand, receives Swiss and other NGO funding (Bidaud 
2012:70), and although it is intricately connected to the Ministry, it poses as 
a non-state organism as a means of appeasing donors’ concerns over state 
corruption. We can therefore begin to see how both ANAE and ANGAP 
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respond to the WB’s and USAID’s policy of diverting environmental 
governance away from the state and into public/private partnerships.  
As part of its efforts to include local populations in programmes of 
sustainable development, the EP1 embarked on the ‘Integrated Conservation 
and Development Programme’ (ICDP) approach which had been formulated 
by the WWF in 1985 (Hufty and Muttenzer 2002). Aiming to depart from 
inefficient and expensive experiences of ‘fortress conservation’ (where 
whole populations are excluded and displaced from conservation areas), this 
model proposed the integration of local people into conservation activities. 
This was to be done through the provision of employment in eco-tourism 
and small, rural development projects, as well as through the establishment 
of buffer zones around strict protected areas where certain resource uses 
were allowed (see Gezon 2006; Harper 2002; Sodikoff 2012a for 
ethnographies of ICDP projects). The ‘development’ part of ICDP 
approaches, however, always remained ancillary to conservation (Hufty and 
Muttenzer 2002:6) and was, in any case, insufficient to sustain more than a 
few families within whole villages.  
The beginning of the NEAP’s second phase, EP2 (1997-2003), 
coincided with political turmoil at a national level, where Ratsiraka was first 
ousted and replaced by Albert Zafy in 1993 as President of the Third 
Republic, and then elected back into office in 1996, just before the EP2 was 
launched. This second phase focused on the process of decentralisation and 
regionalisation, in an effort to correct the deficiencies of the ICDP and as a 
continuation and deepening of economic liberalisation policies. A renewed 
effort to bring conservation and development together was synthesised in 
the 1996 GELOSE law (Gestion Locale Sécurisé), which proposed the 
creation of contractual agreements between local populations and the state 
in order to define local rules of use and access (and where NGOs would act 
as mediators in negotiations). As Hufty and Muttenzer argue, this shift in 
approach owes its legacy to ‘a new philosophy of foreign aid’ that was 
developing internationally and which was based on a ‘re-discovery of the 
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traditional’ and on a turn to decentralisation through the notion of 
‘community forestry’ (2002:6). Although the programme has succeeded in 
setting a significant number of contracts in place, its efficacy remains under 
debate (Kull 2002).  
Political turmoil ensued once again in 2002, and ended with the exile 
of Ratsiraka and the arrival of President Marc Ravalomanana.  
Ravalomanana is usually cited as the environmental president par 
excellence: at the 2003 World Parks Congress in South Africa he pledged to 
triple the number of protected areas in the island and create a ‘6-million-
hectare network of terrestrial and marine reserves’ (Duffy 2006:741). This 
episode is representative of Ravalomanana’s manoeuvre to break ties with 
France and ally with the US and South Africa. It has been suggested, in fact, 
that his pledge to triple the country’s protected areas was largely the result 
of pressure by Conservation International and the WWF, who played a 
powerful card with Ravalomanana as key players in Washington-based 
environmental policy (Duffy 2006:742).  
Whatever the reason, the beginning of the EP3, which was launched in 
2004, was marked by strong government support to conservation initiatives 
along with a revitalised commitment to liberalisation policies, of which 
Ravalomanana became a fervent advocate (foreign direct investment is 
reported to have risen from $86 million in 2005 to $1.47 billion in 2008 
(Dewar et al. 2013)). In terms of conservation, the third phase of the NEAP 
saw three distinct developments which set it apart from earlier initiatives: a 
resurgence of scientific discourses calling for exclusionary practices at the 
expense of development activities (Bidaud 2012; Duffy 2006:743); an ‘eco-
regional’ perspective largely based on increasing the extent of protected 
areas to form large biodiversity corridors (Ferguson 2009:133); and the rise 
of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), with carbon at the forefront and 
which has marked the country’s environmental policy this past decade.  
Among PES projects, which contemplate watersheds or biodiversity, 
Bidaud argues that forest carbon projects have been ‘the most visible, the 
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best financed and the earliest in their implementation in Madagascar’ 
(2012:121). TAMS was the only project that aimed to attain CDM status, but 
it was often presented as being part of the larger ‘Ankeniheny-Zahamena 
Biodiversity Corridor’, CAZ. This 425,000 hectare initiative managed by CI 
has been posed as one of the major REDD projects in the country and as an 
international example of REDD methodology by the World Bank (Bidaud 
2012:140). Another flagship carbon project is the Makira Forest REDD+ 
Project in north-east Madagascar, managed by the Wildlife Conservation 
Society (WCS), and which in 2013 became the first ever African project to 
put ‘Government-backed’ and ‘verified’ offsets for sale in the open market, 
with 32 million tons of carbon predicted to be stored in the forest over thirty 
years, and 700,000 carbon credits thus produced (WCS 2013). 
In 2009, and after deadly protests in the capital city of Antananarivo, 
Ravalomanana was exiled to South Africa. His demise is usually associated to 
a deal he was supposedly negotiating with South-Korean company Daewoo 
to lease half of the country’s arable land. Andry Rajoelina—a young DJ from 
Antananarivo—took over the Government, inaugurating what would 
become a five-year transitional period which saw the living standards of the 
population decline at an alarming pace. In the wake of what was 
internationally deemed a coup d’état major donors withdrew all but 
humanitarian aid, and no follow-ups to the NEAP nor to its funds were 
established. During my last stage of fieldwork in 2013, and with the political 
crisis still unsolved, a new batch of funding was released nonetheless. It was 
dedicated exclusively to the operation of the last stage of the EP3 in relation 
to REDD, Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation. This, 
however, was not to be given directly to the (non-recognised) government, 
but rather channelled through NGOs (Bidaud 2012:83). The transitional 
government has in fact been widely accused of allowing the most recent 
episode of forest destruction, benefitting from illegal rosewood extraction 
by Malagasy and Chinese merchants.  
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On December 2013 elections were finally held, putting an end to the 
transitional period. A remarkable event, signifying the particularities of 
environmental management in the country, was CI’s endorsement of the 
newly elected President, Hery Rajaonarimampianina. CI’s President Russ 
Mittermeier described him as ‘a promising new leader’ (Mittermeier 2014) 
after meeting him only a month after he had taken office, due to his 
determination to put an end to the rosewood trade and commit to 
conservation efforts.  
We can thus begin to see here some of the particularities of 
Madagascar’s historical and contemporary forms of environmental 
management, marked by a prominent and powerful presence of 
international donors and NGOs. Duffy has referred to Madagascar’s specific 
situation as an instance of the ‘governance state’ (Harrison 2004), arguing 
that, over the last two decades, ‘global networks of governance have become 
indivisible from nation states’ and a shift in the location of authority has 
taken place, leading to a ‘re-defined sovereignty’ (Duffy 2006:734).  
As we have seen, this translates into powerful networks of 
transnational actors that determine national policy, and where the 
government intervenes as one more actor, and ‘not necessarily the most 
important one’ (Duffy 2006:736). A case in point analysed by Duffy is ‘The 
Donor Consortium’, which developed along with the NEAP and the Malagasy 
Charter for the Environment in the early 90s. The Consortium is led by the 
World Bank and involves USAID, German, Japanese and Swiss governments 
and the WWF, WCS, and CI. As Duffy argues, the Consortium’s particularity 
lies in the power of environmental NGOs who do not only contribute to 
environmental policy but also direct ‘all forms of national policy-making in 
Madagascar’ (Duffy 2006:741). Ravalomanana’s decision to announce the 
tripling of the country’s protected areas is but one example of the influence 
of NGOs within the Consortium and national policy.  Much of this power is 
not just forged in Madagascar, but actually comes from the US political 
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context, where NGOs have developed a strong lobbying capacity over USAID 
and the World Bank.  
Importantly, however, Duffy reminds us that the circulation of power 
through these networks is neither unidirectional nor ‘monolithic’, where the 
state becomes subject to a powerful and coherent set of external actors that 
dictate policy unanimously. Within such networks, power plays, contingency 
and clashes occur between different donors, and the state (as we will see for 
the case of TAMS) still gets to have a say. Rather, Duffy argues that ‘global 
environmental governance might be thought of more fruitfully as a system 
of practices and regulations that are still emergent and incomplete’ 
(2006:743). I will return to this notion of emergence and incompleteness at 
the end, when I introduce the concept of ‘assemblage’ as a productive way of 
thinking about TAMS as forest carbon project. It is to its history that I now 
turn.  
TAMS, or the complicated project of Andasibe 
Andasibe 
Andasibe refers both to the municipality (Commune Rurale) and its 
administrative centre (the town of Andasibe) that is located 120 km east of 
Antananarivo, on the National Route 2 (RN2). It forms part of the region of 
Alaotra-Mangoro, and within it, the district of Moramanga—which also 
marks the district capital, only 20 km away from Andasibe.  
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Figure 6. The Municipality of Andasibe. Source: Madagascar’s Geographical 
Institute, FTM (Foiben-taosarintanin’i Madagasikara) 
 
The municipality is made up of six ‘fokontany’ (Andasibe, Falierana, 
Andasifahatelo, Ampangalantsary, Morafeno and Menalamba) the smallest 
administrative units in Madagascar. In 2007, it had around 12500 
inhabitants, with almost half of them residing in and around the town of 
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Andasibe34. Out of these, 70% were Betsimisaraka, 20% Merina and 15% 
Bezanozano. As is often the case in rural Madagascar, local elites are formed 
mostly by Merina, Chinese or Indian families, who own or dominate most of 
the local trade. Andasibe’s Mayor during my stay there was Mr. Abdoul 
Kader, a man of Indian and Malagasy origin, whose family was one of the 
most powerful in town.  
Although Andasibe’s lush forested landscapes dominate the area’s 
contemporary conservation-based economy, their role in past industrial 
activities tends to be forgotten. In later chapters I will explore the area’s 
history as key logging site for the early development of the colony (chapter 
four), and as an important enclave for the production of graphite, which 
began around the 1930s (chapter six). Although the graphite mines closed 
over a decade ago, Andasibe is less than 20 kilometres away from the 
contemporary mine of Ambatovy, which began its nickel and cobalt mining 
operations in 2012 and is one of the largest of its kind in the world.  The site 
is run by Canadian conglomerate Sherritt International, who built a 250 km 
long pipeline that goes from the point of extraction to the eastern port of 
Toamasina. The mine provided (temporary) employment opportunities for 
local populations during building, although it also had to relocate some 
families as a result of the pipeline. While its operations have been 
surrounded by controversy over permits and environmental and social 
impact reports, the mine has often partnered with conservation initiatives in 
the area (such as the National Park or the CAZ), and in 2013 began the 
development of its own biodiversity corridor ‘Corridor Forestier Analamay-
Mantadia’ (CFAM).  
Although Ambatovy plays no small part in Andasibe’s local economy, 
the area is economically fuelled by eco-tourism (for both national and 
international tourists) thanks to its renowned protected areas. Its biggest 
attraction is the Andasibe-Mantadia National Park (AMNP), which covers a 
                                                        
34 Andasibe 57901, Falierana 1432, Andasifahatelo 1403, Ampangalantsary 1501, 
Morafeno 1159, Menalamba 1198. 
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total of about 16000 hectares divided between the small Réserve Spéciale 
Analamazaotra in the town of Andasibe (810 ha), and the much bigger 
Mantadia area. Adjacent to the AMNP there is also the Forest Station (Station 
Forestier, 700 ha), run by the local organisation ‘Association Mitsinjo’, who 
also manages the nearby marsh of Torotorofotsy. Mitsinjo was established in 
1991 by German biologist Rainer Dolch in partnership with local people, and 
played an important role in TAMS, as I explain below. Andasibe’s most iconic 
elements are the indri (Indri indri)—the biggest lemur in Madagascar—and 
the orchids that flourish in its humid climate. The area’s flora and fauna do 
not just attract tourists, but also draw in a large number of national and 
international environmental researchers.  
The local economy is therefore dominated by the conservation 
industry. There are two four-star hotels in the area and a series of other 
hotels, bungalows and hostels in town and in the environs of the entrance to 
the National Park. The tourist guide industry booms during the high season, 
attracting many guides from the capital city who wait at the Park entrance to 
offer their services (a guide is required in order to visit the site). Here, the 
knowledge of languages is essential, and the industry is therefore structured 
around ethnic and class divisions: those with easier access to education and 
language learning (usually Merina or from the capital) have a better chance 
of attracting customers than locals do. The AMNP reproduces this labour 
division, with Merina occupying the best administrative positions, and local 
Betsimisaraka employed as manual labour (further explored in chapter five, 
see also Sodikoff 2012). As one goes further inland, in turn, to villages like 
Mahatsara, the chances of making a living out of conservation decline 
drastically.  
It was in this environment, as the area’s eco-tourist activity took off 
during the late 1980s with the opening of the AMNP, that TAMS began to 
take shape.  
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TAMS, Tetik’asa Mampody Savoka 
Considering how complex and extensive the network of organisations 
involved in TAMS is, it is particularly surprising that the origins of TAMS go 
back to the vision and efforts of a single individual with no organisational 
affiliations. Louise Holloway, an independent environmental researcher 
from the UK with a background in environmental studies, arrived in 
Madagascar in 1990 for an expedition studying the sunset moth (Chrysiridia 
rhipheus), a day-flying lepidopteron endemic to Madagascar whose colourful 
appearance had made it famous worldwide. The expedition took her to 13 
protected areas and surroundings, among which was the Andasibe-Mantadia 
National Park (AMNP), which had just been inaugurated the year before.  As 
she climbed the locally famous rock of Andriandavibe, she heard the calls of 
the indri, and realised they were coming from small forest fragments from 
which the lemurs could not get out. Aware that these fragments were partly 
the result of tavy, Holloway also met with local farmers. It emerged that they 
were migrants coming from areas where the land had become too degraded 
for cultivation due to over-intensive farming, and who were in search of new 
arable land. This pattern seemed recurrent in the area and was aggravated, 
in Holloway’s view, by the lack of land tenure security. Both people’s 
agricultural futures and biodiversity seemed to be at risk.  
Over the coming years her research focused on rainforest regeneration 
dynamics in Madagascar, which seemed to differ from forests elsewhere in 
that regeneration did not occur naturally. Two factors emerged as key 
causes: the fact that seeds were not being dispersed because lemurs, being 
arboreal primates, would not leave the forest patches they inhabited; and 
that the destruction of micro fungi through burning led to conditions that 
favoured invasive plants instead of forest vegetation. Part of the approach 
she devised involved the rehabilitation of degraded land in order to create 
forest corridors through which lemurs could move about and disperse 
seeds, while other ideas focused on securing land tenure for farmers and 
developing sustainable agricultural systems that would allow for a faster 
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regeneration of the fallows, thus curtailing the need for farmers to expand 
into the forest. The creation of forest corridors to catalyse the spread of 
plant and animal genetic material, and agricultural techniques to favour an 
improved and ‘settled’ form of tavy would become the main tenets of the 
project in its earlier stages.  
Holloway was, of course, not the only person interested in protecting 
the forests of Andasibe. In 1995, she was contacted by a foreign researcher 
who was at that time working in the area and had heard about her ideas for 
establishing forest corridors. She insisted on the necessity of her project, 
alarmed as she was by the state of the lemurs in the area, and the first 
feasibility study for the project was carried out, bringing together key 
organisations which already operated in the area in a more or less 
independent way. Thus, the National Park authority ANGAP joined in along 
with SAF-FJKM who were in turn, at the time, collaborating with the US 
organisation ‘Volunteers in Technical Assistance’, VITA, in the management 
of the Analamazaotra forest area. Association Mitsinjo and Man and the 
Environment (MATE)—another organisation with German origins—also 
joined the initiative.   
As the project gathered momentum, with an increasing number of local 
actors interested in becoming involved, a decision was made to hold a public 
meeting in Andasibe to develop a project vision. Along with local 
associations and NGOs, the state administrative structure was present 
through the Mayor and representatives of the Ministry of Water and Forests. 
Holloway recalls the meeting as a turning point for what would later on 
become TAMS. The first seeds of TAMS had thus been planted.  
As TAMS began to grow in scope and actors, Holloway, who had been 
self-funded until then, began to look for ways of funding the initiative, a 
necessity that was born of the magnitude of the project. It was then that the 
first contact with carbon markets took place. Rainer Dolch, from Mitsinjo, 
recalls how Holloway had been looking for funding for a long time, but with 
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no success, and how they saw the carbon market as an opportunity to fund 
TAMS: 
‘Louise had always tried to find funding for such a 
project, and unfortunately never succeeded, so only in the 
late 90s, and early 2000s, well, everybody embarked on 
carbon sequestration projects, which came into fashion 
around then, and Louise and I thought that well, carbon 
sequestration could actually be a tool for funding this 
project. So, our focus was never on carbon sequestration 
per se, but it was rather using carbon sequestration as a 
tool for restoring rainforest’ 
During 1998-99, Holloway was close to making a deal with the Carbon 
Storage Trust, a UK based carbon offset company founded in 1997 which 
later became Climate Care in 2003, and was sold to J.P.Morgan in 2008. The 
deal, which would have seen TAMS partner with Land Rover did not 
materialise due to the delays and difficulties that the voluntary carbon 
market had run into at a global level.  
It would not be until 2002 that TAMS secured some funding as it was 
taken over by Conservation International through their CELB (Centre for 
Environmental Leadership in Business) division. Although CI had been 
working in the country since 1990, their approach had not contemplated 
actual reforestation, but had rather focused on protecting the remaining 
forest. Holloway speculates that their interest in TAMS and change of 
direction may have come through some directive from CI in Washington. It is 
important to remember that this happened a mere three years before the 
Kyoto protocol came into force in 2005, which would set carbon trading in 
place globally. Through CI’s involvement and project takeover, negotiations 
began with World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund to turn TAMS into a pilot CDM 
project. It was at this stage, Holloway claims, that ‘everything started to 
change. What had been bottom-up, it had grown from the ground, it started 
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to become organised at the international and national level’. TAMS had 
turned into a forest carbon project.  
The framing of TAMS as a pilot CDM project saw the inclusion of a wide 
array of actors at every scale. Its most important addition was the 
Government of Madagascar through the Ministry of Environments and 
Forests, MEF. A coordination unit was created at the ministry level, ‘Unité de 
Coordination des Fonds Biocarbone’, UCFBC, with two representatives from 
the General Office of Forests, and two from the General Office of 
Environment (I explore in detail the intricacies of the government’s 
involvement in the project in chapter seven). In 2008, ANAE were appointed 
project managers after a public tender. This was also the year in which 
TAMS became consolidated as a CDM carbon project, as it was then that the 
BioCF and Government of Madagascar signed the Emission Reductions 
Purchasing Agreement (ERPA)—the contract stipulating the carbon 
transaction. Conservation International, who had coordinated and funded 
the project’s initial stages, retreated then to a ‘technical partner’ position, its 
role and influence, however, remaining pivotal, as we will see. At a regional 
level the project also involved CIREF, the regional forestry service, as well as 
other national institutions in a more ancillary way.  
Reforestation was carried out by seven organisations that operated in 
the area of Andasibe and were supervised by ANAE.  Although some of them 
were of a strong local character—like the Association des Guides d’Andasibe, 
AGA or Association Mitsinjo—others were the regional branches of national 
actors, such as SAF-FJKM or the Andasibe Mantadia National Park (AMNP). 
These organisations came to be known in TAMS’ organisational structure as 
FAs—Facilitating Agents—who, in turn, hired local populations to carry out 
reforestation activities. At this point, the project’s organisational structure 
was represented in the following way:  
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Figure 7. TAMS organisational structure. Source: Ankeniheny-Zahamena-
Mantadia Biodiversity Conservation Corridor and Restoration Project (Reforestation 
Component), Project Design Document (PDD), p.62 
 
Part of the reforestation was done on the land managed by the FAs, or 
inside the National Park itself, and another part was carried out in land 
provided by individual farmers in exchange for carbon revenue and work 
(see chapter six).  Although the project initially envisaged the reforestation 
of 3000 hectares, funding and CDM regulation complications only allowed 
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for 1000 hectares to be planted—and of those not all of them turned out to 
be CDM eligible.  A small amount of funding for the project came from the 
World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund, although most of it was channelled through 
the funding dedicated to the third phase of the NEAP (EP3), which came to 
an end in 2011 and never resumed. A year later, the BioCarbon Fund 
cancelled the ERPA. TAMS was over.  
There are many reasons that partly account for the failure of TAMS. 
From the BioCF’s perspective, it was the government’s impasse on the 
establishment of a benefit-sharing agreement with local communities that 
hindered the project, but obstacles abounded in what became known as ‘the 
complicated project of Andasibe’: unclear land tenure; a lack of a legal 
framework to establish the property status of carbon; government 
duplicities that vied with each other for donors’ funding; trees that refused 
to grow or grew too fast; a complex and expensive CDM verification process; 
and more.  Although I explore the project’s perceived ‘complexity’ in chapter 
7, it is essential to bear in mind that this dissertation does not aim to provide 
reasons for the demise of TAMS.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented a social and historical account of 
‘carbon’ through three histories: the development of carbon markets as a 
part of climate change mitigation; the historical trajectory of Madagascar’s 
environmental governance; and the emergence of TAMS and its 
transformation into a forest carbon project.  
We first saw how carbon dioxide emerged as a key indicator of 
anthropogenic environmental degradation, and how it transformed into a 
socio-technical and economic object as part of a more general move to deal 
with the negative effects of industrialisation through market-based 
approaches. Carbon trading was taken up as the most efficient and cost-
effective way of dealing with climate change, and through its inclusion in the 
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Kyoto Protocol (and the parallel development of ‘voluntary markets’) a new 
relationship was forged between industrialised and developing countries on 
the basis of carbon ‘offsets’. Forests figured prominently here as sites where 
offsets could be generated, and Madagascar emerged at the turn of the 
century as a key site for forest carbon projects. This was not simply a result 
of the island’s unique environmental attributes: we have seen how 
Madagascar’s renowned status as environmental hotspot is partly the result 
of the country’s political and economic contexts in relation to global 
historical trajectories. These, in turn, have translated into very specific 
arrangements of power and forms of governance, where the country’s 
biodiversity fuels an equally diverse ‘eco-system’ of national actors, 
transnational NGOs and international donors and institutions.  
TAMS could be explained as the result of the interaction between these 
two histories: the development of global carbon markets as part of climate 
change mitigation and their targeting of Madagascar as global 
environmental hotspot. As such, it may be seen through the lens of 
‘neoliberal conservation’ as described by Büscher et al. ‘as a particular set of 
governmentalities that seeks to extend and police profitable 
commodification processes’ (2012:23). But the history of TAMS presented in 
the last section of this chapter complicates this narrative, as it shows that 
the trajectory of the project is much more messy and much less linear: TAMS 
was not the planned result of a single attempt by a given set of global actors 
to commodify the forests of Andasibe.  It rather emerged through the efforts 
of a single individual and grew progressively at the local level, until it 
reached out to carbon markets as a way of funding the project. It was at this 
stage that TAMS transformed into a forest carbon project and, as Holloway 
explained, ‘everything began to change’ with the incorporation of CI, the 
BioCF and the Government of Madagascar. But even at this stage TAMS 
remained a highly ‘emergent and incomplete’ (2006:743) initiative, just as 
Duffy has argued global environmental governance should be seen—proof of 
which is that TAMS, in any case, never produced any carbon offsets after all.  
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This is not to say that TAMS as forest carbon project did not attend to a 
set of specific neoliberal rationalities and techniques for governing forests 
through carbon markets, but it does point to its ‘living, contingent and 
located’ (Hayden 2003:84) character. How may we think then about (and 
with) TAMS, if we are to depart from a single and coherent view of the 
‘global’ encroaching on the ‘local’ with an already established master plan? 
In this last section, I propose the concept of ‘assemblage’ as a productive 
way of understanding TAMS. 
TAMS as assemblage 
The concept of ‘assemblage’ has recently acquired a notable 
prominence in the social sciences. Marcus and Saka (2006) locate its 
ascendance in its capacity to evoke the ‘ephemeral, the emergent, the 
evanescent, the decentered and the heterogeneous’ (2006:101) without 
having to reject, at the same time, a certain condition of structure. As a 
‘conceptual resource’, with origins in Deleuze and Guattari (1987), later 
explored by Manuel de Landa (2002) and borrowed by Paul Rabinow 
(2003), assemblage has been taken on as an apt element to avoid the rigidity 
of ‘final or stable states’ (Marcus and Saka 2006:106)35. In a similar way, Ong 
and Collier talk of the assemblage ‘as the product of multiple determinations 
that are not reducible to a single logic’ (2005:12).  
In her critical re-reading of Scott’s ‘Seeing Like a State’, Li (2005) offers 
an interesting view of the concept of assemblage in relation to ‘improvement 
schemes’. Her aim is to ‘move beyond’ the binary categories of state and 
non-state spaces, and associated forms of power and resistance, that Scott 
employs to explain high-modernist projects. She therefore challenges the 
‘spatial optic’ of an ‘up there’ all-seeing state, or power, operating 
‘unproblematically across national terrain, colonizing non-state spaces and 
                                                        
35 Rabinow (2003), for example, situates the assemblage between Foucault’s ‘more 
conceptually stable states of ‘problematization’  and ‘apparatus’ (Marcus and Saka 
2006:104).   
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their unruly inhabitants’ (2005:384). Rather, Li brings attention to the array 
of social actors which have been active in the production of ‘improvement 
schemes’, arguing for a vision in which such initiatives do not originate ‘fully 
formed from a single source’, but rather come about as an ‘assemblage of 
objectives, knowledges, techniques and practices of diverse provenance’ 
(2005:386). Her use of Nicholas Rose’s term of ‘contingent lash-up’ (Rose 
1999:276 in; Li 2005:386) to qualify the lack of coherence that improvement 
schemes have in their beginnings and to reject a single ‘state vision’ or 
‘master plan’ (Li 2005:386) offers a productive way of thinking about TAMS’ 
beginnings and its relation to processes of nature commodification and 
neoliberal conservation.  
From the perspective of the assemblage, then, the development of 
TAMS as forest carbon project can be seen as a conglomerate of different 
elements and fragments which, like other ‘programmes and technologies of 
government…may have a rationality, but this is not one of coherence of 
origin or singular essence’ (Rose 1999:276). In a sense, TAMS may be 
apprehended through Foucault’s (1977) description of the French legal 
system, as one ‘full of parts that come from elsewhere, strange couplings, 
chance relations, cogs and levers that aren’t connected, that don’t work, yet 
somehow produce judgements, prisoners, sanctions and much more’ (Rose 
1999:276).  
Through the ‘three histories’ presented in this chapter we have seen 
some of the key ‘parts’ and ‘chance relations’ that led to the emergence of 
TAMS as forest carbon project in the forests of Andasibe. In the following 
chapters I turn to carbon’s multiple social lives as it was put to work in these 
landscapes, in order to explore what these ‘strange couplings’ produced.  
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Part I: Introduction to Chapters Three and Four 
A recent short documentary by the BBC World News’ Africa Business 
Report (BBC n.d.) presents Madagascar’s forests as sites that could generate 
from 50 to 60 million dollars in carbon credits within the next five years (up 
to 2020). As the video shows a burning hill in the forest of Analamazaotra in 
Andasibe, reporter Jason Boswell tells us that, 
‘Over the last half century, huge swathes of Madagascar’s 
unique forests have been lost to slash-and-burn farming 
and urbanisation, but the government is now working to 
develop a number of projects in the country which could 
transform this sea of green into a different type of 
resource: one, which would not only protect the country’s 
dwindling forests, but could in turn bring in profits from 
the sale of carbon credits’. 
The story then goes on to present this multi-million dollar ‘potential 
revenue’ as an opportunity for both the government and the communities 
that live in and around the forests.  
As exemplified in this short video, forests in developing countries are 
being re-conceptualised as repositories of a new source of value—the 
carbon credit—with enormous potential. By turning a source of emissions 
into a carbon sink, forest carbon projects aim to actualise this value and 
provide economic, environmental and social benefits.  
What kind of value do carbon credits propose in forest landscapes and 
how is it to be rendered visible, measured and distributed? What kind of 
material and discursive elements are mobilised to bring it about and how 
does it articulate with perceived forms of waste?  If, in turn, value is a 
‘relational concept’ and ‘must always be thought of as “value for whom?”’ 
(Ferry 2011:925), what other forms of locating and understanding value are 
negated or obscured through carbon credits?  
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These are some of the questions that I pose in the next two chapters, as 
I interrogate the nature and effects of this specific form, or social life, of 
carbon— the carbon credit or Certified Emission Reduction (CER)—as it is 
put to work in the landscapes of Andasibe.  
As we will see, the transformation of perceived waste into a source of 
value was TAMS’ most fundamental objective as a forest carbon project, as it 
aimed to turn present or future waste (degraded fallows from tavy) into a 
source of value (the carbon credit through the carbon sink). It was only 
through halting tavy and transforming what were perceived as actual and 
potentially degraded landscapes into forested ones, or what is the same, 
through an intervention in a teleology of degradation, that actual 
‘reductions’ could take place and hence value could be generated. The 
transformation of waste must therefore be seen as the most fundamental 
element of a forest carbon economy: credits or CERs originate exclusively by 
transforming perceived waste into value. Value and waste—and their 
relation to forests and tavy—are therefore the key organising principles that 
I employ in the next two chapters to explore this particular social life of 
‘carbon’.  I do it, however, through various perspectives.  
Rather than taking waste solely as the semantic counterpart of value, 
as it has sometimes been portrayed (Thompson 1979), my aim is to show 
the complicated and productive interplay between these two concepts, 
which are often far from clear-cut. Thus, in chapter three, we will see how 
ambiguity and liminality are defining features of degraded fallows as waste. 
In chapter four, in turn, the straightforward division between forests and 
tavy, as value and waste, will be complicated, as I focus on the way these two 
concepts are mobilised and entangled to generate carbon value. Therefore, 
far from treating ‘loss, waste and the unproductive’ as ‘anti-economic’ (as 
strucuralist positions have sometimes represented waste, see Hawkins and 
Muecke 2003:xii),  I will explore how waste mediates processes of value 
production as part of forest carbon projects, as I open the black box of the 
carbon credit, or CER, and dig into what I term its ‘constitutive elements’.  
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As we saw in the previous chapter, TAMS was not ‘born’ as a carbon 
project, but progressively became one. The project’s transformation into a 
carbon generating activity led to a shift in the kinds of things that were seen 
as valuable and those that were perceived to be waste—with key 
implications for the future of Andasibe’s forests and its inhabitants. These 
are the transformations that I trace in chapter three, as I focus on the 
specific logic of value that carbon credits introduced in TAMS.  
In chapter four I present a historical account of the economic and 
political roles that the forests of Andasibe have played in colonial and post-
colonial times, which are often forgotten due to a conservationist discourse 
on the area’s pristineness. I will also show how, while always represented as 
the antithesis of value and relegated to a marginal position, tavy has 
historically been central to processes of forest ‘valorisation’. This continues 
to be the case in a more acute way since, I will argue, the threat of tavy is 
fundamentally constitutive of carbon credits as a form of value. Forest 
carbon projects, often presented as radical new forms of valorising forests, 
will thus be shown to follow very specific historical trajectories of land and 
labour exploitation.  
Instead of a natural resource or an already existing commodity, then, 
‘carbon’ appears in the next two chapters as a particular form of value—the 
carbon credit—with specific capacities and effects. It is to these that I now 
turn.  
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Chapter Three: From Fallows to Forest 
 
Introduction 
‘TAMS is so much more than a carbon production machine. 
The statement made in the 2007 report on project 
development still stands “It is necessary to consider if we 
want to make the project fit a particular market or to 
harness a market to facilitate our project. … There is a 
danger that preoccupation with meeting the demands of the 
market could subsume the original goals, ultimately also 
threatening the viability of the carbon market aspect of 
TAMS”’. 
Louise Holloway, report for Conservation International, 
2008. 
 
When I spoke to her in 2013, Louise Holloway hadn’t had proper news 
of TAMS for about five years. The last time she’d been to Andasibe was in 
2008, when she had helped with the takeover of the project by ANAE36, 
TAMS’ newly appointed project manager. Conservation International (CI), 
Holloway claims, were very keen on ANAE taking the lead and her ceasing to 
be involved even in project evaluation. She left with the concern that many 
things remained unresolved and whenever she contacted CI or some other 
actors, she says, news was superficial and uninformative. The only 
interesting information had come from one or two project workers in 
Andasibe, who had e-mailed her asking her to come back and work with 
them again because ‘things weren’t working’—an unsettling yet vague piece 
of news. The next time she heard about the project was during our interview 
                                                        
36 Association Nationale d'Actions Environnementales 
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in September 2013, after my return from the field. Hearing about the 
apparent collapse of TAMS, and the wait and uncertainty over ‘benefits’ that 
people in Mahatsara had experienced as a result of their involvement in the 
project, she sounded distraught, and she commented, ‘That is just utterly, 
utterly, tragic … the whole initial idea was sustainability for all, the people, 
the forest, biodiversity and it’s almost like it’s gone in the opposite 
direction’. This was the person who had sometimes been called ‘the mother 
of TAMS’ being told about its death.  
In 2013, of course, TAMS was a very different object from that which 
Holloway had built over the previous decade. Instead of the ambitious yet 
locally based initiative of ‘sustainability for all’, as she had called it, TAMS 
was then (or, at least, had recently been), a forest carbon project, also known 
as the ‘Ankeniheny-Zahamena-Mantadia Biodiversity Conservation Corridor 
and Restoration Project (Reforestation Component)’ at the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) project registry. What had happened over 
the years to TAMS and what did Holloway mean by ‘the whole initial idea’ of 
‘sustainability for all’ having ‘gone almost in the opposite direction’?  
In this chapter I propose to offer some answers to these questions, as I 
explore some of the key transformations that TAMS underwent as it became 
a forest carbon project. I take Holloway’s (premonitory) comment above 
regarding the ‘demands of the market’ as an illustration of the form that 
carbon takes in this chapter. Rather than a natural resource or an already 
existing commodity, carbon appears here as a particular form of value—the 
carbon credit or Certified Emission Reduction (CER)—with a logic of its 
own. By carbon credits’ ‘logic of value’, then, I refer to the specific ways of 
identifying, measuring and understanding worth that were introduced in 
TAMS through its engagement with carbon markets—that is, in its effort to 
transform into a CDM project that would generate carbon credits. The 
‘demands of the market’ in Holloway’s terms could therefore be understood 
as a set of logics and associated mechanisms that operated with the aim of 
generating value (carbon credits) in a forest carbon project. It is important 
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to point out that my aim is not to offer an explanation for the demise of 
TAMS, but rather to explore the effects of this specific form of carbon in the 
project’s transition from its earlier to later stages. As we will see, the 
transformation of TAMS into a carbon project brought about fundamental 
re-organisations in TAMS that affected the key elements and objectives of 
the initial project—with profound consequences for those involved, 
especially tavy farmers.  
In order to explore the transformation of TAMS into forest carbon 
project and its effects, I focus not simply on the operation of carbon credits’ 
particular logic of value but, rather, in the re-organisation of the 
relationships between value and waste that this logic precipitated. Since its 
inception, TAMS was fundamentally a project aimed at producing value from 
waste37 (as I show below), but the way this process was understood and 
carried out changed drastically through the project’s engagement with 
carbon markets. In the sections below, then, I introduce two cases in which 
carbon’s logic of value fundamentally transformed TAMS by re-articulating 
the relationships between what was seen as valuable and what was 
perceived as waste, and the consequent ways of dealing with each element.  
I begin by exploring the diverse and contested roles that degraded 
fallows played as key element in TAMS’ earlier and later stages, the way this 
related to the logic of value introduced by carbon credits, and its effects. 
Degraded fallows, I will argue, are a particular type of resource in that they 
oscillate between productive and unproductive pasts and futures, depending 
on how value and waste are imagined and articulated temporally. As we will 
see, different understandings and treatments of degraded fallows as waste 
transformed TAMS’ objective from ‘restoring the fallows’ to ‘bringing back 
the forest’. This, I will argue, was the necessary result of bringing carbon’s 
logic of value into the project, since, in order to generate carbon credits, 
                                                        
37 The entire carbon trading system too is, in itself, a way of dealing with waste in 
order to guarantee tolerable levels of CO2 for life on earth. In this chapter I only focus on 
waste as a part of TAMS as forest carbon project.  
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waste—either as fallows or tavy—had to disappear from Andasibe’s present 
and future landscapes. Different proposals to recover value from degraded 
fallows in the present, therefore, led to the recovery of different points in the 
past—with fundamental implications for the future of tavy farmers.  
Leaving the fallows aside, I introduce a second case where I explore the 
dismembering of TAMS’ constituent parts into different fragments as an 
effect of carbon credits’ logic of value. This transformation, I argue, resulted 
in some elements being valorised, while others were wasted. But carbon’s 
logic of value did not simply expel or reject certain elements from TAMS’ 
internal structure; it also re-constituted them as something slightly—yet 
fundamentally—different in (carbon) productive ways. The result, as we will 
see, was that of socialising the costs of carbon credit production. In the 
conclusion I briefly present two other examples from the literature that 
seem to point to common themes in carbon credits’ capacity to re-articulate 
questions of value and waste in forest carbon projects. 
Waste in this chapter appears through various guises, as degraded 
fallows, tavy, or those elements in TAMS that became unproductive. I 
therefore draw on different perspectives for my analysis, which range from 
ideas on degrees of value (Thompson 1979), the role of waste in processes 
of recycling (Alexander and Reno 2012), its productive ambiguity (Hawkins 
and Muecke 2003; Taussig 2003), or its cultural semantics where issues of 
‘purity’, ‘memory’ and the relationships between ‘wholes’ and ‘parts’ are 
developed (Moser 2002). What I hope transpires is that, far from simply a 
counterpart to value, the category of waste offers dynamic and productive 
ways of exploring complex processes of value production in forest carbon 
projects. Instead of a category of absolute, ‘undifferentiated’ worthlessness 
(Scanlan 2005:107), or value’s dark mirror, waste will be shown to be an 
illuminating object.  
Back to the future: Recovering different pasts for different futures 
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In the next sections I draw on project documentation and interviews 
with project actors (especially Louise Holloway) to present the changes in 
TAMS’ treatments and understandings of value and waste that came about 
through its engagement with carbon markets. I first introduce TAMS’ most 
relevant element—the degraded fallows—and explore its temporal 
characteristics in relation to ideas of waste and value, where the notion of 
liminality comes to the fore. With this in mind, I move on to present the 
different ways in which degraded fallows were understood and dealt with in 
TAMS’ earlier and later stages. Finally, I suggest that one way of 
understanding these changes is by attending to carbon credits’ logic of value, 
which is premised on a past and a future of absolute value in the forest, and 
where any present and future possibility of tavy (seen as waste) must be 
foreclosed. It is thus, I will argue, that we can understand the change from 
‘the project to restore the fallows’ to ‘the project to bring back the forest’.  
Degraded fallows: between un/productive pasts and futures 
TAMS—Tetik’asa Mampody Savoka—has often been translated as the 
‘project to bring back the forest’ (Dolch et al. 2009). Its most accurate 
translation, however, may be ‘the project to restore the fallows’, ideas of the 
forest being only implicit in its interpretation, but not present in its literal 
form. The ambiguity lies in its verb, mampody, which could be understood as 
either to bring back, change or return to a previous state/recover.  It is 
unclear, however, whether it points to a restoration of the fallows to a 
previous, un-degraded state as fallows, or to an even earlier one as primary 
forest, obfuscating, therefore, TAMS’ main objective through a temporal 
ambiguity.  
Institutional definitions of TAMS have exclusively focused on the idea 
of bringing back the forest. In ‘REDD: a casebook of on-the-ground 
experience’ (2010), for example, produced by Conservation International 
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(CI) and two other transnational environmental NGOs, Tetik’asa Mampody 
Savoka38 is translated as ‘Make the Fallows Go Back to Forest’ (2010:9).  
Interestingly, the understanding of TAMS by its original designer, 
Louise Holloway, does not contain this reference to the forest. Although she 
was not present when the name TAMS was chosen to represent the project 
in one of the early meetings held by the local organisations that were coming 
together in Andasibe as a result her initiative, she recalls her own 
understanding of the name in the following terms:  
‘I understood it not to mean bring back forest but to make 
the savoka (fallows) work again... I liked that, because so 
much of the land had been abandoned because the savoka 
was getting more and more degraded and wasn’t 
restoring soil fertility in the end, so the idea of making 
savoka work again was really nice … The key idea was 
that we were working with savoka to either restore it or 
catalyse its restoration in the form of forest linkages or 
for sustainable cultivation systems, so the key thing was 
the savoka’. 
Although this was of course her own understanding of TAMS and does 
not mean it was shared by every participant, it does point, as we will see, to 
key contestations over the essence of TAMS. Far from a simple matter of 
translation accuracy, then, these diverse understandings of how TAMS was 
to ‘restore’ (mampody) degraded fallows illustrate one of the key 
transformations that TAMS underwent as it became a ‘carbon project’.  
In a general sense, the fallows are fields that, after having been under 
production for a given number of years, are left to rest so that they may 
regain their fertility. At this stage, therefore, the fallows lie in an interim 
position between productive pasts and productive futures. By allowing them 
                                                        
38 Which features as the reforestation component of the larger Ankeniheny-
Zahamena-Mantadia Biodiversity Conservation Corridor and Restoration Project (CAZ).  
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enough time to regain fertility, that is, by suspending them in time, they can 
be (re)integrated into new cycles of production as fertile land. However, 
depending on how many cycles of production-regeneration the fallows have 
undergone, they can eventually become too degraded and lose their capacity 
for regeneration, at which point they become wasteland and are abandoned. 
The latent value they held as fallows, then, disappears because they cannot 
be re-introduced into new cycles of production. This does not mean that 
degraded fallows, as agricultural waste, are completely excluded from 
productive processes because even when their agricultural value has been 
exhausted, they can be used for firewood or pastures.  Even at this stage, in 
fact, degraded fallows beyond apparent recovery may retain some latent 
value in that within longer time frames, their return to agricultural cycles 
could be imagined. Their decay into waste is therefore gradual39 and subject 
to the specific timeframes that are employed to imagine their recovery.  
Value and waste can, of course, be differently imagined. In Andasibe, in 
fact, the fallows are not just evocative of agricultural pasts and futures for 
tavy farmers, but also conjure imaginations of valuable or non-valuable 
nature(s) among conservationists. From this perspective, the fallows are 
identified as secondary vegetation in reference to the overgrowth that takes 
over the temporarily or permanently abandoned field. As such, they gain a 
large part of their meaning by their opposition to the primary—that is, 
untouched or virgin—forest, articulating a dichotomy between a valuable 
biodiversity and an ‘invasive’ or non-valuable one (this is further explored in 
the next chapter). Temporal imaginations are also key here because from a 
conservationist perspective, the abandoned grassland is thought to contain 
no intrinsic natural value due to low biodiversity levels and no way of going 
back to a ‘purer’ natural state as primary forest on its own. Reforestation 
                                                        
39 McConnell argues that the fallows in the Malagasy eastern rainforest tend to be 
categorised according to the degree of regeneration allowed in the following way: 
‘ramarasana (just harvested); dedeka (1—2-year fallow), savoka (3—10-year fallow) 
jingeranto (secondary forest)’ (2002:219). In Mahatsara, the most common way of talking 
about fallows is as savoka. 
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initiatives such as TAMS can therefore be seen as similar to recycling 
practices (explored below) in their attempt to transform waste into a 
renewed source of value—a sort of return to valuable pasts.  
Practices of recovering or restoring degraded fallows are therefore 
intricately linked to the temporalities around which waste and value are 
articulated. It could be argued that, like the Irish bogs of the nineteenth 
century discussed by Taussig (2003), degraded fallows derive their 
peculiarity as a natural resource—or as a peculiar form of waste—by virtue 
of being a sort of ‘suspended life-form’ (Taussig 2003:12) evocative of past 
and future imaginations articulated around what constitutes value and 
waste40. In this wavering between states, or liminal situation, the fallows are 
constituted as an object of imagination of different pasts and futures, in 
relation to what are perceived as the appropriate ways of transforming 
nature for human use—that is, of producing (in this case recovering) value. 
How value—and consequently, waste—is understood in the present thus 
determines the particular point of the past to be recovered and, 
consequently, the kind of future being proposed. It is this productive 
liminality and its relation to the construction of different possible futures 
that I want to focus on here.  
It is important to remember that the fallows are an essential stage in 
the agricultural cycle of tavy, and, therefore, the different treatments of the 
fallows relate directly to this question. As we will see below, the 
transformation of the types of futures proposed by TAMS as a result of 
carbon’s re-articulation between value and waste had direct consequences 
for the future of tavy and those who practice it.  
The aim of the section below is, therefore, to elucidate the different 
kinds of futures that were imagined as TAMS mutated from Holloway’s 
                                                        
40 ‘In the form of peat’, Taussig elaborates, ‘the bog is a cheery, life-maintaining 
thing, to be sure. Yet as muddy prehistoric substitute for the oak forests than once covered 
the island, and as the remnant of what the wealthy landowners have otherwise 
appropriated or drained through centuries, the bog is a poignant sign of destruction, 
exclusion and poverty. Black butter comes to mind’. (2003:12)  
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initial idea of forest restoration into a carbon project in its later years. In 
order to illustrate this, I focus on the role of degraded fallows or savoka—as 
a key element in TAMS—and its representation in two documents that were 
pivotal in establishing TAMS’ essence, as I explain below. In their own ways, 
each had the task of laying down the principles of TAMS, and taken together 
they are exemplary of the changing roles given to the fallows, and their 
position in articulations between waste and value. I complement this 
material with explanations provided by project actors, especially by Louise 
Holloway, and excerpts of consultancy reports she produced for CI.  
The project to ‘restore the fallows’ 
The first document is a power point presentation created by Holloway 
where she lays down the ‘principles of TAMS’ and their implementation ‘in 
practice’. I also draw on another presentation where she delves deeper into 
the production of the ‘savoka garden’, for reasons that I explain below. Both 
objects are part of a series of presentations that were produced as 
‘deliverables under contract to CI’ and their role was to be passed on to 
representatives of the FAs41 and ANAE as they took part in workshops.  As 
such, they were key in establishing the ‘vision’ of TAMS from Holloway’s 
perspective and the ways in which this vision could be attained through 
practice.  
Holloway presents TAMS as an integrated vision of ‘human and 
ecosystem well-being’, where human well-being is defined as the situation in 
which ‘all members of society are able to determine and satisfy their long-
term needs’, and ecosystem well-being is considered as the ‘maintenance of 
diversity and the capacity to support people and the ensemble of living 
things’. This was to be done through a dual approach: the recovery of land 
fertility from degraded fallows for agricultural purposes and the recovery of 
forest cover through reforestation to create biodiversity corridors (where 
                                                        
41The FAs or Facilitating Agents were the organisations working in Andasibe in 
charge of TAMS’ work on the ground, such as reforestation and community involvement. 
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lemurs, in turn, would contribute to the dispersal of plant genetic material as 
they would be able to move between forest fragments).  
The principles of the project set out in the document conform to the 
general tenets of permaculture, as the document itself explains, and are 
centred around ‘the establishment of sustainable human habitats following 
nature’s models’, and on ideas of ‘working with nature, not against it’. 
Permaculture has been described by its proponents as a ‘holistic’ approach 
that merges ‘ethical principles, designs guidelines and techniques for 
creating sustainable, permanent culture and agriculture’ (Veteto and 
Lockyer 2008:49)42. Following these principles, then, Holloway’s idea was to 
‘maximise’ ‘space’, ‘time’ and ‘production’ through agricultural techniques to 
be applied to the fallows, which at the same time would have favoured the 
regeneration of the forest, to be complemented through reforestation with 
native species. In order to attain this vision, then, Holloway elaborated the 
specific objectives of TAMS in the following way:  
 
 Restoring degraded areas to transform them into 
functional ecosystems. 
 Re-establishing the continuity of the natural 
habitat between Mantadia and Vohidrazana43. 
 Facilitating the option for people to improve their 
well-being, especially food and tenure security. 
 Facilitate the conservation of biodiversity. 
 Adapt to and mitigate climate change. 
                                                        
42 Developed during the 70s in Australia, permaculture was posed as an alternative 
to dominant understandings of ‘development’ through the application of  ‘systems ecology, 
landscape geography and ethnobiology’ to areas as diverse as the design of buildings, 
farming systems or urban areas (Veteto and Lockyer 2008:51).  
43 This was, at that time, the proposed project area but it stretched as TAMS 
developed into a carbon project.  
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 Innovate in the use of ecosystem services market 
(specifically the carbon market) to attain the 
above objectives. 
 Capture and stock carbon to mitigate climate 
change. 
We can see how, at that time, the generation of carbon credits was but 
one of the seven specific objectives that made up TAMS.  
As I have explained above, one of the key elements in Holloway’s 
design of the project was the reforestation of the degraded fallows with 
native tree species to form the famous biodiversity corridors, in order to 
favour the dispersal of animal and plant genetic material, and catalyse the 
regeneration of the forest. The other saw the regeneration of the savoka into 
fertile cultivable land, to facilitate the settlement of itinerant tavy farmers 
and an increase in their yields. This latter initiative was to be carried out 
through a combination of improved agricultural techniques in land under 
cultivation, income generating activities such as ‘fruit tree gardens’, 
‘sustainable forest gardens’ for food security (with both commercial and 
subsistence crops), alternatives to forest clearance through ‘firewood 
plantations’, and the ‘savoka gardens’, or what Holloway described as an 
‘enhanced fallow system’. 
The ‘savoka garden’ was the key element in the restoration of arable 
land, its main objective being the regeneration of soils in order to ‘shorten 
the fallow period and/or increase the yield of subsequent crops’. Through 
what were termed ‘improved agricultural techniques’ (the creation of sloped 
terrains, swales for water retention, or mulching techniques, among others) 
and planting of species that helped restore soil fertility, the savoka gardens 
were a kind of  ‘improved fallows’ that had the aim of ‘making tavy more 
durable/sustainable’. This way, the amount of land needed by a family 
decreased significantly—thus also reducing future forest clearance. It 
offered a way of maximising the five-year fallow period by planting ‘trees or 
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shrubs’ that helped ‘restore nutrients to the soil and suppress weeds as well 
as provide useful by-products’. When a farmer, for example, finished 
harvesting rice from a field, she could introduce specific species that 
regenerated the soil while providing fruits, such as banana trees or 
watermelons. After five years, she would have the option of turning part or 
the whole of that regenerated field into tavy, where, if regeneration had 
worked, the rice yield could increase by 40%. The ‘savoka gardens’ were 
therefore a combination of agricultural techniques to apply to the degraded 
savoka that would have favoured a faster recovery of fertility. ‘The idea’, 
Holloway explained during our interview, ‘was to have this cycling, 
enhanced, accelerated fallows that would also be productive’. 
We can begin to see how Holloway’s vision of ‘making the savoka work 
again’ envisaged the recovery of a past where both agricultural and forest 
futures were contemplated. Through the ‘savoka garden’ as ‘enhanced fallow 
system’, we have also seen how, within this agricultural future, tavy was to 
remain a central strategy for farmers. This, however, would fundamentally 
change as TAMS turned into a carbon project.  
The project to ‘bring back the forest’ 
Instead of ‘making the savoka work again’, TAMS’ aim as a carbon 
project has been portrayed by institutional actors as that of recovering the 
fallows to ‘bring back’ (or ‘make them go back’ to) the forest (see, for 
example, Dolch et al. 2009; The Nature Conservancy, Conservation 
International, and Wildlife Conservation Society 2010).  
This can be further explored through an analysis of the Project Design 
Document (PDD), sent for validation in 2010 to the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) project registry. The importance of this document in 
producing carbon credits cannot be underestimated. The PDD (which also 
features in chapter 7) is the main document through which a carbon project 
is discursively constructed and against which carbon accounting and 
verification takes place, constituting the previous and necessary stage to the 
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issuance of carbon credits, or Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs). The 
role of the PDD is that of providing the rationale for the project under CDM 
guidelines, where the dual objectives of emissions reductions and 
sustainable development are presented along with the requirements of 
‘additionality’, ‘baseline scenario’, ‘permanence’ and ‘leakage’. These four 
key-terms, combined with accounting methodologies, may be seen as 
‘constitutive elements’ of a CDM project since they establish the material and 
discursive reality of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) or credits. 
‘Additionality’ refers to the ‘additional’ nature of the project: the fact that 
emissions reductions would not have occurred without the project44. The 
‘baseline’, as I explained in chapter one, constructs the ‘counterfactual 
scenario’ (Lohmann 2014) against which the number of reductions can be 
calculated. ‘Permanence’ and ‘leakage’ finally, refer to the fact that the 
project is sustainable over the 30 years it is supposed to last and that the 
source of emissions targeted by the project will not ‘leak’, or relocate 
elsewhere.  The PDD also contains any other relevant information regarding 
the project’s implementation, such as project boundaries or land eligibility. 
TAMS’ PDD was mainly written by CI with the BioCarbon Funds’ (BioCF)45 
support and with help from ANAE for on-the-ground data.  The name TAMS 
does not appear, however, and the project is referred to as the ‘Ankeniheny-
Zahamena-Mantadia Biodiveristy Conservation Corridor and Restoration 
Project (Reforestation Component)’. The PDD introduces it as an initiative 
that will: 
‘restore rainforest habitat and establish native forest 
corridors between fragmented blocks of remaining native 
forests…The project activity makes an important 
                                                        
44 Or, what is the same, the fact that carbon finance is needed for a project to take 
place (Lansing 2011:735; Bumpus and Liverman 2008).  
45 The BioCF is the World Bank’s Carbon Finance Unit and uses private-public 
funding to carry out demonstration activities of forest and agro-ecosystem carbon projects.  
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contribution to the conservation of biodiversity in one of 
highest areas of terrestrial biodiversity in the world’.  
As a CDM project, it also claims to support sustainable development by 
‘providing farmers with alternatives to unsustainable slash-and-burn 
agriculture’ and assisting them ‘to diversify and improve their agricultural 
production, and to establish native forest plantations and fuel wood 
plantations outside of the project’ enabling ‘low-income farmers to realise 
value from [these] fallows through the sale of CERs while also carrying out 
natural forest restoration’. It is thus that the project is presented to fulfil ‘the 
project purpose of alleviating poverty while conserving biodiversity’.  
As will be explored below, one of the key differences with Holloway’s 
project is that reforestation in the PDD is identified as the main ‘project 
activity’, being the only one that will generate carbon credits. The rest of the 
activities introduced by Holloway are borrowed, yet grouped into ‘leakage’ 
measures. As I explained above, these are measures that every PDD must 
contain and are geared towards making sure that the ‘problem’ targeted by 
the project is not displaced outside its boundaries; in this case, ‘leakage’ 
would have to ensure that no further land encroachment for tavy takes place 
as a result of project activities:  
‘The project proponents are implementing a number of 
measures to mitigate potential leakage as a consequence 
of the project activity. These measures include providing 
strong support to farmers to enable them to diversify 
away from tavy to more sustainable agricultural 
practices; as well as the implementation of fruit gardens, 
savoka gardens, sustainable forest gardens, native forest 
plantations and fuel wood plantations. It is noted that 
these measures are not project activities that will 
generate CERs, but these measures are implemented to 
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prevent leakage and to contribute to the development of 
the local communities’ (emphasis added). 
Although TAMS as a CDM project in the PDD contains the same 
elements as those proposed by Holloway (reforestation with native tree 
species, fruit gardens, savoka gardens, sustainable forest gardens, native 
forest plantations, fuel wood plantations and training in improved farming 
techniques) they are conceived of in a fundamentally different way. We have 
already seen the separation between reforestation as main project activity 
and the rest as ‘leakage’ and ‘development’ measures. This fragmentation is 
not a simple division but had profound effects in TAMS as I show in the next 
section. Here, instead, I want to focus on the role of the ‘savoka garden’, and 
the approach taken with tavy. We can already see a fundamental 
transformation in that agricultural activities are offered as alternatives to 
tavy, which is deemed an ‘unsustainable practice’. This is taken further in the 
way the ‘savoka garden’ is conceptualised in the PDD:  
 
‘Savoka forest gardens: The project assists farmers to 
establish sustainable forest gardens on their land. The 
area and location of land that farmers dedicate to the 
sustainable forest gardens is at their discretion. The 
sustainable forest gardens will provide to farmers an 
alternative use of degraded, unproductive tavy lands — 
particularly those on hillsides. These lands are no longer 
useful to local farmers46, are particularly prone to fire 
and are at risk of further degradation through soil 
erosion. The establishment of sustainable forest gardens 
on these lands brings three main benefits: 
                                                        
46 This is already a contentious claim because as some of Mahatsara residents 
complained, the lands dedicated to TAMS were some of the ‘most productive ones’. It 
already points to very different views on the value of the savoka.  
   91 
 it permits the reclamation and regeneration of 
what is essentially abandoned land; 
 it enables farmers to produce high-value crops, 
providing them with added sources of food and 
income and to enable their shift from tavy 
agriculture; 
 local tree species make up a significant proportion 
of the plants used to create forest gardens; so 
these can be planted to mimic local natural forests 
in both structure and function.’ 
It must be remembered, that, as I explained above, the savoka garden 
was the main activity proposed by Holloway for the restoration of arable 
land—a point she made in a consultancy report for CI in 2008, where she 
requested further input into this element arguing that it was ‘an important 
activity because it is culturally very acceptable (even ‘in demand’) as well as 
meeting the requirement to maintain rice production on hillsides’.  
What we find in the PDD is however very different. In this paragraph, 
in fact, the ‘savoka garden’ and the ‘sustainable forest garden’ seem to have 
merged into one single element as the title above shows: ‘the savoka forest 
garden’. Although they appear in the earlier paragraph on leakage measures 
(see above) as different elements, they become one and the same when they 
are detailed.  In its reworked form, in turn, the ‘savoka forest garden’ 
appears as an element to facilitate farmers’ shift away from tavy and a way 
of establishing alternative plantations. The regenerated savoka, which 
contains, in Holloway’s model, the potential of future value as tavy field is 
here deemed unproductive, as it is to be replaced with ‘high value’ crops 
(where ‘no-burn hill rice’ production is contemplated under a ‘fireless 
regime’, however). We can already see some of the ways in which ideas of 
value in TAMS’ later stages re-articulated those of waste, since as tavy could 
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not provide high economic value, it was relegated to a de-valued position, or, 
one could argue, to waste. 
When I spoke to Holloway in 2013, and she shared the presentation I 
have employed above to illustrate her understanding of TAMS, I was 
significantly surprised to see that the savoka garden contained the option of 
turning land back to tavy. As she explained during our conversation the idea 
was to ‘develop sustainable systems that were incorporated into people’s 
desires to continue with tavy’. This was something that had never been 
brought out during my conversations with project actors during fieldwork, 
nor did it appear in any project documentation I’d had access to. When I 
showed Holloway, in turn, how the ‘savoka garden’ had been reworked and 
introduced in the PDD she commented that it must have been done by 
someone who’d had no experience of work on the ground, judging by how 
forest gardens were mixed up with savoka gardens, also containing phrases 
from other documents.  I suggest, however, that this ‘confusion’ had much 
more to do with the logic of value that carbon credits brought about in 
TAMS, its treatment of degraded fallows as waste and the fundamental 
transformations that were needed in Holloway’s design for the project to 
become a carbon generating one.  In order to produce carbon, I argue below, 
tavy, and consequently the savoka garden, had to be devalued—or wasted 
away—and forgotten.  
Changing visions of TAMS: restoring nature to different ends  
Whether to return them to a previous un-degraded state as fallows, or 
to an earlier one as forest, the restoration of degraded fallows points to a 
process of recovering value from waste, and thus shares similarities with 
practices of recycling. From a Marxist perspective, recycling seems to 
‘intercede’ (Alexander and Reno 2012:1) in the transformation process of 
objects and materials from their original, ‘first’ nature into a ‘second’ one, or 
their integration into the social world through human agency (Lukács 1971). 
Instead of transforming nature for social purposes, therefore, recycling 
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entails the ‘return’ of materials and objects already present in social spheres 
to their original state—in order, however, to begin the cycle of 
transformation again in a re-valued form47. But where practices of restoring 
the fallows share some fundamental elements with those of recycling in 
their attempt to re-introduce perceived waste into productive processes, 
they differ in the character of the matter to be transformed. While recycling 
aims to transform things into something else completely, mampody 
(return/restore) here points to a practice of recovering the pre-state of 
perceived waste, almost as a form of ‘resuscitation’ (Cooper 2006). Its 
contentious character lies in the specific point of the past that is being 
recalled, since different moments in the past conjure different views of what 
waste is and where value lies. They project, in turn, different future 
possibilities.  
If seen as instances of ‘resource making’ 28/03/2016 06:56:00 from 
waste48, the degraded fallows’ key defining feature appears as that of 
‘potentiality’: a position ‘suspended between a past source and a future 
product’ (Elizabeth E. Ferry and Limbert 2008:6) where both past and 
future states are articulated around ideas of what constitutes the right kind 
of nature and, therefore, its perceived value. This ‘potentiality’, however, 
must not be seen exclusively as the domain of what appear as ‘valuable’ 
resources, but can also be applied to waste.  
Although Thompson (1979) has conceptualised waste, or ‘rubbish’, as 
the stage in which objects lose their ‘transient’ value and become the ‘degree 
zero of value’ (a necessary stage before they enter once again a different 
                                                        
47 The division between a ‘first’ and ‘second’ nature in such processes, therefore, 
becomes tricky because although recycling entails the ‘production of originals’ (Alexander 
and Reno 2012:2), these are not intended to go back to nature as such, but are rather 
expected to recover their productivity as constitutive elements of potential new objects and 
materials and therefore begin a new production cycle. The idea of restoring degraded 
fallows is itself an apt way of illustrating how ‘the boundaries between the natural and 
social are continually being crossed’ (Elizabeth E. Ferry and Limbert 2008:8) making 
distinctions between a ‘first’ and ‘second’ always blurry. 
48 I understand the term resource in the broadest possible sense, as ‘objects and 
substances produced from nature for human enrichment and use’ (Ferry and Limbert 
2008:3), and not necessarily defined as such by those engaged in bringing them about.  
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value register), I follow recent analysis in seeing waste’s moments of 
‘indeterminacy’ (Hawkins and Muecke 2003:xii) or ‘ambivalence’ (Moser 
2002:91) between positive and negative value regimes as a source of its 
generativity. Therefore, rather than totally devoid of value, in this wavering 
between states waste contains in itself the possibility of re-generation or the 
recovery of value.  
This applies especially well to degraded fallows in that, as we saw 
earlier on, their most defining feature is precisely this ambiguity: their 
liminal position between value and waste, pasts and futures. Degraded 
fallows in the case of TAMS then conjured the potentiality of their recovery 
as a return to valuable pasts. What we find in the cases presented above, 
however, are two very different understandings of the meanings and 
potential value of degraded fallows as waste in present and future 
landscapes, and thus two diverse proposals for their recovery or 
transformation that also call upon different moments in the past.  
Holloway’s project, on the one hand, aimed to incorporate waste—the 
degraded fallows—by harnessing its potentiality and incorporating it into 
cyclical processes of production, according to the tenets of permaculture. 
The treatment of waste in permaculture is in itself particularly revealing of 
the kind of potentiality, or value, that waste is seen to possess. Although a 
heterogeneous movement that has evolved over the years, permaculture is 
largely based on the creation of ‘closed-loop, symbiotic, self-sustaining 
human habitats and production systems that do not result in ecological 
degradation or social injustice’ (Veteto and Lockyer 2008:51). The concept 
thus contains in itself a very particular articulation between time and waste, 
as it is premised on a cyclical and integrated approach where waste is 
constantly re-integrated—through nature’s own work—into processes of 
production for both social and environmental benefits. The idea of avoiding 
degradation—both ecological and social—is illuminating here of 
permaculture’s understanding of waste: rather than its disappearance due 
to its zero degree of value status (Thompson 1979), permaculture promotes 
   95 
the continued and cyclical transformation of waste as potentially (and 
indefinitely) valuable (human excrement, for example, is transformed into 
manure, and thus generative of future cycles of production). As a slide in 
Holloway’s presentation claims regarding the ‘principles of permaculture’: 
‘all is recycled: productions are entries’. This is reflected in the treatment 
and understanding of degraded fallows (and consequently tavy) in TAMS 
according to Holloway’s vision: far from zero-value, the degraded fallows 
that result from tavy hold the potential of recovery of value both as fallows 
and forest, as they are put to work again through the restoration of the 
forest and the ‘savoka garden’. Acknowledging that current land limitations 
in Andasibe do not allow for the long term frameworks needed for a ‘natural’ 
recovery, Holloway’s project envisaged an acceleration of this process, by 
nurturing the (re)generative capacity of degraded fallows as waste.  
The understanding and treatment of degraded fallows as waste in the 
PDD, is, as we have seen, completely different. In this case, the generative 
capacity of degraded fallows is only recognised as the possibility to turn into 
something else completely: either as forest generative of carbon value, as 
agricultural alternatives with high economic value or as ‘leakage’ or 
‘development’ measures constitutive of a forest carbon project. In any case, 
the recovery of the fallows as a necessary stage in the agricultural cycle of 
tavy is negated, as is tavy itself. It would seem that in this case, the degraded 
fallows acquire that ‘degree of zero-value status’ advanced by Thompson 
(1979), and their ‘recovery’ would refer to their total effacing, since value is 
only located in the return of the forest. The recovery of the fallows in TAMS 
as carbon project therefore proposes the end of waste—a future where all is 
valorised through carbon and where tavy or the fallows have no space. The 
purity of the primary forest in this version of TAMS is thus no longer just a 
matter of environmental pristineness (as in conservationist ideals of nature) 
but also economic: the end of environmental and economic waste is 
proclaimed in the return of the primary forest, now re-valorised through 
carbon. The future holds only forest, and, hence, only value. In a sense, then, 
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‘bringing back the forest’ resonates with ideas of a return to a prelapsarian 
Eden (see also Alexander and Reno 2012) which, combined with a newly 
discovered source of value of nature, propose the obliteration of impurity, as 
fallows and tavy are negated. So what was carbon’s role in precipitating this 
change?  
As I argued in the introduction, what a CDM project aims to produce is 
not so much a carbon absorption—the carbon that is ‘stored’ in trees—as a 
carbon reduction, known in the CDM process as a ‘Certified Emission 
Reduction’ measured in tonnes of CO2 equivalents (tCO2e). The idea of a 
reduction is constructed through those four key-terms or ‘constitutive 
elements’ I introduced above: additionality (the fact that reductions are 
additional to what would have happened in the absence of the project), 
permanence (the securing of reductions for the period that a project lasts), 
leakage measures (to avoid displacing the problem elsewhere) and baseline 
(a counter-scenario based on a projection from the past into a hypothetical 
future without the project against which reductions are calculated). We 
already saw that one of the main differences with Holloway’s project was 
that TAMS as carbon project proposed leakage measures where the ‘savoka 
garden’, and the option of going back to tavy were missing.  This was, I 
argue, because the possibility of tavy could not be entertained as a part of 
leakage measures, as these were explicitly set up to avoid new sources of 
emissions. Seen from a different perspective, if the project aimed at 
achieving ‘emissions reductions’, the way of maximising value was to 
produce no emissions whatsoever: in order for carbon value not to be 
wasted, then, leakage had to erase the possibility of tavy. TAMS as a forest 
carbon project could thus not propose a future where tavy was present.  
It is in this logic of value, that, I argue, we can find the transition from 
TAMS as a project to ‘restore the fallows’ to the project to ‘bring back the 
forest’. We can further explore this through a slightly different take on 
waste’s liminality, drawing on Moser’s (2002) conceptual analysis of waste. 
Arguing that waste has recently seen an ‘accession to culture’—due to the 
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effects of industrialisation, the emergence of ecological awareness, and 
more—Moser proposes a series of semantic and conceptual analyses to 
‘comprehend the cultural transformation being brought about by the 
multiform presence of waste, as both discursive and material reality’ 
(2002:85). His analysis of waste through the concepts of ‘purity, value and 
memory’ (2002:89) is particularly useful for exploring the liminality of 
fallows in TAMS and their changing role. As a ‘category of transition’, Moser 
argues, ‘waste is that unstable position in which purity seesaws with 
impurity, value with non-value, memory with forgetting’ (2002:102). An 
important ‘semantic component’ of waste is therefore ‘memory’ (2002:97). 
He develops this idea from Douglas’ (1966) conceptualisation of rubbish as 
being something ‘out of place’ which is, however—and this is key—still 
present. Rubbish or waste is therefore always in a state of ‘in-between’: a 
decayed state where waste has lost its ‘functionality’ in the previous system 
but from where it has not been completely effaced and retains part of its 
previous ‘identity’ (Moser 2002:97) (otherwise waste ‘could not be known’). 
We can see how degraded fallows, and their identity as having once been 
part of the cycle of tavy (and before that the primary forest) fit this idea of 
waste. It is in this transitional or ‘in-between’ state that ‘the waste-object 
conserves all the memorial capacities with regard to the system to which it 
once belonged’ (Moser 2002:97). This is, therefore, also the stage where 
waste ‘represents the most virulent danger to the ‘purity’ of the system’ 
because at this ‘constitutive stage’ (see also Waldby and Mitchell 2006:109), 
waste has the dangerous capacity to ‘induce remembrance’ (Moser 
2002:98).  
We have seen how, in order to produce value as a carbon project, 
TAMS proposed a future of purity without waste: a pristine, wasteless future 
in both economic and environmental terms (which effectively merge in the 
carbon credit). Since the fallows could not be contemplated in the future 
proposed by TAMS as carbon project, they also had to be forgotten in the 
present—lest they evoked the future possibility of tavy, thus wasting 
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potential carbon value. One way to do this was by reaching to an earlier 
past—the primary forest. Through the discursive and material obliteration 
of the fallows, then, TAMS constructed a future return to a past without tavy 
in the forests of Andasibe. It is here that we can locate TAMS’ specific 
transition from a project ‘to recover the fallows’, to one engaged with 
‘bringing back the forest’.  
In this section I have explored TAMS’ mutation from its earlier to later 
stages and the different treatments and understandings of degraded fallows 
as waste that were introduced through carbon as a logic of value. But this 
was not the only way in which carbon credits as a form of value altered 
TAMS’ original shape. As I already suggested above, another key 
transformation was the disaggregation of TAMS constituent elements into 
individual ones. Although TAMS’ external form did not change substantially, 
then, its internal structure did, with fundamental consequences (Alexander 
2004). It is to these that I now turn.  
Recovering value from TAMS’ own waste 
In this section I leave degraded fallows behind and explore re-
organisations of waste and value through a different perspective. Waste 
appears here as those elements integral to TAMS that the project itself 
expelled as a result of carbon credits’ logic of value—only to recover them 
again in a different, yet valuable form. Let us see how.  
In Holloway’s presentation introduced above, where the principles of 
TAMS are laid out, one of the slides presents TAMS as a cyclical landscape 
containing the six key activities that make up the project. These are: natural 
forest restoration, the plantation of mixed autochthonous species, 
sustainable forest gardens, sustainable fruit gardens, savoka gardens and 
coal/firewood. 
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Figure 8. TAMS as an ‘integrated mosaic'. From Louise Holloway's power-point 
presentation: ‘Vision en practique-les principes’. 
Together, they compose what the slide names an ‘integrated mosaic 
that mutually reinforces itself at the landscape level’. One of the key 
transformations that TAMS underwent in its transition towards a carbon 
project was the fragmentation of its constitutive elements, until then 
understood as composing a whole, into two different types of activities 
which, while related, ended up operating independently of, or even vying 
with, each other.  Instead of a project with six integrated approaches to land 
management, then, TAMS became conceptually understood as being 
composed of two main elements: a reforestation component with native tree 
species for carbon generation and a development one to ‘accompany’ 
(Borges Coutinho 2010:5) it, known as Sustainable Livelihood Activities, or 
SLAs, which was made up of the agricultural activities and techniques 
previously mentioned. Rather than just a means to ‘attain’ (Holloway’s term 
in the presentation) the project’s objectives then, carbon mutated into the 
very aim of the project itself.    
The disaggregation of TAMS into two types of elements, restorative 
and agricultural, had profound effects on its implementation. With carbon 
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generation as the guiding principle of the project, both conceptually and 
economically, the rest of the activities—once integral to the project—were 
relegated to the background, with crucial implications for the farmers 
involved.  
During our interview Holloway explained that 
‘at the outset, when we were seeking the carbon finance, 
we did it so the whole thing was integrated, so carbon 
finance would be for any activity that actually increased 
the carbon value of the area … and it was only through 
working with CI and the World Bank and focusing on the 
carbon issue, that they then got separated out’. 
The divide between forest restoration and SLAs, she speculates, had to 
do with the problem of measuring the carbon stored in trees, something that 
really worried CI in Washington. Diversity of tree species, she argues, felt 
‘burdensome’ for some of the actors dealing with carbon measurements, 
since, originally, people were to have the option of choosing seedlings 
among 100 different species, a flexibility which Holloway claims ‘was not 
liked’.  At some point in 2004, the possibility of receiving carbon payments 
for both SLAs and natural forest restoration was entertained among CI and 
the BioCF, in the understanding that natural reforestation would have 
received ‘higher payments’ (Holloway report). This was later on revoked 
however, and agricultural activities were finally deemed unproductive in 
carbon terms. As Holloway recalls, ‘When the carbon measurements for the 
baselines came out […] they didn’t feel that the gardens would sequester 
sufficient, additional carbon to make it worthwhile, and so that was the 
decision’. In a similar fashion to the 19th century German forestry science, as 
described by Scott (1998), where the need to manage plantations from a 
centralised position (for fiscal purposes) led to unsustainable monocultures, 
we see here that practices of measuring and accounting for carbon were, 
ironically, complicated by biodiversity itself. From this perspective, then, we 
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see the importance of metrics in forest carbon projects, where only that 
which can be measured becomes valued and hence, valuable (Cooper 2015).  
The disentangling of the carbon element of the project into a relatively 
independent object only contemplated for forest restoration, and the 
relegation of all other activities to the area of SLAs meant that the latter was 
left unfunded for a good number of years, and would only be eventually 
applied very timidly. Funding came too little, too late, and only as a result of 
the strenuous involvement of a student who managed to push major donors 
like USAID to sustain livelihood activities. Joanna Borges Coutinho arrived in 
the field as part of her MSc research in International Natural Resources 
Development at the University of Bangor, with the prospect of setting up and 
carrying out research on fair-trade activities within TAMS, as it had been 
agreed with CI and various other actors. Although she had been told that 
many opportunities existed for fair-trade arising out of the agricultural side 
of the project, upon her arrival in Andasibe in 2006, she found that ‘no-one 
had heard of TAMS, and those who had only had to do with the restoration’ 
side of it. Her involvement in the project led to her return in 2009 in the role 
of consultant for CI with the objective of setting up the SLA activities, and 
her efforts paid off as she managed to secure $250,000 from USAID’s ERI 
(Eco-Regional Initiative) programme to support the agricultural activities 
within TAMS (to which USAID had originally committed). The money was 
spent on training sessions for FA (Facilitating Agents) staff and farmers and 
on setting up ‘demonstration gardens’ in a small number of villages involved 
with TAMS49. These demonstration plots were carried out with the idea of 
showing farmers the benefits of, and training them in, the agricultural 
techniques developed by Holloway for the savoka gardens, such as the 
mulching technique in sloped terrains.  ANAE, under Coutinho’s supervision, 
were also trained in SLAs and became key actors in the provision of seeds 
and training in agricultural techniques. In any case, funding for SLAs was 
                                                        
49 Mahatsara was one of the three villages.  
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always limited and it never transformed into real agricultural alternatives to 
the land given by farmers to the project, but remained solely a 
‘demonstration’ activity. In a 2008 report to CI, Holloway stressed the 
‘fundamental importance’ of SLAs ‘to the people living within the 
operational area of TAMS’ and showed her concern for the lack of measures 
available ‘to help anyone inspired by the demonstration plots to start their 
own gardens’.  
We can see then how carbon as a logic of value led to the 
fragmentation of TAMS into its constituent parts—previously understood as 
an integrated whole—where only those elements that could be measured 
and were carbon productive became valorised, relegating the rest to the 
background.  
This process shares interesting parallels with those of privatisation in 
post-socialist countries. In her ethnography of privatisation processes in 
Kazakhstan, Alexander (2004) explores, among other things, the 
reconstitution of objects and persons—and the relations between them—
that the move from state to privately-owned property brought about. The 
case of industrial enterprises is particularly illuminating here because, while 
‘outside forms were maintained’ (2004:310), privatisation involved the legal 
reconstitution of the enterprises’ internal forms: their ‘properties’ as 
property objects. As a result, certain elements became profitable while 
others were left, literally, to rot. The breaking up of the relational parts that 
had previously constituted a ‘holistic system’ translated into Kazakhstan 
being ‘littered with dead factories and steppe cities built around huge 
processing complexes that have become half-abandoned urban disaster 
zones’ (Alexander 2004:310), that is, waste. 
Both in the Kazakh example and in TAMS, then, we find a relationship 
between processes of fragmentation of constituent wholes and changes in 
the location/recognition of value, where some parts become profitable and 
others are effectively ‘wasted’ as a result. I briefly return here to Moser’s 
(2002) semantic analysis of waste, this time through his view on the 
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relationships between fragments and wholes from which, he argues, waste 
gains a great part of its meaning. Well illustrated through the French term 
‘déchet’, waste, he states, ‘is often fragmentary, partial, residual in relation to 
a totality that would have preexisted it’ (2002:86). In this arrangement 
between parts and wholes, waste can appear as either that which remains 
out of a previous totality, that which ‘passively detaches itself from a whole’ 
through decay, or as rejection or refuse— ‘that part which has been actively 
detached (torn, ejected, expelled) from a whole and subsequently cast off 
and excluded’ (2002:87). It is this last sense of waste that I think is useful in 
helping us think through the effect that carbon had in TAMS: the agricultural 
activities that were grouped into the concept of SLAs were expelled and 
rejected as unprofitable. They became almost waste.  
The ‘almost’ is essential here, however, because as I show below this 
was only a partial disconnection. Although what were once essential 
agricultural activities were relegated to a minimal role in terms of project 
implementation with very little value, they were re-incorporated into the 
project in a renewed relationship. Their potentiality—as something slightly 
different—was in fact recovered through carbon’s logic of value.   
This idea of disconnecting and reconnecting has been employed by 
Hayden (2003) to characterise the political work that bioprospecting 
‘benefit-sharing’ agreements carry out in Mexico. Her analysis of the ways in 
which these agreements seek to establish flows of plants and information 
(or ‘local knowledge’) on the one hand, and benefits on the other, contain a 
decisive element in which connections are both ‘made’ and ‘unmade’, 
according to changing conceptualisations of what constitutes the public 
sphere. Along with the plants collected, Hayden argues, bioprospecting 
agreements that link rural locales in Mexico to pharmaceutical companies in 
the US, also bring people associated with them—but which people and with 
what rights and responsibilities becomes a highly contentious issue, one 
riddled with the questions of where to draw the line between the public and 
the private domain. For example, in order to bypass the difficulties of 
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ascribing claims to authorship/ownership of local knowledge among 
communities, scientists select particular sites—urban markets or 
roadsides—and construct them as ‘public’ domain for collecting both 
specimens and information, thus disconnecting plants from the ‘messy’ 
(Hayden 2003:46) social relationships to which they were once attached. 
Market vendors, in this context, are not considered rightful benefit 
recipients, but only intermediaries to the right kinds of people: an ever 
elusive ‘community’ which becomes very difficult to pin down, but which 
nonetheless remains as the archetype of the sharing agreement beneficiary. 
Plants are therefore reconnected to these necessary yet almost abstract 
actors. This is a ‘re-localising’ practice, Hayden argues, where plants appear 
as ‘stabilized, fixed in identifiable webs of social relations’, because it re-
establishes the ‘correspondences and connections for which locality stands’ 
(2003:130), consequently producing inclusions and exclusions.  
A not too dissimilar process of disconnection and reconnection can be 
observed in the development of TAMS as a carbon project, as I now discuss. 
Even if SLAs had very little to offer to farmers other than some training 
in agricultural techniques and a few ‘demonstration gardens’, they 
performed an essential role in the framing of TAMS as CDM project. As we 
saw before, TAMS had to comply with the dual objective of reducing carbon 
emissions and contributing to sustainable development—it is only through 
this dual approach that a project can be integrated into the Clean 
Development Mechanism, and thus generate carbon credits. In turn, the 
project has to comply with the measures of additionality, leakage and 
permanence, as well as the methodological approach to the calculation of 
carbon reductions. I have already mentioned how SLAs were presented in 
the PDD as both the ‘sustainable development’ component of the project, 
and as a ‘leakage’ measure, that is, as guarantors of the permanence of 
reforested plots. SLAs, therefore, provided the rationale through which 
TAMS could be framed as the ‘Ankeniheny-Zahamena-Mantadia Biodiveristy 
Conservation Corridor and Restoration Project (Reforestation Component)’ 
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and appear as CDM compliant. They became, therefore, key in generating 
(potential) carbon reductions.  
A second similar situation took place in relation to carbon payments 
and benefits. The original intention of providing direct payments to farmers 
from the benefits obtained through the sale of carbon credits was thwarted 
for various reasons. One of the most cited ones among project actors was the 
involvement of the government and its demand of sole carbon ownership, 
something which was agreed in the expectation that profits from carbon 
sales would then be passed on to individual farmers, which never happened. 
But while direct payments were from the beginning on top of the table, these 
were never really agreed upon, and were variously taken up and rejected by 
changing staff in CI and the BioCF. Even if direct payments were at some 
point entertained, these were ruled out early on when it transpired that the 
costs of setting up the project and producing carbon in the first instance 
were too high to allow for payments to farmers. In a 2005 report, Holloway 
already makes the point that it is  
‘ironic that low payments/tCO2 offered by the BioCF 
combined with high preparation costs (heavy 
bureaucracy and stringent eligibility criteria), make even 
the highest carbon generating activities too costly to 
allow the project to make direct carbon payments’. 
We find here that carbon as a logic of value is also entwined with a 
clash of temporalities, where low levels of initial funding—as carbon 
payments are only made after reforestation and verification—couple with a 
costly validation process, making only those activities with highest carbon 
value at the outset worthwhile or productive.  
In the absence of direct carbon payments, therefore, ‘development’, in 
the form of SLAs, became the main form of compensation. As André Aquino 
from the BioCF told me during our interview:  
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‘We had a lot of discussions whether this [benefit 
sharing] should come as cash or as development projects, 
and I think the agreement was not cash, but rather 
supplements to the activities that ANAE were already 
providing to the communities in terms of agriculture, 
improve their agriculture, seeds, inputs, machinery, and 
so on …’ 
The agricultural activities that had once been an integral part of TAMS 
and had later on been rejected as unprofitable, were once again recovered—
albeit in a diminished and devalued form—as productive of carbon value by 
becoming the ‘development’ element that could justify the framing of TAMS 
as CDM project.  
This departed fundamentally from the way carbon had been 
conceptualised in Holloway’s vision. As she recalls, ‘SLA would almost be 
compensation for the reforestation … and that was in my mind, utterly 
wrong, that’s not how people had actually viewed it, in the first place’. What 
had begun, in Holloway’s words, as a project in which ‘rice cultivation and 
the cultivation for subsistence would be subsidized by the carbon credits’ 
became exactly the opposite: a project in which the production of carbon 
credits was subsidised by subsistence agriculture through the idiom of the 
SLAs as ‘development’, ‘leakage measures’ and ‘compensation’.  
We can see here a two-way process of disconnection and reconnection. 
Initially, we saw how carbon credits’ logic of value led to the fragmentation 
of TAMS into two elements since only one was measureable and, therefore, 
valuable. The other, those agricultural activities that were turned into SLAs, 
became a sort of residue, almost rejected by the project as an unprofitable 
and un-fundable element. But, on the other hand, this ‘wasted’ component 
was recovered as generative of value by providing the rationale for the 
project as ‘sustainable development’ and shifting a conversation on 
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(expensive) carbon rights into one of compensation, with costs thus 
displaced onto SLA/tavy farmers.  
Like the buildings described by Alexander (2004) in Kazakhstan, then, 
while the outside form remained the same, TAMS as a carbon project was 
internally reconstituted through the transformation of the SLAs’ relation to 
the project: having been once expelled, they were recuperated for the 
generation of carbon value.  
The material or on-the-ground effects of this internal re-organisation 
of TAMS were not perceived in a straightforward sense, since they could 
only be known through their ‘absences’: the absence of credits, benefits or 
agricultural alternatives that extended beyond mere ‘demonstration 
gardens’. Some of these absences are explored in chapter 6, where I 
introduce feelings of having been cheated among those who took part in, and 
gave land to, TAMS in Mahatsara. There is, however, a key piece of material 
evidence of the impact that carbon’s re-articulation of value and waste had 
on tavy farmers, one which relates to the main embodiment, or actual 
presence, that carbon takes in forest carbon projects: trees.  
In 2013 Maman’i Solo, whose husband had devoted a parcel of their 
savoka to TAMS, complained that the tree seedlings, zanankazo, had been 
planted in the best piece of land, ‘where the dingadingana grows’, and did 
not know what to do. The dingadingana (Psiadia altissima) is a type of bush 
or grass that grows in recent forest clearings or early-stage savoka (Kull 
2004:158–159) and thus marks a relatively high fertility. When we joked 
about the possibility of cutting them and turning them into firewood, 
Maman’i Solo laughed and said they were too scared to do that, lest they 
were sent into prison. The effect, of course, was that the harvests of 
following years would not live up to their (already meagre) potential since 
these fertile fallows could not be used. We have here, therefore, a perverse 
turn on carbon’s proposal of futures of value in these landscapes: a 
productive field in carbon credit terms of no value whatsoever to Maman’i 
Solo, which, in turn, wasted its potential as tavy field.  
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It is therefore not surprising, then, that upon hearing of the trajectory 
of TAMS, Holloway felt that everything had gone the ‘opposite direction’, 
since in this chapter we have seen that the only thing that was made 
(apparently) sustainable was the production of carbon—and not even. From 
‘sustainability for all’, carbon as a logic of value had turned TAMS into 
‘sustainability for none’.  
Conclusion  
In the previous sections I have shown how carbon credits’ logic of 
value fundamentally altered both TAMS’ main aims and its internal 
structure—with key consequences for those involved, particularly tavy 
farmers. If the ‘project to bring back the forest’ eliminated any possibility of 
a future with tavy in order to maximise carbon value, the devaluation and 
rejection of agricultural activities and their transformation into SLAs 
replaced (expensive) rights to carbon payments with (underfunded and 
underdeveloped) ‘development’, thus socialising the costs of carbon.  
It is essential to mention, however, that by referring to carbon credits’ 
logic of value I do not imply a single and coherent framework that was 
simply applied to TAMS. As we have seen, in fact, this ‘logic’ was often 
unclear to carbon actors themselves (who are, in any case, a heterogeneous 
group), and decisions were often made ad-hoc and through negotiations that 
acknowledged uncertainty, as in the case of carbon measurements or in 
debates between direct or indirect payments. In trying to expose carbon as a 
logic of value, then, I have aimed to explore carbon credits’ capacity to 
reorganise questions of waste and value in TAMS, but I do not imply these 
are unavoidable or follow an already set and established logic.  
A look at another two examples of carbon projects, however, does 
reveal a certain consistency in the way carbon’s logic of value tends to treat 
(and produce) waste in agricultural landscapes.  
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Leach et al. (2012), for example, talk of a process of ‘disciplining’ in 
biochar pilot projects in Africa whereby farmers’ agricultural practices need 
to align with ‘biochar schemes and their underlying technological and 
market logics’ (2012:300). Biochar is a carbon rich substance that results 
from the burning of biomass ‘under oxygen-deprived conditions’ (Leach, 
Fairhead, and Fraser 2012:285). It has been posed as an effective way of 
recovering soil fertility, and lately, as a space with great carbon capture 
potential, having led to a number of small pilot-projects across Africa. In 
some of these cases, however, the authors point to situations where complex 
agricultural practices are broken down or homogenised to fit ‘singular 
systems’ and ‘cycles’ for the collection, burning and burying of biomass. 
Here, those elements that are not included in the ‘biochar system logic … 
developed in hypothetical models’ tend to be ‘sidelined and ignored, or 
newly targeted as problematic and in need of transformation’ (Leach, 
Fairhead, and Fraser 2012:300). A case in point is the way ‘the vast diversity 
of biomass by-products that result from farming and everyday practices’ are 
‘re-labelled as agricultural wastes’ (Leach, Fairhead, and Fraser 2012:300), 
becoming productive in biochar terms, yet displaced from their myriad uses 
in local lives and landscapes. We can see how issues of fragmentation and 
relegation to waste of potentially valuable elements also make an 
appearance here.  
Even more revealing is Lansing’s (2011) analysis of a forest carbon 
offsetting project in Costa Rica, where, in a similar way to TAMS, the 
project’s trajectory changed as a result of a cost-benefit calculation that was 
needed in order to prove the project’s ‘additionality’ under the CDM50. From 
its original goal of reviving cacao agroforestry, the project mutated into one 
concerned with the elimination of slash-and-burn agriculture by allowing 
rastrojos—recently fallowed land—to go back to secondary forest. This 
                                                        
50 Lansing treats the cost-benefit calculation as ‘a discursive statement that enables 
the creation of value’ (2011:732). I would argue that rather than just ‘enabling’, the cost-
benefit calculation, as part of what I have termed the ‘constitutive elements’ of a CDM 
project, is inherent to value production in forest carbon projects.  
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transformation came about as a result of a cost-benefit calculation that 
showed that the opportunity cost of switching to cacao agroforestry was too 
high to prove the project’s additionality. Rather, rastrojos appeared as sites 
of great carbon sequestration potential, because carbon credits could 
provide the encouragement to switching that was missing in the case of 
cacao agroforestry. This calculation was, however, made possible by 
representing rastrojos as separate spaces devoid from ‘past and future 
relations with other forms of land-use’ and as ‘empty containers of low 
economic value’ (Lansing 2011:743), that is, as present and future waste. An 
important issue that Lansing raises is that the elimination of rastrojos, or 
fallow land, in order to generate carbon value could lead to future ecological 
damage and the loss of food and livelihood security by participating farmers, 
due to the social and ecological roles that rastrojos play as part of 
agricultural cycles. This, he argues, could ‘potentially run counter’ (Lansing 
2011:732) to the project’s aims.  
Holloway’s statement presented above that ‘there is a danger that 
preoccupation with meeting the demands of the market could subsume the 
original goals [of the project]’ resonates here powerfully. As a specific way of 
identifying, measuring and understanding worth, then, carbon credits’ logic 
of value seems to point to some common themes in its dealings with waste 




In this chapter I have explored the social life of carbon as a particular 
form of value—the carbon credit—and its associated logic, as I focused on 
its transformative capacities in re-articulating questions of value and waste 
in TAMS. We have seen how, as a forest carbon project, TAMS proposed a 
future of absolute ecological and economic value in the forests of Andasibe, 
where any trace of waste—as degraded fallows or tavy—had to be erased 
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from past, present and future landscapes. The ‘project to restore the fallows’ 
became ‘the project to bring back the forest’.  
This, however, is but one side of the story. In the next chapter I will 
show how the very same logic of value that I have explored in this chapter, 
and which seems to negate any form of waste in forested landscapes, is, in 
fact, greatly dependent on it: carbon value in its credit form can only come 
about through its articulation with tavy as waste.  
While carbon credits are today presented as a novel source of value, 
their dynamics of value production in relation to tavy are not, however, a 
recent development. Through a focus on historical processes of forest 
‘valorisation’ in Andasibe, I will show how TAMS as forest carbon project 
establishes key continuities with past forest economies, as it pushes tavy to 
the margins as a wasteful practice while drawing on it for the production of 
value. We will therefore see how ‘the project to bring back the forest’ never 
erased tavy from view, but displaced it to a marginal yet productive position.  
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Chapter Four: The Values of Deforestation  
 
Introduction 
The story usually runs as follows:   
‘The 2003 Dreamworks movie Madagascar had it right: This 
island is like no place on Earth. Imagine a place filled with 
small, strange looking creatures roaming a landscape 
ranging from lush forests to drier, sometimes spiny forests, 
where giant bottle-shaped trees mark the skyline. This is 
Madagascar… 
Off the east coast of Africa, Madagascar's geographical 
isolation from the rest of the continent means it is chock full 
of animals and plants found nowhere else in the world… 
Case in point: Madagascar's lemurs. The island is home to 
more than 103 types of the odd primates, all of which are 
unique to the country. The indri, for instance, is a panda-
colored forest acrobat that catapults itself from tree to tree 
and screams a high-pitched wail worthy of a humpback 
whale… 
Roughly 17 million Malagasy people live and work across 
this same varied terrain. Their roots in both Africa and Asia 
mean they are a group as diverse as their surroundings. But 
people's impact on the land means the curious island is far 
from pristine. Roughly four-fifths of Madagascar's forests 
have been stripped bare… 
Thankfully, the government of Madagascar has an ambitious 
vision to make the country's biodiversity the foundation of 
the nation's wealth. CI remains a committed partner in this 
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process’ (Madagascar Country Profile, Conservation 
International website51).  
This is not just CI’s version of Madagascar, its biodiversity and the 
threat to its ‘national wealth’, but it is rather the common, or ‘canonical’ 
(Keller 2015:2) narrative that the island evokes in contemporary global 
imaginaries and which makes of it a ‘biodiversity hotspot’. The story is 
unequivocally always the same: over 80 % of Madagascar’s animal and plant 
species are endemic; this is due its geological break from India 88 million 
years ago, which granted it unique and isolated scenery for species 
evolution; people arrived in the island around 2000 years ago and with 
them came major species extinction and environmental degradation, with 
slash-and-burn cultivation being the main culprit for the disappearance of 
over 80% of the forest. Conservation, or so this story runs, is needed to stop 
this degradation or the forests will be gone in the near future.  
As one of the paragraphs above shows, the indri, that ‘panda-colored 
forest acrobat’, is central to Madagascar’s fauna imaginaries. Locally known 
as babakoto, it is also the main tourist attraction in the Andasibe-Mantadia 
National Park (AMNP from now on), featuring on the Park’s entrance sign 
that is situated about two kilometers from Mahatsara. In April 2013, a 
peculiar situation was taking place on the borders of the AMNP, where the 
road separates the dense, protected primary forest from the secondary 
vegetation or savoka52, which is home to scattered villages all along the 20 
or so kilometres that run between Andasibe and this northern park point. 
Here, tourists, unable to spot the animals inside the protected area, were 
crossing the road onto the side where the last patches of trees meet with the 
savoka to see the iconic primates. As I brought this anecdote up in 
                                                        
51 http://sp10.conservation.org/where/africa_madagascar/madagascar/Pages/defa
ult.aspx. Last accessed November 2014.  
52 Savoka designates both fallow land (as we saw in the previous chapter) and 
secondary vegetation, which can be, but is not always, the same thing. I use it here to 
characterise land that has been cleared for agricultural purposes, in contrast to primary or 
untouched forest.  
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Mahatsara I was told that it was something common for this time of the year, 
since the babakoto follow the goavy tsinahy, or strawberry guava (Psidium 
cattleianum), which only grows on secondary vegetation. This small tree or 
shrub blooms with red, small, juicy fruits in the months from April until 
around June, and is enjoyed by adults and children alike, who pick them up 
as they walk by, or gather them and sell them at local markets or tourist 
routes.  
The strawberry guava is listed as one of the ‘100 worst invasive alien 
species’ in the world by the International Union on Nature Conservation, 
IUCN, considered a ‘habitat-altering weed that poses a major threat to 
endemic flora by competing for light and soil nutrients’ (Global Invasive 
Species Database 2014). The indri (Indri indri) also figures in an IUCN list, 
this time as an (endemic) endangered species (IUCN Red List of Threatened 
Species 2014). The fact that a babakoto, the main trope of conservation in 
Andasibe and Madagascar, may choose to leave the forest reserve to feed 
from a plant which only grows in secondary vegetation and is considered a 
‘major threat’ to its habitat and itself, conveys a powerful image of the 
intricate, yet obscured ways in which the primary forest and savoka, and by 
extension conservation practice and tavy, are related. Although scientific 
and conservation practice insist on presenting them as opposites by 
invoking a natural purity (that of the primary forest), the artificiality of the 
dichotomy can be observed in the impossibility of controlling everyday 
interactions between supposedly antithetical species.  
In this chapter I follow the babakoto in its journey to the blurry yet 
productive landscapes where conservation and tavy meet. I will show how 
tavy, while portrayed today as a threat to the primary forest—just like the 
strawberry guava—is in fact highly generative of value for conservation 
practice, and, more fundamentally, for forest carbon projects such as TAMS. 
The ‘valorisation’ of Madagascar’s forests through carbon credits (turning 
these landscapes into ‘national wealth’, as CI’s story above proposes), I will 
   115 
argue, can only come about so long as tavy’s wasteful presence remains in 
these landscapes as a threat.  
This dynamic is, however, not a recent development. In the next 
sections I will show how TAMS consolidates key continuities with historical 
processes of value extraction in the forests of Andasibe where tavy, while 
constantly left in a devalued position as wasteful and degrading practice, has 
actually been integral to such processes.  Through the trope of ‘valorisation’, 
differently employed by the various extra-local powers that have historically 
operated in Andasibe, I will show how, far from the degrading practice it has 
always been claimed to be, tavy has been integrated into these forms of 
value production in essential ways. This, I will argue, continues to be the 
case in a more acute way, since particular articulations between Andasibe’s 
past and tavy, and their projection into the future, are highly generative of 
the need and value of TAMS as a forest carbon project. Carbon, therefore, 
appears in this chapter as a form of value—the carbon credit—that 
harnesses the generative capacities of tavy-as-waste and reproduces 
historical inequalities. In this sense, it continues the conversation on 
articulations between carbon, waste and value that the previous chapter 
began.  
I first take a slight detour, however, to explore the kind of 
environmental imaginaries that Madagascar evokes today as biodiversity 
hotspot, and their temporal effects. As CI’s narrative above shows, the 
island, and its forests in particular, are portrayed as the last remnants of a 
pristine nature that pre-dates human disturbance, and hence recall a distant 
past outside of history. This, I will argue, has the effect of producing 
‘selective rememberings’ (Coronil 1997), where the economic and political 
roles that these forests have played historically, and tavy’s entanglements 
with them, are effectively forgotten. By obscuring these mutual connections, 
this narrative contributes to the devaluation of tavy as a wasteful practice, at 
the same time as it reinforces the need for conservation.  
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Madagascar, a timely place 
As the babakoto’s taste for strawberry guava reminds us, the 
taxonomic classification of species into native and alien is not a 
straightforward process. As Helmreich (2005) shows for the case of Hawaii, 
biologists perceive it as a complex matter, and shifting boundaries emerge 
from the entanglement of diverse ideas of agency and time with political 
questions of native (human) populations in the island. Thus, a clear-cut 
nature/culture division which organises species into native and alien 
categories according to the absence or presence of human agency is often a 
complicated issue (see also Lien and Law 2011): as species introduced by 
early human settlement are associated with those same populations who 
today adopt the politically salient designation of ‘natives’, for example, the 
‘indigenous’ category is problematised by recognising a particular type of 
human agency as legitimate within the natural sphere. Similarly, different 
ways among scientists of understanding Captain Cook’s arrival in the island, 
as either a continuation of human intervention into nature, (albeit on a 
different, accelerated scale) or as a ‘different regime of introduction’ which 
marks the beginning of non-native species introduction, also lead to 
taxonomic dilemmas (Helmreich 2005:116). We can see that within these 
debates the question is not only one of matter ‘out of place’ (Douglas 1966) 
as in the case of ‘introduced’ species, but also of matter in—and out of—
time, as some pasts are considered more natural than others. Specifically, it 
is an appeal to what are perceived as purer or more real origins and their 
transformation through historical time/human history, that structure these 
varied understandings. As has been explored elsewhere (see, for example, 
Lien 2007; Tsing 1995) distinctions between native and alien natural forms 
find potent echoes as cultural symbols through which racist and xenophobic 
discourses articulate ideas of nationalism, and construct ‘the Other’. Again, it 
is an articulation between origins and purity, and therefore one which 
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invokes more legitimate pasts, that structures such understandings, this 
time in a nationalist/territorial context. 
Coronil (1997) argues that there has been a tendency in Western social 
theory to correspond the dichotomy of nature and culture to that of space 
and time, whereby nature and space are seen as the ‘passive material’ and 
‘inert’ space, respectively, upon which humans act and ‘historical events 
take place’ (Coronil 1997:23). Nature is to Culture as Space is to Time. The 
landscapes that materialise as a result of conservation practice and 
discourse may be seen through this perspective, as space or nature is 
cordoned off and preserved from human intervention, in an attempt to 
‘delineate and maintain a boundary in space and to arrest time in the 
interests of a supposedly pristine nature’ (Katz 1998:54), or, in other words, 
through the production of a space (Lefebvre 1991) devoid of human time, or 
culture. Rather than focusing on the space/time dichotomy, I here want to 
concentrate on the production of nature through particular ideas of time. 
 Both Madagascar and Andasibe can be seen to gain their meaning and 
value in conservation practice through a very particular idea of the past. As 
we saw in CI’s narrative above, an appeal to a pristine nature pre-dating 
human disturbance, ‘Madagascar's geographical isolation from the rest of the 
continent’, is contrasted to ‘people’s impact on it’ (most often embodied in 
the practice of tavy) resulting in a powerful narrative which calls for and 
legitimises conservation as saviour of this ‘national wealth’.  
Ideas of value premised on notions of a pure and native natural past, 
therefore, are set in opposition to all that is seen as human, post-natural and 
degrading. In conservation practice in Andasibe, these ideas take form 
through the image of the primary forest facing the savoka, and further 
materialise through spatial practices by setting borders and limits between 
one type of (desirable) nature and the other. These fragmented landscapes 
act at the same time as stage and script of a very particular story, as we saw 
above. Their confrontation—a pristine nature and a degraded human 
landscape—evokes the dual chronotope (Bakhtin 1981) of the conservation 
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myth: they present a particular vision of the past, and warn against its 
projection into the future, legitimising the teller’s role as moral and 
necessary actor. As Roe (2005) argues, this type of narrative in which a 
scenario of ‘what will happen if the events or positions are carried out as 
described’ (Roe 2005:288) is an archetype of development narratives, which 
generally aim to foster action or acceptance among their audience53.  
The narrative thus establishes Madagascar as a unique place on earth 
on the basis of its natural attributes in relation to time: an island ‘out of 
time’ due to its strange and endemic fauna having followed a different 
evolutionary path detached from anthropogenic disturbances, or, as 
Sodikoff qualifies it, a ‘biogeographical anachronism’ (Sodikoff 2013:140). In 
a sense, the representation of Madagascar as an isolated and unique space 
separate from the rest of the world is a scalar parallel of the image conveyed 
by the AMNP and its suggested opposite, the savoka or tavy fields: they both 
represent a type of nature that is not ‘of our time’, but rather a fragment of 
what once was, and is no more. This nature appears in turn encroached by 
the ills of our time and points towards the future in the form of 
environmental degradation. 
As Ferry and Limbert argue, the word ‘resource’ shares its 
etymological features with the French word source, as spring of water, and 
points to a ‘continuous generation of something from an originary point’ 
(Elizabeth Emma Ferry and Limbert 2008:5). Madagascar’s nature in 
general, and Andasibe’s remaining forests in particular, draw their meaning 
in contemporary global imaginaries from an appeal to such an original 
source, a kind of pre-lapsarian Nature. Their value, like that of heritage as 
described by Sodikoff (2012b), arises out of ‘old age and rarity’, understood 
as a ‘purity’ derived from an ‘apparent proximity to an original source’ 
(Sodikoff 2012b:140). Madagascar’s nature, gaining meaning from its 
                                                        
53 For a detailed analysis of the structure of environmental narratives see Flynn 
2008.  
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perceived belonging to an original, purer time untouched by human history, 
is therefore infused with the affect of nostalgia. 
Boym describes nostalgia in the following terms:  
 ‘as a longing for a home that no longer exists or has 
never existed. Nostalgia is a sentiment of loss and 
displacement, but it is also a romance with one’s own 
fantasy. Nostalgic love can only survive in a long-distance 
relationship. A cinematic image of nostalgia is a double 
exposure, or a superimposition of two images – of home 
and abroad, of past and present, of dream and everyday 
life’ (2003:7).  
We can see the double exposure which evokes this longing for the 
purer times of an Edenic home in the landscape of Andasibe, as the primary 
forest as past is contrasted with the tavy or savoka fields as present (and it is 
only through this ‘double exposure’ that the narrative makes sense). The 
imagery of Madagascar as lost Eden, or even as remnant of the fabulous old 
continent of Lemuria (Ramaswamy 2004), adds to the nostalgic fantasy. As 
Boym suggests, nostalgia is symptomatic of modernity, ‘coeval’ (2003:8) 
rather than opposed to it. If, as Frow (1997) argues, modernity has primarily 
to do with the break of the present from the past, its work being that to ‘cut 
across the knot of heterogeneous strands of time to produce the stabilities 
and unities of a now and then’ (1997:1), then the ‘lament for a lost past’ 
(1997:2) is implicit in it and leads to the production of a mythical past. The 
return to an imagined wilderness, so longed for in the works of Thoreau or 
John Muir for example, can therefore be understood as an effect of the 
disenchantment with the modern world (Cronon 1995).  
Boym distinguishes between two types of nostalgia: restorative and 
reflective. The former, she argues, ‘stresses nostos (home) and attempts a 
transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home’ (2003:13). Although the idea 
of a return to a lost home denotes its spatiality, where nostalgia may be seen 
   120 
as a longing for a place that no longer is54, it is not so much concerned with 
space as such but rather with the ‘yearning for a different time’ (Boym 
2003:8). In its restorative version, then, this space-time is to be attained 
through attempts to ‘conquer and spatialize time’ or to ‘revisit time as space’ 
in an effort to redeem longing and loss through a ‘return to origins’ 
(2003:13). From this perspective, we can see that the opposition between 
primary forests and tavy, and the aim of ‘bringing back the forest’ contained 
in TAMS as a carbon project, do not so much aim to produce a timeless 
nature of absolute stasis, or an island of space devoid of time (see Katz 
1998), but rather act as a ‘rebellion against the modern idea of time, a time 
of history and progress’, proposing instead a ‘time out of time’ (Boym 
2003:8): a universal, ‘natural’ time outside of history55. Contrary to an 
‘invention of tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) which aims to 
establish continuities with the past, this one effects a categorical 
discontinuity. 
The nostalgic affect of this ‘natural’ time, which recalls ‘the edenic 
unity of time and space before entry into history’ (Boym 2003:12), has two 
main effects. On the one hand, by appearing as universal and outside of 
history, this kind of time acquires a mythical character on the basis of its 
timelessness. This shares similarities with the ‘self-totalization’ that 
Greenhouse (1989) claims takes place in Western conceptions of 
temporality and the law, and which work to turn the latter into a ‘temporal 
myth’. An example is the principle of ‘reasoning by analogy to precedent’, 
which she argues  
                                                        
54 In a similar way, Cronon (1995) describes the modern longing for a return to 
wilderness as representing a ‘flight from history’, but he does so in spatial terms. 
Wilderness, from this perspective, can be seen as ‘the original garden … a place outside of 
time’; ‘the frontier … a savage world at the dawn of civilization’; the ‘bold landscape of 
frontier heroism … the place of youth and childhood’; and the ‘sacred sublime … the home of 
a God who transcends history’ (1995:79). 
55 A parallel take on this is Bowker’s analyses on conservation biology and 
biodiversity valuation, where he identifies a similar ‘myth’, which looks, however, to the 
future: ‘much biodiversity current discourse is concerned with rendering the present 
eternal- moving ourselves and our planet out of the flow of history’ (Bowker 2005:112). 
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‘creates a false historicity in that it perpetually reclaims 
the past for the present: in theory, a dispute from 1989 
can be resolved by reference to cases from 1889 or 1389. 
‘The law’ thus accumulates, but it never passes; at an 
instant, it represents a totality’ (Greenhouse 1989:1640).   
Both ‘natural’ time and the time of the law, therefore, become temporal 
myths by their virtue of invoking a total order which sits outside human 
time.  
On the other hand, and by consequence, this type of temporal myth, 
just like the ‘homogeneous empty–time’ (Benjamin 1968) of the nation from 
where mutual origins and belonging can be imagined and eternity is 
invoked, is premised on, and at the same time induces to, ‘specific historical 
amnesias’ (Anderson 1991 in Coronil 1997:67). ‘Selective rememberings’, 
Coronil argues, ‘mythologize a nation’s past and displace conflictual aspects 
of its historical origins’ evoking a ‘sacralized conception of the nation as an 
eternal community’ (Coronil 1997:67). This, in Venezuela, translated into an 
act of ‘purification’ (Coronil 1997:68) whereby links with the nation’s past 
under the rule of General Juan Vicente Gomez were severed by subsequent 
political actors. Obscuring the fact that Gomez’s rule had in effect 
established the pillars for the transformation of the country into a 
prosperous oil nation, the dictatorial rule rather served as a ‘turning point’ 
from which to construct the idea of the birth of a ‘modern Venezuela’ and its 
‘entrance into the twentieth century’ (Coronil 1997:68) as an oil nation 
unpolluted by its past. The Venezuela that emerged was one of mythical and 
‘magical’ properties, as ‘oil wealth created the illusion that modernity could 
be brought to Venezuela as if pulled out of a hat’ (Coronil 1997:68–69)56.  
                                                        
56 For a similar analysis on the role that temporal images play in state practice, see 
Grant (2001) as he explores the effects of ‘timelessness’ and ‘arrests of time’ that the 
infantilisation of public space had in transitional  Moscow. By appealing to an innocent past, 
Grant argues, Tsereteli’s ‘Disneyfied’ statues aided the state in ‘buying time’ (Grant 
2001:352) as they distanced themselves from the context of political and economic 
stagnation in the capital.  
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We can thus see a similar act of ‘selective rememberings’ in the 
representation of the forests of Andasibe as remnants of a lost, mythical 
time, and therefore ‘unpolluted’ by the historical trajectory of the area. 
Myth, Barthes (1972) reminds us, is always ‘constituted by the loss of 
historical quality of things’ (1972:142), transforming ‘History into Nature’ 
(1972:140). The type of nostalgia that Madagascar invokes, therefore, is not 
just premised on a notion of purity (of an untouched, pristine Nature) but 
also performs, at the same time, an act of ‘purification’ (Coronil 1997:68; cf 
Latour 1993), presenting the forests of Andasibe outside of history: like 
‘modernity’, far from a simple ‘illusion’, this ‘periodizing division’ is also ‘an 
operation, it performs certain work’ by making ‘certain things possible’ 
(Frow 1997:3).  
Madagascar’s unusual and unique natural forms, and their relation to 
an isolated evolutionary path, have always puzzled Western science, but 
their understandings have not always been the same. In the 19th century, the 
‘strangeness’ of Madagascar’s life forms, Anderson argues, were ‘minimized’ 
(2013:110) and attenuated in order to incorporate the island into global 
frameworks.  Portrayals of unique, unfamiliar and distant lemurs, for 
example, were downplayed in favour of representations which emphasised 
their amiability and familiarity, placing the island’s nature within the axis of 
domestication, and thus amenable to colonial control. Madagascar, from this 
perspective, appeared as globally connected, rather than apart. Today, 
Madagascar appears, once again, as an island out of time. This discourse on 
uniqueness, in contrast to one of familiarity and continuity, is more 
amenable to contemporary interventions which are premised on notions of 
scarcity and limited resources. If, in the 19th century, Madagascar was 
assembled by Western naturalists as part of a global history so that it could 
be brought under colonial control and ‘domesticated’ (Anderson 2013), 
today it has been set wild again. We can see here the ‘periodizing division’ 
(Frow 1997:3) at work, as the ‘island out of time’ is brought under 
environmental management.  
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In the following section I therefore aim to dispel amnesiac readings of 
Andasibe’s landscape which contrast a mythical, natural time with a 
historical one, to see how both forests and tavy have been mutually 
entangled historically as part of wider political, economic and labour 
regimes. We will see how the forests of Andasibe—today depicted by 
conservation practice as the last remnants of a natural past—have been 
central to the economic and political projects of various extra-local actors 
over the last 200 years. What is more, although continuously portrayed as a 
degrading or wasteful practice, tavy has been fundamental to these 
processes of forest ‘valorisation’, variously understood at each historical 
time.   
Polluting Andasibe’s pasts 
Although I briefly introduce the area before its annexation as a French 
colony, I focus on two snapshots at different points in the past rather than 
elaborating a linear, historical narrative that covers the whole period (I 
therefore ignore an important economic activity of Andasibe—graphite 
mining—which became particularly relevant from the 1930s on, and which I 
leave for chapter six). I present, instead, the development of logging camps 
and the exploitation of the forest of Analamazaotra as foundational 
moments of what became known as ‘Andasibe’ under early colonial rule, and 
the ‘Planina dimy taona’ or ‘Five year plan’ during the early stages of post-
colonial Madagascar. In both cases the forests of Andasibe feature as key 
resources within the different ideas of ‘valorisation’ (mise en valeur) that 
each project envisaged and called upon.  I use archival and secondary data to 
reconstruct the colonial period, and historical accounts in Mahatsara and 
Andasibe for the ‘Five year plan’, since, as we will see, this event seems to be 
missing from any records. I complement the ethnographic data on the post-
colonial era with the ‘National Development Plan 1974-77’ (Repoblika 
Malagasy, 1974a), accessed at the national Library in Antananarivo.  
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Andasibe during the 19th century 
Andasibe-Mantadia (AMNP) is today one of the most visited National 
Parks in Madagascar, mainly due to its accessible location, being less than 
120 km from the capital on the national road (RN2) that reaches to the 
eastern coast of the island. This halfway point between Antananarivo and 
the port of Toamasina has been one of the key elements in the development 
of the town and region, as stop-over between the political-economic hub of 
the country and one of the main commercial ports that could actualise such 
relations with the outside.  
Although Andasibe literally means ‘the big camp’, in reference to the 
logging camps that were established in the area during the early colonial 
rule in the 1900s, its beginnings as a valuable and strategic point for extra-
local powers can be traced back  as early as the 1800s, during the time of the 
expansion of the Merina Kingdom57. At that time, it was the forest of 
Analamazaotra (or Alamazaotra) which encompassed the contemporary 
town of Andasibe and the southern part of the AMNP that was integrated 
into a national economy as a key military post and lodging camp in the royal 
expansion and trade route between the capital and the east. 
Challenging the general assumption that the forest of Analamazaotra 
has been historically depleted by tavy, Campbell (2013) has offered a 
historical perspective on the roles that the forest played for the Merina 
Kingdom, arguing that the policies that were adopted by the crown between 
1791 and 1861 were actually responsible for its vast deforestation. 
Following Merina expansion and the appropriation of cattle herds for export 
to Mascarene markets in the 1790s, ‘cattle traders – chiefly the crown and 
court elite’ (Campbell 2013:70) established cattle pens in Analamazaotra as 
a halfway point between the capital and the port, with cattle rearing leading 
to forest clearance of the ‘western fringe of the forest’ which ‘disturbed 
                                                        
57 The Merina are the ethnic group who inhabit the highlands in and around 
Antananarivo and make up the bulk of the national elite.   
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sands and prevented normal regeneration’ (Campbell 2013:70).  From 1790 
to 1850, wealth accumulation by the Royal Family and Merina elites, 
coupled with increased national power, resulted in four housing booms in 
Antananarivo, where most of the building materials came from eastern 
forests. The crown organised labour by creating ‘permanent woodcutters 
fanompoana units’ (Campbell 2013:81), or groups of forced, unremunerated 
labourers carrying out royal service. Although royal service had originated 
as a ritual obligation owed by subjects to their King, it had later expanded to 
encompass all kinds of compulsory labour required by the sovereign, from 
irrigation works or military service to education in mission schools (Graeber 
2007:46–47), continuing well into the colonial period in various forms 
(explored below). With the adoption of autarkic policies in the 1820s 
following the failure of the Britanno-Merina treaty (aimed at promoting 
economic development from domestic sources), the island saw the surge of 
industrial production in the highlands which required great extents of wood 
for both fuel and production material. This, coupled with the need for 
firewood due to the highland’s cold winters, resulted in a depletion of 
eastern forests almost exclusively for the imperial Merina (Campbell 2013).  
The extensive use of forest resources, and its perceived fast depletion, 
led to policies of forest conservation coming from the crown. The eastern 
parts of the Analamazaotra forest may have also been protected as a 
defensive strategy against invasions (Campbell 2013:92). More importantly, 
as Betsimisaraka escaped to the forests to avoid being incorporated into the 
crown’s forced labour and taxation schemes during the conquest of the area 
between 1817-1823, a number of policies (i.e. forced settlement and 
relocation) were introduced to limit their movement (Cole 2001:40) 
including a ban on the expansion of agricultural land in the forest through 
tavy (Cole 2001:41–43). The first national ban on tavy was instituted in 
1881 (Kull 1996).   
Before French occupation, therefore, Analamazaotra had already been 
integrated into political and economic networks that linked it to the outside, 
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with the forest as the key productive element and tavy already under 
regulation.  
The values of Analamazaotra for the Colony  
Analamazaotra quickly transformed with the onset of colonisation. The 
ancient footpath that had accommodated Merina travel between the 
highlands and the east during the 19th century became one of the central 
routes of the island under French rule. With the arrival of General Gallieni in 
1896 in the role of Governor of the Colony, the eastern route—until then the 
most transited one—became a priority for colonial development, seen as a 
way of shortening travel times for troupes between the coast and 
Antananarivo and facilitating direct control of certain regions for colonial 
authorities (Razanamapisa n.d.). Until then, travel had been done generally 
by filanjana, or palanquin, with goods carried by Malagasy men, but the 
transit times were slow (about 20 days between Toamasina and 
Antananarivo 58 ), expensive (1000 francs for a ton of merchandise) 
(Razanamapisa n.d.:5) and uncomfortable (Sodikoff 2012b:30).  In 1898 
‘numerous prestataires’59 or forced labourers were sent to fix the road 
between Andakana and Analamazaotra, at the same time establishing a 
military post in the area where three ‘indigenous’ operatives were 
appointed60. A ‘whipsaw’61 was set up, in turn, for the production of wood62 
and the rules of forest exploitation were presented to the indigenous 
population, establishing the ‘exact’ areas where villagers could collect 
                                                        
58 M. Argelies, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des colonies charge d’éxaminer 
le projet de loi ayant pour objet d’autoriser la colonie de Madagascar a emprunter une 
somme de 60 million de francs pour la construction d’un Chemin de fer de Tananarive a la 
Coôte Orientale et d’éxécution de travaux publics, FR ANOM 91 COL , c. 361 (Dossier 1, 
pg.4). 
59 Rapport du Chef de Bataille Noël, Commandant Cercle Moramanaga, 1 août 1897, 
FR ANOM GGM 2D, c.166 
60 Rapport du Capitaine Maillard sur la situation pôlitique et administrative du 
Cercle anneèxe de Moramanga, mai 1898, FR ANOM GGM 2D, c.166 
61 A saw operated by two persons to cut timber lengthwise. 
62  Rapport du Capitaine Maillard sur la situation agricole, industrielle et 
commerciale du Cercle annèxe de Moramanga, mai 1898, FR ANOM GGM 2D, c.166 
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wood63. Forest exploitation in the area took the form of the concession 
system, where colonial entrepreneurs were granted temporary forest 
parcels from the state for mining, agriculture or logging activities (Sodikoff 
2012b:10). The main and biggest concessions in Analamazaotra and 
surroundings were given to ‘Compagnie Coloniale de Madagascar’ and 
‘Société de la Grand Ile’. Exploitation began mainly with a view towards 
producing wood for the railway system, both for tracks and firewood, and to 
a lesser extent for rubber production, developing the area’s central 
economic activity during the early 1900s.  
The construction of a railway that would connect the capital with the 
port of Toamasina, the Tananarive-Côte Est, or TCE, was seen as one of the 
most pressing issues for the development of the colony within a global 
capitalist system, as Gallieni himself declared in his speech during the 
inauguration of the TCE in November 1st, 1904:   
‘in our times of keen competition in every world market, 
the railway line is an unavoidable necessity, an 
indispensable weapon for any productive country that 
does not want to succumb to economic struggle nor be 
reduced to a deplorable inferiority’ (Revue de 
Madagascar 1904:545; personal translation). 
The TCE railway was expected to become the motor of rice exports 
from the highlands (Gallieni baptised it as ‘the railway of rice’ in reference to 
the ‘railway of peanuts’ in Cayor, Senegal) and to a lesser extent wood from 
Betsimisaraka forests (Revue de Madagascar 1904:546–547). Indeed, in 
1906, the General Guard of Water and Forests Lhotelian informed in a 
report to Gallieni that, thanks to the railway system, wood exports would 
soon take off, as ‘concessionaires’ were setting up a market in South Africa, 
                                                        
63  Rapport du Capitaine Maillard sur la situation agricole, industrielle et 
commerciale du Cercle annèxe de Moramanga, aout 1898, FR ANOM GGM 2D, c.166 
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where the ‘Compagine Coloniale’ had already sent samples of tracks from 
Analamazaotra to the Transvaal64.  
But the role of the TCE was not just economic. Gallieni’s inauguration 
speech emphasised the civilising task that the Antananarivo-Toamasina link 
would effect by enhancing Merina-Côtier (Coastal) relationships, 
considering it an educational, humanitarian responsibility for the colony and 
a basis of progress (Revue de Madagascar 1904:542). In the mistaken hope 
that the colony would favour the end of Merina domination over coastal 
peoples, Gallieni concluded in his speech that  
‘thanks to the railway, Tananarive and Tamatave will be 
able to shake hands, which will be … a medium for 
expansion and education of the indigenous population 
and, therefore, an element of development and progress 
for the colony itself’ (Revue de Madagascar 1904:544; 
personal translation). 
In 1902 a station was set up a few kilometres from Analamazaotra, 
where the contemporary town of Andasibe is. It was named Périnet after the 
engineer in charge of that section and who, arriving in a preliminary mission 
led by General Roques in 1897, had died during building works. The old 
pathway and carrousel route, the development of the railway and the 
centrality of the station of Périnet facilitated the exploitation of the forest of 
Analamazaotra over the coming decades. Thus, the forest became an 
instrumental resource for the development of the colony.  
                                                        
64 Le Garde General des Eaux et Forêts Lhotelain in Rapport de Tournée de Garde 
des Eaux et Forêts 1906, FR ANOM GGM 5 D (18), 1  
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Figure 9. Railway works near Andasibe Analamazaotra, 1903. Source: 
Madagascar's Geographical Institute, FTM (Foiben-taosarintanin'i Madagasikara) 
 
Wood was not, however, the only thing that Analamazaotra had to 
offer to colonial Madagascar. As Feeley-Harnik (1991) has argued, the scarce 
resource for the colonial state was always labour, not land. The shortage of 
labour has indeed been cited as one of the key problems that colonial rule 
encountered in Madagascar (Sodikoff 2004; 2012b), and often featured as 
the main preoccupation (along with impôts or taxes) for the administration 
in the yearly, regional reports for the province of Moramanga65.   
The system of ‘prestataires’ provided much of the labour force needed 
in the early days of the colony. Although ‘fanompoana’ was banned as early 
as 1901, forced work continued in both open as well as surreptitious ways. 
It would eventually be institutionalised in the 1920s in the SMOTIG 
programme—Service de la Main-d’Oeuvre de Travaux d’Interêt Générale—
which employed conscripts for 2 years to carry out public works, who could 
also be ‘borrowed’ by ‘private industrialists’ (Sodikoff 2012b:51). The need 
                                                        
65 Rapport Pôlitique et Administrative, Moramanga FR ANOM GGM 2D, c. 167 
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to enlist Malagasy workers for both public and private enterprises, who, 
however, refused to become wage labourers and fled to the forests, led to a 
constant tension between the administration’s ‘desire to distance itself’ 
(Sodikoff 2012b:63) from fanompoana and the pragmatics of finding 
available workers. 
The lack of workers for the construction of the TCE was initially 
tackled by bringing in a foreign labour force. With Malagasy populations 
deserting their jobs, countless efforts were made to introduce foreign 
workers—from India and China especially, but also Italian and Greek—but 
with no success, as they either deserted or died en masse due to the harsh 
working conditions (Razanamapisa n.d.:12–14).  
The ban on labour requisition from 1901 had been replaced by a 
personal tax, which effectively translated into a requirement of 30 to 40 
days of ‘free’ work to pay it off. Razanamapisa (n.d.:13) argues that this, 
along with a strong propagandistic initiative and a cricket invasion in the 
eastern area in 1901, led to the enlistment of many locals at the work sites. 
It seems, therefore, that the construction of the TCE was carried out through 
mixed forms of free and corveé labour. The Dossier Algiers from 189866, for 
example, suggests that Betsimisaraka populations carried out 30 days of 
forced work for the TCE but could, after that period, remain in the work sites 
as free workers for 75 cents a day, plus daily food rations. It seems that 
populations may have taken advantage of this system, as numbers of 
workers in Analamazaotra reflect drastic seasonal fluctuations. Thus, in the 
beginning of 1902 there were around 250 workers in the sites of 
Analamazaotra increasing up to 4000 towards the end of the year. During 
the agricultural season (December to May), numbers fell radically, with only 
500 workers in May 1903, to later increase again (Revue de Madagascar 
                                                        
66 M. Argelies, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des colonies charge d’examiner 
le projet de loi ayant pour objet d’autoriser la colonie de Madagascar a emprunter une 
somme de 60 million de francs pour la construction d’un Chemin de fer de Tananarive a la 
Cote Orientale et d’exécution de travaux publics, FR ANOM 91 COL , c. 361 (Dossier 1, pg. 
32).  
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1904:527–528). As Cole has argued, the shortage of labour also transformed 
into a permanent tension between private colons’ need for workers and that 
of the state (2001:50).  
We have therefore seen how the forest of Analamazaotra and its 
inhabitants were integrated into the colony’s project of ‘valorising’ (mise en 
valeur) Madagascar. But how was tavy perceived and dealt with in this 
context? The administration’s efforts to eradicate tavy had the double aim of 
halting deforestation and integrating Betsimisaraka farmers into wage 
labour. As Sodikoff has shown (2012b; 2004), the vilified agricultural 
practice was perceived as a waste of both land and time, and it was hoped 
that wage work would instil a capitalist ‘time-discipline’ beneficial for both 
forests and the ‘indolent’ (Sodikoff 2012b:58) natives. At other times, 
however, tavy was depicted as a necessary evil.  
We can appreciate a similar approach to tavy in an early report on the 
‘provisional management’ of the ‘Analamazaotra Forest Station’ from 1909, 
carried out by Modeste Louvel (1909), Head of the Forestry Section of the 
General Government in Madagascar. The Forest Station had its origins in a 
‘Tree Testing and Nursery Station’, (Station d’Essai et Pepiniere), from 1900, 
established with the aim of carrying out research for both ‘exploitation’ and 
‘regeneration’, although the latter objective was soon eclipsed by the more 
pressing needs of obtaining wood for the railway. In 1904, colonial inspector 
Thiry established it as ‘Station Forestier d’Analamazaotra’, becoming a key 
enclave for the processing and production of timber and, to a lesser extent, 
as a scientific site for the study of Malagasy flora and fauna. Louvel’s report 
from 1909 is basically an inventory of timber species to be used in the 
exploitation of the area, divided into parcels and granted to the two main 
forest ‘concessionaires’, ‘Societe La Grande Isle’ and ‘Compagnie Coloniale’. 
When commenting on the eastern side of the forest, Louvel claims that ‘each 
year Betsimisaraka burn the forest to establish their tavy, destroying 
beautiful wooded parts’. As a result, it appears that tavy had been limited to 
the savoka, ‘land covered with brushwood or parts already burnt for past 
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cultivation’, in the hope that this would ‘force them [Betsimisaraka] to 
cultivate the marshes’ (1909:314), that is, to turn to irrigated agriculture.  
Although Louvel’s report from 1909 identified tavy as the main driver 
of deforestation, a report of 1916 from the Governor of Moramanga67 quotes 
Louvel in bringing attention to the ‘abusive exploitation from both big 
concessionaires and of the natives, who cause the forests of the Colony very 
important damages’. By 1929, the Forestry Service requested a moratorium 
of 15 years in all concessions, acknowledging the disastrous effects that 
logging was having on the island’s forests, and arguing for central, public 
management of the TCE logging activities 68 . The tensions between 
commercial exploitation and the need to conserve forests had become 
evident, and it is no coincidence that around the same time that the logging 
industry in Périnet was transferred to the state for more ‘rational’ 
management69, the first network of protected areas was established in the 
island. More revealing, however, is that fact that three years later, in 1930, a 
new national regulation of forests was passed, where tavy was explicitly 
banned (Raik 2007:7).  
We can begin to see how the forests of Andasibe played a central role 
in the initial stages of the colony (as well as the pre-colonial expansion of the 
Merina Kingdom) as the area became a productive hub of timber and drew 
on local labour for its extraction and the development of the railway—a 
colonial priority as Gallieni himself declared. Tavy, on the other hand, was 
treated as a degrading practice that endangered the value that the forest of 
Analamazaotra held for the colony, leading to the establishment of limits to 
the agricultural practice. This, as I now show, became a dynamic that 
continued into the post-colonial period, although the value of the forests and 
the state’s approach to tavy took different forms.  
                                                        
67 Rapport Economique Moramanga, FR ANOM GGM 2 D, c. 168 
68 Rapport général sur le fonctionnement du service forestier en 1930, p 10, FR 
ANOM GGM 5 D (18), 15 
69 Ibid 
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The ‘Five year plan’ 
Although Madagascar obtained its independence from France in 1960, 
it was only in 1975 that colonial ties were truly severed, as a result of the 
student-led May revolution of 1972 and the instauration of the Second 
Republic with Lieutenant Commander Didier Ratsiraka as President. In the 
context of a total break with the mêtropole, Ratsiraka embarked on a 
Marxist-inspired isolationist era, which has been usually portrayed as one of 
continuous decline in the country’s economic conditions (Gow 1997) lasting 
until the mid 1980s, when Madagascar re-opened to the outside and became 
the first ever African Socialist State to agree to structural adjustment 
policies by the IMF.  
Ratsiraka’s socialist project envisaged the devolution of powers to ‘the 
people’ through a re-dynamisation of the Fokonolona/Fokon’olona (Gow 
1997): a village assembly where people gather to deliberate on any local 
matter of concern, ‘regardless of descent’ (Graeber 2007:69), and which is 
sometimes equated with an organisational institution70. Economic policies 
were based on domestic production for self-sufficiency, with nationalisation 
and large-scale development projects implemented through a politics of 
investment based on debt (Gow 1997). In this context, the country’s 
economy began to decline at a tremendous pace and in rural areas this was 
felt through the retreat of the state, which practically disappeared (see 
Graeber 2007). 
With regards to forestry and conservation, this era is usually portrayed 
as a time when state anti-fire repression was ‘intensified’, ‘marked by 
increasingly harsh approaches to fire enforcement’ (Kull 2004:236). Various 
rulings were introduced in the years between 1972 and 1977 strengthening 
fire prosecution by speeding up judicial procedures, raising prison 
sentences and even placing illegal fires ‘under the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal Criminel Special, which could theoretically give the death sentence’ 
                                                        
70 For a discussion on different understandings of fokon’olona see Graeber (2007). 
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(Kull 2004:236).  This centralised, strict approach to forest fires contrasts 
sharply with the devolution of local powers and the retreat of the state in 
rural parts of Madagascar, being usually understood that, in any case, 
Ratsiraka’s authoritarian endeavours were never very successful due to 
their difficulty of implementation. Although it would seem that many efforts 
went into limiting tavy at the central level, it has also been said that during 
the early rule of Ratsiraka controls on tavy were loosened in the interests of 
national development and food security (Christian Kull, personal 
communication, October 2012).  
These unresolved tensions between central and local power 
structures, coupled with the need to increase domestic rice production, may 
account for the radically different narratives regarding forestry and tavy 
found between national policy and local life histories in 
Andasibe/Mahatsara.   
Indeed, this vision of state fire repression between 1975 until the early 
1980s, which would have meant important hardships for tavy farmers, is 
nowhere reflected in Mahatsara or Andasibe’s understandings of the era. 
Instead, and very surprisingly, these years are remembered as benevolent 
and prosperous, when farmers were allowed to practise as much tavy as 
they wanted thanks to Ratsiraka’s ‘Five year plan’, or Planina dimy taona. In 
fact, during fieldwork, any conversation with people over 45 years of age 
that dealt with the practice of tavy in the past would unequivocally bring up 
the ‘Five year plan’ during the ‘days of Ratsiraka’ (tamin’ny andron’i 
Ratsiraka).  
Very little has been written about those immediate years in which 
repression on fire was relaxed (the 'Five year plan' is mentioned in 
Rakotondrazafy 2007), and nothing, to my knowledge, on the forms they 
took or effect they had at local level. The apparent lack or insignificance of 
this period in the literature, and among current conservation or 
administrative actors in the capital, sharply contrasts with its relevance in 
the local area.  Although its name may be a general reference to the fact that 
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state programmes were operationalised in five-year blocs, local people in 
Andasibe/Mahatsara, as I will show below, specifically locate it as part of the 
national programme for food self-sufficiency, coming directly from central 
government. Whether one or the other, the fact is that the ‘Five year plan’ 
had a real and important impact in Andasibe, proof of which is the fact that 
it has remained inscribed in people’s imaginaries of the past with strong 
nostalgic tints71.  
In Mahatsara, for example, the plan is unequivocally remembered as a 
better time, when people were allowed to practise as much tavy as they 
wanted72, provided they obtained authorisations from the forestry services 
through permits that were renewable at the end of each 5 years. Maman’i Jo, 
for example, has been living in Mahatsara since 2001, when she and her 
family ‘were moved’ from their previous home inside the Park (a few 
kilometres from Mahatsara) as a result of the area having been taken over 
by the World Bank, lasan’ny Banque Mondiale ny toerana tany dia 
nafindranjareo niainga aty izahay. She came with her husband, who later 
died, and now lives with her granddaughter Lala, surrounded by daughters 
and sons. In her fifties, her slender body and soft voice confer a frail 
appearance, which is nonetheless quickly dispelled as she recounts her 
comings and goings with Lala in search of gold. She holds a parcel of tavy not 
too far from Mahatsara, which in any case she deems to be insufficient. In 
the past, she says, there was much more land available, especially during the 
‘Five year plan’, ‘but when we got here it [the five year plan] was already 
over … so we haven’t got much land these days’. 
Tavy during this time is remembered as unrestricted and ‘with no 
limits’—as Maman’i Jo explained, ‘there were really no limits (tsy nisy 
fametrarana), you just did [tavy] as much as you wanted—and it evokes 
memories of opulence, as when taxi-brousses (local buses) would be sent 
                                                        
71 Interestingly, it also became a form of land securitisation since, in theory, farmers 
could claim ownership to the land they had cleared for cultivation. 
72 I explore the significance of the ‘Five year plan’ in ideas of expansion/oppression 
and the role of the state for people in Mahatsara in chapter five.  
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into Mormanaga (the regional capital) full of produce to be sold, and full of 
goods brought back from there, as recounted by another elder from 
Mahatsara.  
Ideas of the ‘Five year plan’ are not restricted to Mahatsara, but form 
part of the local imaginary in Andasibe. In one of our many talks over a beer 
at the local bar in Andasibe, my friend and informant Jean Noel, local park 
guide and president of the Association Mitsinjo73 during 2013, retold how 
his father cleared and acquired great extensions of land through the ‘Five 
year plan’ during the 1980s, as did every villager in Andasibe, with terrible 
consequences for the local environment for which Jean Noel so strenuously 
works.  
In turn, local figures of authority, such as Andasibe’s Mayor, Mr. 
Abdoul Kader, and his senior assistant Roland, narrated the ‘Five year plan’ 
as a programme of national reach, which was part of the Socialist 
government’s plan of securing rice self-sufficiency, ‘tao anatin’ilay hoe 
fahavitan-tena ara-tsakafo’, and without any doubt part of central 
government directives. The lack of documentation was explained by the 
Mayor as due to the probable fact that it was ‘something launched just 
verbally’, ‘zavatra lancena verbal fotsiny, ilay izy’. Roland, in turn, elaborated:  
‘It was done within the food self-sufficiency plan. There 
were no decrees, but that was it. It was the Eastern area 
of the island (faritra antsinanana) that benefited from it 
mostly … it was for people who had no land … Those at 
the Head of Triage, at the Forestry Service, would have a 
look at the land and share it according to the rules for 
those requesting it. And after five years you could claim 
land again. But here it was them at the service of Water 
and Forests themselves who did it’.  
                                                        
73 One of TAMS’ Facilitating Agents or FAs. 
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The discourse found in Mahatsara regarding the benevolence of the 
plan in terms of it imposing ‘no limits’ turns, in the Mayor’s words, into one 
which emphasises its ‘uncontrollable’ character (tsy voafehy), where the 
practice of tavy during this time is seen as the main cause of deforestation in 
the area.  
The significance and pervasiveness of the ‘Five year plan’ in people’s 
memories and imaginaries regarding tavy in Andasibe and Mahatsara 
contrasts sharply with its insubstantiality in national offices, marked by a 
lack of awareness on what the plan was or what it involved. At best, people 
from regional or national organisations operating in Andasibe had 
sometimes heard references to it, as was the case of CI’s technical advisor 
for TAMS—but often held no real knowledge of what it had entailed. The 
Director of the National Land Programme (PNF) based in Antananarivo, for 
example, had not heard anything about what it was and could only speculate 
that it may have had to do with local power holders or politicians allowing 
and encouraging tavy in the shadow of the central government to advance 
and secure their powerful positions.  
The ‘Five year plan’ as it was operationalised in Andasibe is indeed a 
puzzle when it comes to national policy: I have not been able to find any 
decrees, laws, rulings or documents on the ‘Five year plan’ myself in 
Antananarivo’s archives. Having left no apparent traces, it seems that the 
Plan has been forgotten in time. An entry on the ‘National Development 
Plan’ (Repoblika Malagasy, 1974a) published by the Malagasy Republic for 
the years 1974-77, offers the most solid direction in speculating about the 
plan and its relation to national rice self-sufficiency.   
This document is a compilation of the Marxist-inspired speeches and 
writings by Gabriel Ramanantsoa as Head of General Government (he was 
Prime Minister from 1972-1975), setting the framework for the general 
idea(l) of development for the Socialist government. In his programme 
speech from 1972 he states that it is ‘imperative to increase and valorise 
production by mobilising not just monetary resources available but also, and 
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especially, rationally using the capital-labour that our population enjoys’ 
(Repoblika Malagasy, 1974b:ix). Agriculture is thus identified as the base of 
the economy, and the intensification of rice cultivation for self-sufficiency as 
a motor of development, something which is to be attained within the next 
five years:  
‘During the next 5 years, around 20 billion (Malagasy 
francs) will be consecrated to the production of paddy … 
In quantitative terms, the main objective will be to 
eliminate all rice imports at the end of the 5 year period 
… In the current period, the State, acting at the same 
levels as other producers, will deal directly with the 
production, it being understood that the new surfaces 
could be either allocated to farmers or the Fokonolona, in 
order to valorise them [mettre en valeur] following the 
provisions of the bill of specifications, or be cultivated 
under governmental rule’ (Repoblika Malagasy, 
1974a:63–64). 
Although conservation efforts were also encouraged in parallel in 
order to protect national resources, it would seem that the priority of 
guaranteeing food self-sufficiency overrode them. A note by the ‘Direction of 
Water and Forests and Soils Conservation’ published in the midst of the 
independence revolution in 1973, in fact, states that ‘without abandoning its 
traditional role of protection and conservation, the Forestry Service is 
currently oriented towards more dynamic conceptions of development’ 
(Ramanantsoavina 1973:34).  
It is at this intersection, I argue, that the ‘Five year plan’ may best be 
located, as a strategy to attain the ‘valorisation’ of Andasibe’s forests within 
the national development plan of rice self-sufficiency. This era would only 
last 10 years, coming to an end as Madagascar opened up to the outside and 
engaged with international institutions like the International Monetary 
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Fund and the World Bank in the 1980s, marking the beginning of 
contemporary forms of conservation programmes. The targeting of 
Madagascar as environmental hotspot escalated over the coming decade, 
culminating in 2003, as the then president Marc Ravalomanana pledged to 
triple the island’s protected areas in the World National Park Congress in 
Durban. The days of the ‘Five year plan’ were long over, and it is this 
moment that Mahatsara residents identify with strict and arduous tavy 
controls. From this perspective, the ‘Five year plan’ does not appear as just a 
loosening of control over tavy, but rather as an intentional move (either 
national or regional) to integrate the agricultural practice into the Socialist 
programme for national development as a value-generating activity. 
‘Valorising’ Madagascar through tavy 
In the previous sections I have shown two moments in the history of 
Andasibe when its forests were incorporated into each era’s project of 
national/colonial development (along with a brief overview of pre-colonial 
times, when the forest of Analamazaotra served the expansion of the Merina 
Kingdom as a defensive and industrial resource). 
Valorisation, or ‘mise/mettre en valeur’, during these two eras appears 
as a productive trope in idea(l)s of development, referring to the different 
forms of integrating certain elements into productive processes.  As Sodikoff 
explains, during the colonial era ‘valorisation’ referred to ‘bringing land 
under capitalist production’ (Sodikoff 2012b:5), a process we have seen 
took the form of forest exploitation in Andasibe for the construction of the 
railway (as driver of the colony’s political and economic development), and 
for wood exports. In the post-colonial state, as explored above, it referred to 
the exploitation of land for rice cultivation in order to attain the socialist-
isolationist ideal of self-sufficiency. In both cases, as we have seen, then, the 
forests of Andasibe were pivotal for the island’s development, as were its 
inhabitants as a source of labour. Far from remnants of a natural time 
outside of history, we have seen how these supposedly pristine landscapes 
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have been at the centre of the various state-making projects in the island 
over the last two centuries.   
The trope of ‘valorisation’ is also productive in exploring ideas of 
perceived waste or non-value. In both cases presented above the idea of 
‘valorisation’ also entailed the relegation of tavy to a residual place as a 
wasteful and degrading practice, through bans and persecution exerted by 
both regimes. Even if during the ‘Five year plan’ tavy was acknowledged as 
value-producing, it was also criminalised through central government, in an 
interplay between the tensions of conservation and rice production. 
Although contemporary efforts at forest ‘valorisation’ in Andasibe (through 
TAMS and conservation) take a significantly different form, this approach to 
tavy, as we saw in the previous chapter, remains.  
A closer look, however, reveals that although continuously left in a 
devalued position, tavy has actually been integral to these ‘valorising’ 
projects historically, and continues to be so today. From the expansion of the 
Merina Kingdom, tavy was treated by ruling elites as a wasteful practice and 
an obstacle in the recruitment of labour for national development, and was 
consequently regulated or banned. At the same time, however, its 
persecution was erratic and strategically relaxed at times74. Although the 
Merina Kingdom established bans on tavy to curtail autonomy and 
movement, for example, these were at times relaxed in order to secure a 
source of soldiers who were not attached to permanent agricultural fields, 
which would ‘hinder their mobilization’ (McConnell 2002:221). This extends 
to the use of local ‘fanompoana units’, or the provision of free labour through 
Royal tax service in the forest of Analamazaotra, where labourers were most 
likely dependent on their own means—and thus tavy—to sustain 
themselves. The same process was mirrored in colonial policies since the 
                                                        
74 An erratic yet enduring persecution of tavy has historically shortened fallow 
periods, decreasing soil fertility in fixed settlements and forcing farmers to expand deeper 
into the forest in search of fertile land, either in search of a livelihood or to escape work or 
slavery. We can therefore see how, in a sense, the simultaneous degradation of landscapes 
and livelihoods by extra-local powers and their historical persecution of subsistence 
agriculture has favoured, rather than decreased, the expansion of tavy. 
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use of ‘free labour’ by the colonial state in public works and concessions, 
which was sometimes also ‘borrowed’ by entrepreneurs (Sodikoff 
2009:446), entailed farmers’ dependency on their kin for subsistence and, 
consequently, maintained them as intrinsically attached to tavy75. Thus, 
rather than severing farmers from their social and economic relationships 
with tavy, policies that aimed to incorporate labourers into their own 
productive processes and eradicate tavy also depended on its very 
reproduction (Sodikoff 2009). Paradoxically, tavy became the one 
agricultural system that supported peasants’ subsistence, thus guaranteeing 
the constant supply of cheap or free labour that ruling powers needed. 
Betsimisaraka landscapes, therefore, became instrumental in the state’s 
capacity to enact its policies as tavy was made symbiotic with forest and 
peasant exploitation. The ‘Five year plan’, therefore, can be seen as a visible 
instance of the more general trend in the forests of Andasibe where tavy 
became an integral element in ‘valorising’ the island’s forests. 
But how does this play out in today’s conservation and carbon 
economies, where tavy is, once again, squarely situated as the antithesis of 
both ecological and economic value, as we saw in the previous chapter?  
Conservation, Labour and the Value of Loss 
The progressive preponderance of conservation in Madagascar’s 
development policies until today seems to be antithetical to such a pattern 
of value extraction and consequent reproduction of tavy. Conservation has 
generally been seen as non-productive, ‘the antithesis of human productive 
activity’ (Smith 1990:368; Sodikoff 2012b:7), and tavy, from this 
perspective, appears as its antagonist, seen as the epitome of wasteful 
production.  
                                                        
75 It is essential to note that this was not solely an effect of colonial labour regimes, 
but, most likely, farmers who were employed by the colony also purposefully maintained 
their attachment to tavy, both for economic and symbolical reasons (see Jarosz 1996). 
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Even when considered as a mode of production (Brockington and 
Scholfield 2010; Garland 2008), conservation has been differentiated from 
extractive modes of exploitation, its value generating capacity associated 
generally with the symbolic capital it generates, and often seen as non-
consumptive. A reflection of this, as Sodikoff argues (2009; 2012b), is that 
the question of labour has been largely ignored in the conservation 
literature which has always been premised on the ‘parks vs. people’ 
dichotomy (Sodikoff 2012b:6), usually seen as one of conservation vs. 
production (see Garland 2008 for an exception). Even recent analyses that 
focus on contemporary forms of conservation as novel sites for the 
production of capitalist value, tend to adopt the ‘parks vs. people’ discourse 
and overlook instances of labour at the specific locales of conservation. 
Thus, it is interesting that ‘Towards a Synthesized Critique of Neoliberal 
Biodiversity Conservation’ by Büscher et al. (2012) does not contain any 
references to regimes of labour in conservation sites, where local 
populations only feature as affected by displacement and enclosure 
(Büscher et al. 2012:21). Here, as well as in similar works by the same 
authors, where conservation appears as ‘spectacle’ (Igoe 2010) or as 
productive of ‘derivative natures’ (Büscher 2010), the realm of production 
seems to be located in commodified representations of nature (Büscher and 
Igoe 2013:258), capitalist value arising ‘through mass production, 
distribution and consumption of modern and replicable forms of 
representation’ (Büscher et al. 2012:14). The neglect of local labour in 
conservation activities is particularly evident in the adoption of the term 
‘prosumption’ (see Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010) by Büscher and Igoe to refer 
to the ‘blurring of production and consumption’ (2013:286) in biodiversity 
conservation. Identifying consumers’ response to mediated images of nature 
in interactive web 2.0 applications as a form of ‘value-producing labour’, 
(such as starting up a website to save a particular animal), they effectively 
transfer the sphere of production to the (First World) consumer herself. 
When they turn to the ‘material realities’ (Büscher and Igoe 2013:291) in 
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conservation sites, in turn, locals appear as the targets of evictions or failed 
development projects, but not as part of the value production process.  
Sodikoff’s (2009; 2012b) fine ethnography of labour relations in 
conservation departs from this approach by focusing on what she terms 
‘subaltern labor’, or ‘the people at the lowest levels of the social hierarchy in 
Madagascar’ (Sodikoff 2012b:7) employed to carry out manual work in the 
UNESCO Mananara-Nord Biosphere Reserve, in North-east Madagascar. Her 
analysis of the division of labour in the reserve reveals a picture in which 
local, uneducated, peasant Betsimisaraka manual employees are relegated 
to low-wage work (in contrast to the ‘intellectual’ labour of Merina and 
European employees), with salaries that can hardly provide for their basic 
needs. Their work involves activities that help sustain the park and aim to 
legitimise it among their own communities. Through various manual tasks, 
dissemination work and, most controversially, the eviction of local illegal 
occupants, park rangers add value to the reserve.  Their low wages, 
however, mean that they can never break away from subsistence agriculture 
and, consequently, they remain entangled in the economic and social 
relationships of tavy. The paradox is clear: low-wage manual workers are 
asked to cultivate an environmentalist spirit and add value to the same 
fields they are constrained to consume as tavy farmers.  As has been the case 
historically, the provision of cheap labour from which this new form of 
production gains value ends up perpetuating tavy, albeit in a marginal 
position, thus reproducing unequal power structures.  
There is, however, a further intricacy to the interrelation between 
conservation, wage work, tavy, and value. If considered as a mode of 
production, conservation appears to gain its value partly from its symbolic 
capital as a scarce resource, as the imagery of the ‘lost Eden’ imbued with 
the nostalgic affects described above travels through global media and is 
translated into revenue. As Sodikoff claims ‘biodiversity alone does not 
attract aid in the way scarce biodiversity does’ (Sodikoff 2005:269). This 
could not be more relevant to Madagascar, a country which has accrued its 
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meaningful position in the global environmental imaginary as ‘hotspot’ due 
to its endemic—and endangered—flora and fauna. As we have seen, the 
Edenic narratives that characterise the island based on ideals of a pristine 
past appeal to an intrinsic value of nature premised on a temporal 
interpretation of socio-natural relationships, where ‘time is running out’ 
(Sodikoff 2012b:68) and extinction looms as a result of tavy. In this sense, it 
is the threat posed by tavy that partly adds value to the conservationist 
mode of production in Madagascar’s post-colonial political economy. 
Betsimisaraka park rangers, then, embody the dialectic between 
conservation and tavy, as their labour processes—as park rangers and tavy 
farmers—add value to rainforests by both protecting and degrading them. 
This dynamic results in a ‘redeployment of a historical moral hierarchy’ 
(Sodikoff 2012b:9) as Betsimisaraka are partly integrated into exploitative 
labour relations while relegated to marginal positions, at the same time 
reproducing the need for intervention.  
I suggest that the carbon of forest carbon projects, as a form of value 
with a logic of its own, represents a further step in the internal relations of 
conservation and tavy, as it reproduces this dialectic in a more acute and 
essential way.  
In TAMS as a carbon project, exploitative relations can be observed in 
the failure to deliver the much awaited ‘benefits’ that farmers were 
promised as they gave land for the project, or even in their framing by the 
project as recipients of ‘development’ instead of carbon credit owners (as 
explored in the previous chapter). As in Sodikoff’s example, in turn, a clear 
and strict ethnic hierarchy—Euro-American/Merina/Betsimisaraka—
operated in the project. 
But the production of value in TAMS as a forest carbon project does 
not stop at this point. We have seen how conservation gains part of its value 
through an appeal to nature’s intrinsic worth and its potential destruction 
through tavy. This type of ‘symbolic’ value is only partially generative of 
capital since parks are not fully integrated into commodity circuits. Carbon 
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trading, on the other hand, conflates the intrinsic value of nature as 
endangered with its economic value as scarce resource in a system of 
production and exchange. The very internalisation of nature is the process 
through which a system of supply and demand is established on the basis of 
scarcity. As Sahlins argued,  
‘The market-industrial system institutes scarcity, in a 
manner completely without parallel. Where production 
and distribution are arranged through the behaviour of 
prices, and all livelihoods depend on getting and 
spending, insufficiency of material means becomes the 
explicit, calculable starting point of all economic activity’ 
(1972:4). 
The careful management of scarcity, as Harvey has argued, ‘is in fact 
necessary to the survival of the capitalist mode of production’ (Harvey 
1974:272; see also Verdery 1996:42; and Mitchell 2011 for the centrality of 
the management of scarcity in the oil economy). In the carbon marketplace, 
part of this scarcity is instituted through the ‘cap’ system: as emissions 
reductions are established, limited pollution permits are allocated so that 
trading can take place. In the case of offsets, on the other hand, it is the 
threat of scarcity in the future that generates carbon credits—and thus 
value. It is essential to remember, as I argued in the previous chapter, that 
what an offset project is supposed to produce is not CO2 per se, but rather 
Certified Emissions Reductions or CERs. The already introduced concepts of 
‘additionality’ and ‘baseline’ scenario (as part of what I termed ‘constitutive 
elements’ of a CDM project in chapter three) are essential to understand 
how scarcity is produced. On the one hand, projects need to demonstrate 
that they are additional—that is, that emissions reductions would not have 
happened without the project’s activities, or, what is the same, that 
deforestation would have taken place in the absence of the project.  On the 
other hand, the number of offsets obtained (measured in tons of CO2 
   146 
equivalents, tCO2e), must be calculated against a baseline, a mean projection 
of the past 15 years or so of deforestation trends into the future, and 
therefore a conflation between the past (variously represented and 
calculated) and an imagined future. These two elements construct what 
Lohmann (2005) terms a ‘counterfactual scenario’: a singular, imagined 
situation of the future from which expert calculations—and therefore 
carbon value—can follow. In order to calculate, and hence, generate, 
reductions, a source of emissions—in this case tavy—first needs to be 
established as the only possible future reality in the absence of the project. 
CERs, and therefore value in forest carbon projects, arise out of an instituted 
system of imagined future scarcity embodied in the counter-factual 
scenario76, which, in turn, makes the project ‘additional’. It is not surprising, 
in fact, as Leach and Scoones (2015) have argued, that singular, simplistic, 
and often mistaken narratives of slash-and-burn agriculture have seen a 
comeback in landscapes across Africa targeted by forests carbon projects. 
‘Forest carbon project discourses’, they argue, ‘have strikingly brought ‘the 
slash and burn farmer’ back to life, re-imagined as the key villain 
responsible for forest loss and threat’ (2015:17). The threat of loss and 
waste, as I argue below, is thus essential to the production of carbon value.   
This type of value production parallels with the ‘value of loss’ 
described by Hayden (2003) for bio-prospecting agreements in Mexico. Just 
as in this case, bio-prospecting generates value in the present—funds for 
research, for cataloguing, for patenting, etc.—from ‘an idiom of future loss’ 
(Hayden 2003:57), which invokes the possibility of missing out on economic 
returns as plants and their genetic information disappear. As with carbon 
offsets, it is a value which can ‘only be imagined’ (Hayden 2003:57), as the 
present is contrasted to a future determined by resource depletion. In both 
                                                        
76 For the case of REDD, ‘Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation’, 
this form of value production is cunningly encompassed in its very definition: ‘avoided 
deforestation’ represents the generative capacity of deforestation, because with nothing to 
avoid, offsets cannot be generated.  
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cases, then, value emerges from a threat which need not be strictly real: the 
greater the threat—or what is the same, the greater the imagined future 
scarcity—the greater its value in the present. In a similar vein, Weszkalnys 
(2014), following Agamben (1999), employs the notion of ‘the presence of 
an absence’ to refer to the negative or ‘disastrous potential’ (Weszkalnys 
2014:213) of oil in Santo Tome Principe, where the anticipation of a 
‘resource curse’ is productive of a particular kind of temporal politics in the 
present. Therefore, as the country engages in prospective oil explorations, it 
also anticipates the economic and political disaster associated with resource 
booms, in turn generating ‘new entities, organizational forms and 
subjectivities’ (Weszkalnys 2014:213). The ‘National Petroleum Agency’, for 
example, funded by the World Bank, has been set up to oversee government 
policy in the oil sector and to ensure ‘good governance and transparency’ 
(Weszkalnys 2014:218) so that disastrous experiences of oil exploitation 
elsewhere—and the failure to turn oil into economic prosperity—can be 
avoided in the future. The temporality of the ‘not yet’ (Weszkalnys 2014), 
constituted by an imagined absence in the future, becomes generative in the 
present.  
In all cases, resources of this type, whether genetic material as 
information, the benefits of oil, or CERs in forest carbon projects, derive 
their generativity in the present through their imagined absence (or 
scarcity) in the future. As the forests of Andasibe are integrated into carbon 
generating projects, tavy, while maintaining its historical position as a 
‘degrading’ practice to be eliminated, acquires a re-vitalised generativity by 
providing the counter-factual scenario through which scarcity is constructed 
and additionality is justified. Carbon credits can only come about through 
tavy’s threat of waste and loss.    
Conclusion 
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 I began this chapter exploring how contemporary temporal 
constructions of Madagascar as an ‘island out of time’ have imbued it with 
the affect of nostalgia (Boym 2003). This, I argued, has led to very ‘selective 
rememberings’ (Coronil 1997:67) in Andasibe where the economic and 
political roles that its forests have played historically, and tavy’s 
entanglements with them, tend to be forgotten. Rather than the last 
remnants of a natural, ahistorical past, we saw how these landscapes had 
been central to the economic and political projects of various extra-local 
actors over the last 200 years, and tavy, marginalised as a degrading and 
wasteful practice, had in fact been highly constitutive of value. Carbon 
credits, while usually presented as a radically new form of forest 
‘valorisation’, only heightened these dynamics, since, as I argued, their value 
generating capacity is fundamentally animated by the threat of tavy. Like in 
the case of the babakoto and the goavy tsinahy, the relationships between 
tavy and carbon in Andasibe are much more complicated and entwined than 
is usually made to appear. 
Over the last two chapters I have explored the social life of carbon in 
its credit form and its entanglements with questions of value and waste as it 
was put to work in the landscapes of Andasibe. In chapter three we saw that 
carbon credits, as a form of value with a logic of its own, proposed a future 
of absolute ecological and economic value in Andasibe’s forests where any 
past, present or future trace of tavy as waste had to be negated. In this 
chapter, by contrast, we have seen that, while relegated to a degrading and 
degraded position, particular articulations between Andasibe’s past and 
tavy, and their projection into the future, are generative of the need and 
value of carbon credits. We can therefore see how carbon credits, as a 
specific form of value, are not only premised on the absence of tavy, but also, 
and fundamentally, on its absent presence. 
Tsing (2005) has argued that global finance, as speculative 
enterprise, must ‘conjure’ the possibility of profit before it can be realised or 
‘extracted’. This often takes the form of a ‘dramatic performance’, since ‘the 
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more spectacular the conjuring, the more possible an investment frenzy’ 
(Tsing 2005:57).  From this perspective, it is easy to see why the BBC video I 
presented earlier to introduce chapters three and four showed the image of 
a burning hill in the forest of Analamazaotra while claiming that carbon 
credits could generate 50 million dollars within the next five years in 
Madagascar. Tavy provides the ‘drama’ that carbon credits need in order to 
‘conjure’ their potential, and, as we have seen in this chapter, to come into 
being.  
In chapter eight I will come back to issues of waste and value in forest 
carbon projects by focusing on the specific temporal politics they articulate, 
some of which we have already begun to see. I now leave the carbon credit 
behind and move on to other social lives of this multiple object.  
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Part II: Introduction to Chapters Five and Six 
In 2013 The Makira Forest REDD+ Project in northeast Madagascar, 
managed by the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), became the first ever 
African project to put ‘Government-backed’ and ‘verified’ offsets for sale on 
the voluntary market, with 32 million tons of carbon predicted to be stored 
in the forest over thirty years, and over 700,000 carbon credits thus 
produced (WCS 2013). While portrayed as one of the first REDD+ success 
stories in the continent, its history has not been without controversy. Back 
in 2008, around the same time as WCS, in partnership with Conservation 
International (CI), sold Makira carbon offsets to rock band Pearl Jam for 
their ‘carbon neutral’ tour, social scientists carrying out research in the area 
were required by WCS to not mention ‘carbon’ or ‘REDD’ to communities 
lest they raised villagers’ expectations. As scientists entered the forest to 
measure the amount of carbon stored in trees, forest communities were kept 
in the dark to what was going on. Word eventually got out and as ‘carbon’ 
and ‘REDD’ made it into these rural contexts, local Betsimisaraka began to 
refer to it as ‘foreigners selling air/wind’, mivarotra rivotra ny vazaha. 
Recently, a study (Brimont et al. 2015) assessing the impact of the project 
among these communities suggests that tavy farmers are the ones that have 
been affected the most, due to the restrictions on land use and expansion 
that have been imposed to ‘avoid deforestation’. Additionally, the majority of 
these farmers have been left out of the project’s development programme, 
since this has been mainly targeted at owners of permanent rice fields due 
to practical reasons. For tavy farmers, then, the sale of ‘air’ by the Makira 
Forest REDD+ has only translated into a decrease in the availability of 
farming land, with important consequences for present and future 
livelihoods.  
In the last two chapters I explored one specific form, or social life, of 
‘carbon’—the carbon credit—and its articulation with ideas of value and 
waste in the forests of Andasibe. Carbon, from this perspective, appeared as 
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a well-defined—even if hard-to-achieve—object, made up of very specific 
elements (additionality, baseline, etc.) embodied in the presence of 
reforested trees and animated by their imagined absence in the future as a 
result of tavy. From its credit form, I now move on to explore some of the 
more concrete and socially entangled lives of carbon in the landscapes of 
Andasibe and Mahatsara. It is at this stage that carbon begins to lose some 
stability.  
The story of the Makira Forest REDD+ Project offers apt examples of 
the shapes that carbon takes in the next two chapters. As we will see, when 
carbon enters rural contexts and is experienced by farmers, it loses some of 
its coherence as a single object with ‘clearly identified boundaries’ (Lien and 
Law 2011:67), sometimes even disappearing from view. Thus, we saw that 
as natural resource produced in the Makira forest for international markets, 
carbon could be made visible to scientists while remaining invisible to local 
people. Once it entered local landscapes and imaginaries, in turn, it was as 
elusive and dispersed as the ‘air’—hard to know about and locate.  As the 
experience of tavy farmers in Makira shows us, finally, carbon may even fail 
to materialise in any recognizable form, its presence only palpable through a 
new set of restrictions on land access imposed by outside actors that limit 
people’s abilities to secure a livelihood. 
In the next two chapters I will focus on the social lives of carbon in its 
unstable, elusive, or implicit forms in local lives and landscapes.  
In chapter five I explore carbon in Mahatsara as an indistinguishable 
element of what I term the ‘environmental state’, experienced through 
spatial, and I will argue temporal, restrictions.  As we will see, tavy is the 
pillar of social and material reproduction in Mahatsara, connecting people to 
their pasts, presents and futures. The impossibility to expand into new land 
due to conservation practice, and the consequences of being contained in 
space/time, have led to a constant feeling of being ‘squeezed’, voatery. This 
concept, I will argue, extends beyond its spatial and temporal connotations 
and articulates a broader commentary on local experiences of oppression 
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and power(lessness). Although carbon in this case is not explicitly talked 
about, it is implicit when farmers refer to the curtailment of movement, as 
carbon is inherently entangled with the practice of tavy in the interplay 
between agricultural expansion and the fixity of the carbon sink. I thus 
approach the social life of carbon in this chapter through the social and 
material relations of tavy.  
In chapter six, on the other hand, I focus on the social life of carbon as 
natural resource through experiences of its extraction in Mahatsara, as I 
compare it to other sources of work and resources that have been present in 
these landscapes historically. As we will see, carbon labour in TAMS was 
characterised by feelings of volatility in its widest sense. As carbon failed to 
materialise in any expected form, in turn, the project became conceptualised 
as a ‘scam’, or fitaka. Intangibility, social distance and obscurity will be 
presented as key traits of carbon as natural resource, as I analyse the 
infrastructures, labour regimes and forms of exchange and value production 
that were set up in order to ‘extract’ carbon in Mahatsara.  Although carbon 
in this case is explicitly talked about, it appears as an elusive and hard-to-
locate object, where its very existence is doubted, leading to feelings of 
deceit.  
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‘Life before was nice because people were free (libre ilay 
olona) but now people are squeezed (voatery) like now over 
the North there it belongs to Mitsinjo [conservation 
organization], here it belongs to the Park, and now also we 
have SAF with the tree seedlings that we offered [referring 
to TAMS], that is what makes people feel squeezed, 
squeezed!’ 
 
Consider Dadan’i Lala’s comments regarding problems of land access 
in Mahatsara. Although of local origin, Dadan’i Lala had lived for 35 years in 
the area of Sakalava, on the western side of the ridge that separates the 
Betsimisaraka area of Mahatsara/Andasibe from the Bezanozano one in 
Moramanga, where he worked as a driver. He moved to Mahatsara with his 
wife and younger kids around 2005 at the request of his father, a past 
graphite worker who was too old to work the land. As he settled in 
Mahatsara, Dadan’i Lala bought a small parcel of land from a friend, but he 
later gave half of it to TAMS. As we talked in 2011, Dadan’i Lala described 
life in Mahatsara as an experience of being squeezed into the centre of a 
triangle, in which each apex represented a different conservation initiative: 
Mitsinjo, the Park and TAMS. What all of these had in common in Dadan’i 
Lala’s words was not their professed love for nature, nor the opportunities 
they brought to villagers, but their effect in limiting people’s movements and 
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squeezing them into an increasingly smaller area: ‘and here in the centre it 
belongs to the community (fokonolona), it is a small thing though, small!’  
During my early days of fieldwork, as we returned from a morning in 
the fields, Raivo—my very first mentor in Mahatsara—and I began talking 
about the differences between my home and the village, and the daily 
hardships people faced here. She told me how between the months from 
October to February, when the old harvest has run out and the new one is 
not yet available, there would always be a krizy (from the French crise 
meaning crisis) in the village, when people wouldn’t have enough to eat and 
a family of six might have to do with a kapoaka of rice per meal (a standard 
Malagasy measurement corresponding to an empty can of condensed milk; it 
is common for an adult in Mahatsara to have over half a kapoaka of rice at 
each meal). Others, she said, might just have mangahazo, or cassava, for 
lunch, denoting the level of hardship to which people were subjected, who 
were not even able to cook the staple food. When I asked her if this also 
happened in the past, she said that back then people had had enough to eat 
because they practised tavy, but then ‘the state had progressively squeezed 
them’, voateritery ny fanjakana, restricting the availability of land and thus 
reducing the amount of rice harvested yearly, because tavy was not allowed, 
tsy azo atao. Krizy in Mahatsara thus referred to a particular temporality 
effected by the state on a yearly basis, when families did not have the bare 
minimum to lead a ‘normal’ life. This dysfunctional temporality was both 
recurring and accelerating because, as we will see, current tavy regulations 
endanger Mahatsara’s inhabitants’ future in dramatic ways.  
At the time of my conversation with Raivo, I took the idea of voatery at 
face value, as a reduction in the availability of land due to the prohibition to 
expand into further land. After hearing it countless times, however, I came to 
see it as a defining feature of contemporary experiences of life in Mahatsara, 
its meaning extending beyond its spatial connotations. As we will see, this 
form of constraint is also temporal, since the future (and to a certain extent 
the past, too) is being denied to people in Mahatsara. Voatery, in turn, does 
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not just mean ‘narrow’ or ‘squeezed’, but also ‘pressed, distressed’, and as I 
will argue below, ‘oppressed’. In this sense, its meaning not only evokes 
ideas of containment in time and space, but it also articulates the broader 
experience of power(lessness) in the village, ultimately felt to negate 
people’s capacity to attain full personhood.  
In this chapter, then, I will explore the command over time and space 
effected by the state, fanjakana, in Mahatsara and its effects on local lives.  It 
is essential to note that the state here does not just refer to the government, 
but rather to the cluster of administrative and governing bodies that 
regulate access to land through conservation practice, and which I term the 
‘environmental state’77. As we have seen above, TAMS is but one more 
instance of this oppressive force. Although carbon in this chapter does not 
appear explicitly, it must be seen as inherently entangled with the practice 
of tavy in the interplay between agricultural expansion and the fixity 
proposed by the carbon sink.  
As a forest carbon project, in fact, TAMS is premised on a 
conservation/development discourse which represents Betsimisaraka 
farmers as lacking a future orientation and caught in a cycle of poverty as a 
result of tavy, and thus in need of intervention. Carbon, from this 
perspective, appears as an alternative to tavy and as a way of breaking out of 
this ‘poverty cycle’. As we will see, however, not only are Betsimisaraka 
ideals of life deeply future-oriented, but it is the spatio-temporal constraint 
exerted by conservation practice, in fact, that locks them in an uncertain 
present and is leading to a loss of future—and even past—socio-material 
connections. Carbon, as part of these landscapes, appears to curtail those 
very futures it claims to enable.  
This chapter is structured as follows: I begin by introducing the ways 
in which ideas about time and space take form in the Betsimisaraka 
imaginary. Contrary to current conservationist ‘received wisdoms’ that 
                                                        
77 For a similar example see West’s ethnography of conservation in Papua New 
Guinea where conservation is conceptualised as a ‘second government’ (West 2006:115).  
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portray Malagasy people as lacking a future orientation (as I show below), I 
will argue, following Keller (2015; 2008), that people in Mahatsara do think 
about, and engage with, their future(s). Expansion in time and space, or 
what Keller calls ‘pro-gress’ (2008:652), appears in fact as a life ideal for 
Malagasy populations, and gains an even greater weight, I suggest, in the 
case of tavy farmers. Focusing on foundational narratives told by the 
Tangalamena and a harvest ritual called vonivao or ‘new seed’, we will see 
how the ideal of expansion in time and space is understood in Mahatsara, 
and the way it relates to tavy as a key component in the (re)production of 
social and material life.   
From this ‘ideal’, I turn to the present situation of land availability and 
tavy regulations in Mahatsara, which is everything but. With expansion in 
space and time curtailed, we will see how the ‘environmental state’ in 
Mahatsara is experienced as a powerful and oppressive force that threatens 
both present and future generations. Voatery, from this perspective, will be 
seen to articulate a broader discourse on local experiences of 
power(lessness).  
Finally, I turn to the dominant conservationist/development discourse 
in Madagascar that portrays Betsimisaraka farmers as caught in a cycle of 
poverty and lacking a future orientation due to the practice of tavy. This 
discourse, which animates conservation/development practice, I will argue, 
effectively ‘locks’ the people of Mahatsara in space and time by confining 
them to an uncertain present and severing them from future and past 
connections, thus endangering the very same landscapes it claims to protect.  
Island of past, present and future connections 
Like ‘hierarchy’ for India, or ‘urbanization’ for Southern Africa 
(Appadurai 1988; Ferguson 1999:24), the theme of the past has become a 
dominant characterisation of anthropology in Madagascar, widely known as 
the ‘Island of the Ancestors’ in reference to the strong relationship that 
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binds Malagasy people to ancestral custom. As Cole and Middleton (2001) 
have argued, although ethnographic attention to ancestors in African ritual 
and religion almost disappeared after the 1970s, it has remained the main 
topic of enquiry in Madagascar. The past, from this perspective, figures 
predominantly in people’s lives, as they constantly have recourse to it in the 
context of making a living in the present. Since Bloch’s seminal studies on 
Merina religion and rituals (1971; 1986) we have learnt that a keystone of 
life in Madagascar is the task of reconciling an ideal past centred around 
ancestral custom and localities, with the needs and desires of the present. 
Countless aspects of Malagasy cosmology and social life have thus been 
examined in reference to the weaving of the past with the present, of the 
dead with the living (for example, Cole 2001; Feeley-Harnik 1991; Middleton 
1999).  
Nowhere are these connections more evident than in the relationship 
that binds people to land through the concept of the tanindrazana, literally 
the land of the ancestors. As a defining feature constitutive of the social 
group and of  ‘political, ritual and moral order(s)’ (Cole 1997:447), the 
tanindrazana establishes, through the idiom of kinship, the ties that bind 
together the living, and the living and the dead. In the countryside, this is 
mainly done through the medium of agriculture, both past and present. Land 
and labour are therefore pillars of Malagasy social reproduction, both as 
main vehicles of sustenance and because it is here that relationships with 
ancestors are actualised: as people work, inhabit and care for the land where 
their ancestors are buried and dwell, they cultivate their individual and 
collective identity. As Feeley-Harnik argues, ‘living, land and ancestry are 
inseparable’ (1991:22) because either one lives in the land of their ancestors 
and is a ‘master of the land’ (tompontany), or lives elsewhere as ‘stranger’ 
(vahiny).  
This tendency to focus on past connections through ancestral idioms, 
while relevant and fascinating in itself, has, however, led to a very specific 
vacuum in relation to the analysis of the future in Madagascar, a trend that 
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has only recently begun to change (Sodikoff 2013; Cole 2010; Keller 2008). 
From her previous work on memory (2001), for example, Cole has shifted 
her attention to the diverse understandings and expectations of the future 
held by the emergent category of youth, or ‘jeunes’, in Toamasina during 
economic liberalisation in the island (2010). Her study follows young girls 
who turn to the sex economy with Europeans to escape economic hardship, 
or alternatively, those who turn to the Pentecostal Church with the same 
objectives. Although generational change tends to be presented locally as a 
total rupture with the past and ancestral customs, ‘their day-to-day 
experience unsettles such divisions’ (Cole 2010:98), showing that past, 
present and future ways of being and doing are complexly entangled. 
Ancestral practices, Cole argues, are not just a way of bringing the past into 
the present (as Bloch’s famous Malinowski lecture (1977) postulated), but 
also ‘figure the ideal relation between past and future’ (2010:51). Indeed, as 
Walsh has argued, much of Malagasy ritual, while reaching out to the past, is 
ultimately done for ‘the sake of the future’ (2012:5). In the next section I 
explore past, present but also future understandings that link people’s lives 
to the land they work and live in.  
I specifically follow Eva Keller in her understanding of the rural 
Malagasy ‘life ethos’ as ‘future oriented’ since it is based on the ideal of 
‘forward movement’ through the parallel processes of expanding into new 
land and extending one’s kin through present and future generations 
(2008:652). Relationships with ancestors, she argues, are also future 
oriented because it is through ancestral blessing that the ideal of life as a 
‘process of growth’ can ultimately be attained. This, in turn, involves the 
expansion of ancestral land, as the dead are buried in new localities after 
long and fruitful ‘roots’ have been established through generational 
reproduction, in a dual process of movement and rootedness. In this sense 
then,  
‘“Growth” refers to a whole network of aspects, especially 
to generating many descendants and being able to give 
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them land; to cultivating rice; and to obtaining one’s 
ancestors’ blessing, to which the growth of one’s kin 
group testifies’ (Keller 2008:652).  
Keller gracefully employs the term ‘pro-gress’ in its literal form—‘to 
walk forward’ (2008:652)—in order to capture this ideal of generational 
growth and forward movement that extends into the future thanks to 
ancestral blessing. Past, present and future generations, therefore, are all 
implicated in the Malagasy journey of life.  
While Keller suggests that this ideal of social reproduction may be 
‘close to pan-Malagasy’ (2008:652), I would argue, building on Bloch’s work 
(1971; 1975; 1986; 1995), that notions of movement and expansion in space 
gain particular salience among Betsimisaraka farmers, due to the social 
relations of production in tavy. This can be most clearly seen through Bloch’s 
article (1975) on the different conceptualisations of property between the 
Merina—irrigated rice farmers—and the Zafimaniry—a group of tavy 
farmers.  For the former, irrigated land agriculture in lowland valleys entails 
a particular scarcity of land which translates into concepts of property that 
aim to limit the ‘dispersal’ of land to outsiders, cogently contained in the 
Merina concept of ‘inheritance not going away’ (1975:209) or lova tsy 
mifindra. Their kinship system, or what Bloch has called the ‘deme’, is thus 
based on endogamy aimed at keeping ancestral property within the kin 
group, establishing a division between the affines, or havana, and outsiders, 
vahiny, that (in theory) can never be breached.  
On the other hand, Bloch tells us that land for the Zafimaniry is not 
considered property a priori, but rather becomes so through labour. Instead 
of scarcity of land, we find a scarcity of workforce as its defining feature (cf. 
Goody 1971). As tavy requires constant expansion and the provision of 
collective labour, kinship and property ideas are therefore much more 
mobile and expansive, and lend themselves to the incorporation of 
outsiders, since these appear always as potential affines. Whereas irrigated 
   160 
rice agriculture practised in scarce land is therefore related to a closed and 
rigid system of inheritance and descent, tavy allows for a much more 
dynamic and open system—where flux is positively valued. Notions of 
movement and expansion are therefore potentially productive for the 
Zafimaniry, whereas they are seen as a risk for ‘dispersal’ (Bloch 1975:188) 
for Merina farmers . 
This analysis seems to apply to tavy-practising Betsimisaraka as well, 
explaining why marriage in Mahatsara is strikingly dynamic, as new and old 
couples move in together or separate without any clear apparent rules78 
(something also mentioned by Bloch (1975) in his article) or even 
ceremony. Similarly, the notions of tompontany, master of the land, and 
vahiny or stranger, were very rarely expressed in Mahatsara: only when a 
very specific conflict arose over a certain piece of land was property in this 
sense brought out. Finally, as we will see below, genealogical concepts in 
Mahatsara are evocative of movement across space/time, just like those 
Bloch describes for the Zafimaniry, where genealogies are made up of the 
names of localities, rather than specific ancestors, that expand from ‘parent’ 
to ‘offspring’ villages (Bloch 1995).  
Bloch has argued, in turn, that these two different production and 
kinship systems put a very different focus upon the individual household: 
where the Zafimaniry see the house as repository of the hearth and 
reproduction, the Merina see it as ‘antisocial’ (Bloch 1975:210–211) due to 
the potential it poses for exclusion from land and dispersal into the hands of 
outsiders (through exogamous marriage). Instead of the house, then, descent 
unity and ‘corporateness’ (Bloch 1986:38) find expression for the Merina 
through the ideal of the tomb as the site where the group is actually made 
and, importantly, contained.  The Merina, Bloch argues, look toward the 
future in a particularly strange way: with the tomb as its symbol of 
                                                        
78 In general, kinship in Mahatsara can be seen as a ‘bilateral system with a 
patrilineal bias’ (2010:52), as Cole has described it for east-coast Betsimisaraka, but with a 
strong sense of dynamism.  
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continuity (Bloch 1975:208) and where ‘the image created by descent is a 
fundamental negation of the experience of life’, being based on ‘stillness in 
space and time’79 (1986:168). Although taking a different perspective, 
Graeber’s analysis of secondary burial ritual among the Merina also brings 
attention to the essence of ancestral authority as that of constraint through 
restriction—what he terms ‘negative authority’ (2007:62). Although this 
type of authority may be seen as generally characteristic of ancestors across 
Madagascar, its spatial connotations appear particularly significant for the 
Merina, where ‘pulling people together’ mainly entails ‘acquiring enough 
land and property to prevent one’s children and grandchildren from drifting 
away’ (Graeber 2007:62), therefore containing people in space. 
It may thus be tentatively argued that while Betsimisaraka 
philosophy/cosmology (and, equally, that of the Zafimaniry or other tavy 
farmers) is one of ‘life’ (Mangalaza 1998) and movement, that of the Merina 
is a philosophy of ‘death’ and spatial containment. This is best exemplified in 
the way tombs are treated among each group: hidden in the forest and only 
visited on specific occasions for the former (Bloch 1995; Cole and Middleton 
2001), or perched on top of the hills that dominate the highland plateau, 
occupying the most prominent spots in the Merina landscape and acting as 
‘fixed centers’ (Graeber 2007:54).   
These differences, of course, must be seen as subtle variations on 
common themes. While Betsimisaraka ancestral/elder authority is also 
partly constructed on the basis of keeping offspring close to oneself, so do 
Merina aim to attain good futures through ancestral blessing. Similarly, 
expansion of land through tavy is not a type of nomadism in the strict sense 
of the word, and irrigated rice agriculture does entail expansion into new 
areas. There is a series of elements, however, that, it could be argued, relates 
                                                        
79 Bloch explores this theme further in his works on Merina funerary and 
circumcision rituals (1971; 1986) by looking at the denial of time and the creation of a 
timeless, unchanging society located in the ancestral domain. This timeless order, Bloch 
further argues, is a way of establishing an undeniable authority. I do not follow these ideas 
here, but rather concentrate on the opposition between descent groups and kinship which 
he takes on both of these works.  
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to the social relations of each form of agriculture, which makes spatial 
movement be more or less significant in ideas of growth80. Therefore, 
whereas growth through generational time may be seen as pan-Malagasy, 
growth through movement in space could be said to gain a bigger weight 
among Betsimisaraka and other tavy farmers.  
In order to turn these general ideas into more specific ways of 
understanding them in Mahatsara, I focus below on local forms of 
articulating social and material reproduction with expansion in time and 
space. I specifically explore two elements: on the one hand, I look at 
foundational narratives told by the Tangalamena, which, as we will see, 
bring together the landscape and the past through the medium of labour; on 
the other hand, I analyse a yearly harvest ritual, the vonivao, where the 
essence of social and material reproduction—that is, ‘growth’—is enacted 
and where the past is mobilized in the present to guarantee a particular 
vision of the future. In both cases, rivers appear as prominent elements 
constitutive of social life over time, and it is thus, I will argue, that notions of 
expansion in time and space must be seen in Mahatsara: as an intricate 
network of kin-based relationships where each feeds from its predecessor in 
a continuous, expansive flow.  
This first part of the chapter draws strongly on the Tangalamena’s 
narratives and explanations as spiritual/religious leader and as conveyor of 
ancestral history. Although I tried to access this type of knowledge from 
other sources, I was always referred back to the Tangalamena, because he 
was the one who ‘really knew’. I therefore present these ancestral 
connections as they would be in Mahatsara—through the Tangalamena’s 
words—but I do acknowledge that landscapes can be ‘polysemic’ (Bender 
and Winer 2001:10) and seen differently by different people. The second 
                                                        
80 It is interesting to note, for example, Bloch’s (1995) speculation that as Zafimaniry 
have turned to irrigated rice agriculture, (due to land unavailability and population 
growth), these rice valleys may have become stronger symbols of human permanence and 
attachment to land than villages, something that did not happen with their tavy fields .  
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part of the chapter, therefore, reflects more general comments and feelings 
made by other villagers, and which were not, in fact, expressed by the 
Tangalamena.  
(Re)Productive Landscapes  
In his article on the temporality of the landscape, Ingold (1993) 
employs an analogy between orchestral performance and social life to bring 
attention to the act of ‘resonance’ (1993:160) as constitutive of both music 
and sociality. If a successful musical performance depends on each 
musician’s attention to the rest of the orchestral elements in order to 
achieve such resonance, so does social life emerge from ‘people’s mutually 
attentive engagement in shared contexts of practical activity’ (1993:160). 
The ensemble of this practical activity—what Ingold terms the ‘taskscape’ 
(1993:158)—has an intrinsic temporality because it reaches both to the past 
and to the future as people ‘carry forward the process of social life’ 
(1993:157) in their daily acts of living, working and inhabiting the land.  
Through another beautiful analogy, Ingold describes the present as 
gathering ‘the past and future into itself, like refractions in a crystal ball’ 
(1993:159). As a set of related tasks in constant flux carried out in the 
context of ‘dwelling’ (see Ingold 2000), the ‘taskscape’ may be seen as the 
equivalent of music in the example of the orchestra. The landscape, from this 
perspective, appears as the ‘congealed’ or ‘embodied’ (1993:162) form of 
the endless melody that people make up as they attend to one another in the 
context of living81 and therefore offers a glimpse into the ways expansion in 
time and space is entangled with social reproduction and labour. What kinds 
of elements or beings compose, and resonate in, the landscape of Mahatsara, 
                                                        
81 From Ingold’s perspective, the landscape, however, must not be seen as the result 
of a process of ‘inscription’ where cultural design is imposed on an outside natural world, 
but rather as one of ‘incorporation’ through the act of dwelling, where ‘the landscape 
becomes part of us, just as we become part of it’ (1993:63). The rejection of the division 
between ‘inner and outer world’, or a nature/culture ontology lies at the basis of Ingold’s 
work and his concept of ‘dwelling’ (2000).  
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as embodiment of social life over time? And how is harmony imagined or 
experienced?  
 
Figure 10. Landscape seen from the tavy fields ready to be harvested (front), 
with patches of savoka or fallows in the background and some remaining primary 
forest on top. Photograph taken by author in February 2013. 
 
A look at foundational narratives in Mahatsara already points to those 
elements that are seen as meaningful or significant as constitutive of social 
life. These are the ‘stories/history of the elders (big/powerful people)’, 
tantaran’ny olona maventy, told by the Tangalamena as conveyor of 
ancestral history in his role of spiritual leader. In his narrative, the working 
of the local landscape appears as the medium through which history is made 
and, at the same time, anchored in the land. Thus, he claims, local settlement 
dates back to 1828, as Betsimisaraka arrived from the east ‘in search of a 
livelihood’, fitadiavana or mandremby. The first founding father to arrive in 
the area was Ingahy Be Lefitana (‘the great Lefitana’) who 
‘created/produced’, namorona, the field that flanks the river that is today 
known as ‘Sahatana’—a contraction meaning  ‘the field of Lefitana’ (and 
previously known as madio fasika, or ‘clean sand’). Similarly, the river that 
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crosses Andasibe, Sahatandra, (literally Tandra’s field) refers to the field of 
Lefitana’s sister, Viavy Tandra, and Analamazaotra, the story goes, draws its 
name from Lefitana’s brother-in-law, Ranaotra. Other migrants later 
followed these original founders from both north and south eastern 
Betsimisaraka factions, and through further generations, taranaka, the area 
‘became ancestral land’, lasa tanindrazana. We can see how local history is 
articulated through toponyms which give sense to the landscape on the basis 
of kinship and an expansive form of labour: founding fathers (and mothers) 
arrived in the area in search of a livelihood and settled by a river, and the 
area appears as a collection of river/fields belonging to family members who 
established roots by working the land and having children. It is important to 
note that settlement alone does not constitute the ancestral landscape, but it 
is rather the working of the land by the river—the ‘creation of a field’—that 
turns previously unclaimed land into ancestral property—and thus into 
history. It is interesting that until they become the field of such and such, 
rivers were known by their physical properties alone, such as ‘clean sand’ 
for Sahatana, or ‘many worms’, ‘beolotra’, for Analamazaotra. The landscape, 
therefore, appears as a map through which to read Betsimisaraka history 
through the idiom of an expansive movement in which labour and property 
are mutually imbricated, since every arrival involves socialising previously 
unclaimed land through the means of agriculture. This already shows a 
significant departure from the concept of ‘property that does not change 
hands’ among the Merina, as it is expansion in search of a livelihood— 
fitadiavana/mandremby—and the working of new found land that 
establishes origins and claims of historical and ancestral legitimacy to 
places.  
This example is similar to that of Manggarai landscapes in eastern 
Indonesia explored by Allerton, where the history of the Wae Rebo people ‘is 
essentially the history of an ancestral journey from place to place’ which 
establishes ‘connections between topographical features and ancestral 
actions’ (2012:181–182). We can see how these ‘actions’ in Mahatsara’s 
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foundational narratives mainly entail agriculture. Succession in time is in 
turn conflated with expansion in space in a variant form of what Fox has 
called ‘topogeny’ (2006:8) to qualify the Austronesian practice of reciting 
‘ordered succession of place names’  as a kind of topographical genealogy.  
In any case, we can see that in local understandings of history, places 
and people seem to come together though the medium of labour and social 
reproduction, where the ancestor, the river and the field become practically 
one and the same. This will be more clearly seen below through the image of 
the loharano, or water spring, and the way it is called upon in the ‘new seed’ 
ritual. In his study on the Temanambondro of south-east Madagascar, 
Thomas has noted how the use of water in specific rituals plays a pivotal 
role in making them ‘place-specific’ (2006:25). It is not simply the sacred 
efficacy (hasina) of water that makes it generative in ritual, then, but rather 
its association to a particular place, making it a key element of what Thomas 
calls ‘local cartographies of the sacred’ (2006:25). The loharano as employed 
in the ritual, we will see, unfolds a very particular ‘cartography’ of the 
landscape of Mahatsara, one that is expansive and cumulative.   
The Vonivao, or ‘new seed’ ritual 
The vonivao is a calendric harvest ritual that must be performed yearly 
towards the end of the harvest period, between April and May, when new, 
unripe rice, called lango, is still available (reasons explored below)82. It does 
not depend on a fixed date, but rather on the conditions of the harvest and 
the family carrying it out, such as the availability of cash and crops. Also 
known as the ‘rice feast’, fetin’ny vary, its main element is the offering made 
to God and the ancestors of their ‘share’, anjara, of the harvest, and the 
request for their blessing in next year’s harvest or in any other future 
                                                        
82 The vonivao is the equivalent of the better-known santa-bary ritual that takes 
places in various regions across the island. I have not been able to find any references to the 
vonivao in the literature, and I assume it is a local/regional element. I have not compared it 
to the santa-bary because I am trying to specifically get at local ways of knowing and 
experiencing the landscape in Mahatsara.  
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endeavours that will be taken on. The offering can also be employed as 
thanks for past requests or vows, voady, that have already materialised. As 
will become evident through the chapter, this God—equally known as 
Zanahary or Andriamanitra—is a sort of all-powerful creator or force which 
lacks any ‘moral purpose’ (Bloch 1995:67), and is ‘arbitrary and potentially 
violent’ (Graeber 2007:21). I find Bloch’s description of 
Zanahary/Andriamanitra for the Zafimaniry as ‘the external, unchangeable 
parameters of one’s life, including the topography, which affect people in 
ways beyond explanation’ (1995:67), as particularly apt for the way this 
power is imagined in Mahatsara.  
I attended one of the last vonivaos of the season in the area, hosted by a 
woman called Soahary and her husband Julien. Both of them are particularly 
keen on ancestral custom, being also hosts to another yearly ritual—a 
cleansing, spirit possession event in a sacred waterfall inside the Park—
which only they celebrate (this may stem from the fact that Soahary has a 
healing gift, making her more prone to ancestral considerations). Although 
vonivaos used to be much bigger, more collective gatherings in the past, they 
are today practiced only within the family and do not involve neighbours 
due to a lack of resources. This specific ritual took place at the family’s 
beautiful compound in Andranomahintsy, about half a kilometre away from 
the village of Mahatsara, where four family houses are surrounded by 
banana, peach and coffee trees, and edged by the river where they hold 
some irrigated rice fields. As is usually the case for these events, the 
Tangalamena had been called in by the family to perform the role of 
director, as spiritual mediator between the living and the dead. Four 
generations were present, from Soahary’s mother to her new-born 
granddaughter, totalling seven adults and about five children, plus the 
Tangalamena, my assistant and me.  
For the offering and performance of the ritual, a fandambanana—a 
small square piece of woven fibre used as eating mat—was set under the 
window, opposite the door of the house, in the north-east corner. This space 
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is what Bloch describes as the ‘corner of the ancestors, which is the holiest 
part of the house analogous to the tomb’ (1986:52), and a fundamental 
feature of Malagasy spatiality. Under the window, and next to the offering, 
two hats were placed—one for a bald ancestor who would have been 
embarrassed to join otherwise—and an axe for those ancestors who had 
worked as lumberjacks. It is essential to note that these are big ancestral 
personalities that pertain to the area, and are not necessarily directly related 
to the family carrying out the ritual, whose ancestors are later invoked.  
Seven offerings were made, apart from rice, involving those products 
that are considered important in guaranteeing a satisfying life, and placed at 
the top of the mat (honey, coffee, homemade rum, beer, betsabetsa, a local 
alcoholic sweet drink which is always consumed in rituals, and chewing 
tobacco or paraky). At the centre, rice was placed on a big banana leaf, 
ordered into two main lumps and surrounded by six smaller handfuls of 
lango. As a harvest ritual, the vonivao is pregnant with the symbolism of 
fertility, and it is thus that rice is categorised into three distinct types: male 
rice, vary lahy, female rice, vary vavy, and lango, which could be seen as 
‘offspring’ rice in that it is an immature form of rice. This categorisation is 
not one present in everyday life, but only attends to the method of 
preparing, consuming and offering it in this particular ritual. As the 
Tangalamena explained, male rice must be boiled in the pot with no lid on it, 
and eaten standing (in theory), quickly and without spoons, because ‘men 
are always on the go’. Female rice, on the other hand, is cooked with the lid, 
and eaten with its accompaniment, beans and greens in this case, and with 
cutlery, in reference to women’s domestic roles. Lango, finally, is not cooked 
at all, only pounded, probably referring to the idea of immaturity 
characteristic of children. Rice, or more specifically the rice from tavy 
fields83, becomes therefore the medium through which to convey ideas 
                                                        
83 It is essential to note that the rice used for the ritual comes from the tavy fields, 
although this particular family had irrigated rice fields. When I asked the Tangalamena 
whether paddy rice could be used he said it could, but he was actually referring to the 
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about sexual duality and fertility in relation to a successful future of both 
harvests and generations.  
The idea of sexual duality was not just present in the offering but was 
continuously deployed in the Tangalamena’s kabary, the ritual speech that 
makes up the main body of the event: he addressed God in its sexualised 
forms—male and female, Zanahary lahy, Zanahary vavy—and called forth 
the family’s ancestors, appealing first to those of the participating women, 
‘from your mother and from your father’, and then those of the men, ‘from 
your mother and from your father’. As he mentioned women, in turn, he 
constantly referred to them as ‘loharano nisehoana’, or the ‘sources of 
origins’. The Tangalamena thus invited God and the ancestors (in that 
order84) to join in and have their rightful piece of the harvest, in turn 
requesting their blessing for ‘good health, good harvest and giving birth to 7 
boys and 7 girls’85. As he talked to God, the Tangalamena explained that the 
family performing the ritual ‘worked the rice’, niasa vary, just as God had 
instructed the sons of human beings should do, and exemplified through 
various rhetoric devices the importance of rice for one’s livelihood, 
qualifying it as ‘the root of life’, ny vary aró no fototry ny aina. He 
enumerated the problems found in the harvest (such as rats, cyclones or the 
fact that the land belonged to the government) and pondered whether these 
things came about due to some mistake people had made—‘the young ones 
do not know about taboos’—or it was simply God’s wish. The Tangalamena 
called forth a bad or evil ancestor86—one whose passing through the village, 
I was told, meant that fights would break out or harvests would be ruined—
putting small amounts of each offering in a piece of banana leaf and 
                                                                                                                                                      
similar ritual carried out by the Bezanozano, who are irrigated rice farmers. The vonivao, in 
other words, is a tavy related ritual, since it is the agricultural practice of the ancestors. 
84 Although both are powerful beings, there is an established hierarchy where God is 
placed above the ancestors, who, after all, are human beings with all their human faults, as 
the Tangalamena explained. 
85 This is a formulaic phrase in Madagascar representative of a successful life. 
86 This evil ancestor was later explained to me as being a ‘jiny’, a bad spirit that 
inhabits landscape features such as trees or rocks. Sodikoff has explained jiñy or tsiñy as 
‘ancestors gone wild’ (2012a:148).  
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instructing for it to be put out at the gate outside the house, so he would not 
bother the living. A couple of other small packages of offerings were further 
made to take to the tavy fields, for those ancestors who had not been able to 
attend.   
The Tangalamena finally called forth all the loharano, or ‘water 
springs’ in the area, naming key rivers from the south and west first, and 
then those from north and east. He did this through a formulaic form in 
which he called forth all those that flank or border, mihoroka, each river, 
‘from its curves to its stretches’, hatram-binaniny arí, jusqu’á 
ampanihintsininy iny, in a sort of oral mapping exercise for an area that 
extended beyond Andasibe (i.e. Lakato, Mangoro, etc). It is essential to note 
that although loharano refers to water springs or sources, it also means here 
both the whole course of rivers and each and every ancestor that has ever 
inhabited them. The loharano were in fact later explained by the 
Tangalamena as types or ancestries of people, karazan’olona, that inhabit 
each cardinal point. Interestingly, these go beyond Betsimisaraka 
themselves and contain the generations of other ethnic groups such as 
Bezanozano, Sihanaka or Tsimihety.  The established form ‘bordering such 
river, from its curves to its straights’, is in fact a ‘call to every ancestor’, 
fitsoka razana iray manontolo, which makes sure that not one of them is 
forgotten and not called forth. In the Tangalamena’s words, it is a way of 
‘respecting’ every single one of them, big and small. I will return to the 
significance of the loharano below. The ritual ended with everyone throwing 
themselves at the offering, consuming everything in an instant (to get some 
of God’s and the ancestors’ saliva, I was told), with the leftovers on the floor 
swept and left under the window. After the official speech was over, male 
rice, female rice and lango were consumed in that order among the living, 
and before saying goodbye the drinks were served for everyone to enjoy.   
We have seen how the idea of sexual duality is continuously brought 
out in the ritual, as a symbol of fertility in its widest sense. This does not just 
refer to fertility among the living but to a broader form of sexual duality—
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equally applying to rice, ancestors and God—as reproductive of the social 
and material basis of life, where (tavy) harvests and generations appear as 
mutually implicated. The ideal of reproduction that is enacted in the ritual is 
however not limited to that of individual households and their lineages, nor 
even that of the village, for that matter: it rather encompasses every 
ancestry that is felt to be part of the local landscape, a space that is very 
broadly understood/experienced. In a sense, it establishes an extremely 
elastic ‘overarching’ or ‘surpassing’ community (communité de dépassement) 
in the sense described by Althabe (1969) for the Betsimisaraka of the east 
coast, where sexualised forest divinities work to overcome individual 
lineages by creating a community of equals or ‘co-existants’87 who inhabit a 
common landscape (Althabe 1969:114). This fits well with Bloch’s 
description of Zafimaniry ways of continually incorporating ‘strangers’ into 
‘affines’ (1975). Equals, then, in this case, refers to every person—dead or 
alive—that has ever dwelled in the landscape, as each and every one of them 
contributes to the expansion of social life over time.  
This is best exemplified in the figure of the loharano, an element that 
conflates ancestries and rivers as sources of life. These sources, however, do 
not refer to a founding ancestor or a particular water-spring: it is rather 
their flux, through generations and rivers’ whole courses, ‘from its stretches 
to its curves’ (every single ancestor at every point of the river), that 
constitute the social landscape as (re)productive. Life, as is understood in 
Mahatsara, while stemming from a particular point, is nothing without flux 
and expansion through space and time. The significance of rivers, in turn, as 
we saw with the case of foundational narratives, is constructed through its 
relation to land and its working, as rivers and agricultural fields are 
imagined as composing a whole (remember, through settlement and work, 
the river becomes the field of such and such). The flux of life, therefore, 
                                                        
87 As Graeber has argued, a recurring theme in ethnographies of Madagascar, 
Althabe’s among them, is this idea that ‘a community of equals can only be created by 
common subordination to some overarching force’ (2007:21).  
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necessarily entails the working of the land through tavy, as the main element 
through which social life in the present is ‘carried forward’ (Ingold 
1993:157) from the past towards the future. As the flow of the river, tavy 
propels the expansion in space and time of past, present and future 
generations.  
We have therefore seen how Malagasy ideals of ‘growth’ as forward 
movement (Keller 2008) take shape in the landscape of Mahatsara. This is, 
however, just an ideal, and the actual landscape of Mahatsara and the 
experiences thereof are indeed very far from it. Let us see how.  
Voatery: Containment in time and space 
Located right by the primary forest, Mahatsara enjoys some of the 
most breath-taking views I have ever experienced. In 2013, the back of the 
Tangalamena’s house, which lies at the highest point of the village, was 
cleared for building a village common-house, tranompokonolona. The project 
never materialised for various reasons, but the clearing allowed one to look 
over the village fields, and across the road to the National Park: an immense 
extension of thick, lush, dark green forest, fog emanating from treetops, 
soaring birds, and the hunting howls of lemurs as its soundtrack.  
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Figure 11. The Andasibe-Mantadia National Park seen from the back of the 
Tangalamena's house. Photograph taken by author in March 2013. 
 
In the thrill of the moment, I easily forgot that this impressive 
landscape was, for the most part, off-bounds to villagers, who would risk 
fines and imprisonment if they were ever caught inside. 
In his article on Zafimaniry perceptions of the landscape, Bloch notes 
how views of cleared trees are associated and enjoyed as views of clarity 
and spaciousness, in contrast to the ‘oppressively and menacingly 
enveloping’ (1995:66) forest, which would seem to conjure darkness. This 
clarity is not just aesthetic but also relates to central aspects of Zafimaniry 
values which hinge on social reproduction and its rooting to the landscape 
as a way of transcending human impermanence and weakness in the face of 
an uncaring and hostile environment. The darkness of the forest in 
Mahatsara could be said to be double: not only is it dark in comparison to 
the clarity of the fields and village (the signs of the (temporary) success of 
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people over the environment), it is also dark because it represents 
contemporary feelings of oppression and decline.  
In a sense, this is like the case of ‘modernization through the looking 
glass’ that Ferguson (Ferguson 1999:13) describes for the case of the 
Zambian Copperbelt, where modernity is relegated to nostalgia, and decline 
is anticipated in the face of excruciating hardship. The views that I so much 
enjoyed were, for the people in Mahatsara, not evocative of the potential to 
overcome darkness and establish a much-desired clarity, as in the 
Zafimaniry case above, but exactly the opposite. Learning to see the forest 
through everything that it may not become, meant seeing that darkness as 
ever encroaching on Mahatsara and its peoples, a feeling that was 
unequivocally articulated as one of being squeezed/narrowed down in 
space: tery, or narrow, and voatery, or being squeezed/made narrow by 
someone.  
Mahatsara is indeed a very particular place, bearing the marks of 
having been created by an outside entity, and thus far from the organic form 
of expansion I have described above. It has to be remembered that it was 
created in 2001 by the Park authorities as a ‘pilot village’, grouping those 
people that had until then lived inside the Park.  The idea of one single 
location in which various lineages of extended families cohabit in a relatively 
reduced space is actually a foreign concept for villagers, one characteristic of 
larger towns, such as Andasibe. As Graeber has argued for the highlands, the 
idea of town or village, tanana, refers to ‘any place of human habitation’ 
(2007:13), its size being highly variable. In Mahatsara, tanana is ideally seen 
as a small family hamlet centred around a head couple and composed of a 
few houses surrounded by ample terrain, often filled with fruit trees, close to 
drinking water and often not too far from the main road. When asked what 
life used to be like before they were moved to Mahatsara—and people 
always make it explicit that they were moved ‘by them’, nafindran-jareo 
(‘them’ explored below)—villagers are quick to remark this fact, and the 
feeling of confinement they find in the current village. This is usually 
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accompanied by complaints regarding the lack of promised ‘development’—
most notably a hospital and a school—and the lack of co-operation among 
villagers. Far from a ‘pilot village’, or even a village for that matter, 
Mahatsara looks more like the remnants of a failed experiment, an unvoiced, 
uncomfortable feeling of forced grouping always looming over it.  
Feelings of confinement due to resettlement and space compression 
are further increased by the fact that protected areas have progressively 
surrounded Mahatsara since its creation in 2001, as the epitaph to this 
chapter reveals.  
The idea of being narrowed down or squeezed in space comes out very 
strongly too when referring to tavy regulations, generally conceptualised in 
the village as the impossibility to ‘expand’ into further land—tsy azo 
manitatra, tsy afaka mihitatra. People therefore practice a settled form of 
tavy, working on the same space they were given when they were moved to 
Mahatsara over 10 years ago. Instead of acquiring new land88 so that the 
land worked during previous years can be left fallow for enough time to 
regain its fertility89, people claim they have to divide the land they work into 
parcels so that some of it can be left fallow for a couple of years at a time. As 
Maman’i Jo described the process:  
‘We can only do tavy in the area that we received because 
it was already delimited how many hectares 
corresponded to us and it is there that we move 
frequently. You can’t expand into other land. It is this 
little piece of land that we share, here we do this, here we 
do that, in a given year’. 
This means that land is increasingly infertile, with a consequent 
reduction in the amount of produce harvested. If, in the past, rice could last 
                                                        
88 Traditionally, it was the task of the Tangalamena to manage expansion into new 
land, but this is impossible under current regulations.  
89 Ideally ten to fifteen years although this varies according to regulation and 
population growth.  
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for almost a year, in the present it lasts for no more than six months. During 
the rest of the year, then, people are forced to buy rice and therefore search 
for sources of income, which, being highly scarce, translate into the yearly 
‘krizy’ between October and February, as explained in the introduction. 
Although some of the most powerful families in Mahatsara do have access to 
land appropriate to irrigated agriculture, most of them don’t. For most of the 
inhabitants of Mahatsara, then, land is both unproductive and insufficient. 
This constitutes a very worrying situation because with expansion of land 
limited, an already infertile patch has to be increasingly subdivided as 
children come off age. Maman’i Tefy mother of two, 8 and 15, described it in 
the following terms:  
‘it is that piece of land that we have to share with the 
children, because you can’t go there or there [meaning 
expanding into new areas], and it gets smaller and 
smaller (mihakely dia mihakely), and it is that bit that we 
have to share. It is not enough’.  
The future, from this perspective, looks bleak and uncertain90. Voatery 
in Malagasy, however, does not just refer to the act of being narrowed in 
space by someone else, but the same idea of being squeezed can also signify 
notions of oppression, as in being constrained or commanded by someone 
else. As we have seen, feelings of constraint come about partly in people’s 
memories of past displacement and current tavy regulations, which force 
people into confined spaces. Additionally, they appear in everyday feelings 
of subjugation and fear, as even the most mundane aspects of life in 
Mahatsara are under constant surveillance.  
                                                        
90 In a similar way, Hughes argues that the Great Limpopo Transboundary 
Conservation Area that spans across South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique (and is 
claimed to be the largest conservation area in the world), ‘constrains small-scale farmers’ in 
both space and time, ‘while freeing large-scale investors and tourists’ (Hughes 2005:161). 
This is done by fixing people in space through planning, where peasants’ mobility and 
expansion are negated, and their future becomes uncertain. 
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Since encroaching on further land can lead to imprisonment or fines, 
yet tavy is insufficient for a family to survive on, people have to look for 
other ways of making a living. One of the key economic activities during 
2013 supplementing tavy was gold digging. This, and other activities I 
cannot mention here due to privacy reasons, however, are also proscribed 
by law, and people therefore live in a constant state of illegality and fear of 
repression, for even everyday tasks, such as collecting firewood or honey, 
can get one into trouble with the authorities if done inside protected areas. 
Jokes and remarks about this fact abound in people’s everyday 
conversations, eliciting resentful comments such as ‘you can’t even poop 
inside the park’, na dia mangery ary tsy azo atao. I once heard, for example, 
an elder admonishing her 5 year old grandchild for having captured a 
hedgehog (outside the Park): ‘if Rainer [from Mitsinjo, the conservation 
organization] finds out, you will get in trouble!’ she said. Notions of 
entitlement, property and legitimacy also enter these types of 
commentaries. Someone, for example, remarked that, as an element found in 
the river, surely ‘gold had no owner!’, and women puzzled over the 
absurdity of some regulations, such as the prohibition on taking herana, a 
fibre used to weave: ‘it’s not like cutting a tree which then dies’, they said, 
‘herana grows back again!’. After my (naive) suggestion that we could try to 
get permission from the Park for people to collect honey to make some cash, 
an awkward silence followed, and I was later tacitly asked not to mention it 
at all, tsy asina resaka, for ‘they’ were really difficult/oversensitive,  sarotiny. 
In general, these ideas are more broadly articulated as a feeling of being 
scared, matahotra, of being caught or sent into prison, gadra, and even if 
they are usually brought out in a humouristic tone in conversation, they 
point to a very real experience of fear and subjugation in Mahatsara.  
In this dire situation, a recurring narrative among those over 35 years 
of age is ‘Ratsiraka’s Five year plan’ when one could obtain administrative 
permission to clear as much land as one wanted for a renewable period of 
five years, between 1975 and 1983. I already explored ‘the Five year plan’ in 
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the previous chapter, arguing that, contrary to general understandings 
which posit this post-independence era under Ratsiraka’s rule as one of 
strict tavy controls and general hardship, this period is surprisingly 
cherished by people in Mahatsara. As I argued, the ‘Five year plan’ may be 
seen as part of Ratsiraka’s project of integrating subsistence farmers into the 
national economy with the aim of securing rice self-sufficiency, a keystone of 
his socialist endeavour. In Mahatsara, it translated into an unrestricted 
practice of tavy, and this era is constantly remembered and brought up in 
conversation as a time of prosperity and, to an important extent freedom, in 
comparison to the present situation. As Faly, one of Mahatsara’s local smiths 
remembered,  
‘Oh, during those days! During the ‘Five year plan’ life 
was pleasant (mahafinaritra) because you could go into 
any land you liked, you could do tavy, go into any land 
you liked [emphasizes expansion], and there were no 
conflicts/discords (gidragidra) … But you were allowed 
to do what pleased you/what filled your heart (izay 
herim-pon-tena lela), you were allowed to do whatever 
you wanted to make yourself living (iveloman-tena) 
during the five year plan. It was really good during that 
time, there was nothing to scare you, it was only your 
own strength that limited you [in terms of working the 
land]; it was not like now’. 
Faly’s comment portrays the ‘Five year plan’ as a time of both 
unrestricted expansion and autonomy, where one could do whatever one 
needed to ‘make oneself living’, iveloman-tena, without external impositions; 
as he argues, unlike today, the limits back then were marked by each 
person’s strength alone. The idea of ‘making oneself living’ also appears in 
Keller’s ethnography through the concept of tany fivelomana, which she 
translates as ‘land that enables life’ (2008:656). The future is powerfully 
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present in this notion, Keller argues, because it refers to both actual and 
potential land for future generations. Both ‘land that enables life’, and 
‘making oneself living’ thus extend beyond the mere material and 
encompass those elements that we saw as defining a successful life of 
‘growth’. This gains even more force if we consider Cole’s (2010) description 
of this notion of ‘making oneself and others living’, mahamelona tena, as a 
key defining feature of Malagasy life that refers to the achievement of 
‘valued forms of personhood’ (2010:96). By using the capacity (hasina) 
bestowed by the ancestors to make oneself and one’s own family ‘living’, 
Cole argues, this notion marks a ‘full-fledged’ adult, as a ‘generative’ subject 
both socially and materially (2010:52). The idea of ‘making oneself living’ as 
employed by Faly above, then, can also be seen as a commentary on 
restrictions on expansion as a form of denying the freedom or agency to 
dictate the ‘how’ of making oneself alive, and, even more centrally, the 
ability to achieve a full personhood/adulthood.  
The situation in Mahatsara in fact bears striking similarities with 
Keller’s (2008; 2015) analysis of villagers in the northeast who have seen 
access to land denied over the last two decades by the establishment of the 
Masoala National Park. One of Keller’s field sites, the village of Marofototra, 
could actually be seen as Masoala’s parallel to Mahatsara, as it is a new 
village created by the park authorities to gather the various hamlets that 
were previously scattered around the now protected forest. Like Mahatsara, 
Marofototra is surrounded by protected areas where livelihood activities are 
highly regulated and tavy is subject to strict limitations. Where people in 
Mahatsara articulate the situation in terms of being squeezed, voatery, those 
in Masoala do it in terms of having been ‘defeated’ in the purpose of life, resy 
(Keller 2008:656). In turn, in both cases, oppression seems to come from 
shadowy or undefined forces, usually conceptualised simply as ‘them’ (zare 
in Keller’s case, zareo in mine). In Mahatsara, when talking about 
resettlement and restrictions, people would indistinctively refer to ‘them’. In 
both cases, finally, the present condition has led to the past being 
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reminiscent of a time ‘when people were still free’ (‘mbôla libre anteña’ 
(Keller 2008:658)/mbola libre ny olona in Mahatsara)91. 
Taken together, I suggest, these experiences and the way they are 
articulated are powerful commentaries on present feelings of oppression 
exerted by what could be conceptualised as an ‘environmental state’. This 
state does not necessarily take the form of current or past governments 
alone, but it rather refers to the amalgam of outside restrictive forces that 
limit access to land and livelihoods at any one time92. In fact, as Althabe 
(1969) argued for the Betsimisaraka of the east-coast, fanjakana—usually 
translated as the state—must be seen as any ‘outside oppressive force’ 
(1969:37). TAMS, as a project that aimed to halt the practice of tavy and turn 
these fields into carbon sinks, must thus be seen as part of the 
‘environmental state’.   
As we have seen, voatery calls to the notion of people being squeezed 
in space, and governed by outside forces that regulate not just daily 
activities, but, importantly, expansion into new land for the practice of tavy. 
This inability to expand agricultural land, as we have seen, does not just 
translate into hardship in the present, but also—and very significantly—into 
an impossibility to guarantee this and the next generations’ future, since 
land is both insufficient and increasingly infertile and will not be enough for 
children as they come of age. Further, expansion in space, as we saw in the 
first section, is inherently entangled with expansion in time, as both pasts 
and presents are supposed to be taken over to the future through the 
medium of labour according to Betsimisaraka ideals. By confining people in 
                                                        
91 ‘Freedom’ and the capacity to achieve full personhood/adulthood are in turn 
deeply imbricated concepts in Madagascar due to the legacy of slavery. It is no surprise, in 
fact, that Keller mentions fears of going back to slavery as a result of conservation 
restrictions in her ethnography (2015; 2008), since the incapacity to ‘make oneself living’ 
denotes a sense of childhood that is also associated to slavery as ‘a state of being 
perpetually junior’ (Cole 2010:57; see also Graeber 2007; Evers 2002). I did not encounter 
any comments regarding slavery as such in Mahatsara, however.    
92 A similar point is made by Keller (2005) when she argues that in Masoala the 
central Malagasy government and white foreigners merge into ‘one hostile other’ (195)—a 
‘shadowy consortium’ of outsiders who come together as a result of conservation practice.  
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space through prohibitions on expansion, the ‘environmental state’ is 
effectively locking people in space but also in time, by denying 
Betsimisaraka (re)productive capacities that span from the past and into the 
future. Voatery must therefore be seen as a commentary on the command of 
the environmental state over space and time, limiting the capacity to attain 
full personhood, and as thus evocative of local experiences of 
power(lessness) in Mahatsara.  
Discussing conceptions of oppression, Mangalaza (1998) has argued 
that the metaphor of the cyclone is central to Betsimisaraka thought on 
power. ‘The wind, like power, can be the best and worst of things’, he argues, 
‘as a zephyr [gentle breeze], it is a source of life, of 
happiness, and leaves seem to greet it as it caresses them. 
As a cyclone, it expresses sectarian authoritarianism, 
unfair, based on an oppressive force that does not take 
anything or anyone into account in its aggression’ 
(Mangalaza 1998:15–16; personal translation). 
Power, from this perspective, appears as highly arbitrary and 
capricious, with the capacity to inflict violence as much as benevolence, 
depending on which way the wind blows. Experiences of the ‘environmental 
state’ in Mahatsara seem to conform to this idea of an arbitrary power that 
can either be the source of happiness or that of extreme hardship. At times, 
this outside force was seen as the source of ‘development’, through its 
promises of infrastructure in the ‘pilot village’ or through TAMS’ apparent 
potential to provide revenue and work, for example (explored in the next 
chapter).  For others, as we have seen throughout this chapter, this power is 
experienced as oppressive, fearsome, and not far from fatal. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that Maman’i Njiva, one of Mahatsara’s most powerful 
women, who has seen a few of her children thrive thanks to conservation 
work while the rest suffer due to its oppression, would depict the state as 
God’s kin, as she stated that:  
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‘The state is God’s grandson: it can make you live or it can make you 
die’.   
 
Through this sentence, the powerful, oppressive and arbitrary force of 
the ‘environmental state’ as experienced in Mahatsara appears akin to God.  
This view of power strongly resonates with Bloch’s description of 
Zafimaniry understandings of God (1995:67) presented above, and it is in 
fact a similarity that seems to crop up in Malagasy ethnographies. Graeber 
(2007) too, for example, describes the ‘Malagasy’ view of God (in contrast to 
the Christian view held among the Merina) as morally ambivalent, where its 
potential for future destruction and arbitrary violence is acknowledged. This 
is not far, he argues, from the way the government was experienced in the 
village of Betafo, as ‘essentially alien, predatory, coercive’ (2007:21). 
Although this time focusing on ancestral power rather than God, Cole and 
Middleton (2001) have also explored the similar ways in which ancestral 
and colonial power are imagined and experienced among Betsimisaraka and 
Karembola. An analysis of mortuary rituals among these two groups reveals 
that ‘ancestors and vazaha [europeans] are represented as both 
enlightening/empowering and enslaving’ (Cole and Middleton 2001:11), 
with the same capacity to either make people flourish or annihilate them.  
This idea of God for the Betsimisaraka is well captured in a proverb 
reproduced by Mangalaza, which states ‘we humans, we are all like God’s 
chickens; he alone knows the day when he will come and take us one by one’ 
(1998:1). It is God that has the ultimate command over who gets to die, and, 
therefore, over time at its most absolute. State oppression in Mahatsara, as 
we have seen, is experienced as an impossibility to ‘make oneself living’ and 
‘pro-gress’ (Keller 2008), endangering people’s present, and, importantly, 
future lives. Like God, then, the ‘environmental state’ in Mahatsara—by 
curtailing movement in space—appears as having acquired a total command 
over time.  
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Empty futures and self-fulfilled prophecies 
‘I’d rather die tomorrow than die today’ (Aleo maty rahampitso toy izay 
maty androany) is a well-known Malagasy proverb, often invoked by 
conservation and development organisations working in the country 
(present, for example, in a TAMS report; Borges Coutinho 2010). It could be 
argued that it has attained a sort of metonymic character among these actors 
when referring to Malagasy populations, used as it is to exemplify people’s 
condition of living in the present as a result of poverty, and their consequent 
lack of a future orientation.  
In the case of tavy farmers, the story links poverty to population 
growth and environmental degradation (due to increasingly shorter fallow 
periods), leading to further poverty and the impossibility to develop a long-
term approach to agriculture, thus entrenching tavy. The result is the 
stereotype of subsistence farmers caught in a cycle of tavy leading to poverty 
leading back to tavy, unable to plan for the future and care for the 
environment. Indeed, the Project Design Document (PDD) for TAMS 
presents local communities as being ‘locked’ in ‘unsustainable, intensive 
cycles of tavy exploitation that leaves a trail of degraded land as they move 
on’, and justifies TAMS as a project which will ‘enable subsistence farmers to 
break out of the downward tavy—poverty cycle they are currently caught 
in’. Tradition is also portrayed as partly responsible for this self-
perpetuating cycle, since it is often claimed that the endurance of tavy 
relates to its value as ancestral practice (the PDD states that among other 
things, farmers practise tavy due to ‘traditional beliefs and customs’). In 
temporal terms, then, tavy farmers’ relationship to generational time seems 
the mirror image of global environmental discourse: where one faces the 
past, the other looks to the future. Through the discourse on future 
generations and ‘Our common future’ (WCDE 1987) 
conservation/development practice presents itself as the remedy to this lack 
of future orientation in the Betsimisaraka landscape. ‘I’d rather die 
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tomorrow than die today’ is therefore seen as the perfect portrayal of the 
temporalities which Malagasy people are thought to lack or be caught in.  
We have seen, however, that this is not the case. Through the analysis 
of Betsimisaraka ideals of social reproduction, I have shown how people in 
Mahatsara do think of, and engage with, their futures. Following Keller 
(2008; 2015), in turn, I have argued that the social relations of tavy and 
more general pan-Malagasy ideas of generational growth combine to 
produce a particularly strong vision of expansion in space and time as a life 
ideal. Both the future and the environment, then, appear as particularly 
important issues for farmers in Mahatsara, albeit in locally meaningful ways.  
In a sense, the discourse on a lack of future orientation and the 
‘poverty cycle’ in which tavy farmers are caught is similar to the ‘myth of 
marginality’ exposed by Perlman (1976) in the late 60s, regarding Rio de 
Janeiro’s favelas and their inhabitants, the favelados. In both academic and 
public discourse—and not just in Brazil but across Latin America in 
general—marginality during these years appeared as a phenomenon 
stemming from countryside migrants’ mal-adaptation to city life, and thus as 
a result of the poor’s own conditions and behaviours. This discourse 
produced a stereotypical squatter characterised by ‘a lack of attitudinal pre-
requisites’ (Perlman 1976:136) for life in the city due to his ‘parochial 
traditionalism’ as country folk. Once this ‘traditionalism’ was passed on to 
generations in the favelas, it developed into a self-perpetuating ‘culture’, or 
‘cycle’, of poverty’, where cynicism and passivity made the poor unable to 
plan and care for the future. Perlman’s study proved that not only did 
favelados not possess those traits associated to marginality (such as political 
apathy or internal disorganisation), but were, in fact, far from marginal. The 
favelados were rather ‘tightly bound’ (1976:131) and ‘integrated into 
society’ in a ‘functional’ (1976:147) way, ‘albeit in a manner detrimental to 
their interests’ (1976:131), as they were actively being marginalised by Rio’s 
upper classes through exploitation and social exclusion. Where the ‘myth of 
marginality’ constructed ‘poverty as a consequence of individual 
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characteristics of the poor rather than a condition of society itself’ 
(1976:158), the opposite was, in fact, the case.  
The ‘myth of marginality’ (Perlman 1976) shares important 
similarities with what we could term here as the ‘myth of presentism’ found 
in development/conservation discourse in reference to the condition of 
hand-to-mouth living among rural Malagasy or Betsimisaraka. Both myths 
are indeed articulated around a supposed lack—city skills in one case and 
concern for the future and the environment in the other—and they both 
situate ‘victims’ in particular ‘cycles of poverty’ that appear to function 
independently from the rest of society.  The imagery of the ‘cycle’ is in fact a 
powerful device in representing a social problem as a timeless, and 
therefore permanent, self-referential totality. Like the poor in Rio’s favelas, 
then, tavy farmers are represented as victims of their own practices, trapped 
between a traditionalist system—tavy and large families—and its 
reproduction into a ‘downward cycle of poverty’ from which they cannot 
break out on their own.  
It must be pointed out that farmers in Mahatsara do indeed claim to 
live day-to-day due to a lack of economic resources, as Raivo’s notion of 
‘krizy’ made evident in the introduction. Although I never heard the ‘I’d 
rather die today’ proverb, I could easily see how it might be employed. Ideas 
of living in the present, then, are too related to notions of poverty in 
Mahatsara. Tavy, however, does not appear here as the cause of such 
poverty, nor is poverty related to a lack of future orientation (at least not in 
relation to tavy —this is explored below), but it is rather tavy regulations, as 
Raivo made clear, that are seen as the cause of hand-to-mouth living. Like 
with Perlman’s example, then, ‘presentism’ is not an inherent condition of 
subsistence farmers per se: as we have seen, the Betsimisaraka farmer is as 
much concerned with the past and ancestral practice as she is with bringing 
it over to the future through social reproduction. It is the current state in 
which farmers find themselves, as part of the wider socio-political context, 
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that forces the immediacy of the present upon them93. It is not so much, 
therefore, a matter of lacking a future orientation, but rather, of that 
particular orientation being denied in the present through the enforcement 
of conservation.  
The ‘myth of presentism’ in Madagascar may somehow be seen as a 
‘denial of coevalness’ (Fabian 1983), where tavy farmers are effectively 
situated outside the grid of the future by virtue of their supposed lack. 
Fabian (1983) employed the term to denounce the temporal distance 
established by anthropological representations with their object of study: 
anthropological writing, he argued, negated a shared space-time in the 
present, relegating ‘the Other’ to a primitive past. Conversely, we can see a 
similar form at operation here where future, rather than present, co-
habitation is negated, simply because, for Betsimisaraka, the discourse goes, 
the future does not exist. As an empty or neglected future, then, it must be 
programmed and managed if we are to sustain ‘our future generations’.  The 
question bears on, of course, whose generations are exactly being singled 
out as future inhabitants through this kind of ‘chronopolitics’ (Fabian 
1983:144) where the myth, as explored by Perlman (1976), becomes a 
political vehicle for interpreting, and acting on, social reality. I will return to 
this point in chapter 8. 
Interestingly, in Perlman’s (2005) revisit to the favelas 30 years later, 
she argues that the ‘myth of marginality’ gained such force after the 70s that 
it became a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’: it was through policy aimed at the 
removal of the favelas, that the very conditions of ‘disaffection’ and 
‘disconnection’ identified as the problem were ‘perversely’ created (2005:8). 
A similar thing seems to be taking place in Mahatsara.  
As they prepared the offering for the vonivao, the Tangalamena and 
Soahary’s mother, an elderly lady, discussed the reasons behind present 
                                                        
93 For a different take on a similar theme see Day et al. (1999) where the editors 
explore the ways in which marginal people who are denied a future transform it into an 
experience of freedom by purposefully living in the present.  
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catastrophes—most notably the year’s bad harvest due to a rat infestation. 
These came about, they concluded, because young people did not respect 
ancestral custom and neglected their fields, especially as a result of the 
recent surge in gold digging, through which the young only satisfied their 
very present needs: it ‘sustained the stomach’ (mitondra kibo) the woman 
said. This new fleeting source of income was indeed generally seen as 
paradoxical: necessary and welcome in the present, but a problem for future 
harvests, since people did not have time to attend to their fields, and some of 
them had even turned productive agricultural land into digging sites (those 
by the river). The negation of a future in Mahatsara through prohibitions on 
expansion seem to be effecting the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ of ‘presentism’, 
as new generations do not, or cannot, care about the future. 
 As we saw, however, pasts, presents and futures are all implicated in 
Betsimisaraka thought as a unified flow that runs through the landscape. 
Although I was never told this explicitly, I would suggest that the denial of 
present and future reproductive capacity is also taking its toll on the past.  
Rituals and religion, I was constantly told, are not what they used to be. 
The vonivao was a ‘huge party’ in the past that involved the whole 
community, Soahary’s husband had told me as he lamented the loss of 
‘religion’, fivavahana. Similarly, the spirit possession ritual at the sacred 
waterfall, riana-soa, had in the past involved cattle sacrifice, but in the 
present it was being preformed with a chicken that was killed even before 
making it to the waterfall, and eaten in the feast the night before the ritual. 
Contrary to ethnographic accounts of rituals performed at the tavy fields 
(see Sodikoff 2012a; Jarosz 1996), Mahatsara seems to have none (except 
for the taboo, fady, to work the fields on Thursdays). Finally, although 
Mahatsara (literally to make good/nice) acquired its name due to the 
healing properties of its waters, these, I was told, had long ago run out. 
Mahatsara, as it turns out, has lost its efficacy.  
Rituals, as we have seen, are a particular powerful way of bringing 
together pasts, presents and futures. The decline in ritual practice in 
   188 
Mahatsara may be seen in part as the result of poverty caused by the limits 
on agricultural expansion enforced by the ‘environmental state’. This 
time/space oppression, embodied in the concept of voatery, seems to be 
curtailing the relationships that can be established both with the past and 
with the future, as people are confined to the present. Going back to Ingold’s 
(1993) analogy between music in an orchestra and the melody of social life, 
it seems that, as pasts and futures drift apart, the landscape of Mahatsara is 
starting to lose its tune.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored the social life of carbon in Mahatsara 
through the social and material significance of tavy for local 
(re)reproduction, a practice that brings together past, present and future 
relationships between people and these landscapes. Although carbon has 
not appeared explicitly in this chapter, we have seen how it may be thought 
of as implicated in a form of governance—the environmental state—which, 
through restrictions on expansion, contains people in both space and time 
and limits their capacity to ‘make themselves living’ in its widest sense. I 
have also shown that, while usually portrayed as lacking a future-orientation 
by the conservationist ‘myth of presentism’, people in Mahatsara do think, 
and care deeply about their futures. It is, by contrast, conservation practice, 
where we also find TAMS, that curtails the very futures it claims to enable by 
confining people to an uncertain present.  
This is not a situation solely characteristic of Mahatsara. In her 
ethnography on labour relations in a global biodiversity reserve in 
Mananara-Nord, in northeast Madagascar, Sodikoff presents tavy farmers as 
‘feeling pinched or hemmed in’ as a result of a decade of Park activity, 
‘unable to extend their land of descent by bequeathing land to their 
offspring’ (Sodikoff 2012a:117). Similarly, we have seen how Keller’s (2008) 
ethnography of villagers in the Masoala National Park provides fertile 
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comparisons for these kinds of experiences. Far from localised, then, the 
spatio-temporal effects of conservation on tavy-practising communities 
seem to be highly consistent. Sodikoff claims that this may be seen as an 
instance of ‘time-space compression’ (Harvey 1990), characteristic of 
contemporary forms of capitalism and enacted in this case by the 
‘nonextractive production of rain forest value’ (Sodikoff 2012a:116). 
Through the concept of voatery, so salient in everyday life in Mahatsara and 
expressive of power(lessness), I hope to have shown that this ‘compression’ 
may also be thought of as a form of time-space oppression, in which carbon, 
as a novel form of value-production in these landscapes, also partakes.  
In the next chapter I move on to the social life of carbon as (elusive) 
natural resource, through people’s experiences of carbon labour in 
Mahatsara.   
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Chapter Six: Carbon Matters and Experiences of 
carbon labour at the point of extraction 
 
Introduction 
A key regulation of the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms, including projects 
under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), is that emission 
reductions ‘must be real, measurable, verifiable and additional to what 
would have occurred without the projects’ (UNFCCC 2010:7). The fact that 
this ‘new commodity’ (UNFCCC 2010:3) is required to be real, is quite a 
remarkable thing, and already points to some of the specificities of carbon’s 
material properties in these new markets. This goes beyond its ‘fictitious’ 
(Polanyi 1957) character as commodity (the fact that carbon dioxide, CO2—
like land, labour and money—has not been produced for sale and exceeds its 
commodity properties) because, as some of the literature suggests, the end-
product of offset projects—the emission reduction—is a sort of anti-matter. 
In his analysis on the materiality of carbon offsets, Bumpus (2011), for 
example, talks of the tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, tCO2e, as a ‘piece of 
counterfactual material nature’ claiming that ‘carbon offsets create a 
commodity and value out of a piece of nature—carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere—that, if achieved properly, does not exist’ (2011:616).  
Most of the accounts of carbon’s material properties, like the one 
above, focus on carbon credits as a peculiar type of commodity, and 
highlight its intangibility and abstract character (see, for example, Bansal 
and Knox-Hayes 2013). While insightful, I here want to take a step back and 
focus on carbon’s materiality as grounded natural resource94, by exploring 
                                                        
94 I use the term natural resource here in a broad sense, in reference to ‘objects and 
substances produced from nature for human enrichment and use’ (Ferry and Limbert 
2008:3), and not necessarily defined as such by those engaged in bringing them about. My 
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the particularities of its ‘extraction’. This allows me to bring to the forefront 
an often-neglected side of carbon sinks: on the ground ‘carbon labour’. By 
this I mean the specific forms of labour that precede the work of turning 
carbon into commodity (explored in the next chapter), and that remain 
nonetheless central for this process, such as reforestation work in the case 
of TAMS. The emphasis on producing ‘real’ emission reductions already 
reveals a somewhat ‘weird’ property of carbon as natural resource. It would 
be highly unusual for, say, a mining company, to make a statement regarding 
the ‘realness’ of the minerals they extract. There is certainly something 
particular about carbon as natural resource, which seems to point to an 
apparent absence of material form. What implications, then, does the 
strange (im)materiality of carbon have for those involved in its production? 
And what difference does carbon as natural resource ‘make’ to people who 
inhabit African landscapes with long histories of intervention and resource 
extraction, as Leach and Scoones have asked (2015:2)? These are the 
questions that I aim to answer in this chapter as I explore experiences of 
carbon labour in TAMS.  
As I argued in chapter four, local communities in forest carbon projects 
and other forms of commodified nature have mostly been explored through 
the lens of dispossession or displacement (for example, Büscher et al. 2012). 
In this chapter, by contrast, I turn to specific experiences of carbon labour 
among forest communities95 in TAMS.  In Mahatsara, over 60 men were 
hired to reforest degraded lands and about twenty of them, in turn, gave 
land to the project, in exchange for both reforestation work and carbon 
benefits/money. As we will see, these men’s experiences of TAMS as a 
source of wage work were characterised by feelings of volatility in its widest 
sense, as temporary, intangible and detached from the local context. In turn, 
work in TAMS was consistently compared to the more grounded and 
                                                                                                                                                      
aim is to bring attention to carbon as an element produced through reforestation work in 
TAMS, since the question of labour is my main focus in this chapter.  
95 Acknowledging these communities as heterogeneous and where power is 
unequally divided along lines of age, gender and status.  
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permanent jobs in the now extinguished local graphite industry, which 
operated in the area for over 50 years. 
The production of graphite and of a carbon sink in Mahatsara may 
seem, on a first look, unrelated and contradictory. While one is the epitome 
of an extractive industry, reflected in the powerful image of the mine pit, the 
other stands as its antithesis, representative of everything non-extractive 
through the image of the tree firmly rooted to the ground.  On closer 
inspection, however, both graphite mining and TAMS are ultimately 
concerned with the same element, graphite being an allotrope of carbon96. In 
turn, they both derive from the very same landscapes, and they have both 
been assimilated as wage work by men97 in Mahatsara, albeit in significantly 
different ways.  
Ferry’s (2008) ethnography of silver and mineral mining in Mexico, 
reminds us that very similar types of substances that occur in the same 
spaces and are extracted simultaneously by the same people can lead to 
strikingly different ways of articulating and experiencing them as (natural) 
resources. Her example of the production and consumption channels, or 
‘trajectories’, that silver ore and mineral specimens enter after they are 
extracted from the same Mexican mines shows how these two similar 
objects become evocative of very different temporalities: where silver ore is 
treated as a non-renewable resource and evokes a temporality of scarcity 
and progressive mineral depletion, minerals, by entering collections and 
becoming increasingly unique and identifiable, seem to ‘extend their 
temporal horizons nearly infinitely’ (Ferry 2008:69). Thus, ‘the material 
conditions and qualities of minerals and ore’, Ferry argues, ‘make certain 
temporal constructions and experiences more likely’ (2008:54). 
                                                        
96 Allotropes are different structural modifications of an element. Although I employ 
the term here to tease out the connections and differences between carbon credits and 
graphite, I do it in a metaphorical way, given that the carbon of carbon credits is not a 
carbon allotrope but carbon dioxide, a molecule made up of carbon and oxygen (CO2).  
97 I focus largely on men’s work experiences because, in Mahatsara, wage work is 
exclusively male. This dynamic continued with TAMS as no women worked nor gave land to 
the project in the village.  
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Understanding resources as the outcome of ‘relations, practices and 
networks’ that bring ‘persons, things and materials’ (Richardson 2014:4) 
together, I will focus in this chapter on the labour regimes, types of 
infrastructures and forms of exchange and production that were set up in 
Mahatsara in order to bring carbon into being in two distinct forms—as 
graphite and forest carbon. As we will see, carbon, in these two different 
guises, also gave rise to very different experiences of its production.  
As TAMS came to a premature end, in turn, and ‘carbon’ failed to 
materialise in any locally expected way, experiences of volatility mutated 
into feelings of deceit, and the project became conceptualised as a ‘scam’, 
fitaka. A look at three other forms of failed exchange transactions that relate 
to natural resources will help me elaborate on the ways in which carbon in 
TAMS was marked by notions of intangibility, social distance and obscure 
forms of value production and exchange.  
Taken together, these two cases allow me to tease out the 
particularities of contemporary forms of ‘carbon labour’ in Betsimisaraka 
landscapes, the way these relate to the (im)materiality of carbon as natural 
resource, and the political possibilities that opened up or closed down as a 
result. 
I begin, in the next section, by providing a brief account of the various 
ways in which carbon as part of TAMS was understood in Mahatsara.  
The social lives of carbon in Mahatsara  
In their analysis of the Western Area Peninsula forest (WAPFoR) 
carbon project in Sierra Leone, Leach and Winnebah present ideas about 
carbon, carbon-related money and concomitant elements such as climate 
change, as ‘difficult-to-fathom’ concepts for those communities involved—
even if ‘logical in terms of local experience’ (2015:191–192). Carbon is thus 
sometimes explained as ‘smoke from burning wood’, as the ‘mist you see 
above the forest in the morning’ or as an object that Europeans need and are 
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eager to buy, not too dissimilar to the minerals or timber that have been the 
focus of foreigners historically (Leach and Winnebah 2015:192–193).  
In Mahatsara, too, carbon meant different things for different people. 
Some of those with closer ties to the project, for example, could provide an 
account of carbon’s role on the environment, and its links to foreign 
industrial emissions, even if the role of trees in absorbing or releasing 
carbon was not too clear. Thus, Sylvain, for example, who had worked for 
TAMS as head of a tree nursery (chef pépinièriste), explained carbon in 2011 
the following way: 
It [the project] dealt with carbon (carbone) because the 
price of carbon is very high; outside Madagascar the 
environment is already damaged due to too much 
industry and the likes. And those abroad are the ones 
who provide funding (mamatsy vola) for the carbon and 
they say that in five years’ time those trees we have 
planted will have released (mamoaka) carbon, although 
at the moment it looks as if just a little carbon has been 
obtained (ahazoana) because the tree seedlings don’t 
seem to be growing’.  
For many of those (men) who had worked in reforestation, or had 
given land to TAMS, on the other hand, carbon was simply something that 
was in trees and which ‘those abroad’ were interested in ‘buying’, ilay 
carbone vangain’izareo avy any ampita. Its actual properties or origins 
tended to appear somewhat irrelevant, and carbon was most often 
conceptualised as the object of the sale for which people would receive 
payment, generally understood as ‘the price of carbon’, vidin’ny carbone.  
Some people, on the other hand, left carbon unexplained, and rather 
referred to TAMS’ aim of turning savoka into (green) forest, atao ala 
maintso, as a result of ‘foreigners liking green’, vazaha tia ny maintso. When 
probed into the actual forms or meaning of carbon, for example, a man who 
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had given half of his land to the project claimed to not know, for it was 
something that had not yet been experienced, or 'lived', zavatra tsy mbola 
niainana io. Those who had not given land or worked for TAMS, in turn, the 
majority of women among them, tended to shrug when asked and claimed 
not to know what the project nor carbon was about.  
There was an interesting understanding of what carbon credits, crédit 
carbone, were, however. As we know, credits are the end-product of a forest 
carbon project and are therefore supposed to flow from the forests of 
Andasibe to carbon buyers outside Madagascar. In Mahatsara, however, the 
idea of crédit carbone was equated to that of ‘the price of carbon’, often used 
interchangeably, and referred to the money farmers hoped to receive in 
exchange for carbon. While I do not know how this concept sprang up, I 
suspect it had its origins in the idea of mobile phone crédit (from the French) 
as available balance, and was therefore seen as money. It is important to 
point out that the idea of crédit carbone was used much more than that of 
just carbone and it could thus be tentatively argued that carbon was mostly 
apprehended as a form of exchange, where its features as natural resource 
were not all that relevant.  
I have so far provided a brief account of the different understandings 
of carbon in Mahatsara. As we have seen, carbon most often appeared as an 
elusive element, or as Leach et al argue, a ‘hard-to-fathom concept’, its actual 
material properties or origins being often unknown or insignificant. 
Carbon’s most important feature was not contained in the object itself, but in 
the kind of value it promised to farmers. In the next sections I delve deeper 
into the ways carbon—as elusive resource—was experienced in these 
landscapes. Before that, however, I present the landscape of Mahatsara as a 
‘resource environment’ (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014:7) and introduce 
the main theoretical approach I take in this chapter.  
The matter of resources 
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Mahatsara is located 14 kilometres north of Andasibe, along the road 
that connects the town to the Andasibe-Mantadia National Park. The 
landscape changes substantially between the first half of the route, where 
the road separates charcoal fields from pine and eucalyptus forests, and the 
second, where the denuded hill sides of the tavy fields, topped by a few 
remaining trees, face the thick and extensive primary forests on the opposite 
side of the road. The Vakona Forest Lodge, a four star eco-hotel with its own 
lemur and crocodile parks, marks the half-way point between Andasibe and 
Mahatsara.  
A few kilometres before reaching the entrance to the hotel, however, 
the tourist eye, captured by the luxurious and leafy landscape, may fail to 
notice the gate and barrier that lay on the right. They lead into an old mining 
plant, which is nowadays inoperative, except for some activity at the 
sawmill, where tree logs are stacked and processed from time to time. Both 
the mine plant and sawmill complex and the nearby hotel belong to the 
Izouards, a French family who settled in the area during the early 1900s. The 
adjacent village of Falierana, which also names the fokontany (the smallest 
administrative unit in Madagascar), is home to both present and past 
workers of the industrial complex.  
The road that follows, after the hotel, is a bumpier, narrower and more 
unkempt path going all the way up to the various Park entrances. This path 
also leads to the old graphite sites, which are located inside the forest and 
have been closed since the early 2000s. The road is sometimes referred to 
by locals as lalan’i Izouard or Izouard’s road, a reminder of the fact that this 
was a private road that was built by the colonial enterprise to aid transit of 
produce and labour between the mining plant and the forest excavations98.  
                                                        
 
98 This part of the route is also an interesting palimpsest of local settlement and 
displacement, only visible, however, to those who can remember or spot its traces. The new 
village of Ambatofotsy, which precedes the entrance to the Park, displays the latest episode 
of displacement in the area: its villagers, having once lived in mining camps inside the 
forest, were relocated to the area of Ambohimarina as the camps had shut down, but had 
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All along this area, the land is filled with signs which somehow act as a 
script to read it, unfolding two different types of landscapes depending on 
whether one is local or a foreigner: signs in Malagasy warn those who can 
read them of prohibitions regarding access, whereas those in French 
translate the forest into a managed space filled with conservation 
interventions which guarantee its survival. TAMS is present here through 
signs which introduce key specific spots, such as the tree nursery at 
Ambodigavoala (below). Between 2011 and 2013, entering here, however, 
meant encountering a desolated landscape of dead and abandoned tree 
seedlings, nothing like the luxurious reforested hills that the sign promoted. 
 
Figure 12. Signs of TAMS tree nursery in Ambodigavoala. Photograph taken by 
author in March 2011. 
                                                                                                                                                      
again been moved out in 2010 by Izouard, who, some claimed, needed the land for building 
horse stables. 
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Figure 13. Tree seedlings inside the Ambodigavoala tree nursery. Photograph 
taken by author in March 2011. 
 
 At a turn, about 2 kilometres from the ‘barrière’, or main entrance to 
the Park where tourist passes have to be shown, a clearing in the otherwise 
dense vegetation by the riverside reveals a simple, wooden bridge. This is 
the entrance to Mahatsara.  
The landscape between Andasibe and Mahatsara can be seen as a 
palimpsest containing some of the elements that make up what Richardson 
and Weszkalnys call ‘resource environments’:  
‘complex arrangement of physical stuff, extractive 
infrastructures, calculative devices, discourses of the 
market and development, the nation and the corporation, 
everyday practices and so on that allow (those) 
substances to exist as resources’ (2014:7).  
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Natural resources, from this perspective, are not seen to just ‘exist in 
nature’ as bounded substances with ‘essential qualities’ waiting to be 
extracted and transformed (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014:7), but are 
rather seen as the outcome of ‘relations, practices and networks’ that bring 
‘persons, things and materials’ (Richardson 2014:4) together. In the 
landscape described above, graphite, for example, appears not just as the 
substance that is obtained from the mine pit, but also as the road that 
connects the pit to Andasibe, the village of Falierana and its inhabitants as 
graphite labourers, or the now derelict mining plant. This landscape, in turn, 
as malleable and ‘perpetually under construction’ (Ingold 1993:162), attests 
to changing resource environments that ‘compete and overlap’ (Davidov 
2014:35). Thus, the same road that once made part of the graphite 
assemblage, is today vital for carbon, as it grants entrance to its tree parcels, 
some of which are at the same time located in past tavy fields. Similarly, 
some of the land that had hosted ANAE’s alternative agricultural techniques 
(as part of TAMS) had recently become gold digging sites, as amused 
villagers commented. People, of course, as graphite miners, TAMS workers, 
tavy farmers or gold diggers, are another vital element that allow certain 
substances to become resources.  
Richardson and Weszkalnys (2014) draw on a recent turn to questions 
of materiality in anthropology and geography which emphasise the 
‘liveliness’ (Barry 2013:152), ‘vibrancy’ (Bennett 2010) or ‘vitalism’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987:411 in Barry 2013:140) of matter. With special 
interest for the study of natural resources, matter, whether things or non-
human nature, has been shown to matter: water can be uncooperative to its 
commodification (Bakker 2003), while metal may not be as ‘docile’ as 
expected (Barry 2013:139). By emphasising the relational and ‘dispersed’ 
character of resources, as Richardson and Weszkalnys do (2014:18), 
however, we can see that ‘the competencies and capacities of things are not 
intrinsic but derive from association’ (Bakker and Bridge 2006:16). Thus, 
Joyce and Bennett argue, it is not a question of seeing matter as having 
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powers or agency per se, but rather of identifying the ‘effectivity’ that 
objects (in this case substances) can exert in their own right depending on 
the ‘position they occupy within networks of relations that always include 
human and non-human actors’ (2010:5)99. In a similar way, Richardson  and 
Weszkalnys propose the concept of ‘resource materialities’ (2014) to go 
beyond the qualities and agency of specific materials as resources, and 
rather situate them within ‘assemblages’ composed of humans, non humans, 
infrastructures, knowledges, technologies, practices, etc. Natural resources, 
from this perspective, appear as dispersed and relational.  The efficacy of a 
given resource is thus not just contained in the substance per se, but is 
rather the outcome of such assemblages, which in turn, can have political 
origins and effects (Barry 2013; Mitchell 2011).  
An interesting case in point is Hecht’s (2012) example of uranium 
mining and trade in Africa and the contentious and political character of 
‘places, objects or hazards’ being ‘designated as nuclear’ (2012:4). Rather 
than something intrinsic to nuclear objects, then, the ‘distributed property’ 
of what she terms ‘nuclearity’ (2012:14) is seen to emerge from socio-
political and technical arrangements. This should not be seen as a negation 
of specific physical properties however: radiation and its effects, Hecht 
argues, are indeed a physical phenomenon. But these ‘do not by themselves 
determine’ (2012:15) whether and how things and places get categorised as 
nuclear, for their ‘nuclearity’ is the outcome of a series of techno-political 
questions and relations. Thus, uranium miners in Madagascar during the 
colonial era were not considered to be digging in nuclear sites, as these 
mines appeared as ‘banal and peripheral, and more closely allied … to other 
forms of mining than to nuclear things’ (2012:42). The effect was both a lack 
of security and health regulations and consequent illness.  
                                                        
99 This approach is therefore different, Joyce and Bennett argue, from other 
anthropological takes on materiality, such as Miller’s (2005), where the material is 
considered effective ‘only through the mediating agency of human consciousness’ (Bennett 
and Joyce 2010:5). 
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Another important aspect of Richardson and Weszkalnys’ concept of 
‘resource materialities’ (2014) is that it directs attention away from 
resources as commodities and offers instead a fruitful way of exploring their 
‘becoming’ (2014:12) in the first place. This framework, for example, allows 
Weszkalnys (2013) to explore oil’s materiality through an appreciation of 
the extractive infrastructures that precede its commodification and 
conversion into monetary value. Thus, oil’s perceived ‘evil’ efficacy or 
‘magic’ (2013:270) contained in the notion of the ‘resource curse’ derives 
partly from centralized and capital-intensive forms of institutional 
management and extraction which allow oil and revenue to flow through 
illicit channels and to become socially and spatially detached.  
Carbon, in this case, offers an interesting perspective through which to 
analyse particular ‘resource materialities’ (Richardson and Weszkalnys 
2014) and their implications in social lives and labour in Mahatsara. Either 
stored in trees or in minerals underground, the materiality of carbon as 
relational resource in these two different forms will be shown to lead to 
strikingly different ways of organising and experiencing its extraction. My 
aim, in this sense, is thus to not take for granted or naturalise the 
(im)materiality of carbon as part of forest carbon projects, but rather to 
explore it through the different entanglements between people and things 
that were set up in Mahatsara in order to bring it into being. In the following 
sections I focus on regimes of labour, infrastructures and forms of exchange 
and value production that were established for that purpose.  
Carbon labour in the forest 
In this section I introduce the contemporary job situation in 
Mahatsara, which, as we will see, is characterised by a sense of 
temporariness. I then present a history of graphite mining and the ways this 
source of work is today conceptualised in the village. Interestingly, TAMS as 
a forest carbon project in Mahatsara did not just propose the return of the 
   202 
primary forest or the fallows, as we saw in chapter three, but was also—and 
fundamentally—posed as an initiative that would bring back the 
permanence of past work experiences. This as we will see, never happened.  
‘Asa Maharitra’ or Work that lasts 
The ‘terrain’ of Mahatsara is a dusty, open area at the bottom of the 
village, which, being surrounded by the hills in which houses are perched, 
acts as the main grounds or village square. It is usually taken over by 
children most of the day, who use it as playing area, and sometimes by 
young men in the early evening as they gather to play football. Located on 
the route between the main road and further trails to more inland villages, it 
acts as the central point of information for local events, as any relevant 
notices are put up on a wooden wall of one of the most centrally located 
houses. Meetings organised by outsiders, such as ANAE, also take place on 
this spot.  
In April 2013, an important meeting took place, judging by the 
exceptional number of men who attended. For about a week, a notice had 
advertised the gathering, in which, it was stated, nine men would be 
recruited as patrol guards for the new Corridor Forestier Analamay-
Mantadia, CFAM (Analamay-Mantadia Forest Corridor), developed by the 
nearby mine of Ambatovy in partnership with the Regional Forestry Service, 
CIREF, and Conservation International, (CI). Word had already spread 
around the village days before the meeting, and excited conversation 
abounded regarding this new work opportunity and the recruitment 
process, which would involve a test among selected candidates. On the day, 
about fifty or so men sat on the ground, intently listening to the event 
organisers—among whom was the Tangalamena—on how the project and 
recruitment process would work.  As usual, (the few) attending women 
(including myself) sat at the back, where the voice of presenters was often 
lost to crying babies and children’s racket.   
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The meeting was an informative event regarding the soon to become 
protected area zones, their corresponding access rules and infringement 
fines, and the job opportunities it was going to create: 9 males, from 18 to 45 
years, who could read and write in Malagasy and knew the area well would 
be selected to patrol the new ‘surveillance zones’. They had to be willing to 
learn new things, to work Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, to sleep inside 
the forest, and had to be healthy. In return, contracts of 3 to 5 months would 
be established, after which new recruits would be taken on, for a total period 
of one year. The wage, karama, would be 5000 Ariary (about £1) per day, 
plus 2000 Ariary (£0.40) for food per working day.  
As the meeting came to an end, the buzz of the previous days died out 
and was replaced by a bitter-sweet resignation: as it turned out, only four 
men from the area would actually be taken on, since the nine positions 
offered were to be shared between the municipalities of Andasibe and 
Morarano. The first comment made during question time was evocative of 
this general feeling, as an elderly man from a nearby village stood up and 
argued that as much as the environment needed protecting, so did people 
need to make a living. He then requested, in various rhetorical ways, what he 
qualified as asa maharitra, or long-term work (work that lasts).   
All the next questions revolved around the number of workers and the 
recruitment process. Someone claimed, for example, that although 
Mahatsara was the centre of the area, surrounding villages should not be 
ignored and suggested that men were chosen equally from Mahatsara, 
Ranobefoza, Andranomahintsy and Ambolomborona. Another man 
commented on the limited numbers of posts and how this was insufficient 
since he had ‘many young sons, and they all need to work’, while someone 
complained on the age restrictions, claiming that ‘those who are 50, for 
example, know the forest best’. To my surprise, it were not the new 
prohibitions on land access that people seemed to resent, but rather the low 
number of job positions and their temporariness: at best, one could hope to 
obtain a well-paid job for three to five months, and then what?  
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I here want to draw attention to the relevance of the first claim made 
emphasising not just the need for work, but for work that lasts. This 
comment can be clearly located within a more general discourse in the area 
which points to the significance of past long-term wage work, unequivocally 
identified with the now extinct industry of graphite, or manjarano100.  
Closed in the early 2000s, the local graphite industry has not just left 
resilient imprints on the landscape, but also on people’s memories and 
present lives. No man in Mahatsara over thirty years of age will fail to 
mention their engagement with one (sometimes both) of the two local 
graphite enterprises in the area. These past work experiences, in turn, 
extend to the present in the village as they are embodied in daily non-
agricultural practices, such as carpentry or ironmongery. As he cut and 
polished some boards to build a new granary, for example, the Tangalamena 
relished recalling the stories of how he was trained as a carpenter by 
Izouard when he was 15, for whom he worked for 43 years. These should 
not be seen, however, as idealised experiences of work: in the same story the 
Tangalamena would also recall how, in its beginnings, the industry was built 
through indentured work and how workers were often physically punished.  
Graphite mining began in the area shortly after colonisation, in the 
early 1900s, and went through a series of fluctuations where businesses 
would close down and reopen years later. These instabilities were generated 
by a global market in graphite that would expand or contract in particular 
historical periods: in 1916, for example, graphite production boomed as it 
was required by French and British ‘war factories’101. By 1917, no less than 
3000 tons were produced in the region of Moramanga alone, concentrating 
6000 labourers—two thirds of the working population—in various camps or 
                                                        
100 Although people in Mahatsara are usually identified as subsistence farmers, tavy 
is just one of the varied economic strategies that people engage with, others including wage 
work, petty trading (specifically among women) and, during my time in Mahatsara, small-
scale gold mining.  
101 Province de Moramanga, Rapport Economique, 1916, FR ANOM GGM 2D, c.168 
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‘toby’102. With the end of WWI in 1918, the industry suffered its first crisis, 
reaching the production low of 257 tons in 1919103. From all the existing 
enterprises in the area, only three continued production, to retain ‘the 
labour force in case of recovery’104. A recovery did take place around 
1924105, but ended prematurely with the Great Depression in 1929106. After 
the 1930s the industry continued at a steady pace over the years. From the 
early colonial enterprises operating in the area of Andasibe, only 
‘Compagnie Arsène Louys’ made it through, by alternating graphite 
production with logging. It is locally claimed that one of his own foreign 
workers saw the opportunities that graphite mining afforded, and some 
years later decided to set up his own graphite business—‘Etablissement 
Izouard’—in the nearby village of Falierana, with its main mines located in 
what is today part of the national Park. These two enterprises lasted until 
the early 2000s, when national production began to decline due to 
competition from Chinese producers and the increasing costs. A recent 
assessment of the graphite industry in Madagascar notes an important 
resurgence of production in other areas of the country (Yager 2014).  
The significance of this source of work—variously referred to as 
‘Izouard’, ‘Louys’, ‘etablissement’ or ‘orinasa’ (factory)—seems to draw a 
large part of its meaning from its contrast with contemporary job 
opportunities, considered temporary, or on and off, tapa-tapaka foana, and 
unreliable. During one of my walks between villages I came across Da, a 
middle-aged local man with whom I shared part of the route on our way to 
Andasibe. He was excited to hear that I was interested in TAMS, and told me 
he had been one of the team supervisors during the planting work. After 
asking whether I knew when the carbon credits were coming (they had had 
been waiting for years, he said, and it was rumoured that it was the 
                                                        
102 Province de Moramanga, Rapport Economique, 1917, p. 7-8, FR ANOM GGM 2D, 
c.168 
103 Province de Moramanga, Rapport Economique, 1919, FR ANOM GGM 2D, c.168 
104 Province de Moramanga, Rapport Economique, 1918, FR ANOM GGM 2D, c.168 
105 Province de Moramanga, Rapport Economique, 1924, FR ANOM GGM 2D, c.168 
106 Province de Moramanga, Rapport Economique, 1930, FR ANOM GGM 2D, c.168 
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government who had messed up), he explained that the problem in the area 
was that work was temporary, that it did not last: as the mines had closed 
down and TAMS had stopped, everyone had gone back to tavy.  
The conceptualisation of past work for Izouard or Louys in temporal 
terms among men in Mahatsara is particularly revealing of its significance as 
long-lasting and permanent. While it most likely offered a continuous yet 
intermittent source of work opportunities, it is most often articulated as an 
uninterrupted period of time significant for its duration. Like the 
Tangalamena above, who claimed to have worked for Izouard for 43 years, 
Germain, a local of Mahatsara in his late thirties who complements a small 
parcel of tavy with local alcohol brewing and gold digging (and who also 
worked for and gave land to TAMS), explained his work for the mines in the 
following terms:   
‘I worked for Izouard for 22 years, but then 
unemployment came so it [the job] stopped. I didn’t want 
to stop working but the graphite business didn’t work 
well anymore and that’s why it stopped, up till now both 
Izouard and Louys are still closed’.  
The importance of wage work in the graphite industry must be 
understood as a semi-regular source of income which would have secured 
livelihoods at times, ‘luxury’ items at others, and the possibility to re-invest 
in agriculture at times in which relaxed enforcement allowed it, as it offered 
the possibility to hire workers in order to expand the area under tavy 
cultivation. Interestingly, it does not seem to have attracted an 
unsustainable number of labour migrants—at least not for workers 
themselves—as it is claimed that during this time everyone (every able 
male, that is) was employed by either Izouard or Louys.   
This idea of long-term work finds a clear contrast with the current 
labour markets available to those young males who are just coming off age 
and beginning to search for work in Mahatsara. Here, most of the available 
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positions in hotels, the nearby mine of Ambatovy or the National park (with 
tasks such as road repairs before the tourist season begins) are temporary 
and seasonal. Consider the case of Joe, for example.  
Joe is in his late teens/early twenties and has lived in Mahatsara with 
his mother and siblings since the early 2000s. His father worked for Izouard 
in the mines of Tsaravonoina, but died some years ago. Joe is a resourceful 
person who has worked in every possible job that Andasibe would offer to a 
local, non-formally educated person.  
I met Joe during my first weekend in Mahatsara. He was kind and 
attentive, and having heard that I was interested in local stories, tantara, he 
quickly made himself noticed saying there were many stories around. For 
the next few days he shadowed us, and took us to various village spots of 
interest, such as an artisanal alcohol brewery or the local smiths. At our 
request, he became our local assistant on occasions, such as travelling to 
distant villages or helping us carry food supplies from Andasibe to 
Mahatsara. A few weeks after our arrival to Mahatsara, Joe got a job as 
builder/general handyman at the Andasibe Hotel. His manager at the hotel 
was a well-known man of Merina origin who had previously worked at the 
Vakona Forest Lodge (Izouard’s eco-hotel). During his years in Vakona he 
employed many men from Mahatsara and surroundings in manual work, and 
continued to do so in Andasibe Hotel, often also buying produce from 
women in the village, such as beans. The type of wage work he offered was 
temporary, as in the case of Joe, whose main task was building a few 
structures in the first months of the hotel’s opening. Joe had also worked 
previously, both for TAMS and the mine of Ambatovy, for short periods of 
time. Being too young, he did not own land (at that stage anyway) to give to 
TAMS. By the time of our second return to Mahatsara, he had relocated to a 
nearby village with his new girlfriend’s family. There was no more work in 
Andasibe Hotel, he said, so he had now turned to tavy, both in his mother’s 
and his own land and, importantly, to the new local livelihood strategy: gold 
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digging. Although he had entered the CFAM selection process, he had not 
been successful.  
We can thus begin to see that the situation and experience of men’s 
wage work in Mahatsara has radically changed over the last decades. Where 
the previous generations enjoyed a large and steady source of job 
opportunities, today’s generation is characterised by precarious work: 
temporary and insufficient107. In general, it means that families in Mahatsara 
can only rely on the small tavy parcels they hold and the various other 
economic strategies that have been mentioned above, such as gold digging, 
for as long as they last (usually a few months). Wage work, on the other 
hand, has become a complementary yet unpredictable activity108. At the 
intersection of these two forms of work experience we find TAMS. As we will 
see, the project was presented to people in Mahatsara as an opportunity for 
well-paid, long-term work, and thus as a remedy to the precarious 
contemporary situation.  
Working for TAMS in Mahatsara 
In its initial stage (2006-7), TAMS employed 60 men through the 
organisation SAF-FJKM109 (in charge of this specific area) to reforest 140 
hectares of land inside the Park. Workers were arranged into groups of ten 
and were each supervised by an appointed local team manager or ‘chef 
d’équipe’ and a ‘technicien’ from SAF. As a CI operative liked to boast, TAMS 
offered some of the highest wages in the area and was thus highly regarded 
by workers, who indeed often acknowledged how well work for TAMS was 
paid. At a later stage, around 2009, when more land was needed, 23 men 
gave part of their land to the project to reforest 40 hectares. They gave 
                                                        
107 This is, of course, not just a local situation but a widespread effect of 
contemporary precariousness in labour markets globally (Beck 2000). 
108 In general, young men do not migrate to other areas in search of work, nor do 
gender dynamics change significantly with this type of precarious work.  
109 SAF-FJKM is the Protestant Church’s branch for development in Madagascar. It 
operates nationally and has regional presence through its office in Moramanga.   
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between 1/2 and 3 hectares each, depending on how much they had or were 
willing to give, on the promise that they would receive carbon money within 
the following five years and, most of them claim, work.  
The promise of work is a disputed element in TAMS. Most farmers, for 
example, claim that the only way of accessing this second stage of work was 
by giving land, although this is contradicted by official TAMS sources. Others 
claim that they were told work would last for the whole thirty years of the 
project’s lifespan, and that its wealth—as a source of money and work—
would be passed on to their children. In turn, a report on TAMS by Holloway 
dated June 2007 hinges on this aspect, as it is claimed that ‘Conditions upon 
which people are prepared to negotiate transfer of carbon rights almost 
unanimously include: ... secure employment to restore and protect the 
natural forest for the 30 year duration of the project’. On the contrary, the 
document ‘REDD, A casebook of on-the-ground experiences’ produced by 
TNC, WCS and CI in 2010 and which features TAMS as case study for 
‘Involving and Benefitting Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples’ 
states that 
‘the majority of jobs created are expected to be 
temporary, occurring in the first 9 to 12 years of the 
project, though some employment related to ongoing 
maintenance and monitoring will be supported 
throughout the life of the project, along with employment 
related to sustainable livelihoods’ (2010:45).  
Although the Director of SAF-FJKM in Moramanga claimed that work 
had lasted for a total of three years—21 months of reforestation and 12 
months of maintenance—this did certainly not translate into a permanent 
source of work for men in Mahatsara, who generally claim to have worked 
for TAMS for intermittent short periods over the course of those three years, 
sometimes totalling only five months of work on the whole. 
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During the second stage of reforestation, and in the absence of an 
official agreement with the Government of Madagascar on the exact terms of 
land and benefit provision, a ‘temporary contract’ was signed in 2009 
between farmers, ANAE as project manager and the Regional Forestry 
Service, CIREF, at the request of the BioCarbon Fund. This document stated 
that land was being ‘offered’ to the project for a 30-year period during which 
farmers committed to leaving the reforested area intact. In return, it was 
claimed, a final contract would be signed stating the actual benefits that they 
would receive. This, however, never happened, nor was there any clear 
understanding within TAMS organisational structure on how the 
hereditability of jobs or land would work out during this long period of time. 
As this second stage of reforestation came to an end, promises of permanent 
work evaporated as TAMS began to break down and funding was 
intermittently cut110.  
The importance of promises of long-term work in TAMS, at least in 
Mahatsara, cannot be overstated. In an area where the only stable source of 
wealth in the present—the expansion of arable land for tavy—risked 
unaffordable fines or prison, and where no realisable alternatives, such as 
wage work, had been available since the mines closed, for men to have given 
half their land for a conservation/development project must have taken 
some very convincing arguments. We can thus being to see the significance 
of the call for asa maharitra, or ‘work that lasts’, in the CFAM meeting: it 
responds to past experiences of permanent, productive work and 
contemporary feelings of precariousness (both temporal and limited in 
numbers) in the area.  
TAMS began as a project that explicitly appealed to a future of 
permanence, somehow a return to past working lives. During its short life, 
                                                        
110 The intermittence of TAMS and its employment structure was something also 
recognised at higher organisational levels. Mino, the director of ANAE, recalled how 
bureaucratic and organizational ‘blocks’ in TAMS’ higher levels translated into ‘grave’ social 
problems in Andasibe as a whole, as credit given out by local businesses to TAMS workers 
on the expectations of wage payments could not be repaid due to severe delays, and ended 
up disrupting the local social context.   
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however, it transformed into its very opposite, as the unfulfilled promise of 
work coupled with that of undelivered carbon money. Cogently contained in 
the following comment made by one of those men who worked and gave 
land to the project, the hope of permanence mutated into feelings of having 
been cheated, as neither work, income nor even carbon itself materialised: 
‘they told us to give land and they said: this land you will 
plant with tree seedlings and you will work for 30 years 
so that you don’t have to come and go around looking for 
work, (tsy mampivezivezy anareo hitady asa), although 
after planting them we haven’t been employed even once 
during this year, and we are baffled … have they deceived 
the population (mamita-bahoaka) or is there really that 
carbon?; that carbon we still haven’t seen up to now 
though’.  
In this section we have seen how men’s experiences of labour in 
Mahatsara are today characterised by feelings of temporariness in contrast 
to the more permanent and stable work that the graphite industry offered in 
the past. Although TAMS promised long-term work and carbon money (in 
exchange for land) it soon transpired that these promises would not be 
honoured, sparking feelings of deceit. This last quote, however, also points 
to something more fundamental about carbon labour in TAMS: the doubt 
over the existence of carbon itself. In the following section I explore feelings 
of deceit and their relation to carbon’s (im)materiality as natural resource, 
as I compare it to three other cases of failed exchange transactions relating 
to natural resources (graphite, gold and mercury). We will see how the 
notion of deceit does not just relate to the failed promises and 
temporariness of TAMS, but can also be located in issues of intangibility, 
social dislocation and obscure forms of exchange and value production of 
carbon as natural resource.  
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Seeing a scam instead of carbon 
During my first stay in Mahatsara in 2011, people awaited the carbon 
credits/money in the hope that they would eventually arrive. Word was that 
there had been problems with either the government, or, most generally, the 
funders, mpamatsy vola (explored below), but when I asked whether the 
project had ended or was at a halt, I usually got the same hopeful answer 
that it had been stopped temporarily but the money for the carbon would 
eventually arrive: mbola ho avy ny crédit carbone, ‘nijanona fa mbola 
hitohy’111—‘the carbon credits will come’, ‘it has stopped but it will 
continue’.  
At the beginning of 2012, however, some people were already 
beginning to question whether everything had actually been a scam. Faly, a 
local smith who had worked in the initial planting stages but had not given 
any land away (maybe that is why he need not hold on to hope) and his wife 
Hanta put it this way:  
‘What they were giving us in exchange was this: if you 
give land, you will work with us, we will get you work so 
you won’t have to struggle (Hanta: scam), that’s what 
they said … That’s how they tricked us, but all that stuff, 
all that money, is missing’. 
In 2013, however, this feeling had become the general rule in the 
village, and the most common word associated with TAMS when I enquired 
was consistently that of scam or deceit, ‘fitaka’ ‘mamitaka nataon-jareo’112. 
After years of patiently waiting, and with no signs of TAMS coming from 
anywhere, people felt that the whole project had been a scam and they had 
been cheated into giving their land. The problem, of course, was that while 
                                                        
111 This contrasted sharply with those organisations in Andasibe—the FA’s—who 
insisted TAMS was over.  
112 It is important to point out that although the scam commentary was generalized, 
I never heard the Tangalamena qualify it as such.   
   213 
knowing that TAMS had ended and would not provide any benefits, people 
were scared, matahotra, to clear the land, because of the contracts they had 
signed when the project began113. When asked what they would do, no one 
had a consistent answer, and at best they acknowledged in laughter that 
they would eventually have to clear the land, and, shaking their heads, 
would call out the word scam, fitaka.   
It could be argued that feelings of having been cheated resulted from a 
failed exchange transaction due to one side’s default. Although the wording 
of the contract signed with ANAE and CIREF stated that the land subject to 
TAMS was being offered, manolotra, farmers’ own narratives constantly 
highlighted a notion of exchange. Indeed, although the most common word 
employed by farmers when referring to this transaction was that of giving, 
manome, land it unequivocally involved an element in return, whether work 
or carbon credits/money, or both. As we saw above, carbon was most often 
articulated either as the ‘price of carbon’ or as the ‘carbon credits’ that 
farmers were owed by the project. The notion of ‘scam’ or deceit does not 
simply emerge from an economic rationality, however, but points to a 
particular ‘morality of exchange’ (Parry and Bloch 1989), where it is 
perceived that the failure to fulfil one’s obligations was intentional and done 
in bad faith—that is, that one of the parties never intended to settle the debt 
(Graeber 2011). I suggest, however, that the idea of fitaka, or deceit/scam, in 
this case does not derive its meaning solely from a notion of intended (and 
thus illicit) default, but also, and importantly, attends to carbon’s particular 
(im)materiality, both through its social detachment and its 
intangibility/invisibility. Three other failed or illicit exchange examples that 
in turn relate to particular substances or resources—money/graphite, gold 
and mercury—will help me elaborate on this.  
                                                        
113 The validity of these contracts was also a disputed element within TAMS’ 
different organisations. When interviewed on this matter at this stage of the project, CI, for 
example, claimed that these contracts were still in place, whereas ANAE acknowledged that 
without the delivery of TAMS’ promises and with the apparent liquidation of the project, it 
did not make sense to ask farmers to stick to them.  
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In 2011 money that Izouard owed people disappeared. As it turned 
out, men—or their families if already deceased—in Mahatsara were to 
receive their pension money from a lifetime of social security payments they 
had made to the national scheme, CNAPS, through their work for the mines. 
The Tangalamena, for example, had contributed for 43 years, until 2009, and 
Rakoto, who owns one of the two shops in Mahatsara, for 20. The money—
around 18 million ariary (circa £5000)—however, had not arrived and there 
was general speculation that it had disappeared into the pockets of a locally 
based middleman. Being the leader not just for ancestral matters, but also 
for administrative ones, the Tangalamena travelled to the provincial capital 
of Toamasina in various occasions as village representative during the 
following months, as he took the case to court. Every time he came back 
from a trip to Toamasina and narrated the (slow) development of the case to 
everyone else he would appeal to their legal ‘right’ to the money, or zo—a 
concept that also denotes honour and dignity (Althabe 1969:304), and 
which I explore below. Soon before I left the field, it seemed that the case 
had finally been settled, as news arrived that the money had finally been 
released and could be collected in Antananarivo. What is particular about 
this case is that it was never conceptualised as a scam. Although I only heard 
the Tangalamena appeal to this notion of zo, the approach generally taken—
that of delegating the Tangalamena to solve it through legal means—already 
points to an important difference with the case of TAMS. I will come back to 
this below.  
Another case characterised by trickery but not conceptualised as a 
scam was one related to the surge of gold digging in 2012-13. Although 
small co-operatives of villagers tended to be formed for extraction, the tiny 
gold grains obtained were sold individually to particular ‘buyers’, mpividy, 
who came to digging sites or were based in Andasibe. The problem, 
however, was that these men ‘stole’, nangalatra, from villagers because the 
scales buyers used to weigh the gold were tampered.  Again, an incident that 
a priori could have been understood as a form of ‘deceit’ was seen 
   215 
otherwise, this time as outright theft. Before elaborating on this, I present a 
final example, one that was indeed conceptualised as a scam or fitaka.  
It is a story I was repeatedly told in Mahatsara, and it concerns a 
mysterious character, the ‘Rasta’. This man had apparently appeared in the 
village claiming that there was mercury in the rivers and land, which could 
become a great source of wealth for those who were willing to invest. He had 
tricked people into giving him money, promising to double it, and had then 
disappeared, leaving no trace. Part of the ‘Rasta’s’ trickery, it is claimed, 
involved a pair of ‘x-ray glasses’ and other mysterious devices through 
which he claimed could locate the mercury.  
The similarities between this final example and TAMS are particularly 
revealing of the kind of aspects that make certain incidents be seen as scams, 
and not others. I suggest that, at least in this case, deceit points to notions of 
invisibility/intangibility, social distance and obscure forms of exchange and 
value production, and, therefore, to the particular ‘elusiveness’ (see also 
Onneweer 2014) of both carbon and mercury. These two resources in fact 
share some important elements in the way they were understood in 
Mahatsara.  
Just like the various organisations, big and small, which had arrived in 
Mahatsara claiming to see such great potential on the land through a 
resource that was both hitherto unknown and unlocatable, so had the ‘Rasta’ 
appealed to an invisible source of wealth that he alone could detect. It could 
be argued, in fact, that carbon and mercury, as invisible and intangible 
substances of great potential, shared some important elements with 
Malagasy understandings of potency/generativity encompassed in the 
notion of hasina (Graeber 2007; Feeley-Harnik 1991) and its embodiment in 
spirits and charms. As Graeber argues, hasina, or the (invisible) ‘possibility 
for creativity, action, or growth’ is embodied in spirits that are, in turn, 
‘invisible, formless, nameless, incorporeal’ (2007:36). This invisibility seems 
to be, in fact, a key feature of hasina when contained in the specific objects 
or ingredients of charms, because, in Graeber’s view of this ritual logic, ‘it 
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was the fact that the ingredients of charms were hidden from sight that gave 
them their capacity for action’ (Graeber 2007:37). Invisibility and 
intangibility, then, might have played an important role in generating these 
substances’ potential in local imaginaries—a potential that, unlike hasina, 
however, had to be channelled through extra-local actors and one that, 
ultimately, was never realised.   
In turn, just like the Rasta, who had come and gone out of nowhere and 
was impossible to track down, so did TAMS lack a cohesive presence in 
Mahatsara, attending more to rumour and the capricious agency of its 
distant actors. There is, in fact, an interesting parallel between the social 
distance of the Rasta and that of TAMS and its structural organisation as 
understood in Mahatsara. It is surprising, for example, that the ethnicity of 
the Rasta was never mentioned—one of the most straightforward ways that 
Malagasy people use to categorise each other. Instead, he remained a 
(nameless) ‘Rasta’, a somewhat peculiar and rare type of person114. In a 
similar way, agency in TAMS among farmers’ narratives always seemed to 
be located at a distance: the arrival of work or carbon credits, or the very 
continuation of TAMS itself, always depended on either the government, (in 
a moment of transition and high volatility), or most notably, on the elusive 
concept of the foreign funder, or mpamatsy vola. This concept was widely 
employed by people in Mahatsara when commenting on the interruptions 
and rumours regarding the arrival of carbon money. Like the ‘Rasta’, it 
lacked a specific social location, and was removed from the immediate, even 
national, landscape.  
Taken together, I suggest that these examples—all of them relating to 
illicit or failed forms of transactions of particular substances or resources—
                                                        
114 This is a marker I often heard in Madagascar being applied to young men of 
Malagasy origin who do not necessarily have dreadlocks, but depart from the traditional 
look by having, for example, longer hair. I heard it in the specific context of young (elite) 
males with close ties to European females, something highly uncommon. Rasta, from this 
perspective, appears as a marker of distance from  Malagasy sociality/normality. It was not, 
however, a negative marker, but just one of elusiveness/rarity: of men hard to pin down or 
locate as exclusively Malagasy. 
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provide important clues as to why only some came to be identified as scams, 
and the reasons this relates to carbon’s materiality as natural resource, as I 
detail below.  
Questions of social distance and detachment, for example, were not 
present in the case of Izouard and the missing pension money. As will be 
explored below, the ‘resource materiality’ (Richardson and Weszkalnys 
2014) of graphite meant that it remained significantly entangled with the 
local context, and it was thus that the Tangalamena could recourse to legal 
means—through action in Andasibe, Antananarivo and Toamasina—to 
recover the money that was rightfully theirs, their zo. In his discussion on 
credit and debt, Graeber (2011:337) points out that, historically, while 
credit among communities was largely based on trust, as it spread to 
strangers it often led to scams, a fact that highlights the connections 
between scams and distance: surely, the impossibility to track down an 
outside debtor must have played in favour of this type of intended deceit115. 
But the notion of zo employed by the Tangalamena also offers an interesting 
insight into the social relations of exchange through which this particular 
situation was framed. Althabe (1969) has argued that zo for east-coast 
Betsimisaraka refers to a person’s honour or dignity, and is an inalienable 
element attached to the human condition. While inalienable, zo can 
nonetheless fluctuate in a quantitative manner, and is especially employed 
in situations of wage work or servitude, where ‘every subordination, 
everything that marks a condition of servitude, entails a deterioration of zo’ 
(1969:303). Zo is in fact a ‘permanent reminder’ of a community that has 
been born out of its equal distribution, and every act that puts into question 
another person’s zo, Althabe argues, means to forget such community, and 
destabilise equality. Part of its meaning thus derives from questions of 
reciprocity (1969:302), as when an appeal to one’s own zo is employed to 
                                                        
115 I am in no way claiming that TAMS intentionally aimed to deceive people, 
although another social researcher with previous experience in TAMS did suggest that 
deliberate deceitful practices had taken place elsewhere (through one of the local 
organisations) in order to secure project land.  
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establish some form of ‘dialogue’ or social relation where reciprocity is seen 
to have been disrupted (as in the case of coloniser-colonised). We can see 
how this notion of zo would fit in with the case of the missing pension 
money, as the reciprocity of employer-employee as a form of exchange had 
been fractured. An appeal to the money as zo may therefore be seen as an 
attempt to restore this imbalance, and at the same time, as a call for, and 
reminder of, a common or shared form of sociality between workers and 
Izouard.   
The case of the tampered scales in gold sales, on the other hand, may 
or may not have been socially detached (it seems that the buyers were from 
Andasibe) but there might have been other buyers from the regional or 
national capital. In this case, I suggest, it was the tangibility and visibility of 
gold, extracted and manipulated by villagers themselves, and the immediacy 
of the transaction, that favoured an understanding of theft over that of scam.  
By contrast, both carbon and mercury only existed as potential, yet 
elusive and invisible, resources that never materialised and which could 
only be accessed through dubious actors and hitherto unknown processes of 
exchange. It is in fact not difficult to see how, in the context of TAMS, the 
notion of mpamatsy vola—literally money provider—might have appealed 
to a sort of invisible capacity to create value out of nowhere (or at least from 
an unknowable source), a feature that can be evocative of trickery in 
Madagascar and elsewhere (Bloch 1971:31; Alexander 2004). We can 
therefore see how the notion of scam was thus not just related to a failed 
exchange transaction, but also attended to questions of invisibility, 
intangibility, a dislocation from the local context and obscure forms of value 
production and exchange.  
Experiences of labour in TAMS thus seem to point to an idea of 
volatility in its widest sense. This, in turn, contrasts with the much more 
tangible experiences of work for Izouard, as both permanent and socially 
accessible. In the next section I return to the parallel between graphite and 
carbon to suggest that these two different experiences of ‘carbon labour’ 
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relate to the materialities of each resource, that is, to the different 
entanglements between people and things that the extraction of carbon 
generated in each case. I finish by exploring the connections between 
resources, their materiality, and the political possibilities they entail.  
Carbon matters 
I argued above, following Richardson and Weszkalnys (2014), that a 
productive way of understanding resources is as the outcome of relations 
and practices that bring people and things together and not as just bounded 
substances (Richardson 2014:4). From this perspective, resources’ ‘specific 
chemical and physical properties’ (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014:16) 
appear as just one element in the assemblages that bring them into being. 
This element, however, has the capacity to affect both the form such 
assemblages take and the way they are experienced by those involved in 
them. The specific material properties of substances are thus both effective 
and affective, but cannot be considered in isolation from the rest of the 
relations that make up resources as ‘distributed things’ (Richardson and 
Weszkalnys 2014:8). Following this approach, we can therefore begin to 
tease out the differences between carbon as part of the graphite industry 
and as part of TAMS in the landscape of Mahatsara, as well as its effects in 
local labour and lives.  
The idea of permanence associated with Izouard (or Louys) is not only 
relevant in terms of long-term work, but also in the ways that the industry, 
its infrastructure and labour regimes, were entangled with local lives. The 
extraction and transformation of this carbon allotrope involved the opening 
of mine-pits in the forest; the establishment of ‘toby’ or camps in those 
locales where whole villages were set up116; the opening or ‘breaking’ of a 
                                                        
116  This is similar to Walsh’s (2012) analysis of sapphire extraction and 
conservation work in the Ankarana region in Madagascar, as he points out that one of 
sapphire mining’s key characteristics is that it can support a much larger number of 
workers than conservation work. We can thus see how, generally speaking, carbon sinks as 
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road which did not only facilitate the transportation of the allotrope but 
which also became a central element in social lives as it connected people to 
each other and to Andasibe; it involved the establishment of a mining plant 
in Falierana which required a constant workforce that settled in its vicinity 
and the construction of his own home by the plant, presumably to supervise 
operations. All of Izouard’s activities, in turn, did not just settle on a vacuum, 
but rather on a landscape that had already been dwelt in (Ingold 2000)—
lived, worked and died in. Many tombs today are still located on Izouard’s 
land, the main difference with those inside the national park being that the 
former do not seem to need any type of authorisation to be visited in 
funerary rites. Maybe unknowingly, his presence extended to ancestral 
matters, as when he took charge of the fines that people were subject to if 
caught doing tavy illegally (this, of course, need not be seen as an altruistic 
act, but as one geared towards sustaining a much needed workforce). His 
comings and goings along the road that connected the mining plant to the 
forest camps, and his involvement in extraction operations, led to his 
involvement in social relations with his workers, such as lunch or dinner, as 
the Tangalamena recounted, changing from the appellation ‘Izouard’ to that 
of ‘Jean Claude’. In sum, then, graphite mining did not just extract carbon 
allotropes from underground, but forged a series of socialities in those 
landscapes that brought graphite into being. Also, by locally forging a life 
and a line of descent, and thus setting roots in the landscape, Izouard came 
to be seen as sharing particular attributes with local populations—this being 
one of the key ways of understanding attachment to land and origins among 
people in Madagascar (Bloch 1971; Feeley-Harnik 1991). 
The story with TAMS is very different. What is left of it in the landscape 
is a few rusty signs and some indistinguishable trees. This, of course, does 
not mean that they are insignificant: they are the unwelcome remnants of 
                                                                                                                                                      
conservation projects do not require an extensive labour force, whereas mineral extraction 
does. This already points to an important difference of these resource materialities.   
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something that is seen as unproductive—or a scam as we have seen—and 
yet remain in place because of people’s fear of clearing the land. But it does 
attest to the lack of local attachment that the production of carbon entailed 
in this case. As I have explained above people were employed by SAF-FJKM, 
an organisation that has an office about 15 kilometres from Mahatsara, 
which is, however, rarely used, its closest headquarters being in the regional 
capital of Moramanga. I never experienced SAF-FJKM’s presence in 
Mahatsara and only ANAE, with a small local office in Andasibe and its 
general headquarters in Antananarivo, visited the village, twice during my 
stay. CI and the rest of the national actors are located in Antananarivo. The 
mpamatsy vola, in turn, as TAMS’ key actor, remains hugely diffuse and 
invisible. I sometimes heard rumours of ‘them’ coming to Mahatsara but 
they never appeared. In fact, in the absence of a solid organisational 
structure with local presence, rumour was often the sole channel through 
which knowledge about TAMS travelled, knowledge that in most cases was 
proved wrong. Most importantly, of course, carbon remains unseen—no one 
can really say whether any carbon has been produced, nor, for that matter, 
what form it might take or what it might look like.   
We have therefore seen how the extraction of carbon in these two 
forms was based on very different types of entanglements between people 
and things in Mahatsara, translating into highly diverse labour experiences. 
If the carbon-as-graphite entailed a stable and permanent workforce and a 
solid attachment to local landscapes and lives through extractive practices 
and infrastructures, carbon in TAMS remained socially detached through 
erratic work patterns and a mercurial range of actors. Carbon’s very own 
intangibility and its inscription into new and obscure forms of exchange 
(like the vague ‘temporary contract’, for example), in turn, translated into 
feelings of deceit.  
Interestingly, graphite is said to be the most stable form of carbon 
under standard conditions. The analogy between stable and unstable forms 
of carbon labour seems to fit well in this case. Through the concept of 
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volatility in its widest sense, then, I have tried to characterise feelings of 
temporariness, dislocation and intangibility in ‘carbon labour’ for TAMS, 
compared to those of permanence and groundedness in Izouard’s mines.  
Social dislocation and temporariness are, of course, not just present in 
carbon production in TAMS, but can also be observed in contemporary 
forms of resource extraction and global labour regimes in general.  
In his analysis of past copper extraction in Zambia and current oil 
production in Angola, for example, Ferguson (2006) distinguishes between 
socially ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ projects. He argues that copper mining in Zambia 
during the 80s was based on the ‘national development state model’, and 
entailed the construction of vast ‘company towns’ for some 100,000 workers 
that incorporated social development projects like schooling, hospitals and 
even ‘recreational amenities’ like movie theatres (2006:197). By contrast, 
contemporary ‘offshore’ oil production in Angola, Ferguson claims, is much 
more ‘clean’ in the sense that neither production nor oil wealth partakes in 
the wider social context, making it ‘socially thin’ (2006:198). Similarly, 
Appel (2012) details the various ways in which detachment from the local 
place in oil extraction—what she terms ‘modularity’—is brought into being 
through a series of ‘socio-material practices’ that make up the ‘offshore’ oil 
rig as a sort of placeless production process. 
Although one could argue that issues of volatility in TAMS are just a 
reflection of contemporary forms of resource production and labour 
regimes—being equally present in conservation’s industry in Andasibe, in 
the nearby mine of Ambatovy or in oil production in Angola—I think these 
examples show the importance of matter’s ‘affordances’ or ‘efficacies’ and 
their role in specific assemblages. It is interesting to note, for example, 
Ferguson’s claim that current non-petroleum forms of mineral extraction in 
Africa seek to attain ‘oil-like features’ of social disentanglement, largely 
facilitated ‘by new sorts of spatial flexibility made possible by developments 
in communications, air transport, and so on’ (Ferguson 2006:205). Similarly, 
where oil off-shore production is not geologically feasible, ‘the strategic goal 
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seems to be to endeavor to make on-shore production as “off-shore-like” as 
possible’ (2006:203), through, for example, the use of pipelines or ‘gated’ 
extraction sites. We can therefore here see how certain features of matter—
oil’s fluidity, for example—contribute to particular forms of extraction, at 
the same time as matter’s entanglement with different socio-technical 
arrangements—like technological options in mineral extraction—bring 
resources into being in distinctly different forms. Thus, we can see that 
although the production of social distance and temporariness do follow a 
contemporary (neoliberal) trend, these are also partly afforded and 
conditioned by matter’s specificities and its arrangement into particular 
assemblages: if this is achieved through the offshore rig in oil extraction, 
carbon contains the possibility of disentanglement in its own elusive 
(im)materiality.  
I want to finish here by exploring the political implications of the 
different materialities of carbon in TAMS and in the graphite industry in 
Mahatsara. I do this by looking at a similar exercise carried out by Mitchell 
(2011), as he contrasts the different political possibilities afforded by carbon 
as part of the coal and oil industry over the last century.   
Mitchell approaches the differences between oil and coal through a 
focus on the diverse ways of organising the ‘flow and concentration of 
energy’ and the ‘connections and alliances’ established for that aim (2011:8). 
Not far from Richardson and Weszkalnys’ conceptualisation of resources as 
relational phenomena (2014:16), then, he examines the different political 
possibilities that carbon afforded in these two forms as it entered particular 
arrangements of ‘people, finance, expertise and violence’ (Mitchell 2011:8). 
Therefore, the rise of coal in the 19th century transformed into a political 
machine as its specific forms of extraction and production—where vast 
amounts of energy flowed through narrow channels—gave workers the 
‘ability to slow, disrupt or cut off its supply’ (2011:19). Strikes, Mitchell 
argues, became effective ‘because of the flows of carbon that connected 
chambers beneath the ground to every factory, office, home or means of 
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transportation that depended on steam or electric power’ (2011:21), and 
provided a ‘socio-technical agency’ (2011:27) that fuelled the development 
of political claims to worker’s rights and welfare. By contrast, this political 
force weakened with the conversion to an oil-based economy, partly 
because its extraction and transformation did not allow for the kind of 
energy concentration in strategic points that coal had previously enabled 
(except in Russia). Oil’s material properties played an important role in this 
situation, requiring a smaller workforce for both extraction and 
transportation, since its liquid form allowed it to be channelled through 
underground pipelines that could escape sabotage. Indeed, Mitchel claims, 
‘oil pipelines were invented as a means of reducing the ability of humans to 
interrupt the flow of energy’ (2011:38). Shipping, made possible by oil’s 
‘fluidity and relative lightness’ (2011:37), further eliminated the need for 
forms of labour that had previously been critical, as well as allowing the 
bypassing of labour and tax regulations. We can thus see how the materiality 
of carbon in these two different resources played a vital role in allowing or 
limiting the articulation of political claims.  
In the same way, carbon, either as part of the graphite industry or as 
part of TAMS in Mahatsara, also led to different political possibilities. The 
examples of the incident with the missing pension money and with TAMS 
provoking feelings of ‘deceit’ are exemplary of such political implications: 
where the former was open to recourse by legal means, the other was 
elusive and unlocatable, and its unwelcome remnants and perceived 
injustice remain grounded in the local landscape. This, of course, does not 
mean that TAMS was impervious to local political claims. I was told by 
ANAE’s Director Mino that during reforestation work, for example, as 
people’s grudges increased due to a delay in payments, the work rhythms 
began to slow down and planting was done incorrectly in ‘bad faith’, in order 
to damage tree seedlings. Similarly, the one time a World Bank 
representative—or mpamatsy vola—made it to Andasibe, he encountered a 
threatening crowd, in Mino’s words, of ‘angry peasants carrying knifes’ 
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(every male peasant carries a knife constantly, in any case) demanding their 
money.  Either through ‘silent resistance’ (Scott 1985) or in very rare 
occasions, TAMS workers were able to assert a certain political agency. 
Compared to that afforded by the graphite industry, however, this agency 
was—like carbon itself—quite diffuse. The mpamatsy vola never returned to 
Andasibe; trees were kept rooted in the fields; and the contract, in a 
Kafkaesque way, remained in place, effecting its legal force from the distance 
even after the end of TAMS.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored experiences of carbon labour through 
two specific resources—graphite and forest carbon—that have been 
extracted in the same landscapes and by the same people. By exploring the 
labour regimes, infrastructures and forms of exchange and value production 
that each form of carbon entailed, we have seen how carbon in TAMS was 
marked by experiences of volatility in its widest sense through notions of 
temporariness, social distance and intangibility/invisibility. A focus on 
resources as relational and dispersed phenomena has also revealed the 
ways in which the peculiar (im)materiality of carbon came to matter as part 
of the specific entanglements between people and things that were set up in 
Mahatsara in order to bring carbon into being.  
We have therefore seen not just the difference that contemporary 
forms of carbon ‘make’ (Leach and Scoones 2015:2) to those involved in its 
production, but also the way carbon is differently made or ‘done’ (Mol 
2002a), along with its political implications.  
In this and the previous chapter I have focused on the concrete and 
socially entangled lives of carbon in the landscapes of Andasibe and 
Mahatsara, both as an implicit element in spatial and temporal oppression 
through the curtailment of movement by the ‘environmental state’, and as an 
explicit—yet elusive—natural resource as I explored experiences of carbon 
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labour. From this perspective we have seen that offsets, while based on 
carbon ‘absences’ (Bansal and Knox-Hayes 2013) or ‘counterfactual material 
natures’ (Bumpus 2011) have nonetheless very real and grounded effects in 
local labour and lives.  
In the next chapter I move on to another social life of carbon, as I focus 
on efforts to attain its disentangled, commodity form, and on the 
experiences of complexity that result from these processes for TAMS’ main 
actors.  
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Part III: Introduction to Chapter Seven 
 On 18 January 2011, 475,000 EU carbon Emission Allowances (EUAs) 
were stolen from the Czech Republic’s carbon registry. The theft was fast: 
around 11.00 am the registry building was evacuated after a bomb scare 
phone call, and, an hour later, ‘the carbon credits had been sold to an 
account in the Estonian registry’ (Lang n.d.). Although the theft was 
probably carried out within five minutes, no one noticed the missing credits 
until the following day. As a consequence, trading at the European Trading 
System was suspended and on 20 January the European Commission 
announced that in fact ‘more than two million carbon credits’ had been 
stolen in total ‘from Austria, Greece, the Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia, 
worth a total of US$37.7 million’ (Lang n.d.).  
This incident, Lang argues, which was neither the first nor last in 
carbon credit fraud, ‘provides a glimpse into the mess that is carbon trading 
in Europe’, which features 27 different national registries. It also shows, I 
would argue, the idealised form that carbon credits (and other forms of 
commodified natures) are expected to take: a highly mobile, abstract and 
fungible object, that —in the space of five minutes—can be disconnected 
from its entanglements at a specific point in time and space, and re-
entangled elsewhere with very little effort.  Whereas this led to an unwanted 
outcome in the case of the stolen credits, it is this kind of spatial and 
temporal mobility that carbon needs to attain in order to be traded as a 
commodity in international markets. This malleability, in turn, which may 
evoke an appeal to simplicity or frictionless movement, can be, in fact, quite 
messy.  
In the next chapter I follow carbon's complicated journey from tree to 
carbon credit, and the institutional experiences this process led to. As we 
will see, turning carbon into an economic object that could be owned and 
exchanged—that is, commodified—was not an easy task. In its effort to 
produce an object with clearly defined owners and to separate it from the 
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socio-material landscapes in which it was caught, we will see that TAMS 
runs into a series of very complex situations that were never resolved. 'The 
complicated project of Andasibe', as TAMS became known institutionally, 
thus offers a glimpse into the social life of carbon as (unfinished) 
commodity. Although the case of the Estonian stolen credits presented 
above posits these commodities as highly mobile objects, we will see that 
forest carbon projects pose specific challenges when it comes to turning 
carbon into commodity. Far from a one-way process, in fact, we will see 
there is a constant oscillation between the need to keep carbon grounded in 
specific contexts, and the need to disentangle it from those very same 
relationships, producing, at the same time, a lot of complexity.  
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Chapter Seven: Dis/Entangling Molecules in the 
Complicated Project of Andasibe 
 
entangle transitive verb  \in-ˈtaŋ-gəl, en-\  
 
: to cause (something) to get caught in or twisted with 
something else 
: to get (someone) involved in a confusing or difficult 
situation 
 
disentangle  verb  \ˌdis-in-ˈtaŋ-gəl\ 
 
: to separate (things that are twisted together or caught on 
one another) 
: to remove the twists or knots in (something) 
 
Introduction 
It has already been stated that TAMS’ name shifted depending on the 
institutional context in which it was invoked. One of the various names it 
acquired was ‘the complicated project of Andasibe’. The name apparently 
originated at the offices of CI Madagascar, but the first time I heard it was 
from ANAE117’s general director Minombolanoro Razakafoniaina, or Mino 
for short, during our first meeting in 2011, as she illustrated the many 
‘complexities’ that TAMS presented as a project. Commenting on TAMS’ 
many names, Rainer Dolch from Mitsinjo (one of the local organisations in 
Andasibe in charge of implementing the project on the ground), claimed that 
                                                        
117 ANAE, was TAMS project manager since 2008.  
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‘the extent of the name definitely reflects the degree of difficulty to 
implement the project, which is mainly due to its complexity and number of 
stakeholders involved’ (Dolch et al. 2009:142–143). This idea of complexity, 
encompassing notions of confusion and complication, was in fact an ever-
present feature in my conversations with TAMS’ institutional actors, as well 
as in my own ethnographic experience with the project.  But, what was so 
complex about TAMS? In this final chapter I aim to provide some answers to 
this question, as I focus on one last social life of carbon in TAMS: its 
(unfinished) commodity form.  
Over the last four chapters I have presented the various ways in which 
multiple forms, or social lives, of carbon became entangled with the socio-
material landscapes of Andasibe and Mahatsara. As a project ultimately 
concerned with the production of carbon credits, however, TAMS was 
essentially aimed at disentangling such processes and relationships, in its 
effort to produce a bounded, universal and timeless object—the Certified 
Emission Reduction (CER) or carbon credit—that could be clearly identified, 
managed and exchanged. In parallel to rooting trees to particular social and 
material contexts through reforestation, then, TAMS had to carry out a series 
of technical and legal practices to separate carbon from these same contexts, 
in order to convert it into credits and set them in circulation in the carbon 
market.  A first and fundamental step in this process of turning grounded, 
material trees into mobile and abstract commodities (see chapter one) was 
establishing what carbon was and whom it belonged to. This, as we will see, 
was no easy task.  
In the following sections I will follow the institutional experiences of 
TAMS as narrated by some of its key actors as they try to make sense of the 
project’s complexity. By exploring one particular element that was central 
both to TAMS and to accounts of its many complications—carbon 
ownership—I will argue that a big part of TAMS’ complexity derived from 
the type of commodities that carbon credits are and the way they are 
produced.  
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As Lohmann argues, all ‘commodities-in-the-making are different’ 
(2014:158), and respond to multiple and varied processes that aim to bring 
them about. Therefore, referring to a single theory of commodification, or an 
established set of elements in processes of nature commodification, may be 
more confusing than revealing. The commodification of trees as carbon sinks 
in TAMS, for example, did not exactly involve processes of appropriation or 
alienation (one of commodification’s normative features as described by 
Bakker (2005), according to Lohmann [2014]) as we will see below.  In 
order to explore the ways in which carbon credits came into being in the 
forest of Andasibe, I will focus on ‘processes of economization’ as described 
by Çaliskan and Callon (2009; 2010), rather than on commodification per 
se118. 
Economization in this sense refers to  
‘the processes that constitute the behaviours, 
organizations, institutions and, more generally, the 
objects in a particular society which are tentatively and 
often controversially qualified, by scholars and/or lay 
people, as ‘economic’ (Çaliskan and Callon 2009:370; 
emphasis added). 
Callon’s view is particularly set in the discipline of economics and its 
active role in processes of economization, what he terms ‘performativity’ 
(2007). From this perspective, economic models do not simply reflect an 
(economic) reality, but rather contribute to its making. This idea is elegantly 
captured in MacKenzie’s (2006) characterisation of economic models as an 
‘engine’, and ‘not a camera’ (for explorations of the performative role of 
economics as discipline see MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007; Mitchell 
2008).  
                                                        
118 An important element that I do not engage with is the methodology devised and 
used to measure and calculate carbon reductions—one of the most essential ways of 
bringing carbon into being. This is beyond the scope of my ethnography, and I direct the 
reader to Cecile Bidaud’s (2012) fascinating work on this issue in Madagascar. 
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A broader understanding of ‘economics at large’—similar to Foucault’s 
notion of governmentality (Slater 2002:245)—as involving not only 
academia but also government, institutions and any other actors engaged in 
economic discourse and practice, provides a useful referent to assess the 
various processes that were set in motion in TAMS to turn land and trees in 
Andasibe into economic entities. This approach, therefore, focuses on 
processes of ‘rendering economic’ (Callon, Millo, and Muniesa 2007:3), or 
bringing into the market what was previously outside of it. The 
‘performance’ of the economic object is not solely carried out by the 
discipline of economics, in this case, but also by all those actors involved in 
its becoming. Unlike theories of commodification, then, economization in 
this context directs us to the particular socio-technical practices that allow 
for objects to become commodifiable in the first place.   
I will focus, specifically on Callon’s notion of ‘framing’ (Callon 
1998b)—a double movement of entanglement and disentanglement—
through which objects and their  owners can be defined, identified and 
separated from each other in order for trading to take place. 
Disentanglement may thus be seen as partly a process of ‘objectification’, as 
Çaliskan and Callon claim, in its most literal sense (2010:5): that of creating 
or producing the exchangeable object or commodity. 
It is some of these processes that I bring into view in the next sections 
as I follow the complications that arose out of defining carbon and its 
property status, the problems associated with the clarification of land tenure 
in Andasibe and the government’s entangling involvement with TAMS. 
Finally, I will argue that the socio-technical practices that were employed to 
bring about this abstract, mobile and exchangeable object—the carbon 
credit—resulted in a complicated tension between the need to entangle 
trees in particular contexts in order to disentangle carbon. The oscillation or 
wavering between entangled and disentangled carbon, we will see, 
embodies the ‘signature tension’ (Robertson 2000) of processes of 
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commodification in forest carbon projects, and makes them particularly 
complex.  
In this final chapter, then, carbon appears as a complex and unfinished 
commodity, continuously—and necessarily—wavering between a grounded 
materiality and its abstraction into a bounded and mobile form. At the end of 
the chapter I briefly bring together the multiple social lives of carbon I have 
so far explored before moving to the conclusion in chapter eight.   
I begin with a clarification on what I mean by, and how I deal with, 
complexity.  
A note on complexity 
During our first meeting in 2011 at ANAE’s headquarters in the 
peaceful neighbourhood of Mausolée in Antananarivo, Mino shared her 
worries in relation to TAMS. Being the key mediator between the 
government and local communities, she was concerned about the long wait 
that farmers were experiencing due to the delay in government action, and 
the fact that although the ERPA (Emissions Reductions Purchasing 
Agreement119) had been signed in 2008, parts of the reforested areas had 
already been burnt, with unknown consequences for the validation process 
which had still not taken place. She was explicitly worried about the 
‘logistics’ of the project, as she put it, in particular the 30-year period 
established in the contract with farmers which she considered one of the 
most challenging points, because how could farmers, she wondered, look 
after the forests for 30 years? What would happen if the money ran out, or if 
the person died? Who would get the payment then? The other ‘big problem’, 
she said, concerned land tenure clarification in Andasibe, a complicated 
situation due to various conflicting land statuses being in place. Carbon 
ownership, too, posed certain challenges in her view, since there was no 
                                                        
119 Further explored below, the ERPA is the carbon sale contract between the World 
Bank’s BioCF and the Malagasy government.  
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international law to guide the issue of property in terms of carbon—yet 
trade was already taking place. The risks associated with these types of 
projects and their complexity, which translated into long bureaucratic 
processes, she argued, were the reasons why forestry carbon prices were so 
low in comparison to other types of projects.  
This notion of complexity in carbon projects was, however, not only 
shared by middle-level actors such as ANAE or CI Madagascar. The 
BioCarbon Fund’s executive summary in the booklet ‘BioCarbon Fund 
Experience: Insights from Afforestation and Reforestation Clean 
Development Mechanism Projects’ (2012), which includes TAMS as a case 
study120, concludes with a series of recommendations drawn from lessons 
learned. These are:  
 Ensure simple and clear procedures and 
predictable timelines to achieve credit 
certification. 
 Define a simple approach to non-permanence that 
ensures the fungibility of LULUCF credits with 
other credits in the market. 
 Simplify additionality demonstration and baseline 
determination as much as possible. 
 Develop easy-to-follow rules for ex-ante estimation 
of GHG accounting and allow for progressive 
adoption of detailed methodologies. 
 Develop easy to follow monitoring methodologies. 
 Avoid restricting the type of people that must be 
involved in small-scale projects and carefully 
decide the cap in emission reductions imposed on 
this type of project.  
                                                        
120 TAMS appears here as the Vohidrazana-Mantadia Corridor Restoration and 
Conservation Carbon project. 
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(BioCarbon Fund 2012:14; emphasis added) 
From the recommendations, and all throughout the document, we find 
a strong recurring issue: that of complexity that needs to be simplified. 
Indeed, as explained to me by André Aquino, from the BioCarbon Fund and 
responsible for the operation of TAMS in Madagascar, forest or land carbon 
projects are particularly ‘complex’, especially those that hope to achieve 
CDM validation.  
‘The CDM process and land is much more complex. You 
do a windfarm, it’s complex from the point of view of 
financial arrangements but, technologically, it’s very 
simple, we know how to do a wind turbine. Land we don’t 
know … we don’t know how to plant palissandre 
[rosewood] and a hundred other species, we know more 
or less … ownership of land is complex, land is an 
emotional thing, people depend on land for many other 
different things, so I think the complexity of land-based 
emissions is more manifold than any other technology’. 
Methodological issues, strict CDM regulations and validation 
processes, ownership, land tenure, lack of legal frameworks or challenging 
temporalities: we have here particular examples of the issues that were seen 
to complicate TAMS and forest carbon projects in general. Although 
complexity appears unanimously, the forms it takes, however, vary greatly, 
depending on each actor and the scale at which they operate. This, of course, 
could not be otherwise. This makes the writing of the chapter difficult 
because although I cannot assume that complexity meant the same for ANAE 
as it did for the BioCF, neither can I approach each actors’ own feeling of 
complexity, because it would be lengthy, unpractical and, well, too complex. 
In this sense, I follow the common practice in anthropology of trying to 
make complexity visible while simplifying it enough so as to make it 
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comprehensible (Strathern 1991). Rather than trying to summarise the 
multiple and diverse experiences of complexity in TAMS in a unified account 
(Mol 2002a:2), I have chosen to concentrate on one instance of it: carbon 
ownership. This is interesting, I think, because on the one hand it is one of 
the most fundamental elements in the production of carbon credits (as we 
will see below), and, at the same time, it was one of the most recurrent 
themes in accounts of the project’s complexity by most institutional actors.  
It is important to point out, as well, that complexity in this chapter 
does not appear in the sense in which it does in most of the anthropological 
literature: instead of an analytical category that helps me explain 
ethnographic phenomena (i.e. Law and Mol 2002a), I approach it as the 
subject of analysis—as a matter of concern for informants (Riles 2000:xiv). 
This is not, therefore, a case in which I ‘denounce’ (Law and Mol 2002b:4) 
the many simplifications that TAMS enacted as it tried to deal with a 
complex world121, (I could not do justice to Lohmann’s work on this subject, 
for example 2006; 2009; 2014). I rather seek to understand what 
complexity—as an experience of TAMS as forest carbon project—was all 
about. Instead of using complexity to understand carbon trading (as Powells 
2009 does, for example), I explore the processes set in motion to produce 
carbon credits in order to explain complexity in TAMS.  
Also, multiple meanings of entanglement and disentanglement will be 
seen to crosscut and overlap along the chapter. Sometimes I employ the 
terms as analytical categories in Callon’s sense (Callon 1998c), which, as we 
will see below, aim to explain the processes of turning certain things into 
economic objects. At other times, they appear as complications and 
simplifications found in TAMS. Also, although complexity, complication and 
confusion are not necessarily the same thing122, I treat them as variants of 
the same element here when I refer to experiences and explanations of 
                                                        
121 Mol (2002b) has brought attention to the anthropological tendency to valorise 
complexity and negate attention to simplification as a positive virtue.  
122 Latour, for example, has stated that complication and complexity are, in fact, 
opposites (1996:219).  
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TAMS because it is thus, interchangeably, that informants used them. 
Finally, this chapter is in turn one more instance of the tension between 
entanglement and disentanglement, as in my aim to ‘work out or unravel’ 
(one more meaning of disentangle) complexity in TAMS, I have to perform 
one more ‘twist’ between its elements.  
From here, a further problem arises. How does one represent 
complexity and confusion but through another version of disentanglement? 
In this chapter I ‘lay out’ complexity through ‘a series of linear stories’ (Mol 
2002b:249) where these must be seen as, unavoidably, inaccurate and 
incomplete. Although I engage with people’s narrations of the difficulties 
and problems that TAMS ran into, I cannot claim in any sense that these are 
either accurate or true. Often, depictions of TAMS contradicted each other, 
which was of course part of all the confusion that surrounded the project. 
This also makes the structure of the chapter messy, complicated and partial. 
In my own search for simplicity—the linear and coherent chapter—I cannot 
but perform one more instance of TAMS’ complexity.  
Interestingly, what all of the accounts by TAMS actors presented above 
have in common is not just the recurrent issue of complexity, but also that 
which they leave out: the carbon credit itself. Complexities appear as 
obstacles to the achievement/becoming of the carbon credit, an element 
that is however presupposed and left unquestioned. The idea that credits 
could and might be generated, in fact, was always expressed as a future 
‘taming’ of these complexities, that is, when complexities as obstacles were 
overcome: ‘when we clarify land tenure’, ‘when we establish the 
Implementation Agreement’, ‘when the current context [transitional regime] 
is resolved’, ‘when the project goes through the voluntary market, with 
simpler standards and regulations’. Below, however, we will see how 
complexities in TAMS were not mere obstacles to the achievement of the 
‘carbon credit’, but messy complications that emanated from it. I begin in the 
next section by exploring the definition of carbon and its property status in 
TAMS as a necessary first step in its disentanglement.   
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Defining Carbon, Establishing Ownership 
‘The issue of ownership is also part of the essential 
safeguards required by investors or buyers of carbon 
credits. Indeed, which bank, investment fund, or offsetter 
would take the risk of funding a structure that may not be 
able to guarantee the return of the loan, the payment of 
dividends, the delivery of carbon credits in a timely manner 
due to a dispute over property? This is why, before any 
contract negotiation involving carbon credits is undertaken, 
the project developers must clarify the question of carbon 
credit ownership’. 
(Chenost et al. 2010:123; personal translation) 
 
As Slater has stated, and as the quote above from the booklet Les 
marchés de carbone forestier/Bringing forest carbon projects to the market 
makes explicit, property and ownership are one of the ‘most fundamental’ 
forms of framing or disentanglement (Slater 2002:241). Evidence of 
ownership achieved through legal instruments is in fact a ‘universal 
requirement of all tradable permit systems’ (Lohmann 2006:73), because 
without a clear notion of what is to be traded and who the buyer and sellers 
are, economic transactions cannot take place. This operation therefore 
involves ‘the establishment of specific technical, material, textual and legal 
devices which allow an owner(s) to be identified, which define the nature of 
the rights attached, and which dictate the terms of their enforcement’ 
(Çaliskan and Callon 2010:12).  
Carbon credits are an ambiguous commodity, and no binding 
agreement exists as to what sort of products they are. While the literature 
has often characterised them as commodities (for example, Bumpus and 
Liverman 2008:128), they have also been explored as currency (Button 
2008) or as a form of rent (Felli 2014). While Lohmann states that they 
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constitute property rights to the atmosphere because they set exclusive 
rights to a global carbon ‘dump’ (2005; 2006), the term ‘property rights’ has 
been deliberately avoided by the Kyoto Protocol in the claim that they are 
temporal (credits should, in theory, be reduced over time), in favour of 
‘allowances’ or ‘permits’. Credits produced in the CDM, it has to be 
remembered, are in turn of a particular type, being offsets or Certified 
Emissions Reductions (CERs). The BioCarbon Fund terms emissions 
reductions as ‘assets’, arising out of:  
 Having the project registered by the CDM 
Executive Board. 
 Having the emissions reductions verified and 
certified by a third party. 
 Having the Emissions Reductions issued by the 
CDM Executive Board.  
(BioCarbon Fund 2005:2) 
We can begin to see how the production of CERs does not just arise 
from activities carried out on the ground, or the actual carbon stored in 
trees, but also necessitates key accounting, certification and verification 
practices in order to come into being. These practices, in turn, cannot take 
place without clear property rights to the ‘asset’ in question, but the 
ambiguous character of the asset already opens up a space where definitions 
and categorisations become a key site for particular ‘performances’ of the 
carbon credit.  
In an illuminating way, a brochure commissioned by Conservation 
International to a legal expert, David Takacs, entitled Forest carbon: Law and 
Property Rights states that ‘as a new form of property, forest carbon 
presents legal complications that no jurisdiction has completely untangled’ 
(2009:5). We have here our first case of ‘complexity’.   
Although carbon transactions in CDM projects are established through 
the Emissions Reductions Purchasing Agreement, ERPA, where seller and 
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buyer specify the terms of the carbon sale, the juridical nature of carbon 
credits is not contained within international law, and the Kyoto Protocol 
does not provide any indications as to how these should be treated. Carbon 
credits are therefore ‘sui generis instruments’ (Chenost et al. 2010:124), 
created either by instruments of international law or by private voluntary 
initiatives (in the case of the Voluntary Market). Thus, each case is referred 
to national law, where it has to be determined, usually through legal experts, 
the type of assets that carbon credits constitute and their ownership status. 
If no national framework exists regulating carbon credits—and this is the 
case in most countries—then their definition is usually established by 
‘reasoning by analogy’ (Chenost et al. 2010:125). This can lead to different 
situations, depending on each country’s legal system: carbon storage can be 
seen as a natural, biological process and thus deemed a natural resource 
subject to public or state appropriation, or, as in Madagascar, it may be 
equated with a ‘fruit’ from a tree (which, in turn, can be the result of a 
natural process or an ‘industrial’ one, as I explain below), and thus become 
subject to private property. But this process is far from straightforward 
because carbon as property or thing owned can take various forms, ‘adding 
another level of complexity’ (Takacs 2009:13). Thus, Takacs (2009) argues, 
carbon can transform into five different types of property objects—where 
some of them can be broken down into smaller parts with potentially 
different ownership status. For the sake of clarity, and without going into 
too much detail, I present these as a list, with some of the ‘complexities’ 
Takacs identifies (2009:13–16) in brackets. Carbon, thus, can be owned as: 
 Sequestered carbon as ‘the stored commodity’ (is 
carbon separable from the tree and can it have a 
different owner?). 
 Carbon sinks as ‘the natural entities that retain 
carbon’ (is carbon stored in trees, above land, 
below land, roots or branches?). 
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 Carbon sequestration potential (who has the rights 
to manage and control the land that has carbon 
potential?). 
 Carbon credits, or the actual ‘asset’ that can be sold 
in the market, allowing ‘its bearer to pollute an 
amount equivalent to the carbon sequestered’ (are 
they separable from sequestered carbon, carbon 
sinks or sequestration potential?). 
 Usufruct rights, which ‘comprise the range of legal 
rights and agreements whereby an entity may use 
and derive benefit from property that belongs to 
another entity, provided the property is not 
impaired’ (can previous usufruct rights holders 
impede the granting of new usufruct rights to 
carbon actors?). 
Here we already see that one of the first steps in carbon 
disentanglement involves establishing the definition of what is to be traded 
in order to set ‘clear’ property rights, but this move is fraught with 
complications, because of carbon’s multiple entanglements with trees, land 
and people. Carbon ownership in this sense appears as a bundle of rights 
(Hann 1998:1; Maine 1905), but these rights can be ascribed to different 
aspects of the ‘object’ which do not necessarily add up, since they operate at 
different scales. The ‘performative’ character of definitions is clearly 
evidenced here: it is the definition of the ‘thing’ and its classification in legal 
terms that brings it into being, and, depending on which definition is 
adopted, diverse objects and owners emerge. 
The key device employed to define carbon and establish its ownership 
status in TAMS was a study commissioned by the Ministry of Environment, 
Water and Forests in 2006 to a Belgian and a Malagasy lawyer, Matthieu 
Wemaëre and Guy Rajaonson, entitled ‘Note sur la nature juridique du 
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carbone et les droits de propriété sur les crédits carbone. Proposition pour la 
rédaction d'un Protocole d'Accord’ (Note on the legal nature of carbon and 
property rights of carbon credits. Proposal to draft an Implementation 
Agreement). The report, a document that has not been widely circulated and 
that also went by the informal name of ‘the carbon property report’, looks 
like an attempt by the Government of Madagascar (GoM) to establish their 
rights to carbon ownership as sole carbon ‘seller’ in the transaction with the 
BioCF. As André Aquino from the BioCF in Madagascar explained, the 
government’s involvement in TAMS as carbon owner was not a pre-given 
thing, but rather something that emerged out of their involvement with the 
project. This was institutionally accepted on the condition that an 
‘Implementation Agreement’ or Protocole d’Accord was established between 
the Ministry and participating communities where the terms of benefit 
sharing were specified (something that, in any case, never happened).  
Interestingly, the idea of ‘separation’ is recurrent in the Wemaëre and 
Rajaonson report, as the legal definition of carbon becomes problematic due 
to its ambiguous materiality. Carbon, the document argues, is not defined by 
Malagasy law, and the state holds no exclusive rights over it. It must 
therefore be brought into an existing legal status by comparison, and the 
authors deem it most appropriate to establish sequestered carbon as an 
incorporeal ‘industrial fruit 123 ’: an object that results from human 
intervention or activity but where no alteration of substance takes place 
(similar to a harvest) and which, in this case, has no ‘perceivable or material 
reality’. This materiality complicates things for carbon’s categorisation as 
either movable or immovable property: on the one hand, carbon cannot be 
transported from one place to another, but it can be released to the 
atmosphere if the tree that contains it is cut. On the other, it may be argued 
that carbon is ‘inseparable’, indissociable, from the tree, a movable object 
that nonetheless becomes immovable by virtue of belonging to a CDM 
                                                        
123 The notion of industrial fruit comes from the Malagasy civil code. 
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project, since trees are to remain intact for as long as the project lasts 
(usually 30 years). Carbon’s treatment as both immovable and intangible 
runs into a juridical contradiction, however, because an incorporeal object is 
‘necessarily detachable from any material support’, whereas an immovable 
one is not. From what the report terms a ‘pragmatic’ perspective, classifying 
it as immovable would also ‘favour landowners’ in terms of property rights. 
The report, therefore, resolves to treat sequestered carbon as a ‘movable 
incorporeal good’, or bien meuble incorporel (as a specific category of the 
more general ‘industrial fruit’).  
Who do sequestered carbon and carbon credits belong to then? 
Another tension arises here between credits as part of the CDM process, and 
carbon as part of trees within the Malagasy legal system. On the one hand, as 
part of a CDM project, carbon credits are registered and issued to the 
‘project participant’ established in the Project Design Document, or PDD, 
which in TAMS’ case was the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MEF). 
But on the other, the Ministry cannot claim ownership over the fruits of 
private plantations, or over those where people enjoy ‘real rights’. In fact, 
according to the Malagasy civil code, and as stated in the Wemaëre and 
Rajaonson report (2006), ‘ownership of a thing, whether movable or 
immovable, gives rights to everything it produces and that is attached to it, 
whether naturally or artificially’. This would make carbon an ‘artificial 
accessory’ of the tree plantation (because its attachment results from human 
intervention through reforestation) and thus the property of landowners.  
We can begin to see here some of the tensions that arose out of efforts 
to define carbon and establish its property status in TAMS, as a first step in 
bringing credits into being. In the next section I explore these processes 
through the lens of entanglement and disentanglement as defined by Callon 
(1998c; 1998b).  
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Dis/Entangling carbon 
In Entangled Objects Nicholas Thomas offers a view of the 
gift/commodity binary as malleable and contextually changing, highlighting 
the ‘mutability of material objects’ (1991:88). Objects, he claims, can shift 
back and forth from gift to commodity status through context and narrative. 
In Thomas’ view, the gift is characterised by being entangled with its history 
and that of its producer as it is put into circulation, whereas for a 
commodity, those relations are erased—or ‘uninteresting’ or 
‘inconsequential’ (Thomas 1991:103)—so that it can be alienated and 
‘newly appropriated’ (Çaliskan and Callon 2009:387). His argument on 
entanglement is also scaled up to account for the mutual, historical 
entanglements of colonial encounters.  
This notion of entanglement and disentanglement has been taken up 
by Callon to explain, in the field of economic sociology, what he terms 
‘processes of framing’ (1998c). Understanding markets as ‘organized 
collective devices’ engaged in practices of calculation (Callon and Muniesa 
2003), ‘framing’, he argues, serves to demarcate, in any given economic 
transaction, those relations that will be taken into account and those which 
will be left out by the ‘agents’ involved. Without a ‘clear and precise 
boundary’ (1998c:16) which determines the agents and objects that form 
part of a given market transaction, calculation—as the key constitutive 
practice of a market—cannot take place.  
This is where Thomas’ notion of entanglement and disentanglement 
comes in particularly usefully for Callon. As he claims, 
entanglement/disentanglement is a double movement whereby 
(temporary) relationships are established between market actors that allow 
for economic exchange. At the end of this entanglement (always unstable 
and ever-changing) agents are ‘quits’ and can be disentangled once again. On 
the other hand, this exchange can only take place through a clear 
demarcation of those who are carrying out the transaction and of the things 
being transacted:  
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‘To construct a market transaction, that is to say, to 
transform something into a commodity, and two agents into a 
seller and a consumer, it is necessary to cut the ties between the 
thing and the other objects or human beings one by one. It must 
be decontextualized, dissociated and detached … If the thing 
remains entangled, the one who receives it is never quit and 
cannot escape from the web of relations. The framing is never 
over. The debt cannot be settled’ (Callon 1998c:19). 
 
The double movement is of particular importance here as it refers, on 
the one hand, to the proliferation of relations that are brought together as a 
result of market transactions, and, on the other, to all the processes that a 
‘thing’ must undergo in order to become transactable as it is disconnected 
from one context and moves to another124.  
The transformation of an entangled object into one devoid of such 
attachments and thus amenable to circulation can be observed, for example, 
in the case presented by Waldby and Mitchell (2006) in relation to the 
production of embryonic stem cell lines for biomedical purposes. In this 
case, embryos donated by couples who have undergone fertility treatments 
can be donated and disaggregated into stem cell lines for therapeutic 
research. This stem cell line can then be ‘banked, copied and circulated, and 
constituted as the intellectual property of the researcher’ (2006:69). 
Embryos are, however, deeply entangled in webs of kinship and affect, as 
they are the result of a long process involving tensions between loss and 
hope, as couples move from situations of infertility to IVF treatment. For the 
embryo to become a stem cell line, however, it has to be disentangled from 
this network of social relations if it is to enter those of the laboratory. 
                                                        
124 As Appadurai (1986) has argued, on the other hand, certain objects need to 
remain attached to past histories in order to acquire value as exchangeable objects, such as 
heirlooms or antiques. As we will see below, in fact, this is also a necessary and fundamental 
condition of carbon credits.  
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Waldby and Mitchell identify two key mechanisms that bring about 
disentanglement: informed consent and intellectual property rights.  These 
elements work to dissociate the embryo from ‘the network of family 
relations that produced it’ (2006:73) as they establish legal claims to the 
tissues in question. If informed consent transforms a gift into a commodity 
by making the donor forfeit any legal claim to the tissue in the future, the 
patenting of the stem cell line establishes intellectual property rights 
deriving from the ‘inventive step’ (2006:73) undertaken in the laboratory, 
which primes this form of labour and disconnects it from previous ones, 
such as the production of the embryo by the donor in the first place.  
In this case, informed consent and intellectual property rights may be 
seen as what Slater (2002) terms a ‘separative technology’ in processes of 
framing, which works to achieve ‘individual objects that can be materially 
and conceptually disentangled from their context as discrete and 
transactable things’ (2002:238), and circulated as property. Separative 
technologies in this sense also work to disentangle and specify the ‘socio-
legal’ entities taking part in the transaction, and the scope of the transaction 
itself.  
We have already seen part of this process of ‘framing’ above where the 
Wemaëre and Rajaonson report (2006) emerged as a way of identifying and 
disentangling an element of Andasibe’s landscape—carbon credits/CERs 
(certified emissions reductions)—from the trees and land to which they 
were originally attached. In the absence of a legal framework, carbon had to 
be brought into—or entangled with—the existing Malagasy legal system as a 
‘movable, incorporeal good’ in order to become an object of property, a 
move that was in itself complicated due to the ambiguous materiality of 
carbon. As a device that aimed to define carbon credits within Malagasy law 
and specify the various entities that could claim rights to them, the Wemaëre 
and Rajaonson report (2006) can be seen as a key ‘separative technology’ 
(Slater 2002) in TAMS. 
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But through the report an important problem emerged (at least for the 
GoM), in that carbon could not be considered an object owned by the 
government a priori (as the ERPA or the CDM process for registering credits 
presupposed) because carbon was now an ‘accessory’ of the tree plantation, 
and therefore subject to land ownership.  The solution adopted by TAMS 
(and suggested by the report) in order to turn the GoM into the sole carbon 
owner was to establish the Implementation Agreement with landowners in 
order for the latter to relinquish their carbon property rights in exchange for 
‘benefits’125. This, of course, meant identifying who the landowners were.  
Paradoxically, as a ‘disentangling’ device that established carbon as a 
‘movable, incorporeal good’ so that it could be owned, the Wemaëre and 
Rajaonson (2006) report drove TAMS into one of the most ‘complex’ areas 
the project had to deal with: land tenure. As the vice-Mayor of Andasibe 
confided in one of our meetings regarding TAMS, ‘as soon as one began 
looking into land property, all the problems came out’. The initial efforts to 
disentangle carbon led the project to a sticky entanglement with the socio-
material landscapes of Andasibe, where the ‘web of relations’ (Callon 
1998c:8) in which carbon was caught through trees became a major obstacle 
for TAMS, as I detail in the next section.  
Disentangling land ownership in Andasibe 
From its early conception, land tenure securitisation was a key priority 
for TAMS. This came partly as a result of very early project consultations 
with local communities—initiated by Holloway as she designed the 
                                                        
125 We saw in chapter six how, in the absence of the Implementation Agreement, 
temporary contracts were signed between farmers, ANAE, the Regional forestry Service and 
CIREF under BioCF directives, where farmers committed to leaving the land intact for 30 
years in exchange for some future and undefined benefits. The temporary contracts 
established in anticipation of the Implementation Agreement, and the Agreement itself, can 
be seen as further and essential ‘separative technologies’ in that they effectively constituted 
a transfer of property from landowners to the GoM, turning the former into ‘beneficiaries’ 
instead of carbon owners. 
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project—who claimed that one of their requirements was secure land 
tenure. On the other hand, clear land tenure was, as it has been explained 
above, pivotal in establishing carbon property rights and thus in the 
disentanglement of carbon from its local context.  
Clarification of land tenure in Andasibe was consistently seen as one of 
the most ‘complex’ issues by most actors in TAMS. Indeed, land tenure in 
Madagascar, and more generally in Africa, is usually characterised by the 
complexity deriving from ‘pluralistic systems’ (Evers, Spierenburg, and Wels 
2005:3), where state, private and customary systems compete and overlap. 
Broadly conceived, this plurality refers to two main forms of social 
organisation and the normative orders that accompany them and grant 
them legitimacy. We therefore find, on the one hand, ‘direct users’ or local 
communities who attend to land through customary forms of organisation 
and understandings, and, on the other, the varied ‘formal economic agents’ 
(Muttenzer 2006:269) such as territorial administrations, aid donors, 
conservation organisation and international banks, who act within the 
framework of state sanctioned environmental law. Formal law reproduces 
the French ‘système domanial’, or land legislation, and only recognises state 
and private forms of ownership, implemented through a system of land 
titling that was established in the colonial era. Obtaining titles has always 
been a slow and costly process and is rarely employed by rural people, with 
only 10% of agricultural land being titled (Muttenzer 2010). Customary land 
tenure, on the other hand, is characterised by the ‘fuzziness’ (Verdery 1999) 
of local, contextual rules of access and use (see, for example, McConnell 
2002).  
Historically, there have been various attempts in Madagascar to bring 
in customary forms of tenure into the formal system in order to grant state 
‘legibility’ (Scott 1998) to an area always considered inefficient. After 
independence, various ‘cadastral operations’ or collective registrations took 
place whereby communities obtained collective titles to the areas they 
worked and occupied. Towards the end of the 1980s, with the beginning of 
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international environmental action in the country, and in response to 
dictates from the IMF and the WB, the National Environmental Action Plan 
(NEAP) was drafted and included the replacement ‘of the community-based 
tenure system with a formal land tenure system under which all land would 
be titled in the name of individuals’ (USAID 2010:3). The program was not 
fruitful and was ‘suspended due to costs and the difficulty of reconciling 
incompatible formal and customary tenure systems’ (USAID 2010:3). Being 
therefore essentially incommensurate, attempts have been made in the last 
decade to implement a third type of normative order that would bridge 
between the formal and customary systems. In 2004, the Land Reform 
Programme, or Programme National Foncier (PNF), introduced, among other 
things, a new land property status, that of ‘non-titled private property’. The 
idea was for a cheaper, faster and decentralised system to deliver ‘land 
certificates’, or certificats fonciers, to the majority of rural Malagasy who 
occupied land but had no title to it. Both individuals and groups asserting 
rights to untitled land could request these certificates that had then to be 
approved by a ‘local commission’ composed of Municipal authorities, elders 
and neighbours’ (Collectif pour la Défense des Terres Malgaches - TANY 
2015:1).   
TAMS was therefore initially confronted with three forms of land 
tenure for the plots it had reforested. 
First, there was the case of state land, where parcels were ‘managed’ 
by private or (semi) public organisms such as Mitisnjo or the Andasibe 
Mantadia National Park (AMPNP) respectively. Although this should have 
been the most straightforward case, in that land belonged unequivocally to 
the state, it posed a particular, unexpected challenge: in the area of 
Vohimana, where reforestation plots were managed by the organization 
Man and the Environment (MATE), land turned out to belong to a now 
extinct administrative entity, the ex-province of Toamasina. With the 
beginning of the de-centralisation process during the late 80s, this bit of land 
had been absorbed by the newly established region of Moramanga, wherein 
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someone from a committee had, in turn, sold part of the land to an 
individual. Since no laws had yet been established dictating whether ex-
provincial land should go to municipalities (i.e. Andasibe) or the regions (i.e. 
Moramanga), the owner of this piece of land—and therefore its trees and 
carbon—remained unknown (and, to an extent, unknowable).  
Then there was the case of ‘private, titled property’.  Similar to state 
land in that the owner was clearly identifiable, this land status would have 
been easy to deal with if it hadn’t been for the fact that the actual people 
who offered land under this category to TAMS were not the title holders, but 
farmers who had worked the land for over 20 years and had thus been 
classified as ‘occupants’. At some point, those members of colonial families 
that were still present in the area or could be reached (Louys and Izouard) 
came to an agreement whereby they would retain land ownership but would 
cede carbon rights to those classified as occupants. This, however, was 
something that, in Mino’s words, the ‘carbon buyer did not accept’ because 
of the way carbon ownership had been defined by the World Bank’s lawyers 
(this is most probably a reference to the Wemaëre and Rajaonson (2006) 
report). Being unacceptable from a legal perspective, this situation, too, was 
never resolved. 
Finally, and the most poignant of all cases because of the great 
resources it drew on and brought into Andasibe, was the case of customary 
land, now turned into ‘non-titled private property’ through the Land Reform 
Programme (PNF). It was indeed through TAMS that funding from the 
National Environmental Action Plan III (EP3) was obtained to establish a 
local land registry office, or Guichet Foncier, in both Andasibe and the 
regional capital, Moramanga, as a pilot for the national initiative. The 
establishment of the office also included the implementation of ‘PLOF’ (Plan 
Local d’Occupation Foncière) a GPS-based programme of national reach that 
aimed to classify all land use in the commune and digitalise it into colour-
coded maps. Based in the town hall of Andasibe, Rija, a local young man, 
explained to us the intricacies of the programme, and showed us some of the 
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‘unfinished’ maps—material evidence of the complexities found on the 
ground. Although obtaining a land certificate from the Guichet Foncier 
should have been a fast and inexpensive process for individual farmers, it 
transpired that part of the land classified as ‘non titled private property’ had 
already been titled as ‘collective land’ through the previous cadastral 
operation of the 80s and was thus incompatible with the new Land Reform 
certificates. The same parcels of land, therefore, were subject to mutually 
exclusive legislation, one past, the other present.  
There was a further and surprising impediment, however, to the 
granting of land certificates: not only were they in conflict with earlier 
normative orders, but they also clashed with TAMS’ projected future. As it 
turned out, the land certificates risked TAMS itself by granting its holders 
full rights of ownership and use over their parcels and the trees contained in 
them. As I learnt from an anonymous informant, Conservation International 
(CI) had reservations in granting full property rights to the areas because of 
a similar, negative experience in the nearby conservation area of 
Torotorofotsy, where certificates had been issued and then taken back due 
to ‘inappropriate’ land use126. Since ‘land certificates’ granted full ownership 
over land and trees, there was the risk that owners might decide to clear 
TAMS trees legally. Certificates then posed a potential risk for TAMS, and the 
cost of having to take them back in terms of farmers’ loss of trust in 
organisations was seen to be too high. It is in fact quite ironic that although 
the BioCF quoted the establishment of the land registry office as one of 
TAMS’ successes, none of the certificates delivered were to farmers involved 
with the project.  
We can see how the tension between dis/entanglement continued in 
the processes aimed at clarifying land ownership in order to establish clear 
property rights to carbon. As the project to ‘bring back the forest’127, TAMS 
                                                        
126 One of the main differences between land certificates and land titles is that the 
former can be withdrawn by the authorities after having been granted.  
127 Or, as we saw in chapter 3, ‘to restore the fallows’.  
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reforested a number of hectares in Andasibe, rooting trees to particular 
socio-material contexts. But the ‘fuzziness’ (Verdery 1999) of these contexts 
was an impediment to TAMS as carbon project, where a clear object with 
specific owners had to be identified. Extinct administrative territories, 
absent colonial families, earlier legal regimes: land and trees remained 
entangled in a mash of past relationships that greatly complicated the 
separation of carbon from them. In a sense, this is similar to the case 
described by Verdery (1996) during land-reform processes in post-socialist 
Transylvania, where land seemed to acquire ‘elastic’ qualities as it stretched 
or shrank during de-collectivization. Instead of a spatial elasticity, however, 
we find here a temporal one, where trees suddenly seemed to be pulled back 
to a messy past that refused to let them go. The tensions between 
dis/entanglement gained a further twist, however, with the case of ‘non-
titled, private property’. Here, the very ‘separative technology’ (Slater 
2002)—the land certificate—that was needed to bring carbon into being 
risked re-entangling trees with a landscape that endangered the future of 
carbon itself.  
Before I move on to explore another fundamental aspect in TAMS’ 
complexity as identified by its key actors (the Government’s involvement 
with the project), I want to consider here the role that documents play in 
processes of carbon disentanglement.   
Documenting carbon  
As Çaliskan and Callon remind us, and as recent examples in the 
anthropology of finance demonstrate (see Miyazaki 2005; Zaloom 2006), the 
‘material infrastructure’ of the market plays a ‘decisive role’ in market 
formation (2009:384). In processes of economization, that is, materialities 
matter.  
In the previous chapter I explored the materiality of carbon as natural 
resource as the result of the relations and practices that brought people and 
things together in processes of extraction, rather than simply as CO2. In a 
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similar way, then, we can see that the materiality of carbon as commodity in 
this case appears through a set of relations between human and non-human 
actors that aim to render carbon ‘economic’: fungible, mobile and therefore 
exchangeable. Within these networks, a particular form of ‘infrastructure’ 
stands out: documents.  
As a project ultimately engaged with an ‘immaterial’ element—the 
Certified Emissions Reduction, or CER—TAMS depended on a series of 
documents that were indispensable and instrumental to carbon credits’ 
materialisation. We observe here the ‘paradox’ that Miller claims exists in 
projects devoted to immateriality, such as religion, philosophy and finance: 
that ‘the more humanity reaches towards the conceptualization of the 
immaterial, the more important the specific form of its materialization’ 
(Miller 2005:28). CERs, indeed, can only take form through material means, 
and these are in essence the array of documents that were to establish, 
define, calculate and verify carbon reductions, including those documents 
that would have brought carbon into being as an ownable and transactable 
object. From this perspective, then, documents in TAMS can be seen as 
‘market devices’ (Callon, Millo, and Muniesa 2007) in that they have the 
capacity to ‘render economic’: they are not simply representations of the 
things they contain, but also help bring them about128. 
Already introduced in previous chapters, one of these key documents 
was the Project Design Document, or PDD. The role of the PDD was mainly 
that of providing a detailed account of the project, presented as a feasible 
activity which furthered the two main objectives of reforestation projects 
under CDM: emissions reductions and sustainable development. The PDD 
had to demonstrate that TAMS fulfilled CDM reforestation project requisites 
and followed carbon accounting methodologies129.  Its role cannot be 
                                                        
128 As explored in chapter six, the capacity or effectivity of documents must be seen 
as a distributed and relational effect, rather than as an inherent property of documents.  
129 More specifically, the PDD had to prove that TAMS complied with the following: 
land eligibility (that land had remained deforested from 1990 until the project start date); a 
demonstration of project boundaries through GPS coordinates; clear legal title to land, 
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underestimated: it was through this document that carbon credits were 
discursively produced and mathematically calculated, offering a narrative 
and an application of CDM methodology which would have served as a basis 
on which to assess, and eventually grant, project validation—the final step in 
credit generation. But the PDD was in itself dependent on a series of further 
documents as devices which were key to carbon disentanglement because 
they rendered carbon both visible and ownable.  
While the PDD and the ERPA were central in constituting the CDM 
project and the carbon transaction respectively, the Wemaëre and 
Rajaonson report was pivotal in objectifying carbon: establishing what 
carbon was and who might have rights to it. Once carbon was ‘known’ to be 
a ‘moveable, incorporeal good’ that belonged to the landowner, the question 
of land tenure opened up. Land titles played a decisive role in establishing 
certain property statuses, although, as we have seen, these were far from 
clear and remained unsolved. We saw how the case of ‘non-titled, private 
property’ brought to Andasibe a series of additional technologies, peoples 
and materials—the Land Reform Programme, the land registry office, the 
‘PLof’ with its GPS technology and the certificates themselves—in the effort 
to identify and establish clear land-owners in these fuzzy situations. As 
‘market devices’, then, documents in TAMS served the task of ‘abstracting’ 
carbon (see also Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014:14) in more than one 
way: not only did they represent carbon as a particular object or form of 
property, but they also worked to ‘transform’ and ‘displace’ (Callon, Millo, 
and Muniesa 2007:4) ‘it’ from its entanglements with trees, land and people 
by ‘separating’ and rendering it knowable, fungible and exchangeable.  
Over the last sections I have presented a series of attempts at 
disentangling carbon from the socio-material landscapes that TAMS had 
reforested, in order to produce a bounded and visible object that could be 
                                                                                                                                                      
forest rights and rights to carbon credits; carbon measurements carried out through 
approved methodologies based on baselines; and the conditions of additionality, 
permanence and leakage measures.  
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owned and, consequently, exchanged. We have seen how this was not a 
straightforward process, but rather one fraught with complications and 
complexities, where the very ‘separative technologies’ (Slater 2002) 
employed to disentangle carbon led, in parallel, to further entanglements in 
the project.  
But the trees that TAMS planted were not simply rooted to the savoka 
fields in Andasibe, with all the ‘fuzziness’ (Verdery 1999) that that implied. 
As a ‘pilot’ forest carbon project of national and international scope, TAMS 
trees also flourished in Governmental offices and funding budgets, its seeds 
sparking the imagination of staff. 
In the next section I present one more instance of the tensions and 
entanglements that came about as a result of rendering carbon economic, as 
I explore the specific problems that resulted from the government’s 
involvement with the project and its claim over carbon ownership.  
A dis/entangling government—one more complication 
In a consultancy report for CI from 2007, Holloway speculates that the 
transfer of carbon rights ‘to a single entity’—the Government of 
Madagascar—may have been done in order to simplify the carbon 
transaction. This might have made sense in that the Emissions Reductions 
Purchasing Agreement, would have been signed between two entities, the 
BioCF and the GoM, instead of with each landowner. Whether this was CI’s 
or the BioCF’s intention—or a demand from the government—we do not 
know. What we do know is that this move to further disentangle carbon 
ownership did not make things ‘simpler’. As land proved particularly ‘elastic’ 
(Verdery 1996) in the forests of Andasibe, so did the GoM appear to stretch, 
or rather multiply, in its involvement with TAMS, leading to very messy 
entanglements, as I will now show. 
   256 
Trapped Between Forests and the Environment 
CDM projects engage with individual countries through a Designated 
National Authority, DNA, which is usually—but not necessarily—a 
government agency. The DNA plays a pivotal role in the development of the 
project, first by authorising it through a ‘letter of no objection’, and by 
confirming in a ‘letter of approval’ that (undefined 130 ) sustainable 
development criteria are met in the project, ‘that the country has ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol, and that participation in CDM is voluntary’ (UNFCCC-CDM 
n.d.).  Additional tasks also involve the ‘submission of standardized 
baselines’ for the project, which is the framework for calculating the number 
of emissions reductions produced. These steps are therefore necessary for 
the PDD to come into being and be validated and registered, and through 
these documents (which may be seen as one more instance of ‘separative 
technologies’) the DNA acquires a central role in the successful production 
of carbon credits.  
 
                                                        
130 ‘The UNFCCC does not provide a definition of sustainable development in the 
context of the CDM. Sustainable development is defined in general terms as “development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs”’ (Brundtland, 1987 in BioCarbon Fund 2012:120).  
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Figure 14. Designated National Authority Diagram. Source: UNFCCC-CDM 
 
Madagascar’s DNA came into being by decree on February 6 2010, 
effectively becoming the authority in charge of CDM and other carbon 
projects (excluding REDD). Its office was in the Climate Change Office, DCC 
(Direction Changement Climatique), which is in turn part of the General 
Office of the Environment, DGE, (Direction Générale de l’Environnement), 
within the Ministry of Environment and Forests, MEF.  This was not the only 
General Office within the Ministry, however, since the MEF was itself the 
result of a merge between the Ministry of Water and Forests, and the 
Ministry of Environment, which took place around 2008131. The DGE then 
worked in parallel to the General Office of Forests, DGF (Direction Générale 
                                                        
131 A more recent Ministry re-organisation has turned the MEF into the MEEMF, 
Ministère de l’Environnement, de l’Écologie, de la Mer et des Forêts, the Ministry of the 
Environment, Ecology, Water and Forests.  
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des Forêts), a situation that has led to a recognised conflict, mostly over 
funding (see Bidaud 2012:149–150). For TAMS, but presumably with a view 
towards future BioCF projects, a further entity was set up, probably as a fix 
to this conflictive situation: the Biocarbon Fund Coordination Unit or, 
UCFBC, ‘Unité de Coordination des Fonds Biocarbone’, headed by a member 
from the DGE, along with a colleague from the same office, and two members 
from the DGF.  
This created a ‘complicated’ institutional structure in the eyes of the 
rest of actors that operated at a national level because TAMS funds were 
channelled through the DGF, as reforestation project, while the DGE held 
supervisory power over TAMS’ implementation as carbon project. The 
UCFBC was thus divided between two competing offices, and it was in this 
parallel structure, many actors claim, that things got ‘stuck’. As an 
anonymous informant involved in TAMS’ organisational structure at the 
national level explained during our interview:  
‘In the Ministry there is DGF and DGE: those two are 
fighting each other for money. And one of the problems 
with TAMS was that the DGF had the money for TAMS, in 
addition to the money from CI, but the DGE deals with the 
signature of carbon projects etc., and they said ‘we are in 
charge of the project, so give us the money so we can 
manage it’. That was one of the problems. Environment is 
newer than the Forest … They are newer but don’t have 
funding’. 
Although this conflict was not overtly admitted in my interviews with 
either the DGE or DGF, an officer at the former did suggest that the work of 
the UCFBC was not ‘sufficiently valorised’, in the sense that funding only 
flowed through other channels.  
This competition over TAMS and its funding mechanism had dire 
consequences for the project as a whole. With funding channelled through 
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one office, and validations managed by the other, the dispute between DGs 
led to serious ‘blocks’ and ‘halts’ (in project actors’ words) due to which 
funds would not be released, or validation of operations would not be 
granted. When problems arose, they were delegated to others, with further 
delays in project implementation. Along with a ‘complex’ administrative 
structure, where invoices and their approval travelled through varied and 
different channels, ‘time gaps’ became an obstacle to work on the ground, 
because both workers and trees were subject to their own, different 
temporalities. Reforestation work, for example, was dependent on the 
temporality of trees, and delays resulted in important levels of tree 
mortality. When funding halted for four months during the rainy season, the 
transplanting of seedlings had to be delayed further until the end of the dry 
season, with consequent loss of tree seedlings. As could be expected, this 
also had a huge impact on the additional costs of reforestation: at a given 
point, out of the projected 900 hectares to be reforested, only 53 had been 
completed. Delays in payments to reforestation workers in Andasibe, on the 
other hand, led to a disruption of social life in town because credit based on 
the expectations of TAMS’ wage payments had already been given out by 
local businesses. At a certain point in time, Mino recalls, FAs132 were 
receiving death threats, family members could not honour their 
responsibilities with each other, children were not attending school, 
businesses were closing down and ANAE would not even dare going to 
Andasibe. The ‘halts’ and ‘blocks’ that resulted from disputes between DGs 
at the Ministry level had a great impact in the operation of TAMS on the 
ground.  
Entangling Potentials 
In the previous sections we saw how efforts to produce carbon as a 
property object with clear owners drove TAMS into complex situations as a 
                                                        
132 Facilitating Agents—local organisations implementing reforestation on the 
ground.  
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result of carbon’s necessary entanglements with trees, land and people—
past, present and future. The idea of a sole carbon owner, the GoM, might 
have seemed an appropriate move in bypassing a complex multiplicity of 
actors. Or it might have been a governmental demand that could not be 
turned down. In any case, multiplicity returned with a vengeance. Were 
trees in TAMS part of a reforestation project, and therefore the domain of 
the DGF, or were they part of a carbon project, and thus clearly set within 
the DGE? As we have seen, they were both—and it was in this unexpected 
entanglement that many actors identified TAMS’ coup de grace.  
The question of property in TAMS was not simply a matter of 
establishing who the carbon owners were because TAMS was productive of 
much more than carbon credits. TAMS also involved its own ‘projectness’, a 
feature capable of mobilising people, resources and imaginations beyond 
the Certified Emissions Reductions.  
At its most obvious, TAMS was productive beyond carbon credits 
because it drew on a number of funding sources at different points in time. 
The report Les marchés de carbon forestier/Bringing forest carbon projects to 
the market (Chenost et al. 2010:152), for example, states that the investment 
cost for TAMS133 with 591 ha reforested, had been 1,600,300 US$, and the 
operation costs had been 750,000 US$ over five years. But it was also 
productive of a governmental body, the UCFBC, which occupied space in a 
Ministry ridden with competition and rivalry. The claims by the DCC of the 
UCFBC not being ‘valorised’ may not only refer to the allocation of funding, 
but could also be seen to contain notions of institutional legitimacy and 
prestige directed against the DGF. Although this is just speculation, TAMS, as 
an international pilot project, may have been seen as an object that would 
legitimise the DGE as key player in the new environmental arena that was 
unfolding at the time. When the BioCF pulled out, in fact, the DGE had 
contacted ANAE and CI to reassure them that the Ministry was not dropping 
                                                        
133 Here called the Corridor Ankeniheny-Zahamena, volet AR.  
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the project, for they had already invested a lot in it. Legitimacy and prestige, 
on the other hand, were not just matters of rivalry between ministerial 
directorates, however, but also between the government and international 
NGOs. There was an apparent competition, in fact, between the Ministry and 
CI to appear as project leader in front of international actors. As a carbon 
project, then, TAMS did not just conjure (cf. Tsing 2005) the potential value 
of carbon credits, but also of itself as pilot project: an object of prestige, 
legitimacy and both present and future funding.  
Conclusion 
The complexity of making things simple 
As a fungible object that can be identified, quantified, managed and 
exchanged, the carbon credit in its commodity form has a powerful capacity 
to conjure ideas of simplicity. Molecularity, technicality, efficiency and 
economic rationality, among others, embody a particular ‘appeal to 
simplicity’ (McAfee 2003:204) in the management of climate change, not 
dissimilar to that of the gene in molecular biology. The connections between 
genes and carbon molecules pose, in fact, interesting parallels. Just like the 
US claimed to have found ‘the secret of life’ (Kay 1993:16) in the 1930s 
through molecular biology, carbon (and energy) has also been presented as 
‘life in its most fundamental sense’ (Alexander 2005:464), since everything, 
after all, is made out of carbon molecules. Both elements, in turn, have been 
treated as single, bounded entities that are amenable to control and 
commodification (McAfee 2003), where they can be abstracted from their 
temporal and spatial contexts and where clear property rights can be 
established. The ‘molecular vision of life’ (Kay 1993) from this perspective is 
presented as a ‘frictionless’ (Tsing 2005) one. The work that must be done to 
bring them about, as we have seen, is not all that smooth.  
We have seen how processes and technologies aimed at disentangling 
carbon from Andasibe’s forests were fraught with complications, and were, 
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in many instances, productive of further entanglements: if carbon had to be 
defined in order to be known and owned, this led to messy entanglements 
with Malagasy civil law, opening up the complicated question of land tenure; 
the land certificate as ‘separative technology’ (Slater 2002), on the other 
hand, brought up the risk of re-entangling carbon to its original landscape, 
endangering the very future of carbon itself; the need to produce carbon 
from reforested parcels in Andasibe meant having to deal with rival and 
competing governmental offices; finally, TAMS itself, as productive of value 
beyond the Certified Emission Reductions, became caught in a mesh of 
entangling relationships with dire consequences for the project as a whole. 
Instead of external to the carbon credit, then, complexities often emerged as 
its effect.  
Through an analysis of the processes set in motion to turn carbon into 
an economic object that could be owned and exchanged—that is, 
commodified—we have seen the various complications that TAMS ran into. 
A large part of this complexity, it could be argued, derived from the nature(s) 
of carbon credits: from the type of objects they are and the way they are 
brought into being. The concept of nature(s) in this case aims to convey the 
specific socio-material landscapes to which trees are rooted on the one 
hand, and the specific properties of the commodifiable object that carbon 
credits are assumed to be. In a sense, land/trees and carbon is a mirror 
image of the binary that Callon sets up to introduce the concepts of 
entanglement/disentanglement as he opposes money to organs. Money, he 
argues, is one of the easiest objects to disentangle since it is, in essence, 
‘already framed: cold, circulating, constantly changing hands, going from 
account to account’ (1998c:34). As an object whose function is to provide 
equivalence and aid the circulation of commodities, money is already nearly 
disentangled in its totality. At the opposite end we find human organs, which 
are, by definition, ‘entangled in the body of the donor and through him his 
family or circle or friends’ (Waldby and Mitchell 2006:68) and pose a 
particular difficulty when it comes to processes of disentanglement since the 
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organ must be both materially removed (issues of time) and is usually 
transferred as a gift, in ‘a limited form of circulation which honors the 
material and social embeddedness of organs’ (Waldby and Mitchell 
2006:68)134. Carbon credits and trees suggest a similar parallel, this time, 
however, contained in the same material element: whereas carbon is 
conceived of as a bounded form of ultimate equivalence (Alexander 2005) to 
be traded at a global level, trees are the archetype of permanence and 
locality, their roots a powerful metaphor for their entanglement with their 
socio-material contexts. It is due to the oscillation between these two 
nature(s) or elements—the all-pervasive entanglement of trees/land and 
their necessary disentanglement for the production of CERs—that, I argue, 
forest carbon projects are particularly ‘complex’ endeavours.  
Oscillation, a continuous movement between alternative states, has 
been employed to account for particular forms of complexity (Law and Mol 
2002b:17–18). In her analysis of medical comparisons between treatments 
and patients’ conditions before and after treatments, Mol argues that a 
particular type of complexity derives from diseases ‘being more than one 
but less than many' (2002b:247). Instead of single or plural objects, diseases 
waver between the two: 
‘although intermittent claudication is not ‘really’ an 
encroached vessel lumen inside the body, of which pain 
surfaces as a symptom when a person is walking, lumen 
width and pain are not entirely independent either’ (Mol 
2002b:247). 
The view of disease in this case is one in which there is neither a 
singular object made up of 'underlying structures and emerging symptoms', 
nor multiple ones that result from the fragmentation of independent 
                                                        
134 Yet money can, and often is, subject to processes of re-entanglement, through 
ear-marking, for example (Zelizer 1994), and organs can be turned into particular types of 
commodities by erasing their history and links to previous owners, as in the case of the 
certain organ markets (see Waldby and Mitchell 2006). 
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elements. It is in this ‘relation of in/dependence’ (Mol 2002b:247), or an 
oscillation between things that are both connected and disconnected, that 
complexity arises. ‘In a complex world’, Mol and Law claim, ‘there are no 
simple binaries’ (Law and Mol 2002b:20).  
It could be argued, then, that complexity in TAMS, and in forest carbon 
projects in general, stems from the oscillation between the ‘necessarily 
ambivalent’ (Law and Mol 1998:29) nature(s) of carbon credits, where roots 
both enable and impede their becoming. In this sense, then, complexity may 
be seen as the result of the ‘signature tension’ (Robertson 2000) of forest 
carbon projects in processes of commodification, as I described it in chapter 
one: the fact that, along with fragmentation and abstraction—or as we have 
seen in this chapter, disentanglement—carbon credits can only come about 
through the production of very specific and grounded forms of nature, and 
their consequent entanglements with socio-material contexts. The 
interplays between the need to root in order to abstract, and the need to 




Over the last five chapters I have explored the various shapes that 
carbon takes as part of a forest carbon project in the specific landscapes 
where it is deployed—what I termed, at the beginning of this dissertation, 
carbon’s multiple social lives.  
Arguing that the production of carbon as a ‘tradable bit’ of nature 
entails a double movement between grounding nature in specific landscapes 
in order to abstract and fragment it—forest carbon project’s ‘signature 
tension’ in Robertson’s (2000) terms—I have presented the 'proliferating' 
(Hayden 2012) forms of carbon that emerge through diverse material and 
discursive practices.  
In chapters three and four I explored the social life of carbon in its 
credit form, as a specific form of value with a logic of its own, and its 
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interplay with questions of value and waste in the forests of Andasibe. In 
chapter three we saw how, through its engagement with carbon markets, 
TAMS transformed from ‘the project to restore the fallows’ to the project ‘to 
bring back the forest’. Carbon, in its proposal of a future of absolute 
economic and ecological value, negated any past, present and future trace of 
tavy or the fallows, which were relegated to the category of waste. In 
addition we saw how carbon credits’ logic of value transformed TAMS’ 
internal structure with fundamental consequences for the communities 
involved, as they went from being potential carbon owners to mere 
beneficiaries of an undefined form of development.  
In chapter four, on the other hand, we saw how this projected future of 
absolute ecological and economic value where tavy had no place was but one 
side of the story. Tavy, as constitutive of the threat of scarcity on which 
forest carbon projects are premised, turned out to be, in fact, highly 
generative of value. Through a historical account of the economic and 
political role of forests in Andasibe we saw how this was not a novel 
phenomenon: tavy, while always treated as a wasteful and undesirable 
practice by extra-local powers, had been integral to these actors’ projects of 
forest valorisation. Although Madagascar’s position in global environmental 
imaginaries as representative of a natural time outside of history tends to 
obscure the political and economic pasts of Andasibe’s rainforest and 
present conservation as a novel way of value production, we saw that 
carbon establishes very specific, historical continuities.  
From its ‘credit’ form I then moved on to other less explicit or stable 
social lives of carbon as part of TAMS. In chapters five and six we saw how, 
as carbon entered the rural landscapes of Mahatsara, it began to lose some 
of its stability, sometimes also disappearing from view. In chapter five, for 
example, carbon dissipated into a more general experience of 
power(lessness) as an implicit element of what I termed the ‘environmental 
state’. In its curtailment of Betsimisaraka ideals of ‘forward movement’ 
(Keller 2008) through restrictions on the practice of tavy, the 
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‘environmental state’, and carbon as part of it, was experienced as a form of 
spatial and temporal oppression, articulated around the notion of voatery. 
Although not explicitly talked about, then, carbon in this case was inherently 
entangled with the practice of tavy in the interplay between agricultural 
expansion and the fixity of the carbon sink. 
In chapter six, on the other hand, I explored the social life of carbon as 
natural resource and the implications of its particular (im)materiality for 
those involved in its extraction through a look at the infrastructures, labour 
regimes and forms of exchange and value production that were set up in 
order to ‘extract’ carbon in Mahatsara. A comparison between past and 
present experiences of ‘carbon labour’ for men in Mahatsara—as part of the 
graphite mining industry and as part of TAMS— revealed the specific traits 
of contemporary forms of carbon and carbon labour as highly volatile: 
temporary, intangible, and socially detached. As carbon failed to materialize 
in any locally expected form—either through work, money or benefits—it 
led, in turn, to feelings of deceit.  
All along, then, we have seen how, as carbon was put to work in the 
forests of Andasibe and Mahatsara, its shapes shifted and wavered, leading 
to a multiplicity of forms and lived experiences. In this final chapter, in fact, 
we have seen how this multiplicity was not simply an effect, but rather a 
fundamental necessity of forest carbon projects.  In order for carbon to 
emerge as a mobile and bounded object, it needs to remain entangled with 
its socio-material landscapes: carbon necessarily wavers between its rooted 
and abstract forms, its commodity properties being continuously exceeded 
by carbon as something else.  Far from a 'bare molecule' (Barry 2005), then, 
CO2 as part of global forms of environmental governance, appears as a 
multiple object, variously ‘done’ and ‘known’ (Mol 2002a). But what does 
carbon actually do? 
A recent comment by Hannah Apple (2015) on the book 'The social life 
of money' (2014), points to some important similarities between the 
multiplicity of carbon and that of money as explored by the author, Nigel 
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Dodd. Against a monetary realism that treats money as 'a thing’—'as 
ontologically singular, homogenous and homogneizing' (Appel 2015:428)—
the book presents money in various guises: ‘as process, culture as 
constitutive of money forms rather than merely an external influence, 
money as a repertoire of scales, asymmetrical exchanges, and as an 
instrument of collective memory' (Appel 2015:428). This multiplicity, in 
turn, is presented as a space for possibilities due to money’s 'capacity of 
reinvention' (Dodd 2014:272). But this claim to multiplicity and the 
possibilities it brings about, while theoretically consistent, worries Appel 
because, in her own words, this theoretical insight 
'can seem to suggest that, in showing money to be 
multiple, flexible, and capacious, we have then somehow 
undone its power; that this mere theoretical assertion 
has actually undone the “real” power of money in the 
world' (2015:428 emphasis in original) 
Far from it, Appel reminds, us, ‘money can, and often does act as a brutal 
singularity...A thing' (2015:429).   
In the final chapter of this dissertation I want to leave carbon’s 
multiplicity as it has appeared in the landscapes of Andasibe and Mahatsara, 
and move on to consider carbon in its ‘brutal singularity’ (Appel 2015:429). 
From the ways in which carbon is variously done in a specific locale, then, I 
turn to consider what carbon actually does as key object in global forms of 
environmental management. I will do this by bringing together, and further 
exploring, the mutual and productive connections between time and carbon 
that have appeared throughout this dissertation, as well as their political 
implications. As an object that has re-structured the relationships between 
industrialized and developing countries through global forms of 
environmental governance, carbon, I will argue, establishes new forms of 
inclusions and exclusions as it forecloses the future for some, while opening 
it up for others.   
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Chapter Eight: Uncommon Futures  
 
Introduction 
BIG BEN STRIKES the hour. In a muted, ghostly room, the 
custodians of the future convene. Keeper of the Board 
Books: Mektoub, it is written. And they don’t want it 
changed. ‘If three hundred men—then three thousand, 
thirty thousand. It could spread everywhere. It must be 
stopped, now’. ‘Our man Martin is on target. Quite reliable.’ 
William S. Burroughs, Ghost of Chance  (1995:8) 
 
As might be recalled, Martin was the emissary sent by the Board to 
sabotage Captain Mission’s project of Libertatia, for in his quest to 
demonstrate that humans and nature could live in ‘relative harmony’, 
Mission had tampered with the ‘prerecordings’ (Burroughs 1995:8), which 
the Board, as custodians of the future, did not want to be altered. The result, 
as we know from the introduction, was the blowing up of the Garden of Lost 
Chances where Mission’s lemur friend Ghost lived, and the unforeseen 
release of extinct and bizarre diseases and viruses that had spread 
worldwide and brought an end to humanity.  
In this final chapter I explore the mutual and productive connections 
between time and carbon as a key object of global forms of environmental 
governance to mitigate climate change. Like the Board in Burroughs’ story, I 
will argue, carbon works to administer time by opening the future for some, 
and foreclosing it for others, establishing, in turn, diverse and unequal global 
trajectories.  
Throughout this dissertation we have seen the varied ways in which 
carbon and time are mutually entangled as part of a specific forest carbon 
   269 
project. In chapters three and four, for example, we saw that that the 
production of carbon value entailed —and fundamentally emerged from—
very specific articulations between the pasts, presents and futures of 
Andasibe’s forests in relation to tavy. Chapters five and six, by contrast, 
revealed particular temporal experiences for people in Mahatsara as a result 
of carbon in two different guises. As an implicit element in the interplay 
between movement and fixity in agricultural and reforested landscapes, we 
saw in chapter five how carbon was experienced as part of an 
‘environmental state’ that regulated, and impeded, social and material 
expansion for tavy farmers, leading to both spatial and temporal forms of 
oppression. In chapter six, on the other hand, although the temporal 
implications of carbon were not as evident as in the previous chapter, we 
saw how carbon labour was marked by notions of temporariness, in contrast 
to past experiences of permanent work for the graphite industry. In chapter 
seven, finally, we saw that processes to disentangle carbon were often 
impeded by its parallel entanglement with past and future relations (such as 
in the case of land tenure) as part of reforested trees and their socio-
material contexts. We have seen, therefore, as Ferry and Limbert (2008) 
have argued for natural resources, that the relationship between carbon (in 
its multiple forms) and time goes ‘in both directions’ (Elizabeth E. Ferry and 
Limbert 2008:4), as carbon is both produced by, and productive of, 
particular temporalities.  
In this chapter my aim is to take these connections further and, rather 
than just explore them through a specific forest carbon project, consider 
them from a more general perspective. Therefore, the chapter may be seen 
less as a conclusion—in the sense of bringing things to a close—and more as 
an opening up of a specific theme that has appeared as an important element 
in many of the ethnographic chapters here presented.  
In the next sections I will argue that carbon, as key object in the 
management of climate change, attends to a recent realisation of temporal 
limits to (capitalist) growth, and, at the same time, aims to re-work and 
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overcome them through temporal strategies: a sort of ‘temporal fix’ in 
Harvey’s sense (1982; 2001). Forest carbon projects such as TAMS can in a 
sense be seen as an instance of a global re-distribution of time, where the 
future becomes closed or fixed in some places, and open, or mobile, in 
others. In the final section of this chapter I turn to the ‘Anthropocene’ as the 
embodiment of contemporary articulations between ideas of temporal limits 
to growth and socio-natural presents and futures, and argue that this 
temporal concept hides, in fact, diverse and unequal trajectories. In the 
emergent global chronographies of the Anthropocene that carbon brings 
about through a re-worked relationship between time, people and nature, 
we will see that ‘Our Common Future’ is neither singular, nor shared.  
From spatial to temporal limits to growth 
‘Nature’, Cindi Katz has argued, ‘changed in the 1970s’ (1998:46). Over 
the decade that went from the take-off of American environmentalism with 
Rachel Carson’s ‘Silent spring’ in 1962 to the 1973 oil crisis, nature ceased to 
be the ‘open frontier’ for unlimited economic expansion that capitalism had 
until then taken for granted. The report by the Club of Rome entitled ‘Limits 
to Growth’ (1972) may be seen as the embodiment of this change of 
perspective, as it proclaimed the ‘finiteness’ of the Earth (Cooper 2008:16). 
Published in 1972, ‘Limits to Growth’ projected an unsustainable future for 
life on earth if current trends of resource depletion, population growth and 
waste build up continued, and warned against the ‘insurmountable’ (Cooper 
2008:16) limits that economic expansion would face if no action was taken. 
Interestingly, this was also the time when oil companies gave up a discourse 
on oil as ‘an almost limitless resource’ (a discourse, in turn, that had been a 
pillar of the dominant view since the 1930s of ‘the economy’ as ‘an object’ 
capable of unlimited growth) as they began to anticipate its end (Mitchell 
2011:189). As one of the most iconic images of this era of newly found 
planetary limits we have the photograph of Earth taken by the Apollo 17 
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mission in 1972 and which became a globally circulated emblem of the 
environmental movement during that decade (Lekan 2014). Viewed from 
outer space the ‘Blue Marble’ or ‘Blue Planet’ appeared as a glowing and 
beautiful—yet fundamentally finite—object.  
At this stage, Katz argues, nature was ‘remade for capitalism’ (Katz 
1998:46). In an effort to overcome the limits imposed by environmental 
degradation (limits that were inextricably also social, as O’Connor (1998) 
argued), nature became an ‘accumulation strategy’ in its own right (Katz 
1998:60). Corporate capitalism thus turned to ‘a green economy’ through 
nature’s commodification and privatisation (see chapter 1), observed, for 
example, in the proliferation of new biodiversity reserves. The result, 
according to Katz, was ‘a more intensive form of nature production’ 
(1998:46).  
Katz has portrayed this intensification or remaking of nature as a kind 
of ‘involution’ (1998:46) similar to the one undergone by the concept of 
space in the early 20th century. This process of space re-making or 
‘involution’ in Katz’s sense, began, according to Smith (1990), when 
planetary expansion came to an end with the final partitioning of Africa in 
the 1880s. From then on, capitalist expansion became a matter of reworking 
spatial divisions through an ‘internal differentiation of global space’ (Smith 
1990:119–120), leading to ‘uneven development’ as the ‘hallmark of the 
geography of capitalism’ (Smith 1990:4). According to Katz, then, just like 
space in the early 20th century, nature was re-made in the 1970s to 
overcome the newly found limits to capitalist growth.  
Contemporary forms of nature commodification, which have departed 
from simply creating protected areas and have turned, as we know, to the 
making of ‘natural’ bits to be traded in global markets (see chapter one), 
may be seen as a new stage in this re-working or ‘involution’ of nature that 
began in the 1970s, but with a twist. Importantly marked by emerging 
processes of financialisation (Sullivan 2013), this new phase, I suggest, 
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attends not just to spatial, but also to temporal limits to growth135. Although 
this does not mean that spatial limits have been either overcome or 
forgotten, the last two decades reveal an emerging concern with temporal 
ones: from the view of a finite Earth as seen from—and in—space, we have 
now moved on to the Anthropocene (a new temporal relation between 
society and nature that I explore below) as the most iconic element of ‘our 
times’. With its ‘tipping points’ and dangerous ‘acceleration rates’, the 
Anthropocene powerfully evokes the idea that we are ‘running out of time’.  
The 1987 Brundtland report entitled ‘Our common future’ may in fact 
be seen as a turning point in the transition from spatial to temporal limits, 
since it marks the moment when the question of time became inscribed and 
problematised into the expansion of capitalism. The report, which hinged on 
a wide array of environmental, social and economic problems such as 
population growth, food security, energy or urbanisation, presented ‘a new 
reality from which there is no escape, [that] must be recognized—and 
managed’ (WCDE 1987:11). To this aim, it proposed a view of ‘sustainable 
development’ as one that ‘meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ 
(WCDE 1987:16). The Brundtland report thus inaugurated a new way of 
thinking about and relating to time and the environment, since (capitalist) 
‘development’ appeared as endangered in the future. Within this view, 
however, limits to growth were not seen as ‘absolute’ but rather a matter of 
technological and social organisation, to be ‘both managed and improved to 
make way for a new era of economic growth’ (WCDE 1987:16). This new era 
thus implied the need to re-work and manage nature to secure ‘a common 
future’, that is, to overcome temporal limits. It is in fact highly telling that 
only five years later, in 1992, the revisit to the Club of Rome’s ‘Limits to 
Growth’ report entitled ‘Beyond the Limits’ claimed that ‘limits to growth 
                                                        
135 Undoubtedly, as Munn has argued, 'in a lived world, spatial and temporal 
dimensions cannot be disentangled, and the two comingle in various ways' (Munn 1992:94). 
My main focus in this chapter relates to temporal dimensions, but I acknowledge that these 
cannot be isolated from spatial ones.  
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were time-like, rather than space-like’ (Cooper 2008:16): time was in fact 
‘the ultimate limit’ (Meadows, Meadows, and Randers 1992:180). It is at this 
stage, then, that we find a temporal involution in the sense described by Katz 
for space, since, from now on, the future will be a key object of intervention 
through environmental management at a global level. In this new scenario, 
carbon emerged as a fundamental element. 
Carbon, an economy of the future 
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit, may be seen as a 
key moment in this reworked relationship between time and socio-natural 
futures since it is here that the management of the future in relation to 
environmental governance begins to be globally organised: the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is adopted 
with the stated aim of 'stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system’ (UNFCCC 1992:4). Carbon emerges 
here as ‘a critical object of intervention’ (Lansing 2011:739) as it is made to 
stand for other types of greenhouse gases and it is established that by the 
year 2000, carbon dioxide levels—or, what is the same, accumulated carbon 
waste—do not exceed those of 1990. To attain this view of the future, five 
years later, along with an agreement on emissions reductions, a global 
system of carbon trading is put in place through the Kyoto Protocol, which 
will come into force in 2005. Carbon trading may thus be seen as one of the 
main concerted efforts taken at a global level to manage and overcome the 
latest and most pressing crisis for economic growth, now contemplated in 
temporal terms: climate change.  
Yet carbon’s relationship to time is not simply that of a strategy, or 
solution, to overcome temporal limits to growth. As I show in the next 
sections, the CDM, as a mechanism that re-arranges so-called First and Third 
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World relationships through carbon trading may be seen as a way of ‘buying 
time’ in various ways. Carbon credits and specifically those of forest carbon 
projects such as TAMS, in turn, may be argued to be temporal objects in the 
most literal sense since they are made out of—and at the same time create—
very specific temporal articulations. Let us see how.  
Buying time 
Emissions trading, as we saw in chapter two, emerged as a result of a 
debate between the most appropriate ways of dealing with industrial waste, 
CO2 emissions in the case of carbon trade. Instead of a direct tax on 
emissions, trading in carbon credits, or permits, was posed as the most cost-
effective and efficient initiative: a ‘transitional’ mechanism that would allow 
polluters to progressively lower down their emissions and adapt to a low-
carbon (or even fossil fuel-free) economy. This was the ‘flexibility’ conferred 
to polluters by carbon and other forms of emissions trading: the capacity to 
delay structural change (such as ‘switching’ to alternative forms of energy) 
by trading in carbon credits amongst themselves. Whereas some polluters, 
from this perspective, would have been able to make the most out of 
reducing their emissions or transitioning to low-carbon technologies, for 
example, others (usually the biggest polluters and therefore those with most 
difficulty to make the ‘switch’—and, perversely, those that most needed it) 
could defer action by simply buying credits. The cap-and-trade system136 in 
this sense may be seen as a mechanism for trading in rights not just to 
pollute, but also to defer (expensive) action: a way of ‘buying time’. But this 
idea gains a greater force when considering carbon offsets as part of the 
CDM, since the mechanism now re-arranges this market of deferrals by 
allowing emissions to be reduced in developing countries and be sold to 
polluters in industrialised ones, who, in the meantime, can keep a business-
                                                        
136 The cap-and-trade system entails the establishment of a cap on emissions in a 
national territory where allowances are sold or given out to polluters who can then trade 
among them. 
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as-usual scenario. Although the transfer of resources (technology, 
sustainable development and revenue) to developing countries has been 
invoked as a positive effect of carbon markets, the mechanism poses 
important questions for the future of these countries, since emission 
reductions establish a system that necessarily extends into the future. When 
the time comes for developing countries to reduce their own emissions, as 
Clark and Knox-Hayes point out, ‘the low-hanging’ fruit will have already 
been sold, thus imposing ‘a greater share of the costs to make the same 
reductions their European predecessors have already made’ (2011:15). That 
is, through the CDM, industrialised countries are today acquiring future 
possibilities of emissions reductions in developing countries, at the same 
time as deferring structural change. The political economy of carbon offsets 
thus institutes a system where low-carbon futures are (cost-effectively, or 
what is the same, cheaply) manufactured in developing countries and 
consumed—in the present—by industrialised ones. 
But the idea of ‘buying time’ gains an even greater meaning when 
considering the kinds of objects offsets are, the way they come into being 
and their temporal implications in the specific locales where they are 
generated, as explored throughout this dissertation. 
Carbon credits as objects made out of time 
In chapters three and four, as I explored the social life of carbon in its 
credit form and its interplay with notions of value and waste in the forests of 
Andasibe, we saw that credits or reductions arise out of very particular 
temporal articulations. In chapter three we saw that carbon credits’ logic of 
value resulted in proposals of a future of absolute economic and ecological 
value in the forest where tavy (and the fallows) as waste could not be 
contemplated. It was here, I argued that we could locate the transformation 
of TAMS from the project to restore the fallows, to the project to bring back 
the forest, since, in order to maximise carbon value, any past, present and 
future trace of tavy had to be erased/negated. But this, as we saw in chapter 
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four, was only one side of the story since tavy, while kept in a degrading and 
degraded position, was fundamentally productive of carbon value: it was the 
articulation between a past of tavy and its projection into the future that 
created the threat—and hence the imagined future scarcity or absence—
through which carbon value could be conjured (Tsing 2005) and generated. 
As a specific form of value, I argued, carbon credits were premised both on 
the projected (and promissory) future absence of tavy, and its imagined 
presence. This was not just the result of the specific characteristics of TAMS 
because, as we saw, these two future scenarios emerged out of what I 
termed the ‘constitutive elements’ of a forest carbon project, the concepts of 
‘additionality’, ‘baseline’, ‘permanence’ and ‘leakage’. ‘Additionality’, the 
requirement that emissions would have occurred without the project, and 
the ‘baseline’, a mean projection of past deforestation through which 
reductions could be calculated, were thus fundamentally based on an 
imagined future of tavy-based carbon emissions, what Lohmann has called a 
‘counter-factual scenario’ (2014:471). It was only through this double 
scenario of alternative-yet-complementary futures (with and without tavy) 
that the need and value of carbon credits (its additional character and its 
baseline) could actually come about.  
From this perspective, it may be argued that the type of value carbon 
credits create, just like that of financial derivatives137, is a ‘sign which 
creates itself out of the future’ (Rotman 1987:96 in ; Maurer 2002:18). 
Carbon credits, or offsets, are effectively made out of speculative futures.  
The relocation to the speculative future may in fact be seen as a central 
trait of emerging forms of commodified natures (most clearly seen in 
processes of nature financialisation, since financialisation is fundamentally 
premised on the speculative future) and other forms of value that derive 
from ‘life itself’ (Rose 2001). As we saw in chapter four, carbon credits share 
key similarities with genetic material in bioprospecting agreements in 
                                                        
137 This is not the only similarity between carbon and financial derivatives. For a 
detailed account of these see Lohmann (2010). 
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Mexico (Hayden 2003) or prospective oil in Santo Tome Principe 
(Weszkalnys 2014) in that they all derive their generativity in the present 
through their imagined loss, or scarcity, in the future. Similarly, in the 
context of biotechnology, both Franklin (2005) and Waldby (2002) have 
noted the promissory capacities of stem cell research and techniques in their 
claim to overcome biological limits (of age and decay, for example) through 
their regenerative potential. Often portrayed as revolutionary, Franklin 
argues, these ‘regenerative narratives’ (2005:61) point to future possibilities 
of ‘unlimited production’ (2005:65) (of tissues, stem cells, etc.), and are 
structured around a ‘rhetorical fabric of hope, health and an improved 
future through biological control (2005:59). In all cases, then, the value of 
these types of resources seems to be located in the speculative future, and it 
is a value, in turn, that is often posited as a way of overcoming limits. In her 
extensive analysis on the simultaneous rise of biotechnology and 
neoliberalism in the US, Cooper has in fact argued that ‘neoliberalism and 
the biotech industry share a common ambition to overcome the ecological 
and economic limits to growth associated with the end of industrial 
production, through a speculative reinvention of the future’ (Cooper 
2008:11). Although Cooper explores, among others, the case of the US 
petrochemical sector and its move from extractive industries into genetic 
technologies of molecular biology during the 1980s, her view that the profits 
of post-Fordist economies ‘will depend on the accumulation of biological 
futures’ (2008:25) seems an apt way of illustrating the type of value that 
emerging forms of commodified natures conjure. The idea of ‘buying time’ as 
a central element in the political economy of carbon and other emergent 
forms of commodified natures thus acquires an almost literal meaning.  
Fixing the Future 
In her analysis of the particular forms of ‘spacetime construction’ that 
take place in carbon markets, and bringing attention to the counterfactual 
through which reductions are calculated and credits are granted, Knox-
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Hayes has argued that ‘carbon markets control things that never happen, by 
giving value to the prevention of a future occurrence’ (2010:956). Rather 
than just valuing ‘future time’, like financial markets do, then, carbon 
markets also need to value ‘non-time’. From this perspective, according to 
Knox-Hayes, ‘emissions reductions have neither real space nor real time 
since the emission never occurs’ (Knox-Hayes 2010:956). Over the course of 
this dissertation however, we have seen that both the space and time of 
emissions reductions are, in fact, very real.  
What are the consequences, then, of this political economy of time, or 
futures, that carbon institutes through the CDM in the specific locales in 
which credits are generated? Following Methamnn (2013) and Lohmann 
(2005) I suggest that what CDM projects, and forest carbon projects in 
particular, do, is close down the future in some places, in order to open it up 
in others.  
As we have seen, carbon credits can only come about through the 
articulation of two alternative-yet-complementary futures, ‘with and 
without’ the project. According to Methmann, these two futures, in turn, 
need to be fairly similar, otherwise comparison could not take place. This 
can be easily seen in TAMS in the comparison between a future of carbon 
value with no tavy in it, and a future of waste with only tavy. We can begin to 
see how forest carbon projects entail the limitation of possibilities in those 
places where they are carried out, since credit generation is premised on 
two—and only two—possible futures. This, according to Methmann, posits 
CDM projects as ‘governing the future as ‘future perfect’ (Bigo 2007:31), in 
the sense that: 
‘By monitoring what is happening today, this course of 
action is prolonged and extrapolated into the future. The 
future is already determined and complete, it is already 
here. And we can only attempt to alter it slightly, as the 
basic parameters are already fixed. In effect, the CDM 
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simply administers a present which has always-already 
become our future’ (Methmann 2013:15). 
The futures that forest carbon projects propose in specific locales are 
therefore not just speculative but also, and fundamentally, preemptive. From 
a slightly different perspective, this ‘administering’ of the future by CDM 
projects could be seen as an instance of what Born has termed ‘technologies 
for producing teleology’ in reference to the deployment of ‘systematic 
techniques to conceptualise and protend the future: to bring the future into 
the present, delimit it and close it down’ (Born 2008:295). Although Born’s 
analysis is done in the context of techniques employed by IT and media 
industries to deal with future market uncertainties, we can see how this idea 
of ‘protending’ the future is effected by forest carbon projects through their 
temporal articulations. In the case of TAMS, we can see, the future of 
Betsimisaraka landscapes is already pre-determined and delimited; it is 
fixed and cannot be altered.  
This, however, entails a very significant paradox because it means, as 
Lohmann has observed (2005), that whereas the future appears as known 
and singular for those targeted by an offset project (tavy farmers in the case 
of TAMS), the concept of ‘additionality’ implies that project initiators are left 
out of this pre-determined future, since they alone have the capacity, or 
agency, to alter the already established course of (imagined) action. In 
Lohmanns’ words, this ‘treats carbon project sponsors and managers as free 
agents while implicitly demoting other actors into passive objects of 
deterministic calculation’ (2005:218). They are, in Burroughs’ sense, the 
‘custodians of the future’, in that they both determine—yet are above—the 
‘prerecorded future’.  
Since the credits generated through this fixing, or closing down, of 
future possibilities in specific landscapes are then integrated into a market 
and acquired as a form of delaying structural change and keeping a 
business-as-usual scenario (as explored above), we can begin to see that the 
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political economy of carbon that the CDM sets in place is one of, essentially, 
time: it entails the delimitation of future possibilities in those places where 
it operates, in order to open them up elsewhere. Far from ‘Our Common 
Future’, as the Brundtland report proclaimed in 1987 through its vision of 
‘sustainable development’, contemporary strategies to deal with limits to 
growth seem to point to a redistribution of futures along historical lines of 
inclusion and exclusion.  
From this perspective, carbon may be seen as a (loose) parallel to 
Harvey's notion of the 'spatial fix'138 (1982; 2001), this time in its temporal 
form.  The ‘spatial fix’ in Harvey's sense aimed to designate ‘capitalism’s 
insatiable drive to resolve its inner crisis tendencies by geographical 
expansion and geographical structuring’ (2001:24). Overcoming limits thus 
entailed, according to Harvey, temporary solutions of spatial reorganisation 
carried out through the interplay between fixed and mobile forms of capital. 
We can therefore see how carbon operates as a ‘temporal fix’ in Harvey’s 
double sense: both as a temporary solution, or ‘fix’, to overcome capitalism’s 
newly found temporal limits, and as a form of temporal reorganisation, 
where time, and more specifically, the future, is ‘fixed’, or made stable in 
certain places, so that it can be opened up, or made mobile, in others.  
Carbon in the Anthropocene 
Coined in 2000 by Nobel prize-winner chemist Paul Crutzen, the 
Anthropocene aims to designate a new geological ‘epoch’ distinct from the 
Holocene and marked by man’s disturbance of the Earth’s ecological 
systems. Although its value as geological epoch marker is a contested issue 
(Castree 2014), the concept has travelled fast outside of its original setting, 
and it is currently being used both in and outside academia, most often as a 
                                                        
138 I employ the notion of carbon as temporal 'fix’ as a loose parallel to Harvey’s, 
which is, in itself, ‘a loose and heterogeneous concept’ (Jessop 2006:146). 
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way of bringing attention to the need for urgent action in the face of climate 
change and future environmental collapse.   
Swanson et al. (2015) have reviewed the concept of the Anthropocene 
as an emergent and inchoate academic field through an analysis of four 
diverse conferences centred around it between 2009 and 2014. They argue 
that the Anthropocene ‘not only marks a geological time, but also a scholarly 
one’ (2015:150), since it has captured the imagination of scholars across a 
wide range of fields. Much of its use in the social sciences has been related to 
its promise to do away with the nature/culture divide, as it bridges between 
the human and natural sciences. The Anthropocene, as it is currently being 
used, seems to confirm that we have, indeed, ‘never been modern’ (Latour 
1993). In any case, the authors point towards the multiplicity and instability 
of the concept—being ‘more than one and less than many’—as part of a 
‘field-in-the making’ (Swanson, Bubandt, and Tsing 2015:150).  
I here want to focus on the temporal imaginations, and implications, 
that the Anthropocene conjures and brings about, both in and outside 
academia. As marker of ‘a new temporal unit’ that presents humans as ‘the 
most significant’ natural force (Swanson, Bubandt, and Tsing 2015:164), the 
Anthropocene suggests a new way of thinking about, and relating to, the 
entanglements between nature and people in relation to time. It evokes, I 
argue, a paradoxical temporality in which humanity seems to be caught: the 
fact that humans seem to have taken over nature as the main force in 
‘making time’, and yet, this is a time that endangers both nature and humans 
as it points towards apocalypse, or what is the same, the end of time.  
The Anthropocene is thus exemplary of—or as Castree has put it, 
practically interchangeable with—contemporary ideas of ‘planetary 
boundaries’ (2014:437), which are, as we have seen above, imagined in 
temporal terms. Carbon features prominently, if not essentially, in the 
imaginary of the Anthropocene, for various reasons. Firstly, the beginning of 
this new geological epoch is often located in the industrial revolution and 
the consequent rise in CO2 levels as a result of coal. Secondly, the carbon 
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molecule also embodies the Anthropocene’s key paradox: the fact that due to 
human intervention, this ‘essential element of life’ (Bridge 2011:822) now 
threatens life (and therefore time) itself. As a key object in global forms of 
environmental governance, in turn, carbon has become an essential 
mechanism in the management of the newly imagined future. As capitalism’s 
latest ‘fix’, then, carbon aims to manage and rework the temporal limits that 
the Anthropocene suggests.  
‘Our Time’, Tsing has argued, ‘is the “anthropocene”’ (2012:95). By 
exploring the temporal implications and politics that have come up in this 
dissertation through an ethnography of TAMS, and relating them to the 
political economy of carbon more generally, my aim in this final chapter has 
been to show that as a contemporary reworked relationship between socio-
natural futures, carbon, as part of the Anthropocene, hides multiple 
trajectories. Rather than a general evacuation of the future (Guyer 2007), we 
find selective and unequal ones (see also Wilk 2007). 
Bridges 
Around 2012, a pun in the graceful Malagasy style came into fashion in 
the national media and public sphere whereby the Tetezamita—or 
transition, literally meaning a bridge to cross to the other side—turned into 
the Tetezamitatra—or an ‘elongating bridge’—evoking the irony of what 
seemed like a never-ending transition. Even more ironic, maybe, was the fact 
that this transition was being led by the (unelected) government of Andry 
Rajoelina, whose party’s name, Tanora Gasy Vonona (Determined Malagasy 
Youth) was a not too subtle reference to the French high-speed train TGV; 
Rajoelina, as Cole has argued, ‘offered a fast train to the future’ (2010:181).  
Tetezamitatra in Madagascar became exemplary of the country’s latest 
‘political crisis’, marking the impasse of national forces in reaching an 
agreement over the holding of elections. This ‘elongating bridge’ was not just 
a commentary on the perceived freezing of the island’s time, but also, and 
fundamentally, on its unequal effects: the fact that the living conditions of 
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the average Malagasy person had deteriorated at an alarming pace since the 
2009 coup, while the wealth of a small elite with governmental ties seemed 
to be burgeoning, palpably, for example, in the unprecedented number of 
new and gigantic SUVs that roamed the narrow paved roads of the capital. 
As a famous political TV programme put it, it was evident that some were 
‘manoeuvring’ to keep the transition going. The suspension of time in 
Madagascar had therefore translated into a temporality of fast decline for 
many, and one of exponential growth for a few. As in the case of transitions 
in post-socialist countries examined by Buroway and Verdery, instead of the 
‘unilinear movement from one stage to another’ the Tetezamitatra as 
transitional period turned out to be an uneven one with ‘multiple 
trajectories’ (1999:14). In this suspended state, a small elite had 
productively ‘seized time’ (Verdery 1996) and been propelled to the future, 
while the rest remained caught- or ‘immobilized’ (Verdery 1996:46) in an 
uncertain and unproductive present. Tetezamitatra in Madagascar evoked 
the diverse and unequal temporalities that inhabit a given present moment.  
I want to briefly return here to the similarities between carbon and the 
emergent field of biotechnology. The regenerative possibilities that 
laboratory objects, such as stem cells, conjure, seem to point to a radical 
change in temporal understandings and imaginations. The possibilities 
afforded by stem cell techniques in overcoming processes of aging and decay 
(or what is the same, temporal limits to life), for example, seem to imply new 
ways of understanding and manipulating time. ‘Life itself’, Franklin argues,  
‘is repositioned outside the grid of neatly brachiated 
channels of ancestry that was formerly the master figure 
of life as a systematic unity ... and life components are 
assembled in ways that were, until quite recently, 
considered to be biologically impossible’ (2005:60).  
In a similar way, Waldby claims that in these shifting understandings 
of biological processes, a ‘temporal homogeneity involving uniform growth, 
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renewal and ageing’ is being replaced by ‘a model where time is 
heterogeneous, with sites of self-renewing vitality interspersed with sites of 
irreversible loss and degeneration’ (2002:316). In carbon, then, as in 
biotechnical objects that promise to overcome temporal limits to (biological) 
growth, we encounter a redefined understanding of time, and a burgeoning 
of multiple and diverse trajectories.  
Questions of politics, Grosz argues, are also, ultimately, ‘questions of 
change and of desirable futures’ (2004:253). With a detailed attention to 
politics as the stage where future possibilities are imagined, forged or 
denied, anthropology can offer a grounded view of lived experiences in the 
global chronographies (cf. Ferguson 2006) that are developing in the 
transition to the not-so-common, and not-so-singular, Anthropocenic 
future(s).  
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APPENDIX I 
Key actors in TAMS' organisational structure and their main roles (see 
also Figure 7, page 68): 
BioCarbon Fund: The BioCF was created in 2004 as part of the World 
Bank’s Carbon Finance Unit and uses private-public funding to carry 
out demonstration activities of forest and agro-ecosystem carbon 
projects. It featured as the carbon buyer in the Emission Reductions 
Purchasing Agreement (ERPA) in TAMS and provided some of the 
initial funding. 
 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (Ministère des Eaux et Forêts, 
MEF): The Ministry featured as carbon seller on the ERPA on behalf of 
the Government of Madagascar, and was posed as the main project 
owner. Its representation in TAMS went through the Unité de 
Coordination des Fonds BioCarbone (UCFBC), a specifically appointed 
unit within the Ministry to deal with carbon projects which included 
two members from the General Office of the Environment (DGE) as 
part of the General Office of Climate Change (DCC), and two members 
from the General Office of Forests (DGF).  
 
Conservation International: Although CI was usually represented as 
provider of ‘technical support’ to the project, its role was pivotal in 
TAMS, especially at the national level through its offices in 
Antananarivo.  
 
ANAE: Association Nationale d'Actions Environnementales became 
TAMS project manager in 2008 through public tender, and was mainly 
in charge of coordinating the on-the-ground activities of reforestation 
and Sustainable Livelihood Activities (SLAs) in Andasibe.  
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FAs: The FAs were local environment/development NGOs and 
organisations working in Andasibe. In TAMS their task was to carry out 
reforestation and Sustainable Livelihood Activities (SLAs). Some of 
them (i.e. Mitsinjo or AGA) had a clearly local character, whereas 
others, (SAF-FJKM or ANGAP) were national organisations with local 
or regional offices.  
 
Local communities: They were involved in the project as 
reforestation workers hired by the FAs, and some of them also offered 
land to the project.  
 
Louise Holloway: She was TAMS’ original designer and developed the 
project in the 1990s. She left around 2008, after CI’s takeover of the 





   287 
APENDIX II 
Brief description of key concepts and elements of a Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) project 
 
Objectives: CDM projects have the dual objective of reducing 
emissions and providing some form of sustainable development.   
 
Additionality: As defined by the UNFCCC Report of the COP (2006) in 
paragraph 43: ‘A CDM project activity is additional if anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced below those 
that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project 
activity’.  
 
Baseline: As defined by the UNFCCC Report of the COP (2006) in 
paragraph 44:  ‘The baseline for a CDM project activity is the scenario 
that reasonably represents the anthropogenic emissions by sources of 
greenhouse gases that would occur in the absence of the proposed 
project activity’. In TAMS it was based on a mean projection of past 
trends of deforestation due to tavy.  
 
Permanence and leakage measures: Permanence refers to the need 
to make sure reductions remain in place for the established period of 
the project (30 years in TAMS) and leakage is defined by the UNFCCC 
Report of the COP (2006) in paragraph 51 as  ‘the net change of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases which occurs 
outside the project boundary, and which is measurable and 
attributable to the CDM project activity’. 
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ERPA: This is the Emissions Reductions Purchasing Agreement, or the 
carbon sale contract.  
 
PDD: This is the Project Design Document, which must contain a full 
description of the project as well justify the project’s additionality, 
reductions calculations through the baseline and permanence and 
leakage measures.   
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APPENDIX III 
Brief timeline of Madagascar’s political history. 
 
1787–1810:  Reign of the Merina ruler Andrianampoinimerina.  
1810–28: Reign of the Merina ruler Radama I (son of 
Andrianampoinimerina).  
1828–61: Reign of the isolationist Merina Queen Ranavalona I (the 
widow of Radama I). 
1861–63:  Reign of the Merina King Radama II. 
1868–83: Reign of the Merina Queen Ranavalona II. 
1896: Madagascar is declared a colony of France with General Gallieni 
as the island’s Governor-general.  
June 26, 1960: Independence is declared. 
1960–72: First Republic under President Philibert Tsiranana. 
May 14, 1972:  ‘The May Revolution’. An uprising in Anatanarivo, 
initiated by medical students, leads to the end of the First Republic as 
Tsiranana is forced to resign. 
1972– 1975:  Interregnum under General Gabriel Ramanantsoa.  
1975–91: Second Republic under Didier Ratsiraka who embarks on a 
socialist/isolationist project.  
1991–93: Opposition against Ratsiraka’s government leads to a 
Transitional Period.  
1993: Third Republic under president Zafy Albert. 
1997: Didier Ratsiraka is reelected president. 
2002: The Mayor of Antananarivo Marc Ravalomanana is elected 
president and Ratsiraka, who does not recognize the result,  flees to 
France. 
2009: Political unrest builds up in the capital. An anti- government 
rally in February results in over 50 deaths and the Mayor of 
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Anatananarivo Andry Rajoelina takes over the government, becoming 
the president of the High Transition Authority (HAT). Ravalomanana 
flees to South Africa.  
November 2010: Rajoelina holds a constitutional referendum and the 
Fourth Republic is installed.  
2013:   Elections are held in December after a five-year transitional 
period, and in January 2014 Hery Rajaonarimampianina becomes 
Madagascar’s new President.  
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Glossary:  
 
Although every Malagasy term has been translated in the text, I here 
provide a glossary with the most recurrent or relevant ones.  
 
Asa maharitra: work that lasts 
Babakoto: Indri-indri lemur 
Crédits carbone: carbon credits/money 
Fanjakana: the state 
Fitaka: Scam 
Fokontany: the smallest administrative unit in Madagascar 
Iveloman-tena: to make oneself living 
Loharano: water springs 
Mpamatsy vola: (usually foreign) funder  
Razana: ancestors 
Savoka: Fallows and/or secondary vegetation 
Tangalamena: Village chief 
Tanindrazana: land of the ancestors  
Tavy: Slash-and-burn agriculture 
Vazaha: (usually white) Foreigners 
Voatery: Being squeezed/oppressed 
Vonivao: New seed (ritual) 
Zanahary/Andriamanitra: God  
Zo: honour or dignity 
  




FR ANOM: Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en Provence, France 
 Fonds Territoriaux: Madagascar 
 GGM Gouvernment Général de Madagascar 1841-1860 
   Série D: Politique et administration générale 
     1895/1959 
    2 D - Rapports périodiques des   
    circonscriptions administratives 1896/1940, 
    c. (carton) 1 à 229 
    5 D - Rapports annuels des services 
      1895/1959  
 
Fonds Ministeriels: Deuxieme Empire Colonial 
Ministère des Colonies 
 Inspection ge ne rale des Travaux publics 
  Madagascar et Comores 
   Chemins de fer 
    Chemins de fer d'inte re t ge ne ral 
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